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COMMENTARY ON MARXISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE WORKS OF CLAUDE LEFORT

Abstract
This article is conceived as a rather unusual investigation. On the one hand, it treats of the relations between phenomenology and Marxism in the work of the early Claude Lefort. Scholars emphasize that the amalgamation of the phenomenology and Marxism of Lefort is due to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. But we think it does not prohibit him from applying phenomenology to the social domain. Thanks to phenomenological methods, Lefort has access both to the philosophy of history and theoretical sociology. So we try to develop the ‘social critique’ of Lefort in a phenomenological sense. This article analyzes the work of the early Lefort in the context of the thought of and debates between Merleau-Ponty, Castoriadis, and Sartre. But these investigations are not only historical; the article also raises questions about the real connections between phenomenology and Marxism. The original side of our research is to associate the phenomenology of Lefort with the material phenomenology of M. Henry. So we face a double task. From one side, our objectives are historico-philosophical. We try to discover the meaning of the Lefort’s phenomenological Marxism. From the other side they are phenomenological: we try to describe the phenomenon of the materiality of a social class in the aim to study the fundamental concepts of Lefort’s philosophy. We investigate the problem of the class consciousness in the terms of the being of a phenomenon in the world. As a result, we have to do with the problem of a renewal of the concept of the matter and the praxis. This problem is not easy to solve in one text. But we think we have arrived at the following result: in the Russian literature Lefort is considered only as a political thinker, and we showed that he is both a political philosopher and a phenomenologist. Moreover, in a sense his phenomenological approach can be more important to elucidate social phenomena.

Key words
Claude Lefort, phenomenology, Marxism, class consciousness, material phenomenology, concept of matter and praxis, social phenomena.

References

• Audier, S. (2005). Machiavel. Conflit et liberté. Paris: Librairie Vrin.
• Castoriadis, C. (1949). Les rapports de production en Russie. Socialisme ou Barbarie, 2, 1-67.
• Henry, M. (1990). La phénoménologie matérielle. Paris: PUF.
• Labelle, G. (2005). Merleau-Ponty et les aventures de la phénoménologie. Philosophie. Revue d’idées, 7 (1).
  Retrieved from http://www.revueargument.ca/article/2004-10-01/304-merleau-ponty-et-les-aventures-de-la-phenomenologie.html
• Lefort, C. (1978a). Les Formes de l'histoire. Paris: Gallimard.
• Lefort, C. (1978b). Sur une colonne absente. Écrits utour de Merleau-Ponty. Paris: Gallimard.
• Lefort, C. (1979). Éléments de la critique de la bureaucraties. Paris: Gallimard.
• Lewis, W. S. (2005). Louis Althusser and the Tradition of French Marxism. Lanham: Lexington Books.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). La Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, NRF: Gallimard.
• Merleau-Ponty M. (1948). Sens et non-sens. Paris: Gallimard.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1955). Les Aventures de la dialectique. Paris: Gallimard.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1960). Signes. Paris: Gallimard (NRF).
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Le Visible et l’invisible. Paris: Gallimard.
• Ory P., & Sirinelli J.-Fr. (2002). Les intellectuels en France: De l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours. Paris: Armand Collin et Éditions Perrin.
• Poltier, H. (1997). Claude Lefort: La découverte du politique. Paris: Michalon.
• Poltier, H. (1998). Passion du politique: la pensée de Claude Lefort. Genéve: Labor et Fides.
• Richir, M. (1988). Phénoménologie et Institution symbolique. Paris: Millon.

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HIDDEN FOUNDATIONS OF DISGUST: REEVALUATING THE EXISTENTIAL NATURE OF DISGUST

Abstract
In spite of the many important findings made within the theory of emotions, scholars still struggle to coherently account for the unique structure of disgust or determine its essence. In contrast to much of the contemporary literature on disgust, I aim to show that, through employing the phenomenological method in his 1929 essay “Disgust” (Der Ekel), Aurel Kolnai was able to grasp the real significance of the phenomenon of disgust. The current study aims to clarify and present Kolnai’s insight into the nature of disgust wherein the latter is first and foremost conceived as an ambivalent, multifaceted, but coherent phenomenon. Namely, as a defense mechanism that reacts against the proximity of a disturbing object charged with an ambiguous value of confusion that fluctuates between surplus of life and intention towards death. In order to achieve this goal, I present Kolnai’s notion of disgust by first focusing on the foreground of the phenomena of disgust: the essential features of the intentional content of disgust, the object of disgust in particular. I then present and analyze the life-death complex as the underlying structures of the visceral sense of disgust. Lastly, I show how the life-death complex relates to the visceral sense of disgust, thereby affirming the coherence of disgust.

