I. *ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ*

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CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPERIENCES AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTS IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S AND VASILY SESEMANN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

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In many ways Vasily Sesemann's (1884–1963) aesthetics is connected with Nicolai Hartmann's (1882–1950) expanded analysis of the aesthetic reality. Both authors are against subjectivism in aesthetics, but they also reject naturalistic and objectivistic explanations of the aesthetic phenomena. Sesemann and Hartmann focus their attention not only on the problem of the aesthetic object, but also attempt to reveal the internal relation between aesthetic experiences and the structure of the aesthetic objects. The objective of this paper is to show that Hartmann's and Sesemann's aesthetics can be discussed in the light of phenomenological philosophy. Both philosophers argue that there must be a correlation between an object and the act of its aesthetic experience. The claim of the paper is that this correlation can be discovered only by using the method of phenomenological reduction. This paper first explains the conception of the aesthetic objects structure in Hartmann's and Sesemann's aesthetics. Later, it examines the aesthetic perception in Hartmann's and Sesemann's aesthetics. Finally, the paper argues that Hartmann's and Sesemann's aesthetics are essentially based on the phenomenological reflection of correlation between aesthetic experiences and the structure of the aesthetic objects.

Keywords: Nicolai Hartmann, Vasily Sesemann, phenomenology, phenomenological reduction, aesthetic experience, aesthetic object.

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КОРРЕЛЯЦИЯ МЕЖДУ ОПЫТОМ И СТРУКТУРОЙ ОБЪЕКТОВ В ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ ЭСТЕТИКЕ НИКОЛАЯ ГАРТМАНА И ВАСИЛИЯ СЕЗЕМАНА

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Эстетика Василия Сеземана (1884–1963) во многом связана с расширенным анализом эстетической реальности Николая Гартмана (1882–1950). Оба мыслителя выступают против субъективизма в эстетике, но также отвергают натуралистические и объективистские объяснения эстетических явлений. Однако внимание Сеземана и Гартмана сосредоточено не только на проблеме эстетического объекта: оба пытаются раскрыть внутреннюю связь между эстетическим опытом и структурой эстетических объектов. Цель данной статьи — показать, что эстетику Гартмана и Сеземана можно анализировать в свете феноменологической философии. Оба философа утверждают, что между объектом и актом его эстетического восприятия должна существовать корреляция. Тезис автора статьи состоит в том, что эту корреляцию можно обнаружить только с помощью метода феноменологической редукции. Первая часть статьи посвящена концепции структуры эстетических объектов в эстетике Гартмана и Сеземана. Затем рассматривается эстетическое восприятие в эстетике Хартмана и Сеземана. Наконец показывается, что эстетика Гартмана и Сеземана основана на феноменологическом отражении корреляции между эстетическими переживаниями и структурой эстетических объектов.

Ключевые слова: Николай Гартман, Василий Сеземан, феноменология, феноменологическая редукция, эстетический опыт, эстетический объект.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper studies the connection of Nikolai Hartmann's (1882–1950) and Vasily Sesemann's (1884–1963) aesthetics with phenomenology. The authors were close friends since childhood, both studied philosophy in Saint Petersburg and both matured under the influence of neo-Kantian philosophy (Botz-Bornstein, 2006). Both of them distanced themselves from neo-Kantian idealism and linked their positions to critical ontology and critical realism. But the question of what kind of relations the authors have with Husserl's phenomenology remains undeveloped[1]. Both authors argue that aesthetics can be created from the examination of either the aesthetic object or the aesthetic act. The aesthetic act can by further analyzed in terms of the receptive

[1] For Hartmann's philosophy's connection with phenomenology, see (Spiegelberg, 1960; Möckel, 2012).

