EDN CLCUOA

INTRODUCTORY CONTEXTS TO ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE CONSTITUTION IN E. HUSSERL'S WORKS OF VARIOUS PERIODS

NATALIA ARTEMENKO

PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor.
Independent Researcher.
198035 St. Petersburg, Russia.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3484-758X

E-mail: n.a.artemenko@gmail.com

The article examines the development and context of the problem of passive constitution in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The thematization of passive synthesis arises primarily in the later period of his work — in the *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, the *Crisis of European Sciences*, the *Cartesian Meditations*, as well as in the investigations on intersubjectivity (*Husserliana XIII–XV*). However, the groundwork for this later analysis can already be discerned in Husserl's earlier writings, such as *Ideas I*, *Ideas II*, and the *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. In these texts, Husserl distinguishes between the active and passive spheres of consciousness: the proto-synthesis of time, secondary passivity (as the result of past activity of the ego), and auxiliary perceptual syntheses that ensure continuity of experience. Although a systematic thematization of passivity is not yet present, these analyses already reveal a stratified structure of the passive sphere and its role in the constitution of subjectivity. In the later *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, the focus shifts: passivity is understood both as a condition of the normal course of perception and as the associative flow that ensures the continuity of consciousness. Thus, the development of Husserl's treatment of passivity can be seen as a movement from implicit distinctions to a systematic explication of passive syntheses, thereby opening the way to a genetic phenomenology of subjectivity.

Keywords: Husserl, phenomenology, passive synthesis, proto-synthesis of time, secondary passivity, genetic phenomenology, subjectivity.

© NATALIA ARTEMENKO, 2025

ВВОДНЫЕ КОНТЕКСТЫ РАССМОТРЕНИЯ ПАССИВНОГО КОНСТИТУИРОВАНИЯ В РАБОТАХ Э. ГУССЕРЛЯ РАЗНЫХ ПЕРИОДОВ

НАТАЛЬЯ АРТЕМЕНКО

Кандидат философских наук, доцент.
Независимый исследователь.
198035 Санкт-Петербург, Россия.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3484-758X

E-mail: n.a.artemenko@gmail.com

В статье рассматривается развитие и контекст проблематики пассивного конституирования в феноменологии Э. Гуссерля. Тематизация пассивного синтеза возникает преимущественно в поздний период его творчества — в «Анализах пассивного синтеза», «Кризисе европейских наук», «Картезианских медитациях», а также в исследованиях по интерсубъективности (XIII–XV тома Гуссерлианы). Однако уже в ранних работах, таких как «Идеи I», «Идеи II» и «Лекции по феноменологии внутреннего сознания времени», обнаруживаются предпосылки для более позднего анализа. В них Гуссерль различает активную и пассивную сферы сознания: прото-синтез времени, вторичную пассивность (как результат прошлой активности Я) и пассивные вспомогательные синтезы восприятия. Несмотря на то, что в этих текстах отсутствует собственно систематическая тематизация пассивности, они выявляют ступенчатую структуру пассивной сферы и ее роль в становлении субъективности. В поздних «Анализах пассивного синтеза» акцент смещается: пассивность понимается как условие нормального хода восприятия и как ассоциативный поток, обеспечивающий непрерывность сознания. Таким образом, развитие темы пассивности у Гуссерля можно понимать как движение от косвенных различений к последовательной экспликации пассивных синтезов, что открывает путь к генетической феноменологии субъективности.

Ключевые слова: Гуссерль, феноменология, пассивный синтез, прото-синтез времени, вторичная пассивность, генетическая феноменология, субъективность.

This article is concerned with the background and context of thematization of the passive synthesis and the sphere of passivity as such in E. Husserl's works. Husserl resorted to the theme of passive synthesis in his later works (*Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926* (Husserl, 1966; 2001), *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass* (Husserl, 1973b; 1973c; 1973d)[1], *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (Husserl, 1973a; 1960), *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phä-*

[1] Reference is made to three volumes on *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* which comprise texts on the problem of intersubjectivity; further referred to as *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. First Book* (Husserl, 1973b), *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Second Book* (Husserl, 1973c), *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Third Book* (Husserl, 1973d).

nomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (Husserl, 1976; 1970)). However, the theme of passivity was already touched upon by Husserl in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch* and *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch* (Husserl, 1950; 1952)[2], we will start with them, and, hereafter, dwell upon the text of one of Husserl's later works, namely, to *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926*.

1. "IDEAS. FIRST BOOK". "IDEAS. SECOND BOOK"

There is still no thematization of the sphere of passivity as such in *Ideas. First Book*. Nonetheless, in his *Ideas. First Book* Husserl essentially distinguished proto-synthesis of immanent time-consciousness, which doesn't belong to discrete activity of the Self, "Nevertheless, we have excluded this primal synthesis of consciousness originaliter of time (which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis) along with the set of problems belonging to it" (Husserl, 1950, 273; 1983, 283), but is the synthesis of the unity of all acts and experiencing of the Self:

> We have not aimed at, here, the *unity of consciousness of immanental time*, although that must be remembered too as the all-embracing unity for all mental processes belonging to the stream of mental processes and, more particularly, as a unity of *consciousness* combining consciousness with consciousness. If we take any particular mental process, it is thus constituted as a unity spread out in phenomenological time in the continual consciousness "originaliter" of time. <…> No matter how alien in essence mental processes can be with respect to one another, they are nonetheless constituted altogether as *one* temporal stream, as members in the *one* phenomenological time (Husserl, 1950, 273; 1983, 283).

Although, there is no direct indication of the passive nature of proto-synthesis in the work under consideration, its very distinguishing from the discrete activity of the Self is important. This distinguishing is also evident *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* (Husserl, 1969; 1980), where Husserl, in the course of his study, discovered that the time of constituted objectivity (a tripartite time structure) is substantiated on a deeper level: any intentional act has a tripartite time structure (a time environment), nonetheless, all the acts of consciousness belong to the same continuity, non-interruptible continuity of phases of time-consciousness. Thus, the stream of

[2] Reference is made to the first and second books of *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*; further referred to as *Ideas. First Book* (Husserl, 1950) and *Ideas. Second Book* (Husserl, 1952).

time-consciousness, which substantiates the structure of time constitution of objectivity, is revealed. The stream, as an infinite temporal horizon, substantiates any act, since the latter has its duration. Thus, being a condition for the continuity of consciousness, the "stream" substantiates the whole intentional life of consciousness. The temporal-constitutive stream of consciousness, discovered in the lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, turns out to be the last level of consciousness, the limit for phenomenological reflection.

