“Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology” (Vol. 13, No. 1 2024)
Special Issue
Analytical philosophy & Phenomenology

Guest Editors: Garris Rogonyan & Andrey Veretennikov

Do phenomenology and analytic philosophy have common topics to talk about? Answering this question is not easy since the criteria for what today can be considered analytic philosophy or phenomenology are rather vague and often controversial. It is difficult to say whether in both cases we are talking about a philosophical movement, a distinctive style of philosophizing, or a particular intellectual climate in research. Many, however, are not particularly bothered by the existence of such criteria. It is enough, in their view, to regard analytic philosophy and phenomenology as notional labels that help in one's thinking as a first approximation. One can, of course, speak of two philosophical traditions in order to point to a certain set of problems and methods for solving them. But in this case, too, we are faced with the obvious fact that this totality of problems and methods is of an open character. For example, in the case of analytic philosophy it is difficult to say whether it has an orthodox core, or what might be considered its official teaching. Whereas in the case of phenomenology the role of orthodoxy still seems to be played by the works of E. Husserl. However, "heresies" today coexist quite peacefully with orthodoxy, and are often favorably perceived by it as its legitimate heirs and successors.

Nevertheless, despite the vagueness of the criteria for belonging to the either tradition, phenomenology and analytical philosophy have something in common. And that "something" could serve as a basis for a dialogue between traditions. As a historical phenomena, the two traditions have their origins in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, they have at least one common source – the works of G. Frege, which inspired B. Russell and E. Husserl, the two official founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology, respectively. However, more than a century after the birth of these philosophical traditions, it can be said that they have had different fates, both in terms of their internal development and in terms of their spread and influence on the humanities. Shared origins do not yet guarantee any mutual understanding or interest in each other.

Indeed, apart from the origins, another common feature for both traditions is their almost complete disregard for each other, at times reminiscent of the Cold War. This is even more surprising given that both traditions initially declared rigor, clarity, and systematic approach in solving certain problems. Of course, one cannot deny the fact of their mutual, albeit latent, influence on each other. For example, one of the most prominent representatives of analytical philosophy, W. Sellars, began by studying phenomenology under the supervision of M. Farber. And this could not but be reflected in his works, although he rarely mentioned Husserl. After all, it was thanks to phenomenology that concepts such as intentionality, intersubjectivity, and constitution became commonplace in analytic philosophy. And this is not only about concepts, but also about research topics and ways of posing problems. Otherwise, however, this mutual influence was more limited to restrained malevolence and disparaging remarks.

Today, however, the situation is gradually changing, and we can observe how both traditions are converging in a variety of fields of research, be they problems of linguistic meaning, perception, other minds, etc. From the frequent calls for dialogue, philosophers seem to have finally moved on. Therefore, in addition to the history of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, the prospects for their further collaboration are of particular interest today.

We would be glad to see materials devoted to the following headings, although they, of course, may not be limited to this list:

Language and knowledge

• Meaning and sense
• Certainty and reliable knowledge
• Conceptual and non-conceptual content of experience
• The problem of the world
• Intersubjectivity
• A priori knowledge

Psychology

• Consciousness and perception
• The problem of other minds
• Intentionality
• Free will
• Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
• Mental causality
• Psychology of perception
• Mind-body problem

Society, history and ethics

• History of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology
• A comparative analysis of problems and methods of analytic philosophy and phenomenology
• Ethics
• Value judgments
• Society and Lifeworld
• History and Narrative

“Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology” (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2023)
Special Issue
Phenomenology & Structuralism

Guest Editor: Georgy Chernavin

The radically different strategies of interacting with “sound common sense”, found within two big philosophical discourses of the 20^th century (phenomenology & poststructuralism), led nearly to the impossibility of communication between those discourses. One could contrast the goal of phenomenology, which consists in investigation of Sinnbildung, Sinnstiftung and Sinnsedimentierung, with the poststructuralist art of forming, inventing and production of concepts. The passion for paradoxes, the provocation of sound human understanding as a motor of thinking (characteristic of poststructuralism) is still bound to doxa and to the common sense, although it tries to “turn it inside out”. Phenomenology tries rather to take a “step back” from solidification of common sense in order to observe doxa and the sense-building in statu nascendi.

