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BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS FOLLOWING-THE-HORIZONS

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According to Dreyfus, the depth of Heidegger's difference from Husserl lies in their divergent approaches to the thematization of being-in-the-world. Dreyfus portrays Husserl as a proponent of cognitivism, for whom the subject's relation to the world is mediated by mental content, and contrasts this with Heidegger's thematization of everyday absorbed coping. Dreyfus' position has faced significant critique in contemporary debates. However, this paper suggests that scholars may overlook one of his possible insights. Despite the appeal to the sphere of passivity and pre-objective affections, Husserl's phenomenological language remains bound to describing being-in-the-world as being-directed-towards-objects, while Heidegger avoids the object-centeredness in his thematization. This paper aims to clarify this point of tension between them, as revealed by Dreyfus, by employing a different criterion — specifically, their treatment of the distinction between the visible and the invisible. It argues that the rigidity with which the boundary between the visible and the invisible is postulated determines how object-centered the language of phenomenological description becomes. To emphasize this point, the paper examines four figures of being-in-the-world: Husserl's "being-directed-towards-the-object", Heidegger's "dealing-with-something", Gadamer's "being-situated", and the figure of "following-the-horizons", which emerges from them. With each subsequent figure, the demarcation boundary between the visible and the invisible becomes increasingly blurred, leading to the transition from the language of objects to the language of fused horizons. As a result, this paper attempts to introduce a phenomenological thematization of being-in-the-world that places the concept of the horizon at its center and employs the language of horizonal interwovenness. This kind of phenomenological thematization is referred to as horizonal phenomenology.

Keywords: being-in-the-world, horizon, phenomenology, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Dreyfus.

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БЫТИЕ-В-МИРЕ КАК СЛЕДОВАНИЕ-ЗА-ГОРИЗОНТАМИ

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Согласно Дрейфусу, глубинное различие между Хайдеггером и Гуссерлем заключается в различии их подходов к тематизации бытия-в-мире. Дрейфус представляет Гуссерля как сторонника когнитивизма, для которого отношение субъекта к миру опосредовано ментальным содержанием, и противопоставляет этой позиции хайдеггеровскую тематизацию повседневного вовлеченного обращения. Позиция Дрейфуса подвергается значительной критике в современных дебатах. Однако критики могли упустить из виду значимый инсайт, сделанный Дрейфусом. Несмотря на обращение к сфере пассивности и допредметных аффектов, феноменологический язык Гуссерля остается связанным с описанием бытия-в-мире как направленности на объекты, в то время как Хайдегер избегает объектно-центрированности в своей тематизации. Данная работа намерена прояснить эту точку напряжения, выявленную Дрейфусом, через обращение к критерию, отходящему от когнитивистской интерпретации. А именно, через экспликацию подходов Гуссерля и Хайдеггера к различению видимого и невидимого. В работе утверждается, что то, насколько строго постулируется граница между видимым и невидимым, определяет то, насколько объектно-центрированным будет язык феноменологического описания. Чтобы подчеркнуть эту идею, в работе рассматриваются четыре фигуры бытия-в-мире: направленность на объект Гуссерля, обращение-с Хайдегера, ситуированность Гадамера, а также фигура следования за горизонтами, возникающая из трех предыдущих. С каждой последующей фигурой демаркационная граница между видимым и невидимым становится все более размытой, что приводит к переходу от языка объектов к языку слияния горизонтов. Цель работы заключается во введении такого феноменологического тематизирования бытия-в-мире, которое ставит концепт горизонта в центр описания. Такой способ феноменологической тематизации предлагается называть горизональной феноменологией.

Ключевые слова: бытие-в-мире, горизонт, феноменология, Гуссерль, Хайдеггер, Гадамер, Дрейфус.

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Dreyfus, "the depth of Heidegger's difference from Husserl" lies in their divergent approaches to our being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1993, 19)[1,2]. Whereas Husserl's phenomenology appeals to mentalistic intentionality and expresses being-in-

[1] Earlier versions of the article were presented at 4th International Research Summer School in Genetic Phenomenology *Lifeworld — between Evidence and Delusion. Husserliana vol. 39 on Lifeworld* in Warsaw and Graduate Conference *Critical Perspectives on Phenomenology: Actual Investigations of the World, Environment, Nature* in Prague in 2024. I am grateful to Georgy Chernavin, Greg Yudin, Philipp Haueis, Bettina Brandt, Karel Novotný, Joana Ernst, Stella Christoph, Sina Sabbagh,

the-world through the relation between a self-sufficient subject and an independent object, Heidegger "overthrows" this distinction and thematizes being-in-the-world as the being of the embodied person engaged in everyday concerns. Dreyfus exposes the tension between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies through an engagement with Searle's theory of intentionality. He brings the three philosophers into the realm of action and claims that we can trace Heidegger's relation to Husserl more clearly if we (a) "sharpen" Husserl's mentalistic presuppositions through Searle's thematization of action and (b) demonstrate how Heidegger develops his account in opposition to these presuppositions. Through the interrogation of Searle, Dreyfus identifies two strands of divergence between Husserl and Heidegger: the subject/object distinction and the self-referentiality of intentions.

Firstly, for "Husserl — Searle" hybrid constructed by Dreyfus, being-in-the-world is thematized as the existence of a self-enclosed subject who has access to the world only through mental contents. In the domain of action, this boundary is drawn through the distinction between the experience of acting and the bodily movement caused by that experience. On the one hand, I have an experience of action even in situations of delusion or bodily immobility. On the other hand, my body can move without my having experienced the action. These two aspects of action illustrate "totally separate domains" of subjects and objects in our being-in-the-world that Dreyfus identifies in Husserl's approach (Dreyfus, 1993, 23).

Secondly, access to the world is achieved only through the "active aboutness" of the intentional states. For Husserl, every appearance is given "with a form of reflective or self-monitoring rationality", as Zahavi puts it in his interpretation of Dreyfus' position (Zahavi, 2013, 321). Thus, the experience of acting always presupposes an active representation of the goal, as well as an experience of the causal connection between the actively posed mental content and the executed bodily movements. "[W]e always seem to know during an action that we are acting" (Dreyfus, 1993, 23–24). Husserl's being-in-the-world, therefore, consists, as it were, of the sequence of separate, inde-

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[2] Originally, Dreyfus addresses intentionality — and not being-in-the-world — as a point of divergence between Husserl and Heidegger. He claims that the "real issue" in their relation pertains to two contrasting accounts of intentionality (Dreyfus, 1993, 18). However, considering that he views being-in-the-world as the category for the "human activity in general", I believe that we can also take it as the basic point of distinction. On the concept of being-in-the-world as the fundamental phenomenological category of world-relatedness, see also (Pollard, 2018, 401). On the interpretation of Husserl's intentionality as being-in-the-world, see also (Crowell, 2002, 123–124; O'Murchadha, 2008, 376; Moran, 2016, 110).

pendent from each other, and self-referential lived-experiences directed towards objects in the world.