In his *Ideas. Second Book*, Husserl offered the following commentary on correlation between the passive and active spheres:

> Every spontaneous act, *after* being performed, necessarily passes over into a confused state; the spontaneity, or if you will, the activity, to speak of it more properly, passes into a passivity, although of such a kind that-as has already been said-it *refers back* to the originally spontaneous and articulated performance (Husserl, 1952, 12; 1989, 13–14).

Thus, passivity derivative of spontaneity refers to it, since it has a potential to repeat, to reactivate the "vague objectivity" of the passive sphere. Moreover, Husserl designated the sphere of passivity as *secondary passivity* (*sekundäre Passivität*). *Sekundär* is a term that means both secondary (derivative) and auxiliary. In this case, both meanings are important, since a passive aesthetic synthesis, being derived from spontaneous activity of the Self, ensures its further fulfilment and, therefore, is auxiliary to it.

In the ninth paragraph of his *Ideas. Second Book*, entitled *Categorial and Aesthetic ("Sensuous") Synthesis*, Husserl indicated the auxiliary nature of the aesthetic synthesis in relation to activity of the Self (*Ich-aktivitäten*), meanwhile, the aesthetic synthesis is of the passive nature.

However, at this stage neither the aforementioned proto-synthesis of time-consciousness nor the auxiliary passive syntheses of perception were considered by Husserl as merely passive. The main point of dividing into passivity activity in *Ideas. Second Book* is dividing into the spiritual and the material (sensory) ones.

On the one hand, passivity is understood as merely the material Self in need of rational activity. In the paragraph 61 entitled *The Spiritual Ego and Its Underlying Basis* (Husserl, 1952, 275–280), Husserl distinguished two levels of subjectivity, i. e., the passive sensuality as the background of the spiritual sphere and, properly, the sphere of spirit. He noted that,

> Hence if we take the personal Ego in its developmental nexus, then we find *two layers*… we find a two-fold "subjectivity": *the higher* one *is the specifically spiritual,* the stratum of the *intellectus agens,* of the free Ego as Ego of free acts, including all proper acts of reason,

> the positive ones and the negative as well. The unfree Ego also belongs here, "unfree" taken precisely in the sense in which it applies to an actual Ego: I allow myself to be dragged down by the sensual. The specifically spiritual Ego, the subject of spiritual acts, the person, finds itself dependent on an *obscure underlying basis (Untergründe)* of traits of character (*Charakteranlagen*), original and latent dispositions, and thereby dependent on nature.
>
> We rejoin here the ancient distinction, which imposed itself so early, between reason and sensibility. <…> In the sphere of the senses, in the sphere of the basis, grasped as extensively as possible, we have associations, perserverances, determining tendencies, etc. These "make" the constitution of nature, but they even extend further, *since* this constitution is also there for spirits: all life of the spirit is permeated by the "blind" operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives, tendencies which emerge in obscurity, etc. … (Husserl, 1950, 276–277; 1989, 289).

In this case, the "blind" sensuality is understood as a supplier of matter for rational activity of the Self.

On the other hand, passivity is understood as secondary passivity, that is, as once-being-activity of the Self. Therefore, passivity represents nothing more than a transitional moment of activity, since it is either not-yet or no-longer activity. And yet, we believe that the discussion of proto-synthesis, proto-possession, and auxiliary passivity is important since it indicates the direction the meaning of passivity developed in in Husserl's later works.

Thus, even a glance at conditional thematization of passivity in the works of the period under consideration *(On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), Ideas. First Book, Ideas. Second Book),* allows us to note the stepped nature of the passive sphere. Passivity was considered in the following senses: (1) passivity as the passive material, passive sensibility *(Ideas. Second Book)* or the passive impression *(On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)),* (2) passivity, as secondary passivity, is the result of activity of the Self (*Ich-aktivitäten*) *(Ideas. Second Book),* (3) the auxiliary reproductive function of the aesthetic synthesis ensures the continuity of perception (transition within one act, for instance, from perceiving one side of the table to perceiving the other side) *(Ideas. Second Book),* passivity as the proto-synthesis of time-consciousness ensuring the continuity of succession of acts through time *(Ideas. First Book, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)).*

The above cited classification is relative, as these works essentially lack thematization of passive constitution as such. However, the auxiliary role of the syntheses occurring without of activity the Self and ensuring normal perceiving becomes apparent even at this stage. Moreover, the sphere of passive sensibility becomes apparent in *Ideas. First Book* as the very foundation which becoming of subjectivity occurs from,

and, herein, the direction for developing the genetic correlation between passivity and activity is getting indirectly outlined. Understanding subjectivity as the becoming one, developing by stages, is a step towards the genetic research entailing thematization of the sphere of *primary* passivity, which was put under consideration in Husserl's later manuscripts. In the context of the above-mentioned classification of the various meanings of passivity, it is important to note the fundamental difference between secondary passivity (the once-being activity of the Self) and other meanings of passivity as initially deprived of activity of the Self.

2. "ANALYSES CONCERNING ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SYNTHESIS"[3]

Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, as well as the above-mentioned works, dates back to the period which followed the "transcendental shift". Over the 1920s, Husserl delivered a series of lectures on proto-constitutions (*Urkonstitutuionen*) and their phenomenological justification. The manuscripts of lectures and research papers on this topic written between 1918 and 1926 were collected and included into the 12th volume of Husserliana, published under the title of *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*. However, this title does not entirely correspond to the content of the volume in question: the manuscripts comprised in this book, to a greater extent, present the analytical study of constructing stages (*Stufenbau*) of constitutive realizations of consciousness, a description of flowing of the stream of time-consciousness, revealing of the inner structure of the syntheses of perception and the synthesis of association, rather than a study of their passive nature as such. Husserl emphasized the passive nature of syntheses, and yet he did not make it a particular subject of study. Moreover, defining the significance of his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl speaks of the need (which, however, was not accommodated by him within these texts) to explore the stream of consciousness as such (*an sich*), which reveals the inadequacy of static description and leads to the problematic of his later texts on constitution of time.