act of the spectator, or the creative act of the artist. Hartmann argues that phenomenologists, especially Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), developed an analysis of subjective acts and aesthetic enjoyment, but did not analyze the structure of an aesthetic object. With this criticism Hartmann points out, however, that the phenomenological method allows analyzing not only the subjective acts, but also aesthetic objects (Hartmann, 1966, 30). Hartmann notes that phenomenological description developed the analysis of subjective acts, but lagged behind in the analysis of the aesthetic objects themselves. It is this imperfection that Hartmann aesthetics have to overcome. In Hartmann's opinion, this focus on the analysis of subjective acts is explained by the fact that phenomenologists based themselves on the superstition attributed to immanent philosophy, the superstition that in an immediate experience only the act is given, and not the object. Therefore, Husserl's desire to return to the things themselves remaines unfulfilled. I would agree wth these approaches only partly. Indeed, the analyses conducted by Geiger were focused on aesthetic experiences and the aesthetic analysis of objects was left behind. However, this criticism wouldn't be accurate in terms of Husserl's analyses and his emphasis on the concept of intentionality. Subjective acts are always correlated with the same objects as they are given to subjectivity. In other words, phenomenology abstains from the objects-as-they-exist-in-themselves analysis, but aims at the objects-as-they-are-given-in-different-acts-of-the-subjectivity analysis. A phenomenologist must turn to experience and reflect what is given in experience and how it is given in experience in relation to specific acts of consciousness. This return of seemingly independent objects to acts constituting them is nothing more than the phenomenological reduction. Intentionality of consciousness means that all acts and experiences of consciousness are directed towards certain objects, and these objects, in turn, are related to the performance of experiences establishing or supporting them. However, not only acts of consciousness are related to what they are directed to, but also all analysed objects can be described only as given in certain experiences from this standpoint. I can describe love for a particular person and this love will be directed to him/her. On the other hand, this beloved person will be described as beloved only in relation to these particular experiences. Moreover, I can describe love for an imagined princess or a movie hero, though these objects of love will also be described not as real, but as imagined or ideal objects, i. e. given in corresponding acts. The phenomenological analysis covers all relevant and potential objects of consciousness in their relation to corresponding experiences. Thus, Hartmann's observation, that the very essence of the problem requires an analysis of the structure of the aesthetic object in correlation with the aesthetic experience, is fully consistent with the program of phenomenological philosophy.

Sesemann analysing the aesthetic object and aesthetic act highlights the relationship between them. This relationship between the aesthetic object and aesthetic act is in line with the correlation of the intentional object and intentional act described in Husserl's phenomenology. My claim is, that this correlation can only be discovered through the use of the phenomenological method, using phenomenological reduction. What is decisive for Husserl in *Ideas I* is the phenomenological reduction, in other words the change of attitude from naturalistic to phenomenological (neutralization of certain dogmatic attitude towards reality) and discovery of correlation between noetic act and noematic correlate. Husserl says there are strict essential laws of intentional corrrelation between noesis and noema: "Every act, or every act-correlate, includes in itself, implicitly or explicitly, something 'logical'. It is always to be explicated logically, namely by virtue of the essential universality with which the noetic stratum of of 'expressing' allows of being attached to everything noetic (or that of expression to everything noematic)" (Husserl, 1983, 282). In other words, Husserl explore the structural alignment between the intendent object and intending act, correlation between intentional objects and their modes of givenness. In *Ideas I* (§ 91) Husserl says: "Where is a matter of describing the intentional correlates faithfully and completely, there we must also apprehend all such characteristcs which are never accidental but are instead governed by eidetic law and fixed in rigorous concepts" (Husserl, 1983, 221). By performing the phenomenological reduction, by suspending our belief in the absolute reality of the world, philosophers start to pay attention to how worldly objects are given to us. When Husserl talks of the phenomenological or transcendental reduction, he has in mind the systematic analysis of this correlation between subjectivity and world. As he writes: "The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible the 'transcendental reduction' — the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness" (Husserl, 1970, 151). Dan Zahavi states, that the aim of phenomenological analysis is not to investigate either the object or the subject, either the world or the mind, but to investigate their intersection or correlation: "Phenomenological reflection does not only target experiential structures. It also investigates the object of experience, and the correlational a priori that holds between the experienced object, and the different modes of givenness" (Zahavi, 2017, 26). Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism's supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject's experience of it, or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely

the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world. Aesthetic values are objective, but they are available only through aesthetic perception. therefore, we need to change the attitude. Husserl himself acknowledged, that phenomenological method of reduction is similar to notion of aesthetic intuition. As Husserl writes to von Hofmannsthal, the phenomenological reduction requires us to take a stance that is essentially deviating from the "natural" stance towards all objectivity (Husserl, 1993, 133). As we will see, Hartmann's statement that derealisation is implicated in aesthetic intuition means that each aesthetic intuition requires us to take a different attitude towards all objectivity. The act of derealisation is close to this kind of phenomenological reduction that take place in a strict cancelation of each naturalistic attitude.