Key words
Aurel Kolnai, disgust, emotions, phenomenology, intentional content, visceral sense, the life-death complex.

References

• Bessemans, C. (2012). Ethics and Value-reality. Aurel Kolnai’s Legacy: An Analytic Ethic Based on the Phenomenology of Value-consciousness and Moral Awareness. Leuven: K.U.Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte.
• Bessemans, C. (2013). A Short Introduction to Aurel Kolnai’s Moral Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Research, 38, 203-232.
• Dunlop, F. (2004). Introduction. In Z. Balázs & F. Dunlop (Eds.), Exploring the World of Human Practice: Readings in and about the Philosophy of Aurel Kolnai. Hungary: Akaprint Nyomda.
• Ferran, I. (2008). Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
• Ferran, I. (2013). Aurel Kolnai: Fenomenología de los sentimientos hostiles. In A. Kolnai, Asco, Soberbia, Odio (7-32). Madrid: Editorial Encuentro.
• Ferran, I. (2015). The Emotions in Early Phenomenology. Studia Phaenomenologica, 15, 349-376.
• Hartmann, N. (1926). Ethik. Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Kelly, R. (2011). Yuck!: The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Kolnai, A. (2004). Disgust. In B. Smith & C. Korsmeyer (Eds.), On Disgust (27-93). Chicago: Open Court.
• Kolnai, A., & Honneth, A. (2007). Ekel, Hochmut, Haß: zur Phänomenologie feindlicher Gefühle. Germany: Suhrkamp.
• Kolnai, A., Williams, B., Wiggins, D., McAleer, G. (2008). Ethics, Value & Reality. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
• Menninghaus, W. (2003). Disgust: Theory and History of a Strong Sensation. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
• Nussbaum, M. C. (2004). Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
• O’Shiel, D. (2015). Kolnai’s Disgust as Violation of Value. In M. Delville, A. Norris & V. Von Hoffmann (Eds.), Le dégoût: Histoire, langage, esthétique et politique d’une émotion plurielle (25-39). Liège: Université de Liège.
• Sartre, J-P. (2007). Nausea. New York: New Directions Publishing.
• Smith, B., & Korsmeyer, C. (2004). Visceral Values: Aurel Kolnai on Disgust. In B. Smith & C. Korsmeyer (Eds.), Aurel Kolnai, On Disgust (1-25). Chicago: Open Court.
• Radford. R. (2004). Aurel Kolnai’s “Disgust”: A Source in the Art and Writing of Salvador Dalí. In Z. Balázs & F. Dunlop (Eds.), Exploring the world of human practice: readings in and about the philosophy of Aurel Kolnai (327-331). Hungary: Akaprint Nyomda.

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TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND JUDGMENT

Abstract
Communication and intersubjectivity are considered as correlative problems of the phenomenology of consciousness. The term “communication” is taken in the narrow sense and refers to already formed communities with relatively independent subjects. Intersubjectivity is understood as a double constitution: the goals and means for their achievements, on the one hand, and their coherence of action, on the other. The source of intersubjectivity and communicative consciousness as a whole is the discriminating ability of consciousness, and above all the ability to distinguish between one’s own and another’s, as well as between what is real and what is unreal. The first difference is correlated with the problem of a common understanding of goals and objectives, the second with efforts for coherence. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s approach to the problem of intersubjectivity. I show that the concepts of one’s own and others’ must be supplemented by the concept of real and unreal. Criticism of the Husserlian conception focuses on the premise of the early phenomenology of the primacy of perception in relation to judgment and all other modes of consciousness. In this paper judgment is regarded as the primary ability of a person to communicate, to determine the relationship between parts and the whole in search of common solutions and a common understanding, which remain relative and factual also through judgments. I conclude that the difference and correlation of the act of consciousness and meaning is the source of communication; any communication involves internal communication on the type of feedback. Any communication has two levels: (1) communication and (2) communication of communication.

Key words
Intersubjectivity, communication, difference, judgment, perception, real and unreal, one’s own and the other’s.