In his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* Husserl addressed thematization of passivity in two senses: as auxiliary empirical (reproductive) syntheses that ensure the normal perceiving, and as the proto-associative unity of the time syntheses. Moreover, this work opened up potential to understanded passive synthesis not only as the reproductive, but also as the productive one.

---

[3] Husserl, E. (1966). *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926* (Hua XI). Den Haag: M. Nijhoff; Husserl, E. (2001). *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Trans. A. J. Steinbock. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer. Further referred to as *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis.*

Let us refer to the tests introduced in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, while we will keep our prime focus on the text of the lecture on the passive synthesis, in its 1925/1926 version[4]. What crucially distinguishes Husserl's understanding of the passive sphere presented in his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* from the interpretation characteristic of his previous works? This is the question we will attempt to answer.

§ 1. THE PASSIVE SYNTHESIS IN PERCEPTION

In the introduction to his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, Husserl considered passivity as auxiliary passivity, not as secondary to activity of the Self, but as the one that ensures normal experiencing. In the first instance, we will examine the phenomenon of self-giving in perception, namely, the characteristic objective sense of perception and the syntheses of coincidence which constitute it. After, we will analyze modalization (*Modalisierung*) of the syntheses of perception. Thereafter, we will review the associative synthesis and the passive motivation of presentations.

1.1. Self-giving (*Selbstgebung*) in perception

By Husserl, any external perception occurs amid an infinite number of perspectives for examination of an object being concealed[5]: thus, a spatial object can be given in perception only from one of its sides, but not in the entirety of its sensory-perceived features. In this regard, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the actually perceived one (one side of an object) and that which becomes just co-presented in given perception (sides of an object hidden from view at that point). However, despite the fundamental incompleteness of perception of such kind, it is not the particular presently-perceived sides that are constituted as objects, but the very object as such: as, for instance, we see not a section of a table, but the table as such despite the fact that it is just a side of the table that is actually being perceived. Perception of the table as such instead of one of its sides indicates that the objective sense remains unchangeable through changing of perceptions of an object[6].

---

[4] Husserl delivered this lecture three times in Freiburg: over the winter term of 1920/21, over the summer term of 1923 and over the winter term of 1925/26. In both cases of repeating the lectures, Husserl revised the text.

[5] Cf. also (Husserl, 1973e).

[6] Husserl gives the following explanation of this idea: "Thus, this fundamental division between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial structure of the correlation: External perception and bodily 'object'. When we view the table, we view it from some

Due to unchangeability of the objective sense of perception, the perceived object is constituted as identical to itself through time, thus, gradually perceived parts of the table are perceived as parts of the same table, but not as different objects. The continuous preservation of the objective sense of a perceived object is ensured not by activity of the Self, but by the syntheses of coincidence. The objective sense of perception is constituted in the passive syntheses of coincidence (cf. Husserl, 1966, 8; 2001, 44).

Perception of a spatial object amid the obscurity of its perspectives is made possible by the passively constituted constancy of the objective sense. Husserl spoke of "self-giving" of an object in perception in this vein. An object "in-itself" is given in perception, as it is in-itself, regardless of its appearing side. Moreover, it is only an object "in-itself" (for example, a table) that can be given in perception, but not its side, regardless of its being a side of the table, which once again indicate the passive nature of the course of the syntheses of "coincidence".

1.2. Modalization of consciousness and syntheses of perception

Husserl believed that there is also a certain "emptiness" inherent in perceiving, along with the fullness of contemplation. Husserl explained the abovesaid in a following way, "Every momentary phase of perception is in itself a network of partially full and partially empty intentions. For, in every phase we have genuine appearances, that is, a fulfilled intention, albeit only gradually fulfilled, since there remains an inner horizon that is unfulfilled and an inner horizon of indeterminacy that is still determinable" (Husserl, 1966, 8; 2001, 44–45).

"An inner horizon of indeterminacy" is a "determinable indeterminacy" which means that every manifestation is entwined with the intentional, empty horizon. Objects of perception (with obscured perspective inherent in perception) are given in-themselves through fulfillment of protentions of not-yet-perceived sides of an object and through retaining its already-perceived sides. The side of the table appearing in the proto-impressional Now represents the fulfillment of protention during ap-

particular side, and this side is thereby what is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a variety of complexes of possible visibility. That is a very curious situation peculiar to the very essence of the matter at hand. For proper to the very sense of every perception is perception's perceived object as its objective sense, that is, this thing, the table that is seen. But this thing is not [merely] the side genuinely seen in this moment; rather (according to the very sense of perception) the thing is precisely the full-thing that has still other sides, sides that are not brought to genuine perception in this perception, but that would be brought to genuine perception in other perceptions. Generally speaking, perception is original consciousness (*Originalbewußtsein*)" (Husserl, 1966, 4; 2001, 40).

pearing. Retentive anticipation and protentive retention make the "empty" horizon of perception. Husserl suggested that, in case of "normal" perceiving, protentions are getting fulfilled, and the objective sense remains unnamed through the synthesis of coincidence. Thus, such constitutive fulfillments of consciousness, defined by Husserl as the syntheses of fulfillment (Husserl, 1966, 25; 2001, 63), make the syntheses of coincidence, responsible for preserving the objective sense of a multi-manifested object throughout experience, possible.

The "empty horizon" in the context of *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* is seen as the horizon of perceiving a separate object in relation to its currently hidden characteristics. However, the "empty horizon" is also the outer horizon of the non-given one, as can be seen from analyses of the phenomenon of the "empty horizon" made by Husserl in his other works. Thus, in his *First Philosophy* (Husserl, 1959), Husserl defined the empty horizon "hidden from view" as a part of the horizon continuously adjacent to the "area of that which is evidently-given" (Husserl, 1959, 147, my translation. — *N. A.*)[7].