However, according to Dreyfus, Husserl's approach "overlooks" the logic of everyday absorbed coping, which is filled with actions performed without clearly defined or actively held-in-mind purposes, such as walking down the street, talking to a neighbor, or waiting for a bus (Dreyfus, 1993, 23–24). It is Heidegger who goes beyond the presuppositions of mentalistic phenomenology and offers a thematization of a more fundamental form of being-in-the-world. For Dreyfus' Heidegger, a large portion of our being-in-the-world consists of "absorbed comportment", where one does not distinguish between one's lived-experiences and the objects towards which one is directed. Our everyday activity proceeds in a manner of a flow without the constant accompaniment of mental states or the active positing of purposes. It is characterized by a purposiveness that is rather "geared into the demands of the situation" than guided by explicitly posited goals. From this perspective, Heidegger's description of being-in-the-world represents for Dreyfus a "human activity in general", whereas Husserl provides only a "derivative mode" occurring in situations where the flow of action is disturbed (Dreyfus, 1993, 33).

According to Płotka, despite the complexity of Dreyfus' interpretation of Husserl, it is, at the same time, undoubtedly limited to the cognitivist point of view (Płotka, 2017, 105). Dreyfus' certainty regarding Husserl's "mentalistic overtones" makes two of his critique points somewhat problematic. Firstly, Husserl's transcendental idealism can indeed create the impression of a commitment to the mind/world distinction. However, as Loidolt claims, Husserl's idealism, "consequently taken to its end", does not turn us away from the world towards the self-enclosed consciousness but rather enlarges consciousness to transcendental subjectivity as the dimension of manifestation, in which everyday life reveals itself (Loidolt, 2022, 98–99). It is exactly the work of the transcendental reduction to suspend "the inner/outer boundaries that locate consciousness 'in my head' and reality 'out there'" (Loidolt, 2022, 98). The role of phenomenology consists in revealing being-in-the-world as a "first-personal" givenness of the world. Consequently, transcendental subjectivity, for Husserl, "is its world", and therefore cannot be conceived through the rigid Cartesian mind/world dichotomy.

Secondly, in relation to the self-referentiality of intentions, Loidolt, in her explicit critique of Dreyfus, provides a genetic phenomenological account, emphasizing that Husserl's consciousness is not just "a mode of total attention" but presupposes a sphere of passivity (Loidolt, 2017, 134). Instead of a "simple divide" between Heidegger's "dark, blind, and mute" and Husserl's "homunculi-like" modes of being-in-the-world suggested by Dreyfus, she defends a phenomenological perspective that

connects them with each other. She claims that from Husserl's point of view, the life of transcendental subjectivity does not solely consist of acts like thinking or willing but is permeated with passively experienced affections, which carry us to turn towards them. The world is already pre-given to us in our actions without our active participation in making it. The sphere of passivity, where "immersion, <…> temporal self-projection, and <…> bodily orientedness dwell", is not a sphere of unconsciousness but rather a field of experience, although it does not represent the kind of experience where we "actively 'do'" something (Loidolt, 2017, 127, 133). By considering Husserl's phenomenology through the prism of "analytic attention", Dreyfus, therefore, misses the point and imposes on Husserl the wrong representationalistic picture in relation to self-referentiality of lived-experiences.

Although I agree with Loidolt's critique of the first point, I argue that we can still learn something important from Dreyfus regarding the second point. I agree that Dreyfus overlooks the dimension of passivity in Husserl's argument, which weakens his claim regarding the self-referentiality of intentions. While it may seem to Loidolt that we can save Husserl's position by appealing to the sphere of passivity, it still remains the case that Husserl's phenomenological language addresses being-in-the-world as "being-directed-at-an-object" (Summa, Klein & Schmidt, 2022, 93). It is the emphasis on the intentional object itself that is central to Husserl's phenomenology, which Heidegger, according to Dreyfus, seeks to dissolve in his description of being-in-the-world. When Loidolt, in contrast to Dreyfus, claims that "[c]onciousness is never a mode of total attention, but always and essentially surrounded by an experiential background, or corona" (Loidolt, 2017, 134), she nonetheless implicitly presupposes that "there is an object present for the subject". The language that Husserl employs for his thematization remains an "object-centered" one (Alves, 2017, 14–15), even when we incorporate in it a domain of "orientedness and disclosedness" (Loidolt, 2017, 133). I believe that Dreyfus' critique is not merely concerned with emphasizing activity while overlooking the sphere of passivity in Husserl, but with problematizing being-in-the-world as a directedness-towards-the-object.

In order to demonstrate this point, I will examine Husserl's and Heidegger's approaches to being-in-the-world from the following perspective. I argue that the difference between them, which Dreyfus highlights through the notion of self-referentiality of intentions, lies in the rigidity with which they conceptualize the boundary between appearance and horizon, or, alternatively, between the visible and invisible aspects of appearance. Whereas Husserl preserves the "fundamental division" (Husserl, 2001, 42) between the originary given and the co-meant aspects of appearance, for Heidegger, this division is dissolved through the language of the involvement of

the equipment in the "wholeness of equipment" (Heidegger, 1962, 97). In other words, the rigidity of the boundary between visible and invisible serves as a criterion for distinguishing Husserl's being-in-the-world as 'being-directed-towards-the-object' from Heidegger's being-in-the-word as 'dealing-with-something'. Moreover, I argue that Heidegger's critique, as approached by Dreyfus, contains its own gaps that prevent us from fully thematizing everyday absorbed coping. It is Gadamer's phenomenology that enables us to further radicalize Heidegger's attempt to completely dissolve the boundary between the visible and invisible and to conceive of being-in-the-world as 'being-situated-in-the-world'[3].

In this paper, I examine Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Gadamer's thematizations as "figures" of being-in-the-world and aim to trace their critical inheritance through the progressive dissolution of the fundamental distinction between the visible and the invisible[4]. In the first three sections of the paper, I analyze Husserl's figure of "being-directed-towards-the-object", Heidegger's figure of "dealing-with-something", and Gadamer's figure of "being-situated". In the fourth section, I propose such a figure of being-in-the-world that follows Dreyfus' insight into absorbed coping and incorporates within itself Gadamer's thematization of the fusion of horizons. I term this figure "following-the-horizons".

2. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-DIRECTED-TOWARDS-THE-OBJECT

Since for Husserl, the experiential life proceeds in the form of "unitary experiences" (*Einzelerfahrungen*, Husserl, 2002, 125), being-in-the-world means for him being-directed-towards-the-object. As we can read in the manuscript *Hintergrund — vorgegebene Gegenständlichkeit, Endgegenstand und Durchgangseinheiten* (Husserl, 2008, 13–18), the object is the "thema" towards which I am directed, It is something that "lies in the ego's view" (*im Ich-Blick liegt*). It is the "target point" (*Zielpunkt*) and the "end-conscious" (*Ende Bewusste*) of my being-in-the-world. What we can also learn from this manuscript is that the directedness towards the object proceeds

[3] As we will see, this progressive dissolution of the fundamental division in Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Gadamer's phenomenologies is structurally related to the phenomenon of horizon as a co-meant aspect of any appearance. It seems that current scholarship on the notion of horizon in Husserl's phenomenology (Kwan, 1990; Walton, 2003; 2017; Tengelyi, 2004; Geniusas, 2012a; 2021; Lünser, 2023), as well as in the phenomenologies of both Husserl and Heidegger (Elm, 2004; Geniusas, 2012b), and of Husserl and Gadamer (Vessey, 2009; Moran, 2011; Nenon, 2016), tends to overlook this movement of progressive dissolution. The present work also aims to address this gap.

