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THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD IN THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY OF HEIDEGGER

Abstract
The goal of the article is, one the one hand, to show the concrete correlation between the phenomenological conception of the world in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its conception in the critical philosophy of Kant, insofar such philosophy could be treated as one of the significant predecessors of Heidegger’s understanding of the world. On the other hand, this explication allows us to analyze the limits and the borders of Heidegger’s phenomenological conception of the world. In order to achieve such goal, the following tasks were undertaken by me: (1) the reconstruction of the phenomenological conception of the world in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology at two levels (i.e. (a) the world as wholeness of involvement and (b) the world as the direction of the transcendence)); (2) the reconstruction of Kant’s cosmological concept of the world made from the perspective of the interpretation of this concept given by Heidegger; (3) detection of the continuity and divergence between Kant’s cosmological concept of the world and its phenomenological conception posed by Heidegger in light of Kant’s concept of the transcendental ideal. As result, I would like to pose and defend the following theses. (1) Heidegger primarily treats the world as a priori condition of the possibility of the wholeness of involvement, and yet, more fundamentally it is treated as the direction for the transcendence of human Dasein. Thus, being understood as such direction, it represents universal horizon of the existent possibilities. (2) Kant characterizes the world as an idea of reason, namely, as the totality of appearances, being formed on the bases of the universal hypothetic synthesis of the unconditional one. Herewith, Kant’s cosmological concept of the world ought to be distinguished from his concept of the moral world. (3) Both Kant and Heidegger understand the world as the totality a priori, which in every case differently presupposes the presence of the human being. (4) The concept of the world as the direction of the transcendence posed by Heidegger has the formal functions similar to those, which are ascribed by Kant to the concept of the sum-total of all possibilities, consequently, not to the world, as the totality of appearances, but to the totality of all objects of thought altogether (to the transcendental ideal). Thereupon, Heidegger believes that whole definition of the Kant’s cosmological concept of the world can be achieved only from the perspective of the transcendental ideal. (5) Heidegger tries to overcome the limitation of Kant’s theory of the world as present being by understanding it as the condition for possibility of that-which-is as ready-at-hand. For Heidegger it is also a way to manifest the ontological foundation common both for Kant’s cosmological and moral concepts of the world.

Key words
World, totality of appearances, involvement, direction of transcendence, transcendental ideal, the sum-total of all possibilities, Kant, Heidegger.

References

• Dastur, F. (1986). La Constitution Ekstatique-Horizontale de la Temporalité chez Heidegger. Heidegger Studies, 2, 97-109.
• Heidegger, M. (1976). Metaphysische Anfangsründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26). Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
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• Kant, I. (1964). Kritika chistogo razuma [Critique of Pure Reason]. In Sobranie sochinenii v shesti tomakh. T. 3 [Collected Works in 6 Volumes, Vol. 3]. Moscow: Mysl’. (in Russian).
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REVISTING HUSSERL’S ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE IN LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to revisit and reassess the account of language at the origins of Husserl’s phenomenology specifically focusing on Logical Investigations. I would like to argue that there is an ambivalence in Husserl’s discussion of language in Logical Investigations: on the one hand, Husserl is concerned with language as one of the most important symbolic systems and a requisite for scientific knowledge, and he emphasizes the role of linguistic discussions as the philosophically indispensable preparations for constructing pure logic; on the other hand, he applies the idea of the fundamental distinction between the realm of ideal and real being to his views of logic, science and language, which finally causes him to interpret the relation between logic, science and language as the inessential one. The paper begins with discussing Husserl’s view of symbolic methods and sign systems in Prolegomena. The second section is focused on the idea of the necessity of linguistic investigations for pure logic presented in the Introduction to the second volume of Logical Investigations. In the final section I make an analysis of the 4^th Logical investigation with the special emphasis put on the idea of pure logical grammar.

Key words
Functions of language, symbolic thought, pure grammar, phenomenology, early Husserl, linguistic investigations, theory of science.

References

• Byrne, T. (2017a). Husserl’s Early Semiotics and Number Signs: Philosophy of Arithmetic through the Lens of “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 48 (4), 287-303.
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• Derrida, J. (1978). Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Stony Brook, New York: Nicolas Hays.
• Fisette, D. (2003). Husserl’s Programme of a Wissenschaftslehre in the “Logical Investigations”. In D. Fisette (Ed.), Husserl’s Logical Investigation Reconsidered (33-57). Dordrecht: Springer.
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• Husserl, E. (1994b). On a Logic of Sings (Semiotic). In Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (12-19). New York: Springer.
• Husserl, E. (2001a). Logical Investigations. Volume I. London, New York: Routledge.
• Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical Investigations. Volume II. London, New York: Routledge.
• Husserl, E. (2003). Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887-1901. New York: Springer.
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• Schmit, R. (1992). Die Idee der logischen Grammatik bei Husserl: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Betrachtung. Husserl Studies, 9 (1), 31-49.