Moreover, in Appendix XVIII (*Fictitious Modes of My Stream of Time-Consciousness*) to the second book of his *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*, Husserl gave the following explanation to the meaning of the empty horizon:

> In its true sense the horizon is not an empty presentation, [yet] it highlights (*heraushebt*) this empty presentation, which comes to awakening in it… The empty horizon is, though, not the closed-in-itself and defined consciousness, in its turn, of a defiantly or indefinitely imagined object, but is a mode of consciousness attached to a presentation (*ist ein einer Vorstellung anhaftender Bewusstseinmodus*)… (Husserl, 1973c, 150, my translation. — *N. A.*).

Thus, by Husserl the "empty" horizon is the horizon which restricts perception as the area of that which is non-given. The "empty" horizon is formed by "empty intentions", in other words, by implying but not fulfilled through contemplating intentions. Owing to these implying intentions, the field of that which is sensory-given in perception has no strict boundaries, but shows a gradual shift into the horizon of that which is not-given. That allows perception, being only a fragment cut out "'from' the world, from the universe of things of possible perceptions" (Husserl, 1976, 165; 1970, 162)[8], to be fulfilled as perception "in" the world.

---

[7] Cf. also: „Im Außenhorizont zu scheiden der Bereich noch wahrnehmungsmäßiger Anschaulichkeit und der unanschauliche Leerhorizont. Dieser umspannt die ganze We1t als einen unendlichen Horizont möglicher Erfahrung, dem ein bestimmter Einheitsstil vorgezeichnet ist" (Husserl, 1959, 308).

[8] "The thing is one out of the total group of simultaneously actually perceived things; but this group is not, for us, for consciousness, the world; rather, the world exhibits itself in it; such a group, as

Such expanded understanding of the "empty" horizon is also substantiated by some special "empty" co-representative presentations being present in perception, which will become an issue under considered in the next paragraph devoted to synthesis of association.

We have examined the "normal" course of perceiving and the syntheses characteristic of it. However, Husserl has also defined some other modifications of consciousness corresponding to disruptions in normal course of perceiving. Namely: the mode of confidence (which correlates with the syntheses of fulfillment in perception), the mode of denial (denoting reverse erasing of that which is retained and that which is potentially expected through "disappointment", resulting from the syntheses opposite to the syntheses of fulfillment), the mode of doubt (representing a shift between the modes of confidence and denial).

Now, after considering the constitutive syntheses of perception and modalization of consciousness in perception, we should reveal the essentially passive nature of these constitutive fulfilments and their influence on the active sphere. Husserl explained it in a following way, "Looking back at our initial introduction to the modalities of being and the modalities of belief, we recognize that everything that was disclosed at that time was initially a modalization taking place purely in the intentionality of perception, potentially as completely passive". On this basis, Husserl believed that, "It is clear now that we must distinguish between the passivity and the activity of the ego: (1) modal modifications of passive doxa, of passive intentions of expectation, their inhibitions passively accruing to them, and the like; (2) responsively taking a position that is peculiar to making a decision, doing so actively, as proceeding from the ego" (Husserl, 1966, 51–52; 2001, 92).

Thus, Husserl emphasised the need to distinguish between the spheres of passivity and activity of the Self. The distinction between the passive and active spheres is based on the essential differences in processes occurring within them and their constitutive influence. Eventually, Husserl distinguishes between "passivity" and "activity" in a following way,

> (1) Initially in passivity the syntheses of concordance or discordance, of uninhibited intentions that are fulfilled freely, or inhibited intentions that are crossed out, etc. And correlatively, we have in the noema modes of being that maintain the identical objective sense, possibly in connection with an opposing sense. (2) The active position-takings (*Stellungnahmen*) of the ego, the active decisions, convictions, letting oneself be convinced, and taking sides, etc., and finally the activity of conviction in the broadest sense (where we no longer speak strictly of testifying for or against). These activities also have their noematic

---

the momentary field of perception, always has the character for us of a sector "of" the world, of the universe of things for possible perceptions" (Husserl, 1970, 162).

> correlates. We must note here that it is not a matter of merely making passive intentionality patent (*Patentmachen*); it is not a matter of becoming merely cognitively aware in perceiving, a mere living through the enticement that is taking place in an attentive turning-toward, that is, a matter of merely becoming consciously attentive to enticements, nullities, and the like. Rather, the ego passes its judgment in its own position-taking, *it makes* a decision for or against, and so forth. One may well say that here lies the specific source for what we normally mean or can mean by judging (Husserl, 1966, 52–53; 2001, 92–93).

According to the above mentioned quotations the syntheses of "consistency" and "inconsistency" correlatively correspond, in the noematic area, to certain "modalities of being" (*Seinsmodalitäten*), which means that modalization of the syntheses of perception is occurring passively, since the very syntheses of "consistency" (fulfilment) and "inconsistency" (disappointment), underlining the specific modes of consciousness (confidence, doubt, denial), are occurring passively without any active intervention of the perceiving "Self", to whom the perceived object is always already-given in a certain mode of consciousness. The activity of the Self is only capable of post-factum arriving at a conclusion about a subject, since such constitutive realizations of the decisions, convictions, etc. belong to the sphere of activity of the Self.

Thus, the sphere of passive constitution includes the syntheses of perception and the associated modalities of consciousness of an object[9] and passive intentionality, since the horizon of perception ("the empty horizon") is formed passively. Since, as it was shown above, the passive syntheses of perception are presupposed by activity of the Self (in the genetic sense they precede it), they are also designated by Husserl as proto-constitutions (*Urkonstitutionen*).

1.2.1. Synthesis of time-consciousness as a passive "proto-association"

Stemming from considering the passive synthesis as the synthesis of constitution of the protential-retentive temporal structure of consciousness, let us resort to the text from Appendix XVIII[10] to *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*. Husserl outlined a general

---

[9] It should be noted that, along with passive, Husserl also distinguishes active modalization, so the above-mentioned modalities of consciousness, while passive, can also be active. Thus, for instance, the mode of doubt can also be a consciously adopted attitude toward an object. In order to support this statement, let us make a following quotation: "Rather, it is clear that a subjective-active comportment of the ego-precisely what we characterize in the genuine sense by the term 'doubt', or the expression 'I doubt whether it is this or that' — also corresponds to what we called, already in perception itself and in its passive course, a split perception, 'perception modalized as a doubtful perception'" (Husserl, 1966, 57; 2001, 97–98).