[4] I take the notion of *figure* from Geniusas' thematization of the horizon as the figure of intentionality, see (Geniusas, 2012a, 233).

through the "field of view" (*Blickfeld*) in which the object appears. So to every object as foregrounded, there belongs a background. My being-in-the-world, therefore, is being-directed-towards-the-object-through-the-background-of-its-appearance.

However, if we take the situation of writing the text as an example, it seems wrong to claim that the text is the sole object towards which one is directed. Together with the text, I am also somehow directed towards particular thoughts, sentences, the posture in which I sit at my desk, the way my fingers type on the keyboard, etc. All these unities go hand in hand. So it seems incorrect to isolate them from each other and to foreground only the text. Perhaps, it can be claimed that the text is the most prominent object among other objects, which is the reason why it occupies the foreground of my directedness, whereas other objects remain in the background. Nevertheless, it remains unclear where the boundary should be, demarcating the foregrounded "text" from the backgrounded "paragraph" or the "particular thought" in the dealing of "writing the text".

The goal of the further reasoning of this section is to show that 1) Husserl's "being-in-the-world as being-directed-toward-the-object" is possible because of the distinction between the foreground and the background that he draws; 2) the distinction between the foreground and the background is undermined by Husserl himself; 3) the undermining of the distinction leads to the undermining of Husserl's statement on the meaning of being-in-the-world.

As Husserl presents it in § 1 of *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* (Husserl, 2001, 39–44), any perceptual experience is an experience of a constantly identical object through the flow of changing appearances. On the one hand, the perceptual object appears as "the same" constant object. It preserves itself in its identity; it does not suddenly vanish or turn into another object. In the perception of the table, "what is identical is a constant *x*, a constant substrate of actually appearing table-moments" (Husserl, 2001, 42). On the other hand, being identical, it appears through the flow of appearances. It is always given to me in a succession of perspectives. This succession is divided by a "fundamental division" between the visible and the invisible. If I perceive the table, then I perceive it only from one side, whereas the other sides remain invisible to me. There is only one side that is "originally there", "genuinely perceived", "originally exhibited", and given "in the flesh"[5]. And all other sides, although they "do not appear as such, genuinely", are "co-meant" and "co-present". The object consists of an actual appearance and non-actual appearances presupposing each other. The

[5] The side of the object is also given "here and now", as Summa interprets it in relation to the perceptual situation (Summa, 2014, 183).

visible "points beyond" to the invisible. Moreover, the visible is *visible* because it refers to the invisible. It is nothing without the invisible. The side of the table would not be 'a side of the table' if it did not refer to the other sides of the table. And *vice versa*, the invisible would not be co-meant if it were not indicated by the visible. Husserl calls the invisible part of the distinction a "horizon" of the appearance (Husserl, 2001, 43; see also Kwan, 1990, 367).

Through § 8 of Husserl's *Experience and Judgment* (Husserl, 1973, 31–38), we will be able to accomplish an important modification of the statement on the fundamental division between the visible and the invisible, which shows that any experience is horizonal. Let us pay attention to the following argument.

> [E]very experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as 'itself-there', it has its own horizon (Husserl, 1973, 32).

This argument has two important implications. It means, firstly, that not only perceptual objects but any intentional object is given through the distinction between visible and invisible. Any intentional object — whether perceived, remembered, fantasized, or judged — appears perspectivally, i. e., horizonally[6]. It means, secondly, that not only is the object divided between visible and invisible. The whole experience is

[6] It could be argued that only the perceptual object can appear perspectivally. Husserl himself claims that "[w]here there is no spatial being, it is senseless to speak of a seeing from different standpoints with a changing orientation in accordance with different perappearances, adumbrations" (Husserl, 1983, 91). However, if the perspectiveness of the object is considered not through the spatial but through the temporal — or rather, affective — dimension (see Summa, 2014, 186–197), it can be extended to any intentional object. The invisible sides of the object are the passively constituted "object-like formations" that remain sleeping in retentional consciousness and are "awakened" to affective prominence by the associative force of the visible side (see Husserl, 2001, 243–244; see also Steinbock, 2004, 23–26; Bower, 2013, 152–153). Moreover, they are always engaged in a "competition" with each other for the ego-pole's attentive turning-towards them. In the case of the perspectival givenness of the remembered object, Husserl speaks of two awakened pasts that cannot be given simultaneously, but instead strive to "repress" each other in order to become the visible aspect of remembrance (Husserl, 2001, 407–409). For instance, when I remember my school friend, I first of all recall him as a stomatologist and a very responsible person. But the other aspects of my friend's character remain unawakened, waiting to become more prominent when the "particular situation" (Summa, 2014, 197) of remembrance allows them to stand out in comparison to other aspects. Thus, any intentional object, when explicated in terms of affective perspectivity, should be interpreted as an "idea in the Kantian sense": it can never be given in its completeness and is constituted as a regulative ideal, through which only certain aspects become visible, while others necessarily remain in the background (see Carta, 2022). So even the remembered object, as Husserl puts it, should be conceived as a "limit" that can be progressively but never fully clarified (see Husserl, 2001, 408).

horizonal (see Geniusas, 2012a, 233; Walsh, 2017, 413). Thus, the object itself is "the visible". It itself is given "in the flesh", being surrounded by the horizon of co-meant but not given originary objects[7]. The object stays in the foreground, distinguishing itself from the background of all other objects. This shift between the givenness of the sides of the object to the givenness of the objects corresponds to the shift from the internal horizon to the external horizon of experience, where the internal horizon is the horizon of the co-meant sides of the object and the external horizon is the horizon of the objects staying in the background.[8]

That experience is horizonal means that not only the object or its side can be considered as visible. In different Husserl's works, we can find how he implicitly thematizes a sort of *funnel of visibility* in which any originary givenness calls to even more originarity. Let us consider some of Husserl's texts and then return to the image of experience as a funnel of visibility.

Husserl claims that the visible side of the object contains the aspects that are not originary given. It, "in itself, [is] also laden with a similar distinction" of visibility and invisibility (Husserl, 2001, 43). The originary appearing side of the object hides in itself the further invisible aspects that can be revealed only in a closer look at them. When we look at the surface of the table, we always have the opportunity to take a closer look, to observe the details of the material it is made from, and to examine the subtle shades of its colors. "Indeed," says Husserl, "the call resounds as well with respect to the side that is already actually seen: 'Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your place, changing the position of your eyes, etc.'" (Husserl, 2001, 43).

The side of the object, thematized through the temporal constitution, consists of the core of visibility, which Husserl calls "primal impression", along with the horizons of retentions and protentions that are not given originally (see Husserl, 1991,

[7] Such an understanding of the object as being itself the visible, however, does not take into consideration the distinction between the presenting act (*Gegenwärtigung*) and the re-presenting act (*Vergegenwärtigung*), where only in the case of presentation as the "primordial mode of intuitiveness" (Husserl, 2001, 110) the object can be given in the flesh (Husserl, 2001, 74–75; see also Summa, 2022, 210). The first distinction presupposes that, regardless of whether we are dealing with presentation or re-presentation, there is a foregrounded, originally given aspect, along with backgrounded, co-meant aspects at both levels: the level of the object's sides and the level of the object itself. The second distinction presupposes that perception, as "actually completely intuitive" consciousness, is distinguished from presentification, which is always "more or less intubitable" but can never become a "full[lly] intuitive[lly] present" (Husserl, 2001, 244–245).