References

• Brentano, F. (1924). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Bd. I. Leipzig: Meiner.
• Gusserl’, E. (1994a). Filosofiya kak strogaya nauka [Philosophy as Rigorous Science]. Novocherkassk: Saguna. (in Russian).
• Gusserl’, Е. (1994b). Fenomenologiya vnutrennego soznaniya vremeni [Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected Works]. T.1. Moscow: Gnozis. (in Russian).
• Gusserl’, E. (2010). Kartezianskie meditatsii [Cartesian Meditations]. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt. (in Russian).
• Gusserl’, E. (2011). Logicheskie issledovania [Logical Investigations]. T. 1. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt. (in Russian).
• Molchanov, V. (2011). Konstitutsiya prostranstva. Suzhdenie i telo [Constitution of Space. Judgment and Body]. Voprosy filosofii, 10, 155-167. (in Russian).

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HUSSERL’S EARLY RECEPTION OF BOLZANO’S THEORY OF THE PROPOSITION IN ITSELF

Abstract
Even today, much of the development of Husserl’s interpretation of Bolzano’s philosophy prior to the Logical Investigations remains in the dark. However, recently published manuscripts from Husserl’s early period make it easier to understand Husserl’s original approach to Bolzano’s ideas. This article aims at describing one aspect of Husserl’s reception of Bolzano, namely his reception of the latter’s concept of propositions in themselves. It also corrects some errors concerning the traditional interpretation of Lotze’s and Frege’s influence on Husserl’s turn against psychologism. Whereas Husserl’s 1896 “Logic Lectures” employ a number of Bolzano’s terms and ideas, there is no trace of Lotze and almost no trace of Frege when the objectivity of logic is discussed. It is rather the integration of Bolzano’s famous concept of propositions in themselves that forms the core of Bolzano’s logical realism, into Husserl’s early phenomenology which drives Husserl’s move against the alleged psychologism of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. The article reconstructs Husserl’s early unsuccessful attempt to avoid the pitfall of psychologism by using a Brentanian theory of abstraction. This failure opened the way for a more positive appreciation of Bolzano’s concept of propositions in themselves. Such a concept posed problems for Husserl’s theory of judgment as inspired by Brentano, Stumpf, and Erdmann. Describing the twists and turns of the integration of Bolzano’s proposition in itself into Husserl’s work should contribute to a better understanding of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, philosophy of logic, and, generally speaking, of the history of philosophy of the 19th and 20th century.

Key words
Husserl, Bolzano, Brentano, Erdmann, proposition in itself, judgment, state of affairs, psychologism.