[10] Beilage XVIII: *Assoziation und Synthesis (1925)* / Appendix 18: *Association and Synthesis*. (Husserl, 1966, 405–411; 2001, 505–512).

study of the synthesis of association in this text. Herein, associations were understood by him as the universal, genetic principle for synthetic constitution of life of consciousness. Let us quote, "Synthesis in its different shapes as universal unification of the life of an ego = association in the broadest sense". Association is a law of the "spiritual" sphere, in other words, the law of motivation, as opposed to the law of causality of nature. Husserl also emphasized the passive nature of the synthesis of association, "[Association is] the consciousness of similarity without active relating" (Husserl, 1966, 405–406; 2001, 505).

At the end of the manuscript under consideration (Husserl, 1966, 408–409; 2001, 508–510), Husserl defined the temporal synthesis of the unity of the stream of time-consciousness as "proto-association". The stream of time-consciousness in its original unity is constituted in a continuous flowing at various levels of synthesis of associations.

Thus, the synthesis of "association" in the broader sense is understood by Husserl as passive constitution of the unity of consciousness and subjectivity as such. It stands to mention that a plan for examining the various levels of the passive synthesis of association, representing a certain stepped structure (*Stufenbau*) of the life of consciousness was outlined by Husserl in this manuscript as well. He emphasised that the study of associative synthesis involves revealing the passive side of actual (empirical) experience, revealing the passive (in the sense of unconscious) life of consciousness (Husserl, 1966, 408; 2001, 508). However, since in the purpose of this paper is an attempt to cover the passive synthesis as the transcendental synthesis that underlies constitution of subjectivity (and, let us note, alongside this, of intersubjectivity), we will not analyze the passive (in the sense of unconscious) life of consciousness (although later in his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* Husserl proceeded to the study of the passive synthesis as the principle of actual affective life of consciousness, affective awakening in memories, etc.). Such analysis should be a subject of a specific study, shifting to the field of phenomenological psychology[11].

§ 2. ASSOCIATIVE SYNTHESIS AND PASSIVELY DIRECTED PRESENTATION (PASSIVE INTENTION)

However, the topic of passive syntheses studied by Husserl in his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* goes beyond the above discussed syntheses of consistency and inconsistency of experience. Let us consider the associative syntheses, presented in the third section of *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*. The syntheses of associ-

[11] Since the study of intentional consciousness from the perspective of revealing its actual distinctive special being belongs precisely to the field of phenomenological psychology, which is distinguished by Husserl from transcendental phenomenology. Cf. (Husserl, 1962, 343).

ation will be considered together with the associated phenomenon of passively directed presentation, which the former impart passive nature to.

For these purposes, we should first consider "empty presentations". The "empty presentations", in their own way, are the opposite of contemplation. Unlike in contemplation, there is no objective sense implemented in empty presentations, there is nothing presented in them, or, as Husserl puts it, "Nothing takes place genuinely in the empty presentation, an objective sense is not genuinely constituted" (Husserl, 1966, 72; 2001, 114).

Husserl has classified three following types of empty presentations. The empty presentations of the first type of are those that stay after contemplation ceases, they are the retentional moment of intentionality. Empty presentations of the second type are the presentations focused on something not-yet-given in contemplation, in other words, the protential moment of intentionality. Protentions and retentions surrounding the proto-impressional "Now" with a horizon of the future and the past, which are the "proto-regularities" of the passive genesis, "govern the life of consciousness as the time-constituting unitary stream" (Husserl, 1966, 73; 2001, 115).

The third type of the empty presentations suggested by Husserl which is of an interest to us, are the making co-present (*Mitvergegenwärtigung*)[12] empty presentations, which do not present an object, and yet they are focused on it; they imply an object as co-present with the actually-perceived one. The presentation of such kind gets "awakened" through the constitutive realization of consciousness, which is defined by Husserl as the "associative synthesis". An evident presentation occurring in actual perception awakens an empty presentation through the associative synthesis[13].

However, there is a number of following questions which were left without answers: Is the synthesis of association of passive nature and how does the synthesis of association correlate with the passively directed presentation? We are able to find a clear answer to the first of them: Husserl insisted that the syntheses of association

[12] Husserl has also defined them as memories of the present (*Gegenwartserrinerungen*).

[13] Husserl has explained in in the following way, "The connection of this perceptual presentation with the empty presentation is a 'synthetic' one, which is to say, a unity of consciousness is produced that carries out a new constitutive accomplishment, whereby the both objectlike formations receive special characters of unity noematically. More precisely, the perceptual presentation, what appears perceptually in this way or that, points to the emptily presented object as something that consequently belongs to it. A directed ray arises in perception and goes clean through the empty presentation to what is presented in it. From a genetic perspective, we also say with reason that the perception has awakened the presentation, but awakening means precisely both the emergence of a synthesis of directedness in which the one presentation is 'directed toward' and in which the opposing presentation is accordingly directed in itself…" (Husserl, 1966, 75; 2001, 117–118).

"are not syntheses that the ego has actively instituted; rather they are syntheses that are produced in pure passivity and that nevertheless can then be produced when the particular lived-experiences entering into connection with one another have arisen from the activity of the ego" (Husserl, 1966, 76; 2001, 118).

The above said indicates that not only in a case of natural passive perceiving, but also in a case of active resorting to it (for instance, in a case when I consciously decide to focus on a table), the associative synthesis that awakens empty presentations will also proceed passively. As for the second question, Husserl gave the following answer to it:

> If, from the very beginning, we remain focused most simply on the realm that already has our exclusive interest now, the realm of passive presentations as the material for passively emerging syntheses, then we will be concerned generally speaking with such syntheses in which a presentation points beyond itself to another presentation. The latter thereby gains a new inner character that it otherwise could not have. It is the character of the specific "intention", that is, of teleological directedness, of being-intended, of meant-ness… (Husserl, 1966, 76; 2001, 118).

Thus, through the passively occurring synthesis of association, empty presentations acquire a specific direction (passive intention) towards their object, which, at the same time, is not the object of presentation. On this premise, it is clear that the previously discussed making co-present empty presentation is a *passively* directed presentation. Herein, it is crucial to reiterate the *passive* nature of awakening of empty presentations: although an empty presentation always gets awakened solely in connection with some evident presentation of actual experience and is motivated by it, an empty presentation as such is passively awakened, revealing the pre-given "empty" horizon of an object.