[8] On the internal problems of demarcation between the inner and the outer horizon, see (Walton, 2003, 4; Overgaard, 2004, 114).

105)[9]. The primal impression is described by Husserl as, on the one hand, the "absolute beginning <…>, the primal source" of givenness and, on the other hand, as an "abstraction", an ideal point of 'now' that is always surrounded by the temporal horizons (Husserl, 1991, 105–106, 338). It presents itself as, at the same time, the most originary given now-moment "dividing past from future" (Sokolowski, 1964, 539) and something that cannot be reached as a truly given presence distinguished from retentions and protentions. Thus, for Husserl, the primal impression serves as the unattainable asymptote of visibility, beyond which we cannot go to further possible visibility.

The world, on the contrary, turns us to the most distant horizon of the interplay between visible and invisible (see Husserl, 1983, § 27; 2002, 125–126). The world represents the limit of the invisible that is always co-present with the visible[10]. We can

[9] It can be argued that, for Husserl, the primal impression is not the core of the object's side, but rather of the lived experience, that is, of the immanent object (see Brough, 2010, 29). This argument brings the noetic–noematic (or subject-object) distinction into the thematization of visibility, which had previously not been addressed by the text. However, this claim can be opposed by Shigeru Taguchi's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, which he refers to as a "mediation-based analysis", incorporating insights from the Kyoto School of philosophy and the thought of Hajime Tanabe (see Taguchi, 2019; 2023). According to him, transcendental phenomenology considers reality as full of "cut[s], crack[s], split[s], rupture[s], cleft[s], or fissure[s]" (Taguchi, 2019, 25). These ruptures are, for instance, the ruptures between: (1) the object as it is in itself and the object as it appears to (inter) subjectivity; (2) the present as independent from the past or future and the present as impossible without retentions and protentions; and (3) the subject as existing independently from other subjects and having her own world, and the subject as possible only within co-existence with other human beings. Everyday life and other philosophical traditions, such as realism or idealism, "locate" themselves only on one side of these splits and take it to be the reality. Whereas phenomenology, by following the principle of all principles, accepts both sides of the distinction and claims that every such "rupture" is, at the same time, a "connection" between the supposedly mutually exclusive sides. As Taguchi puts it, "reality can neither be reduced to material objects nor to subjective experience, but rather it is nothing other than 'mediations [between them]" (Taguchi, 2019, 37). The "differentiating-connecting" aspect of the ruptures of reality is what Taguchi calls "mediation". For him, the goal of phenomenology is to thematize these self-evident mediations while avoiding the absolute ontological localization of either of their sides. From the perspective of Taguchi's interpretation, Husserl's fundamental division between the visible and invisible is one of the ruptures of reality that phenomenology seeks to thematize. This rupture appears on both the noetic and noematic sides of reality and can be considered without involving them in the analysis. Thus, not only the lived experience but also the object's side can be considered to have a deeper core of visibility, which Husserl calls the "primal impression".

[10] It can be argued that the world as the limit of the invisible is not the world as the life-world which Husserl presented in *Crisis* (Husserl, 1970). It is not the world as the Structure, as the fixed "ground of all praxis" (Husserl, 1970, 142). For sure, the world as the most distant horizon encompasses everything that is given, it is a pre-given world. Moreover, this world-horizon is also invariable and irrevocable. But in the case of *Ideas I*, the world appears only as a constitutive part of the fundamental division, but not an infinite realm of "always taken for granted" original self-evidences (Husserl,

switch our attention from the givenness of the side of the object to the givenness of the object, and then to the givenness of the perceptual field, in which the object acts as only "one side" of the field. However, the perceptual field itself could be grasped as the visible, where the invisible refers beyond itself, further and further, to the encompassing horizon of the world. As Husserl expresses it:

> I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the verandah, into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly "know of" as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness — a "knowing of them" which involves no conceptual thinking and which changes into a clear intuiting only with the advertence of attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly (Husserl, 1983, 52).

For Husserl, visibility functions like a funnel that starts from the asymptotic invisibility of the world and descends into the asymptotic visibility of the primal impression[11]. If the experience is like a funnel, then it also means that the visible and the invisible cannot be presented as static categories. Any visibility is contaminated with invisibility. So we cannot rigidly isolate the given side of the object from the non-given sides, the foregrounded object from the backgrounded, and so on. The world, the object, the side of the object, and the primal impression are only, as it were, the *platos of visibility*. It means that they are just one of many other possible relatively-stable, "abstract" unities, among which we could name, for example, the special-world (*Sondernwelt*), situation (see Luft, 2011, 40; Held, 2012, 449), perceptual field (Husserl, 2002, 125), or, referring to Dreyfus' interpretation, solicitation (Dreyfus, 2013, 18)[12].

Husserl's description of horizonality is problematic because (1) he draws a rigid boundary between visible and invisible, and (2) it follows from his reasoning that every visibility is contaminated by invisibility. On the one hand, Husserl argues that

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1970, 127). The world as the asymptote of invisibility is what Geniusas, in his interpretation of Husserl's notion of horizon, calls the *Wherein* of experience (Geniusas, 2012a, 195). On the different notions of the world in Husserl's phenomenology, see also (Lee, 2019).

[11] We can also easily see how Husserl implicitly involves the model of the funnel of visibility by using the same terms "in person / in the flesh" for different levels of visibility: (1) "[T]he object <…> is given as itself just like it is meant, and it stands there *in person*, so to speak" (Husserl, 2001, 141, my italics); (2) "[T]he genuinely perceived [side of the object is] <…> actually there, appearing *in the flesh*" (Husserl, 2001, 43, my italics); (3) "[Primal impression] presents a phase of the object as now in the narrower sense, as there itself and now present, *in person*" (Husserl, 1991, 140, my italics).

[12] All these unities are abstract in the same way in which the primal impression is "something *abstract*" (Husserl, 1991, 338). They (1) do not exist independently of their invisible sides, and (2) contain within themselves the core of fuller visibility.

there is the visible, i. e., something that is given in the flesh. So *there are* "objects", "sides of the objects", "perceptual field", "primal impression", etc. But on the other hand, all these unities are not actually given in the flesh — they always contain an inner core of originarity. Any unity, therefore, is only an abstract moment (a *plato*) of the *descent from invisibility to visibility*.

Husserl's figure of being-in-the-world as being-directed-toward-the-object is possible because of the fundamental division between visible and invisible. The latter is the condition of possibility of the former. However, if we attempt to dissolve the fundamental division and claim that *there is* primarily a descent of visibility and that *there are no* isolated unities, we will also dissolve Husserl's figure of being-in-the-world and open the possibility for further variation of the phenomenological figure of being-in-the-world, which could be more responsive to the graduality of visibility.

3. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS DEALING-WITH-~~SOMETHING~~

Husserl's ontology, exhibited with the statement "I am always directed to the object", is problematic since it presupposes the rigidity of the fundamental division between visible and invisible and through this the stability of the object as the *terminus ad quem* of our being-in-the-world. However, when we consider horizonality not as the side of the fundamental division but as a continuum, exhibiting the funnel of visibility, we will see that the object *is-not*. The object is only a plato of stability in the descent of visibility. This state of affairs in Husserl's phenomenology calls us to reformulation and to the selection of such concepts that could better reflect the horizonality of experience as a continuum. For such a reformulation, let us turn to Heidegger.

For Heidegger, our being-in-the-world is exhibited as 'dealing-with-something'. Dasein's way of being, as he claims in *Being and Time*, is "'*dealing*' in the world and *with* entities within-the-world" (Heidegger, 1962, 95). I am always already dealing with something: I am "writing the text", "reading the book", 'typing on the keyboard", "washing the dishes", etc. Heidegger calls this "something", which we encounter in our "concernful dealings", equipment. In Dasein's concern, equipment is not given through the bare contemplation but is always "what gets used". Equipment is encountered within the dealing-with and is not possible without it. The particular dealing-with-something is never given as isolated from other dealings. For example, I am never *just* "writing the text", I am "writing the text" *in-order-to* "submit it to the journal", *in-order-to* "continue my academic career", *for the sake of* becoming a philosopher. Equipment, therefore, "always is *in terms of its belonging to other equipment*" (Heidegger, 1962, 97–98).

"Taken strictly," Heidegger argues, "there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment" (Heidegger, 1962, 97). That there "is" no such thing as *an* equipment means, firstly, that equipment does not show itself proximally as it is for itself. If I am "writing the text", then I am never *just* "writing the text", I am writing the text *while* "typing on the keyboard", "looking at the laptop", "sitting on the chair", and so on. The "text", that I am writing is inseparable from "laptop", "monitor", or "table". Equipment is not possible without being involved in the "wholeness of equipment". That there "is" no such thing as *an* equipment means, secondly, that there *is* the wholeness of equipment but not the equipment itself. The equipment is intelligible only within the wholeness of the equipment that ontologically precedes it.

Since dealing-with is always already a dealing-with-something, it also cannot proceed without referring to other dealings-with. "Writing" is not possible without "typing-in", "sitting-on", "watching-at", and so on. That is why Heidegger shifts his description, firstly, from the totality of equipment (*Zeugganzheit*) to the totality of involvement (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), which stays closer to the *dealing-with* than to the equipment. It is through the activity of letting-something-be-involved (*Bewendenlassen*) that my dealing-with discloses the equipment with which I am dealing. Secondly, Heidegger makes a shift to the referential totality (*Verweisungsganzheit*) which unites equipment and dealing-with into one meaning of 'being a dependent part of the whole'.

The referential totality in terms of which any dealing-with-something *is*, extends itself to the world. The world is the referential whole "to which Dasein assigns itself" and "*wherein* Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself" (Heidegger, 1962, 119). Since the world is the referential whole, equipment is encountered within-the-world, so that for any equipment, the world is always already "there" (Heidegger, 1962, 114). The world is that "in terms of which" the equipment is given to me.

That equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to…' means for Heidegger that in our dealing-with it tends to "withdraw". It is not "*grasped* thematically as an occurring Thing" (Heidegger, 1962, 98). "On the contrary," claims Heidegger, "that which we concern ourselves primarily is the work — that which is to be produced at the time" (Heidegger, 1962, 99). When I am "writing the text", I am not dealing-with-the-text in the sense of having this text as a theme of my dealing. I am not directed towards the text. Rather, I am directed towards particular goals: completing this paragraph, assigning a comprehensible structure to the text, reaching a certain number of words, etc. This *towards-which* of my dealing-with is also involved in the totality of equipment. This ability of equipment to *withdraw* in my absorbed concern within the

world makes the totality of equipment not the bundle of entities but the *wholeness* of relations, which cannot be divided into the totality of its constituent elements.

In Heidegger's description of being-in-the-world as dealing-with-something, the horizon is inscribed through the notion of the *Verweisungsganzheit*. *This particular* dealing-with-something ("writing the text") always already *is* in terms of the referential wholeness to which it belongs ("typing on a keyboard", "looking through the structure of the text", "looking on the laptop", etc.). *Verweisungsganzheit* is the invisible part of Husserl's fundamental division, which inherits his structural features. In both Husserl and Heidegger, (1) the invisible makes the visible possible, (2) the whole world is invisible (it is the world-horizon), and (3) the visible is only an abstract part of the invisible.

However, Heidegger's horizonality is not as rigid as in Husserl's phenomenology. It does not represent the fundamental division in its full power. From the very beginning, Heidegger includes the "ability to withdraw" into the being of the equipment, letting only the dealing-with be preserved in Dasein's being-in-the-world. The horizonal descent from the invisible to the visible receives in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein more prominence than in Husserl's "being conscious of the object". Moreover, as Knudsen claims, Dasein's understanding is "finite and open-ended at the same time" (Knudsen, 2023, 126). That dealing-with-something appears within the wholenness of references implies that its meaning can be expanded and can be "penetrate[d] deeper into [the referential wholneess] by getting a better and more nuanced understanding of the entities that [Dasein] encounter[s]" (Knudsen, 2023, 126). The horizon is open-ended and dynamic, so any understanding hides in itself a possible non-understanding that can be pursued and clarified (see also Elm, 2004, 167–168).

Despite the difference in Heidegger's approach to horizonality of experience, it can be claimed that he still inherits the problem of isolatedness of the visible. For Heidegger, as we saw, there "is" no such thing as *an* entity, which means that *there is ~~something~~*. Heidegger begins his thematization of being-in-the-world with dealing-with-something in order to comprehend it later as dealing-with-~~something~~. He tries to describe being-in-the-world through the statement "I am always already dealing-with-(~~something~~ –> referential whole)". However, being withdrawn in the dealing, *something* still leaves its trace through the preposition *with*. Heidegger sees that the visibility of *something* is contaminated with the invisible. But instead of introducing a complete dissolution, he stays with a modified version of the fundamental division. He preserves the *something* as ~~*something*~~. This problematic state of affairs can be also seen in § 15 of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Heidegger, 1982, 154–178), where Heidegger argues that "[t]o *exist* <…> means, among other things, *to be as*

comporting with beings"(Heidegger, 1982, 157). Even though "objects exist only for a subject that does the objectifying", it still "belongs to the nature of the Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already with other beings" (Heidegger, 1982, 157).

One of the possible developments of Heidegger's idea of the withdrawal of equipment can be found in Dreyfus' interpretation. In *The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental*, he, drawing on Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologies, describes our being-in-the-world from the perspective of the experience of total absorption (Dreyfus, 2013). The world of the "absorbed coper" for Dreyfus is the world permeated with the "lines of forces". This world is not made up of isolatable objects but rather of "the shifting field of attractions and repulsions" (Dreyfus, 2013, 17–18). These attractions and repulsions are not *something* that stays in front of us as something with which we are dealing. Solicitations withdraw from the objectifying field of vision. "We need not even be aware of the solicitations to go out *as* solicitations" (Dreyfus, 2013, 18). When I am writing the text and press the wrong button, the solicitation to delete the wrongly typed letter does not capture the whole field of the foreground of my dealing-with. It passes by in my "total absorption, sometimes called flow" (Dreyfus, 2013, 28). Dreyfus, it can be argued, dissolves the part *with-something* of dealing-with-something and preserves only the dealing as "absorbed coping".