References

• Bergmann, H., & Brentano, F. (1946). Briefe Franz Brentano’s an Hugo Bergmann. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7 (1), 83-158.
• Beyer, C. (1996). Von Bolzano zu Husserl, Eine Untersuchung über den Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.
• Bolzano, B. (1837a). Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre: Versuch einer ausführlichen und grösstentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter, Band I. Sulzbach: Seidel.
• Bolzano, B. (1837b). B. Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre; Versuch einer ausführlichen und grösstentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter, Band II. Sulzbach: Seidel.
• Bolzano, B., & Exner F. (1935). Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano’s mit F. Exner. In Bernard Bolzano’s Schriften, Band IV. Praha: Královská česká společnost nauk.
• Bolzano, B. (2004). On the Mathematical Method and Correspondence with Exner. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi.
• Bolzano, B. (2014). Theory of Science, Volume One. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Brandl, J. (2014). Brentano’s Theory of Judgement. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2014 Edition. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/brentano-judgement/
• Brentano, F. (2009a). On Psychologism. In F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (238-239). New York: Routledge.
• Brentano, F. (2009b). The True and the Evident. New York: Routledge.
• Brentano, F. (2009c). The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. New York: Routledge.
• Brentano, F. (2009d). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. New York: Routledge.
• Centrone, S. (2010). Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl. New York: Springer.
• Chisholm, R.M. (1982). Brentano and Meinong Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• Erdmann, B. (1892). Logik, Band I. Halle: Niemeyer.
• Føllesdal, D. (1994). Husserl and Frege: A Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy. In L. Haaparanta (Ed.), Mind, Meaning and Mathematics: Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege (3-50). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Frechétte, G. (2011). De la proposition à l’état de choses: Husserl lecteur de Bolzano. In A. Dewalque, D. Seron, and B. Leclercq (Eds.), Catégories ontologiques et catégories logiques (33-53). Liège: Presses de l’Université de Liège.
• Frege, G. (1894). Rezension von: E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Artithmetik. Band I. Zeitschrift für Philsophie und philosophische Kritik, 103, 313-332.
• Haddock, G. & Hill, C. O. (2000). Husserl or Frege? Chicago: Open Court, Chicago.
• Husserl, E. (1994a). Review of Melchior Palagyi’s Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik. In Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (197-206). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (1994b). Briefwechsel, II (Hua, Dokumente). Den Haag: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (1994c). Briefwechsel, III (Hua, Dokumente). Den Haag: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (1994d). Briefwechsel, V (Hua, Dokumente). Den Haag: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (1994e). Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (2001a). Logical Investigations, Vol. 1. New York: Routledge.
• Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical Investigations, Vol. 2. New York: Routledge.
• Husserl, E. (2001c). Logik Vorlesung 1896, I (Hua, Materialbände). Dordrecht: Springer.
• Husserl, E. (2009). Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie, Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893-1918) (Hua XL). Dordrecht: Springer.
• Ierna, C. (2012). Husserl’s Psychology of Arithmetic. Bulletin d’analyse Phénoménologique, 8, 97-120.
• Koreň, L. (2014a). Quantificational Accounts of Logical Consequence I: From Aristotle to Bolzano. Organon, 21 (1), 22-44.
• Koreň, L. (2014b). Quantificational Accounts of Logical Consequence III. The Model-Theoretic Account: Quantificational Approach Triumphant? Organon, 21 (4), 492-515.
• Kraus, O. (2009). Introduction. In F. Brentano, The True and the Evident (xiv-xxvi). New York: Routledge.
• Lotze, H. (1887). Logic in Three Books, Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Marty, A., Antonelli, M., Marek, J.C. (2011). Deskriptive Psychologie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neuwmann.
• Meinong, A. (1892). Anzeige von: Franz Hillebrand, Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse. Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 10, 443-466.
• Mohanty, J. N. (1977). Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship. In J. N. Mohanty (Ed.), Readings on Husserl’s Logical Investigations (22-32). The Hague: Nijhoff.
• Moore, G. E. (1902). The review of Franz Brentano’s The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. International Journal of Ethics, 14, 115-23.
• Rollinger, R. (2008). Austrian Phenomenology, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Others on Mind and Object. Frankfurt a.M.: Ontos Verlag.
• Stumpf, C. (1999). Syllabus for Logic. In R. Rollinger, Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano (311-339). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Twardowski, K. (1977). On the Content and Object of Presentation. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Twardowski, K. (1982). Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
• Varga, (2014). Was hat Husserl in Wien außerhalb von Brentano’s Philosophie gelernt? Über die Einflüsse auf den frühen Husserl jenseits von Brentano und Bolzano. Husserl Studies, 31 (2), 95–121.

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IDEAS II: THE MIND AND ITS BODY

Abstract
It is well known that Husserl never accepted to publish Ideas II. During one of his conversations with Cairns, he explained his failure to complete the second volume of Ideas by a “feeling of inadequacy to his task”. In this paper I argue that the apparent simplicity of the subject of Ideas II – the successive constitution of the material and animal nature and of the world of spirit – hides a much more difficult question: the relation between nature and spirit, and even more specifically the relation between mind and body. We will show that in Ideas II this problem leads to an aporia in both senses of the word: contradiction between two apparently valid positions and obstruction of a passage. Husserl may well have noticed this aporia when he spoke of a “vicious circle”. However, he was probably not conscious of its severity and did not really develop a solution. We will argue that Husserlian phenomenology simply does not have the conceptual means to tackle the difficulty. To surpass the aporia one must go beyond the strict context of phenomenology to reason in terms of a phenomenological metaphysics.

Key words
Phenomenology, Husserl, Ideas II, metaphysics, body, mind, reality, constitution.

References

• Cairns, D. (1997). Conversations avec Husserl et Fink. Grenoble: Millon.
• Husserl, E. (1950a). Cartesianische Meditationen (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1950b). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Wissenschaft, erstes Buch (Hua III). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1950c). Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures. Paris: Gallimard.
• Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Paenomenologishe Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Hua IV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1982). Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures, livre second. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• Michel, B. (2014). Phénoménologie et réalité matérielle. Studia Phaenomenologica, XIV, 329–348.
• Michel, B. (2018). La métaphysique de Michel Henry. Revue internationale Michel Henry, (9). (À paraître).
• Nenon, T. (1996). Husserl’s Theory of the Mental. In T. Nenon & L. Embree (Eds.), Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II (223-335). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.
• Ricœur, P. (2004). A l'école de la phénoménlogie. Paris: Vrin.
• Sokolowski, R. (1964). The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.