2.1. "Productive" and reproductive association

In his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* Husserl considered the associative synthesis (and associative awakening, in particular) in a dual sense. On the one hand, the associative synthesis is understood as reproductive, in other words, associatively awakening the concrete empty presentations (for instance, presupposing a currently invisible side of an object) and awakening the affective perception in the present, thus ensuring normal perceiving or remembering. Thus, Husserl first defines association as a doctrine of genesis of reproduction and its formations. On the other hand, the associative synthesis is understood as "productive" (proto-association), in other words, as the one which awakens the passive intention and determines the nature of con-

stitution of the passive horizon. The matter under consideration in the second case is not reproduction of the specific, previously experienced presentations and their incorporating into the passive horizon of perception, but awakening (generating) the direction for constituting the horizon of the world and the very nature of intention to constitute the world. In his work *Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit* (Landgrebe, 2010), Landgrebe explained the aforementioned "productive" nature of associative awakening in a following way. He believes that the initial attuning (*stimmungsmässige*) opening of the horizon becomes evident not as conditioned by (*bedingtdurch*) the associative "memories-of…" moods, certain and understood as ready and distinguishable, but as conditioned by the attunement of life itself. There are two aspects that also must be distinguished in such understanding of association: the proto-associative synthesis as awakening in the current present[14], and the original passive synthesis as awakening of the very intention for affectation. It stands to mention that the matter under consideration here is not two distinct processes, but solely different levels of the same constitutive fulfillment. To be precise, the issue here is two research perspectives to a *single* constitutive fulfillment, i. e., a reflexive description and archaeological questioning of the primary source of constitution.

Our interest lies precisely in this second meaning of "associative awakening", which Husserl mentioned but did not essentially examine in his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*. We think that the reason this examining never took place roots in the lack of motivation for a dismantling reduction to the realm of the primary subjectivity.

We have already posed a working hypothesis (see Artemenko, 2019) which suggests that shifting to reconstructive genetic research, which enabled the sphere of passive constitution of primary subjectivity to be revealed, was motivated by the need to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity. The fundamental analysis of the passive synthesis (as well as general rethinking of the very concepts of passivity and activity), the dismantling method was developed for, was required precisely to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl didn't intend to solve the problem of intersubjectivity in the texts under consideration, thus the study was confined to describing the actual passive life of consciousness.

The associative synthesis, as the productive one, sets the specific nature for forming of the horizon of perception, awakening an intentional impulse of the spe-

[14] Cf. "…under the rubric of primordial association, was that systematic or systematizing affective awakening that makes possible the objectlike structure of the living present, all kinds of original syntheses proper to the formation of unity of manifolds" (Husserl, 1966, 180; 2001, 230).

cific nature, with the specific direction, the attunement for constituting the world. The associative synthesis, as a transcendental principle of genesis, as the law of the motivational relation in the realm of passivity, determines the intentionality of this impulse as well. The associative synthesis awakens not just the passive, empty horizon of perception, but also a passive intentional impulse (*Triebintentionalität*)[15]. In relation to the primary passive constitution, the intentional impulse awakened by the associative synthesis is of secondary nature. It gets awakened by it as the intention of the specific nature.

Let us see how the passive synthesis of association, awakening the intentional impulse was considered in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*. As it was noted above, *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* lacks direct thematization of the passive synthesis as the primary "productive" synthesis which a passive intention (intentional impulse) toward self-constitution and constitution of the intersubjective world is awakened in. The concept of an intentional impulse was introduced in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* amid considering affectation. Let us cite a passage revealing the meaning of affectation, "By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego" (Husserl, 1966, 148; 2001, 196). And further, "it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object" (Husserl, 1966, 148–149; 2001, 196). Husserl defined such action, extending to the Self, as awakening. The analysis of *affectation* is made by Husserl as a description of the passive side of actual experience of the objective world (Husserl, 1966, 148–154; 2001, 196–202), experience of the already-constituted individual Self (Husserl, 1966, 172–176; 2001, 220–225). However, such analysis gives no room for considering an original intentional impulse, which is not yet a habitually established intentional impulse[16], but only "innate" striving-for a certain realization. In this regard, we should note the distinction between affectation and a tendency to affectation made by Husserl (Husserl, 1966, 161; 2001, 209). Herein, Husserl introduced an example of perceiving a melody:

---

[15] An intentional impulse is neither a blind instinct, nor an amorphous will of the philosophy of life. The impulse is already endowed with an intentional structure.

[16] Husserl examines the habitually established, realized intentional impulse in text no. 11 dated 1930–1931, published in the third volume of *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* (Nr. 11 *Apodiktische Struktur der transzendentalen Subjektivität. Problem der transzendentalen Konstitution der Welt von Normalitätät aus*). Husserl defines such realized impulse as habituality of an act (*Akthabitualitäten*), which is secondary to an act and, therefore, it is only secondary passivity. Cf. (Husserl, 1973d, 148).

in the first instance, music plays so softly or indistinctly that we don't hear a melody (it remains unnoticed by us), but in a while the music gets louder and affects us; we perceive the melody while noticing its continuous sounding, that is, its sounding which had preceded the moment it became distinct and attracted our attention (that is, affected us). Thus, there is the pre-affective level[17], the tendency to affectation, the "attunement-for" in affectation. This passive focusing, preceding affective awakening in actual experience, preceding the Self's active resorting, is the very intentional impulse. It is beyond any doubt now, that even if one can speak of the passive synthesis awakening an intentional impulse, then a matter under discussion must be the certain proto-affective synthesis awakening (generating) a process of temporal constitution. Thus, awakening of the passive intentional impulse belongs to passive constitution in primary subjectivity, to the Self's transcendental birth. The following reflection which belongs Husserl's archival manuscripts on intersubjective constitution confirms the aforesaid interpretation: "My transcendental birth. Innate instincts[18] are instincts awakening during the 'passive', 'out-lying to my Self' (*Ich-losen*), temporal becoming (*Zeitigung*), which constitutes the primordial ground (*Urboden*). They 'awake by turn' which means that the unities constituted in the primordial ground emanate affections directed toward the Self-pole."[19] The "productive" (creative) primary passive synthesis should be understood in this very sense, since it is the beginning of self-constituting of the Self, his transcendental birth. The intentional impulse to constitute subjectivity in the intersubjective world awakens in the primary passive synthesis. Thus, it is the primary intentional impulse, awakened in primary constitution, that stands behind the teleology of subjective constitution, which Husserl refers to in his later works[20]; this is precisely the teleological meaning of the primary intentional impulse, "It seems

[17] Herein, Husserl distinguishes between the pre-affective syntheses which do not involve the Self, and actual affectation as involving (awakening of activity) the Self (Husserl, 1966, 153; 2001, 200–201). The latter are presupposed by the former (Husserl, 1966, 159; 2001, 207) and represent a sort of condition for them becoming possible. However, these pre-affective and affective syntheses are not separate processes; they are moments of the "entire" passive synthesis.