Let us now turn to Gadamer's figure of being-in-the-world, where, as I suppose, we can find the complete dissolution of the fundamental division.

4. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-SITUATED

As we can read in the *Truth and Method* (Gadamer, 2004), being-in-the-world for Gadamer can be exemplified as being-situated[13]. Being situated means occupying a standpoint that constrains one's field of vision. This limitation of my situation is exhibited by the notion of horizon that acts as a "range of vision". And since for Gadamer this range of vision is ontological, it is not possible to get outside of the situatedness[14].

[13] It could be argued that Gadamer's claim, "[w]e always find ourselves within a situation" (Gadamer, 2004, 312), as an expression of his approach to being-in-the-world, is also implicit in phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. However, for Husserl and Heidegger, the concepts of "object" and "equipment" as sense-unities (*Sinneinheiten*, Husserl, 2001, 139) remain central to the thematization of being-in-the-world, whereas Gadamer, as we will show, completely overcomes object-oriented language through the notion of situation.

[14] That the range of vision is an ontological characteristic of being-in-the-world is illuminated by phenomenological "always already". It does not mean that it is not possible to get outside of the ontic, i. e., *this particular*, situation. However, this being-outside of the particular situation also means being-inside the other particular situation from which we have a point of view on the first situation.

"The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it" (Gadamer, 2004, 312).

The range of vision is not a rigid boundary that encloses everything within it in an isolated realm. The "closed horizon <…> is an abstraction" (Gadamer, 2004, 315). To have a horizon means "not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it" (Gadamer, 2004, 313). The range of vision is, first of all, necessarily vague; it does not express itself through a clearly drawn line. Everything that is closer to the horizon of my vision and moves away from the center of the standpoint becomes less accessible for consideration and shrinks. Secondly, it is principally possible to reach something that stays beyond the horizon, to make it closer, to move the horizon by changing the center of the standpoint. Let us consider these two points in relation to the interplay between the visible and the invisible that we thematized previously[15].

Firstly, I claim that by defining the horizon as a 'range of vision', Gadamer contributes to the dissolution of the rigid boundary between visible and invisible and to the thematization of the gradual transition from visibility to invisibility. The visible gradually becomes less visible when it moves away from the center of the vision and descends into the invisible. What Gadamer conceives here as 'situation', can be applied to any appearance. "Object", "equipment", and "solicitation" should also be defined by this gradual transition from visibility to invisibility.

Secondly, the horizon is "something into which we move and that moves with us" (Gadamer, 2004, 315). As the limit of vision, it is not a constant limit, but one that can be overcome. "To have a horizon" means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it by changing one's point of view (and therefore by moving). Moreover, the horizon as a limit can be modified. "To have a standpoint" means for Gadamer to have the ability to focus on the particular parts of the whole range of vision. One may be so involved in the current standpoint (i. e., situation) that she forgets its constraintness. "A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him" (Gadamer, 2004, 313). I may become so involved in my own career issues that I forget that I can see the world from a different standpoint, not related to the situation of work, or that other people can and do look at the world through other standpoints. On the contrary, "[a] person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small" (Gadamer, 2004, 313)[16]. It means, firstly, that our range of

[15] These two characteristics of the horizon are also accurately articulated by Nenon (2016) when he discusses the "malleability" and "explorability" of the horizon.

[16] I suppose that Gadamer is speaking here about the horizon in its ontic meaning, namely about *this particular* horizon, and not about the ontological meaning of situatedness.

vision is plastic. We can see closer or further, as well as "better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion" (Gadamer, 2004, 316). It means, secondly, that the range of vision can be modified. We can "acquire a horizon" to be able to look further than our current position allows us.

That the "closed horizon is an abstraction" means not only that there is a gradual transition from the visible to the invisible, but also that the horizon is not a discrete unity. The horizon of one point of view cannot be distinguished from the horizon of the other point of view by the "yawning abyss" of the invisible. Horizons are "fused" with each other in such a way that there is always a path leading from one standpoint to the other (Gadamer, 1989, 41). "The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon" (Gadamer, 2004, 315). That the horizon is not a rigid boundary means that there are no rigid boundaries between cultures, traditions, and human beings as such. The otherness of the Other is marked not by the unbridgeable barrier but by the traversable distance of the understanding.

That there are no discrete horizons can be a reason why it is so problematic to talk about the distinction between the one unifying horizon and the plurality of horizons. Gadamer emphasizes this problem through the question: "If <…> there is no such thing as these distinct horizons, why do we speak of the fusion of horizons and not simply of the formation of the one horizon, whose bounds are set in the depths of tradition?" (Gadamer, 2004, 317). There are horizon*s*, but these horizons are *horizons supposedly existing by themselves* (Gadamer, 2004, 317). Every horizon is "embraced" by "a single horizon" of the world. I disagree, therefore, with Moran's assertion that Gadamer "carefully emphasizes [that there] is not a single horizon but rather a coalescence of horizons (plural)" (Moran, 2011, 811). He claims that, despite the horizons can fuse with each other, they remain "different from one another" and "never become identified into a single horizon" (Moran, 2011, 812). I believe that it is the very nature of the horizon that causes it to resist being understood through the dichotomy between the singular and the plural[17]. This is the reason why Gadamer adheres to the language of horizons that only "supposedly" exist by themselves.

Gadamer's confusion with the abstracted horizons should remind us of Heidegger's problem with ~~equipment~~. However, I claim that there is a significant difference between them. For Heidegger, there is equipment as an entity (*Seiende*), which is constituted by its involvement in the referential wholeness. But Gadamer does not con-

[17] For this reason, I also disagree with Vessey, who claims that, for Gadamer, the horizon consists of "the set of beliefs" (Vessey, 2009, 530). The horizon cannot be understood as a set of isolated unities, such as beliefs.

ceive of horizons as entities. From the outset, they are revealed through their vagueness and fusedness with one another in such a way that we cannot isolate them or transform them into discrete entities.

In order to preserve and further radicalize Gadamer's language, dissolving the boundary between the visible and invisible, let us express being-in-the-world through the notion of "following-the-horizons" and state: "I am always already following the horizons." In this ontological figure, the notion of horizon emphasizes the openness of any sense-unity and at the same time does not refuse to address it. There are "objects", "situations", and "solicitations" but there are also other, more and less stable forms of sense-unity that cannot be grasped by these notions. Moreover, any unity is viewed as only relatively stable, namely as a unity "supposedly existing" by itself (Gadamer, 2004, 317) since any sense-unity is always permeated by invisibility. The notion of 'following' replaces 'being-directed-towards' and 'dealing-with' since it also contributes to the preservation of non-isolatedness of the sense-unity.

In what follows, we are going to thematize the figure of "being-in-the-world as following-the-horizons" and attempt to *see* the being-in-the-world through the horizonality of experience. What we are going to accomplish is to attempt to acquire a horizonal understanding of phenomenological ontology. Let us call this approach horizonal phenomenology.

5. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS FOLLOWING-THE-HORIZONS

It seems that the metaphor of the wave can be one of the most productive ways to describe what the expression "following-the-horizons" means. When we look at a wave, we do not see it as a discrete unity that can be well separated from other waves. The wave, first, is interwoven with other waves. Second, it weaves smaller waves (crests) into itself. Third, it is woven into the ocean. But there are no rigid boundaries between any of them, only gradual (sharper or smoother) transitions. Sometimes, we can see that "the wave" is more prominent and can be easily distinguished from other waves. Other times, the waves are hardly distinguishable not only from each other but also from the surface of the ocean.

Let us think about any unity — or about any sense-unity — through the metaphor of the wave. Like waves, unities can be more or less distinguishable. "Unity" is not a point of stability but is always in the process of becoming a unity. This idea of "becoming a unity" can be expressed in various other ways. We can talk about the *crystallization*, *sharpness*, or *density* of the sense-unity. For example, the "perceived ball" is sharper than the "ball as it appears to the basketball player during the play".

The "writing of the text as it is expressed in language" is sharper than the "writing of the text as it is happening during the writing itself". Like the wave, the unity is interwoven with other unities. "Writing the text" is never *just* writing the text. It is simply more prominent and distinguishable in the interwovenness of the dealings. When we take a closer look, we see that this unity weaves-in (e. g., in "typing on the keyboard") and is woven-into (e. g., into "pursuing an academic career") other unities.

Now, instead of trying to express the density of the sense-unity through the metaphor of the wave, let us use the notion of horizon. Let us claim that the sense-unity is a horizon. In what follows, I will attempt to thematize some peculiarities that we can find in the sense-unity as expressed through its horizonality.

A horizon is not possible without the other horizons. It cannot exist in isolation from them, precisely because it "consists of" the other horizons. For instance, what does it mean "to write the text"? "To write the text" means 'to type on the keyboard', 'to look at the screen of the laptop', 'to recall examples from the literature', 'to look along the sentences', 'to make pauses during the re-reading and re-writing', and so on. The horizon of "writing the text" is *there* through the other horizons. In some cases, it becomes more prominent in relation to them, such as in the case of disruption, when one gets lost in one's own text and does not understand what exactly one is doing when "writing the text". However, in the typical situation of "writing the text", it does not strictly distinguish itself from the horizons with which it is interwoven. It appears as if it were one wide-spreading, inflated wave on the surface of the ocean.

That a horizon "consists of" the other horizons does not mean that they are related to each other through hierarchical relations in which one horizon is included in another. Horizons are not containers for each other; they are not placed inside one another[18]. Firstly, every horizon weaves-in other horizons: I am not *just* writing *this particular* text but the essay that I am preparing for *this particular* journal on *this particular* topic, implementing *these particular* philosophers, etc. I am not *just* writing but typing on the keyboard, using a method of touch typing, varying the speed of typing, looking at the monitor, etc. Secondly, every horizon is woven-in other horizons. The horizon of "writing the text" is woven-into the horizon of "studying at the university", which, in its own turn, is woven-in the "pursuing of academic career", etc. Thirdly, every horizon is interwoven-with other horizons: I am not *just* writing the text, but at the same time "sitting on the chair", "tracking the working time", "adjusting the glasses", "drinking the coffee", etc. These are the three aspects of horizonal *interwovenness*[19].

[18] On the critique of the horizons as containers, see also (Malpas, 2002, 408–409).

[19] Husserl also uses the term "interwovenness" (*Verflechtung*), when he discusses that the object is not "something fixed and dead", but rather involved in the interwovenness of the "becoming and

How does it make a difference to talk about interwovenness rather than hierarchical relations? This point underpins the ongoing attempt to dissolve Husserl's fundamental division. Viewing the horizons as rigidly nested within each other implies their isolation from one another. The horizon of "writing the text" weaves-in the horizon of "typing on the keyboard". However, "typing on the keyboard" is not included in the "writing of the text" since both of these horizons can be interwoven-with other horizons. In particular, this means that there is no permanent, fixed relation between these two horizons. We can imagine a situation where "typing on the keyboard" becomes the horizon that weaves-in the horizon of "writing the text". For example, when one is practicing the touch typing method. We can also imagine the situation where these two horizons are so closely interwoven that we can hardly distinguish them from each other. For example, when "writing" can be associated solely with "typing" or when it becomes so familiar to write by typing that there is no other possibility to write the text. If I type fast enough that I can express my thoughts without reducing the speed of thinking about sentences, and if I have become accustomed to this, then it will not be possible for me to write the text with any other approach. Or, we could say, this horizon of "writing the text" presupposes a different horizonal *constellation* than the horizon of "writing-as-typing the text".

By thematizing the graduality of the horizon's givenness, we cannot speak of the givenness of "one" or "several" horizons. Discrete values do not apply here. The horizon is always already in a dynamic process of intertwining with other horizons. Counting the foregrounded horizons is akin to trying to count the waves looking at them from the shore. Sometimes it is possible to do so, but this possibility is not constantly present to us. The non-discreteness of horizons can be further emphasized by Gadamer's bewilderment about the singular/plural distinction. We "speak of the fusion of horizons and not simply of the formation of the one horizon" (Gadamer, 2004, 317) since horizon*s* do appear to be more or less dense. This is dynamic density, but it is preserved through the relative stability of "objects", "solicitations", "situations", "cultures", "traditions", etc.

The decreasing density of horizons can be demonstrated. For example, we can certainly claim that there is a horizon of "writing of the text". This horizon has high density, which means that it is a stable and delineated horizon, that it can be well distinguished from other horizons, and that it preserves its contours. The "writing of the text" may be well distinguished from the horizon of "going along the street". It can also be distinguished from the horizon of "typing on the keyboard". How? Well,

being-transformed" in the flow of temporal consciousness (see Husserl, 2001, 233).

because we can write the text without using the keyboard, or we can use the keyboard without writing the text. However, we can then switch our attention from the horizon of "wiring the text" to the following row of possible horizons: a) writing-the-the-essay; b) writing-the-book; c) writing-the-academic-text; d) writing-the-text-for-the-daily-mail; e) writing-the-email. Here, we could probably agree that all of these horizons preserve their stability and delineatedness. There are a lot of peculiarities and nuances that distinguish these horizons from each other. Let us not dwell on this row of examples but continue it with the following one: a) writing-the-essay-for-the-course-in-philosophy; b) writing-the-essay-for-the-master's-course-in-philosophy; c) writing-the-essay-in-the-field-of-analytic-philosophy. Here, it can be said that the situation has not changed: we can still identify the contours that distinguish an essay in philosophy from a master's essay in philosophy and emphasize their differences. But how far can we proceed with this? Let us turn to the third row: a) writing-the-essay-for-the-course-in-philosophy-in-the-middle-of-the-day-in-the-library-while-being-surrounded-by-other-students; b) writing-the-essay-and-being-constantly-distracted-by-the-problems-of-the-text-while-drinking-the-coffee-to-boost-productivity-and-maintain-the-flow-of-writing. Here, the horizon of "writing the text" loses its clear contours and ceases to be a unity as we once thought of it. Is there such a unity as "writing the text"? Certainly. Is there such a unity as "writing the essay in philosophy"? Yes, we could argue. But things get different when we consider the third row. For someone who is involved in the dealing of "writing the text", there should exist this fleeting feeling of writing-the-text-while-trying-not-to-be-distracted-and-helping-oneself-to-get-concentrated-with-a-cup-of-coffee. But this "fleeting feeling' can no longer be expressed as an isolated unity, it can even hardly be noticed in our daily comportment as a delineated meaning. And yet, it *is*. It *is* as being less dense than all other horizons mentioned before.