Still the fundamental intuition of the structuralism is as follows: sense as a result, a side effect (comparable to optical, linguistic and positional effects), to put it shortly the fundamental “senselessness” of the sense – it needs to be contrasted with the phenomenological search for pre-predicative experience and for the “sense” of the sense. As viewed by a structuralist, we can be at the same time “engaged in the world through meaning” and “disengaged from the contingent meanings which the world elaborates”. What the phenomenologist’s reaction to the contingency of Sinngebilde would be? What form of disengagement would let us shift from the phenomenological to the structuralist attitude and back?

These attitudes come closer when one considers the idea of two “registers”: the phenomenological one and the symbolic one. Here phenomenology and (post-)structuralism meet one another, though not in the filed of ontology or theory of knowledge but rather in the domain of critique of ideology where one observes contingency of ideological institutions. One finds himself/herself immersed into the highly aggressive ideological discourse which is taken for granted by one’s fellowmen. What would be a phenomenological and (post-)structural answer to this existential situation?

We are seeking new contributions and welcome submissions, including – but not limited to – such topics as:

• Derrida as phenomenologist
• The contingency of the despot
• Doxa and the passion for paradoxes
• Pre-predicative sense & sense as a side effect
• The “sense” of the sense & the “senselessness” of the sense
• The poststructuralist and the phenomenological critique of ideology
• Symbolic institution and symbolic tautology in Richir’s phenomenology

Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe.
Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems.

Editors: Witold Płotka, Patrick Eldridge

This book presents the origins of Central and Eastern European phenomenology. It features chapters that explore the movement's development, its most important thinkers, and its theoretical and historical context. This collection examines such topics as the realism-idealism controversy, the status of descriptive psychology, the question of the phenomenological method, and the problem of the world.
The chapters span the first decades of the development of phenomenology in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia before World War II. The contributors track the Brentanian heritage of the development. They show how this tradition inspired influential thinkers like Celms, Špet, Ingarden, Frank, Twardowski, Patočka, and others. The book also puts forward original investigations. Moreover it elaborates new accounts of the foundations of phenomenology. While the volume begins with the Brentanian heritage, it situates phenomenology in a dialogue with other important schools of thought of that time, including the Prague School and Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic.
This collection highlights thinkers whose writings have had only a limited reception outside their home countries due to political and historical circumstances. It will help readers gain a better understanding of how the phenomenological movement developed beyond its start in Germany. Readers will also come to see how the phenomenological method resonated in different countries and led to new philosophical developments in ontology, epistemology, psychology, philosophy of culture, and philosophy of religion.

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“Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology”—Vol. 10, No. 2, 2021
Special Issue
“Women Phenomenologists: Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Gerda Walther”

Guest Editors: Ronny Miron & Simona Bertolini

Edith Stein (1891-1942), Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966), and Gerda Walther (1897-1977) share at least three common traits. Firstly, they were Edmund Husserl’s students and came under the influence of the realist phenomenology of the so-called “Munich and Göttingen circles”. Stein and Conrad-Martius studied with Husserl and Adolf Reinach in Göttingen; Walther, instead, took courses with Husserl in Freiburg and studied with Alexander Pfänder, one of the main proponents of the phenomenological tradition in Munich. Secondly, they had to abandon the project of beginning an academic career, as, for a woman, this was not an easy goal to fulfill at that time. Thirdly, they developed phenomenology in a personal way, regarding both the conception of phenomenological method and the field of objects this method addresses. Stein devoted herself to the theoretical project of connecting Husserl’s rigorous description and Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics, with particular regard to the structure of the human person; Conrad-Martius established a relationship between ontology of real being and science, by elaborating an original philosophy of nature; Walther dedicated herself to diverse subjects, such as ontology of social communities, phenomenology of mysticism, mental illness, and parapsychology. These philosophies have received increasing attention in the last years, in particular in connection with the role of metaphysics in phenomenological inquiry, the profundity of human soul, the natural origin of man, and the religious experience.
The aim of our issue is to shed new light on the reception of Husserl’s philosophy in the thinking of these phenomenologists and on their peculiar contribution to broaden the field of phenomenological research.

We welcome submissions combining historical and systematic accentuation. Contributions can focus on one of the three indicated phenomenologists or suggest a comparative perspective in this regard. Authors are invited to consider one of the following topics:

• Women phenomenologists and the question of phenomenological method;
• Edith Stein’s phenomenological analyses, metaphysics, and philosophical anthropology;
• Conrad-Martius’ ontology, philosophy of science, and conception of man;
• Gerda Walther’s contribution to and development from phenomenology;
• Theoretical affinities and differences between women phenomenologists’ perspectives;
• The relation between women phenomenologists and other proponents of phenomenological tradition.

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