[18] This article leaves out the issue of the correlation between the primary passive synthesis and an instinct. Instincts and affects intrinsic to the life of consciousness undoubtedly belong to the realm of passivity; however, we should refrain from a hasty, simplifying identification of the primary passive genesis (as the primary constitution) with the passive affective syntheses. As it was stated above, they constitute the "entirety" of the passive synthesis, yet they must be distinguished as different perspectives on the passive synthesis: the static-reflexive and the archaeological-reductive ones.

[19] An archival manuscript: Ms B III 3, 8 (1933). Quoted after: (Lee, 1993, 164, my translation. — *N. A.*).

[20] Cf. text no. 22 *Teleologie. Die Implikation des Eidos transzendentale Intersubjektivität im Eidos transzendentales Ich (aufgrund von Noten vom 5. November 1931)* (Husserl, 1973d, 378–387).

that constitution of the whole world has been already "instinctively" predetermined for me, since the functions implementing it possess their most essential characteristics (*ihr Wesens-ABC*), their essential grammar in advance (*im voraus*)" (Husserl, 1973d, 385, my translation. — *N. A.)*. Thus, the primary productive passive synthesis (passive constitution) awakens a "subject of the impulse", or, to be precise, awakens a subject's impulse toward subjective constitution (towards bodily constitution of the Self in the intersubjective world). In his book *Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Husserl*, Ichiro Yamaguchi, a Japanese researcher of Husserl's phenomenology (Yamaguchi, 1982), considering the associative synthesis which an intentional impulse is awakened in as a proto-association (a primary passive synthesis), cites the following fragments from the late unpublished manuscripts of group E (pertain to intersubjective constitution) as an example of characteristics of an intentional impulse awakened in this synthesis: "Every transcendental Self has [something] innate — one innately has the 'teleological foundation' for one's streaming constitutive transcendental life in oneself, which one constitutes oneself as a human being in, constituting the world (*zeitigend*) in time."[21] And further: "Affectations and acts have been already-focused (*abgestellt*) on ontological constitution. [This is how they manifest their] teleological [character]. The [very] course of associatively temporizing fulfilment has teleological meaning; it is already "attuned-for" (*angelegtauf*)."[22] This intentional impulse is getting fulfilled through constitution of subjectivity[23].

§ 3. THE SUMMARY OF ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE SYNTHESIS

The study of the passive syntheses of perception analyzed in this paper is primarily of descriptive nature. The course of these syntheses remains hidden amid the "normal course" of perceiving; however, the phenomenological reflection makes their revealing (description) for the "Self" possible. We can find the similar observations concerning the constitutive syntheses of time- consciousness in the lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*. However, there is a crucial distinction: the very indication of the passive nature of the syntheses is possible only within the genetic perspective, when the phenomenal one begins to be con-

[21] Transcr. E. III 9, S. 7a (1933). Quoted after: (Yamaguchi, 1982, 57, my translation. — *N. A.*).

[22] Transcr. E. III 9, S. 5a (1933). Quoted after: (Yamaguchi, 1982, 58, my translation. — *N. A.*).

[23] Cf. "This impulse primely achieves its synthetic action only through its actual fulfillment, which inevitably becomes possible along with all the other components of the proto-structure of receptive fields, kinestheses and the emotional (*gefühlhaften*) general feeling" (Yamaguchi, 1982, 59, my translation. — *N .A.)*.

sidered not only as the "given" but also as "pre-given" one, in other words, as the one possessing a certain genesis. And yet it must be concluded that the aforementioned description of the passive syntheses of perception has not yet attained the final aim of the *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* i. e., reveling the very (*an sich*) stream of time-consciousness.

Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis revealed the sphere of passivity as the sphere of flowing of the temporal syntheses, that associative forming of the horizon of perception also occurs within the temporal constitution of the stream of time-consciousness. However, at this point, it is worth asking: what exactly makes *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* so remarkable in comparison to the lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*? Foremost, the texts comprised in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* are made crucially important by articulation of the problem of thematizing the sphere of passivity. Here, passivity denotes neither merely material that has not yet become part of active fulfilment (hyletic), nor secondary passivity, as once-being-activity, but temporary constitution itself (the constitution of perception, the horizon of perception), as well as constitution (affective awakening) of the very Self. The sphere of passivity was considered as forming of a horizon which is *genesis in-itself*, forming in a sense of allowing for becoming, as it was noted by Landgrebe (2010). Thus, the crucial innovation in these texts lies in the fact that primary passivity is no longer understood as the pre-impressional givenness, passive material for fulfillment of the syntheses of time-consciousness. Husserl has shifted from dividing into the hyletic as passive material and the functional Self intrinsic to the lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*. Such division entails solipsism which makes constructing of intersubjectivity problematic. The "sphere of the hyletic" understood as the ultimate passivity that has not yet become the *content* for fulfillment of activity of the Self, in this sense, is out-lying to the Self (*Nicht-Ichliche*) (Husserl, 1973d, 287). The sphere of the primary subjectivity is also the sphere out-lying to the Self, but not as opposing to the Self , but as the sphere with no distinction between the Self and the Other Self (*Ur-Ich, Vor-Ich*). In his later works[24] Husserl considered the sphere of primary passivity as the sphere of impersonal transcendental life, defined as the "proto-Self" (fore-being of the Self) only by virtue of homonymy; such analyzing of the sphere of primary passivity allows us to speak of passive constitution of intersubjectivity.