All horizons are interwoven in the totality of horizons that we, continuing the phenomenological tradition, call the world. The world is the *interwovenness of horizons*. Let us illustrate this with the following example. When I am "writing the text", I am never *just* 'writing-the-text', but 'writing-the-text-while-working-in-the-library-and-typing-on-the-keyboard-and-drinking-coffee'. But neither is the horizon of writing–the-text-while-working-in-the-library-and-typing-on-the-keyboard-and-drinking-coffee the ultimate horizon, since it is also interwoven with further horizons. I am writing-the-text-namely-the-essay-for-a-philosophy-course-while-working-in-the-library-in-the-middle-of-the-day-while-typing-on-the-keyboard-and-drinking-coffee-in-the-process-of-pursuing-my-academic-career-while-being-in-my-twenties-while-living-in-the-foreign-country-etc. This sequence, emphasizing the horizonal

interwovenness, can be extended to infinity. Thus, the notion of the world is the thematization of the infinity of the horizonal interwovenness.

Let us call the "etc." (*und-so-weiter*, see Husserl, 2002, 126) of the horizonal interwovenness *intertwinedness*. To claim that *this particular* horizon is intertwined means to thematize its interwovenness with the totality of horizons, namely with the world. For example, to claim that "writing the text" is intertwined means to claim that "writing the text" is writing-the-text-while-sitting-in-the-library-while-pursuing-the-academic-career-*etc*.

It can be argued that in the following-of-the-horizons-of-the-world I am rather following *these* horizons than *that* horizon. While writing the text, I am rather following the horizon of "typing on the keyboard", than "singing the opera", I am rather following the horizon of "thinking about the book", than "riding the bicycle", etc. It means that some horizons are more foregrounded and some horizons are more backgrounded. But it is also not the case that the relationship between the foreground and the background is dichotomous. As was claimed in the previous sections, there is a descent from the invisibility (background) to the visibility (foreground). In order to preserve this style of being foregrounded, let us use the notion of *situation*. Putting this through the metaphor of the waves, we could say that the situation is the surface of the ocean, whereas the ocean is the totality of the horizons, i. e., the world.

Horizons can be more or less *persistent*. By persistency, I mean the duration for which the horizon remains foregrounded. For example, the horizon of "living in a big city" can be persistent enough if I have actually spent (and still spend) most of my life in the big city. Among the persistent horizons, there are also *constantly persistent* horizons. These are the horizons that do not leave the limits of the situation and appear in every foreground. For example, the horizon of perception is a constantly persistent horizon. Perception can be less foregrounded when I am absorbed into the following of such horizons as "thinking about the mathematical equation?, but it is still interwoven with this horizon in the constellation of the situation.

That all horizons are interwoven with each other emphasizes the horizonal character of *not-ness*. In the following horizon of "washing the dishes", I am actually also "singing opera". But this horizon of "singing the opera" stays so far away in the background of the situation that I am able to add to this horizon the sense of *not-ness* — 'I am *not* singing opera while I am washing the dishes', 'I am *not* playing the table games while I am washing the dishes', etc. *Not-ness* in this sense is also subject to horizonality. It also can be expressed through the gradations.

That there is a situation means that the whole world cannot be foregrounded. From this, it follows that horizons can have different constellations of interwovenness.

For example, "writing the text" can mean either writing-the-text-on-the-laptop or writing-the-text-with-a-pen; "writing-the-text-with-a-pen" can mean either writing-the-text-with-a-pen-in-the-notebook, or writing-the-text-with-a-pen-on-the-margins-of-the-book; etc. It is not possible to foreground several horizonal constellations at the same time. It means that it is not possible, for example, to write the text with a pen and to write the text on the laptop with the keyboard at the same time. "Writing" is writing a dissertation, an essay, a testament, an anecdote, an article, an article-for-authoritative-journal, an article-for-authoritative-journal-in-a-short-time-while-studying-at-PhD, and so on. These are the different horizons that cannot be foregrounded together. Let us call this aspect of horizonal interwovenness *contingency*[20].

To express the being-in-the-world through the notion of "following" means, firstly, to avoid the isolating directionality towards the unity as it is the case with "dealing-with" and "being-directed-towards". It means, secondly, to emphasize the graduality between activity and passivity of the action. I am the one who chooses to follow the horizons, and I am the one who is guided and directed by the horizons. Thirdly, it means to indicate that the following is the following of the horizons of the whole world. When I am "writing the text", I am also "visiting the theatre" and "fighting against the cheetah". Despite the fact that I am doing this in the sense of *not-ness*, as was said earlier.

6. CONCLUSION

In the previous sections, we explicated four phenomenological figures of being-in-the-world.

1. Husserl: "I am always already directed to the object."
2. Heidegger: 'I am always already dealing with ~~something~~."
3. Gadamer: 'I am always already situated in the world."
4. The result of the phenomenological examination: "I am always already following the horizons."

We also explored various phenomenological approaches to the distinction between the visible and invisible. The explication began with Husserl's fundamental division, which posits a rigid boundary between the visible and invisible, and concluded with its complete dissolution in Gadamer's thematization of horizonal fusedness, which allows us to overcome the distinction through the notion of horizon. This paper attempted to demonstrate that the figure of being-in-the-world can vary with

[20] I take the notion of contingency from Luhmann's analysis of the paradoxical statements. See, e. g., (Luhmann, 2002, 79).

respect to the distinction between the visible and invisible. The more the boundary of this distinction dissolves, the less being-in-the-world can be explicated through directedness towards isolated sense-unities. This progressive dissolution leads from stable objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*) to an understanding of being-in-the-world as permeated by unities that are unstable, open, and mutually permeable. In the phenomenological language of Gadamer, which may be viewed as the culmination of the dissolution, there are no self-enclosed unities, but only the descent of visibility within the horizon as an exceedable limit of vision. In his phenomenological hermeneutics, only the movement of foregrounding and backgrounding remains (see Gadamer, 2004, 310). The language of unities is replaced by the language of fused horizons.

The thematization of being-in-the-world as following-the-horizons allows for a deeper critique of Dreyfus' account of intentionality in terms of action. It is not the case that our being-in-the-world is rigidly divided between the "foreground coping" and the "deliberate action", as Dreyfus claims (see Dreyfus, 2013, 28)[21]. Rather, we are faced with a whole spectrum of different ways of being-in-the-world, distinguishable by the degree of rigidity with which they draw the boundary between the visible and the invisible. The more rigid the boundary, the closer our being-in-the-world comes to deliberate action; the less rigid the boundary, the closer it comes to "total absorption" in the world. Moreover, each distinct mode of being-in-the-world appears only as an "abstraction" that cannot be fully separated from the horizonality of experience (i. e., the descent of visibility) that constitutively precedes it. Thus, the figure of following the horizons encompasses every particular way of being-in-the-world and allows for their comparison in terms of the fundamental division between the visible and the invisible.

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[21] Or, as Summa and Mertens put it, between broadly intentional behavior and intentional action (Summa & Mertens, 2018, 182; see also Summa, 2024, 207–208).

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