[24] The shift from dividing into the hyletic and fulfillment of the Self is also evident in *Cartesian Meditations*, where Husserl speaks of the passive synthesis that itself provides all the material.

In the chapter devoted to the problem of passive constitution of his *Faktizität und Individuation* (Landgrebe, 1982, 71–87), Landgrebe arguing that the constitutive fulfillments of primary passivity should not be understood as the "empty forms" related to the proto-impressional content, made the following observation on dividing into the Self's primary fulfillments and the sphere of the hyletic one, "It might seem at first that all concepts of constitutive fulfilments of time-forming (*Zeitbildung*) were just the concepts of mere *forms* of activity (*Funktionsformen*), requiring some given content in order to simply make a move. In his lectures on time-consciousness, Husserl understands this content as the hyletic givenness, which the proto-impressional consciousness corresponds to. [We find] the same meaning of hylé understood as formless material in his *Ideas* <…>. In spite of it, we should note that these concepts of hylé and the primordial impression corresponding to it were later discarded" (Landgrebe, 1982, 79, my translation. — *N. A.)*.

Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis has already clearly revealed that constitution of the Self occurs, in a certain sense, from his own self (the proto-impressional one as such is the result of passive self-affection). However, it is worth keeping in mind that the proto-Self, "carrying out" self-affection and temporal self-constitution, is define as "the Self" only by virtue of homonymy. As we attempted to show above within the interpretation of the passive synthesis of association in its relation to passive intentionality, in his *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, alongside reproductive passivity ensuring normal experiencing, Husserl already emphasized the presence of the primary, proto-associative, "productive" synthesis that awakens the very constitution of subjectivity. However, despite this aspect of the passive synthesis being indicated in *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis,* it was not examined there in its essence.

In this regard, it is also important to note that the static description, the intentional analysis of time-consciousness, is insufficient to reveal the sphere of passivity as the sphere of inner (*an sich*) course of subjectivity. The task of analyzing the very stream of time- consciousness, outlines, though, in implicitly, the problem of the method of revealing the sphere of passivity, since it is the passive fulfillment of the life of consciousness, its being, eluding reflexive attempts to comprehend it, from the phenomenological reflection that objectifies it, that the analysis strives for. In the paragraph 27 entitled *The Presuppositions of Associative Synthesis. The Syntheses of Original Time-Consciousness* Husserl spoke of this insufficiency of the description of the syntheses of time-consciousness for revealing the sphere of the passive being of consciousness.

Let us resort to the text of paragraph 27, which reveals the full scope of the problematics of the analysis. Herein, Husserl adhered to the following line of reason-

ing. Considering passive constitution of the very Self, his "inner being" is primary in relation to considering passive constitution of possessing the world:

> But lying deeper and essentially preceding this is the problem of the inner, the purely immanent objectlike formation and the constitution, as it were, of the innerworld (*Innenwelt*), that is, precisely the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience as being for itself (*als für es selbst seind*), as the field of all being proper to it as its very own (*ihm selbst eigen zugehörigen*) (Husserl, 1966, 126; 2001, 171).

This transcendental life of consciousness is not exhausted by the constitutive temporal syntheses of perception:

> It is extremely important to note that under the rubric of time-constituting syntheses, we consider not only the syntheses of the temporal object's retention and protention that belong on the whole and for itself to some kind of temporal object, but also that the concrete, full living present (*Lebensgegenwart*) is a unity arising from a synthesis encompassing it. (Husserl, 1966, 126; 2001, 172).

However, it is this inner life of consciousness, that is not captured by the method of the intentional analysis: the intentional analysis of time-consciousness "and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions"[25]. Being of the abstract nature, the intentional analysis of time-consciousness does not capture the deeper level of being of consciousness, "it does not give us any idea of the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the presents-which in some way concerns the particularity of content" (Husserl, 1966, 128; 2001, 174).

It is also worth noting that, amid analyzing passive synthesis in this article, we overlooked an important element of the passive sphere: namely, that the passively constituted "empty horizon" of perception, which defines as a field of the ungiven "the whole world as an infinite horizon of possible experience" (Husserl, 1959, 308, my translation. — *N. A.)*; such horizon always-already contains the perspective of "the

[25] "If, now, time-consciousness is the primordial place of the constitution of the unity of identity or of an objectlike formation, and then of the forms of connection of coexistence and succession of all objectlike formations being given to consciousness, then we are still only talking about that consciousness which produces a general form. Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions. It grasps, it is only interested in the necessary temporal form of all singular objects and pluralities of objects, or rather, correlatively it is only interested in the form of manifolds that constitute the temporal object" (Husserl, 1966, 128; 2001, 173).

Other". Herein, we will merely advance a working hypothesis, that constitution of the meaning of "the Other" is also of passive nature (on this, see Artemenko, 2019).

The conclusions we came to in this paper, namely: the discovery of the passive nature of associative realizations of consciousness and their correlation with forming of "empty" presentations that constitute the "empty" horizon of perception, as well as the consideration of the passive synthesis as awakening an intentional impulse, can be used in the future in analyses of the problem of intersubjectivity and primary passive constitution as co-constitution.

REFERENCES

Artemenko, N. (2019). The Problem of Passive Constitution in Husserl's Genetic Phenomenology. *Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology*, 8 (2), 409–444.

Husserl, E. (1950). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Hua III). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1952). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution* (Hua IV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1959). *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion* (Hua VIII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1960). *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media.

Husserl, E. (1962). *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Hua IX). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1966). *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926* (Hua XI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl E. (1969). *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* (Hua X). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, E. (1973a). *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1973b). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905–1920* (Hua XIII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof.

Hussel, E. (1973c). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928* (Hua XIV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1973d). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–1935* (Hua XV). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof.

Husserl, E. (1973e). *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907* (Hua XVI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1976). *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* (Hua VI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1980). *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)* (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media.

Husserl, E. (1983). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* (F. Kersten, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.

Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.

Husserl, E. (2001). *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic* (A. J. Steinbock, Trans.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer.

Landgrebe, L. (1982). Das Problem der passiven Konstitution. In *Faktizität und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie* (71–87). Hamburg: Meiner.

Landgrebe, L. (2010). *Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit*. Würzberg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Lee, N. (1993). *E. Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Yamaguchi, I. (1982). *Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Husserl*. Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.