There is no profound research into the relationship between Hartmann's aesthetics and phenomenology yet, however in *Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics* Mirko Wischke describes Hartmann's aesthetic as phenomenological, because according to Hartmann art in its essence has two layers — sensuous and real layer. And more importantly, that his points of emphasis — the incompletness of the art, which requires the imagination of the viewer, performer, or interpreter. The reception of a work becomes an active process of completion (Wischke, 2010, 135). Analising Sesemann's aesthetic Saulius Geniusas argued, that due to the primacy that these aesthetics grant to intuition, intentionality and the objectivity of aesthetic values, its underlying principles are decidedly phenomenological. (Geniusas, 2016, 125). I agree with both opinions, but my assertion is that Hartmann and Sesemann understands aesthetics as a transcendental analysis of the correlation between the aesthetic object and the aesthetic act[2].

2. THE REALITY AND IRREALITY OF THE AESTHETIC OBJECT IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S AESTHETICS

The aesthetic object in its beauty is directed at the experiences of the observer. So it could be said, that the aesthetic object should be the same thing for every subject. But there comes the question of why aesthetic objects are not admired by everyone and at all times. Hartmann gives an example of a landscape, which is perceived by two differently minded observers. The first values the landscape in terms of the economic activity, and the second contemplates the landscape as an expression of beauty. Sensing things the same way, while the experiences are different. Hartmann draws attention to the importance of the experiencing subject's attitude. This attitude is not

[2] For more information on Seseman's aesthetics, see (Jonkus, 2014; 2023).

the only condition which the aesthetic manifestation of the object depends on, but it is necessary. Getting back to the analysis of the object itself is aided by the observation that aesthetic experiences are not that unique, as is sometimes assumed. It is common for them to have an intersubjective objectivity, which is not only predisposed by the state of mind, but also by the structure of the object itself. As Hartmann points out, not every landscape causes the feeling of aesthetic pleasure and enjoyment. It is important that while observing the landscape, we experience it not only as we sense it, but also as reavealing something that is invisible to our senses. Each of these experiences consists of sensible and extrasensible planes, but the extrasensible plane remains dependent on what is given by the sensible plane. Thus the plane of objects invisible to the senses is not a product of creative imagination, but is produced by what is seen directly, by the structure of the perceived object itself (Hartmann, 1966, 33). An object of beauty manifests as an ambivalent object. It is consisted of the irreal and real planes. It is this duality that creates the impression of an unstable fluctuation.

Hartmann criticizes art theories that interpret art as a substitution of reality or an imitation of reality (Hartmann, 1966, 33). The play of reality and appearance in artistic phenomena cannot be reduced to a representation of reality. Mimetic acts do not guarantee objectivity. On the contrary, according to Hartmann, objectivity does not mean that the artistic expression relationship with the subject has to be denied. Rather, objectivity is located in the heart of aesthetic expression, because it only takes place by implementing the necessary conditions. An aesthetic object may only occur in reality by taking distance from it and denying it. Therefore, the aesthetic object combines in itself reality and irreality (Hartmann, 1966, 37).

Two planes can be seen in Hartmann's position. The union between reality and irreality, which distinguishes artistic expression and confronts reality with it, can be considered through the prism of perception, but also refers to the ontology of the artistic work. Artistic creation is associated with the activites of derealisation or dematerialisation. It reveals the work of art's ambivalence of the balancing between two different poles of existence. Paradoxically by revealing to the observer irreality, artistic creation interrupts the reality and thus reveals its potential. However, irreality must be expressed, and it is impossible to do it without real support.

Hartmann's arguments with regard to the work of art's ontology is based on the ambivalence of reality and irreality, while the latter is not possible without reference to the perceiving entity. Therefore, the aesthetic object and its structure and mode of interpretation is inevitably associated with perceptual analysis. The act of derealisation as a part of aesthetic intuitions is the change of attitude from naturalistic to phenomenological and neutralization of certain dogmatic attitude towards objective reality.

3. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION AND THE AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

For a long time it was thought that perception is composed of seen, heard and sensed elements. Those are colours, dimensional shapes, sounds and everything else that composes the whole of sensing. In Hartmann's opinion all of this is an incorrect conception of perception, because new studies have shown that perception is not composed of senses and does not even know the elements of senses such as those. The former we can produce only in a reverse order by disassembling the perception itself when there are artificial conditions created in an experimental way, which do not exist in real life. Hartmann explains perception itself as a complex whole, which is full of contrasts and connections between opposites. The philosopher like many other phenomenologists relies on the perception of the whole, because according to him we never optically see the whole of an object, but perceive it without issue continuing that which is invisible to the syntheses of perception:

> In der alltäglichen Wahrnehmung ist vieles enthalten, was überhaupt nicht sinnlich aufaβbar ist. Wir sehen den Baum und den Käfer, aber wir sehen auch das Leben in beiden, und zwar differenziert, als Lebendigkei verschiedener Art. Wir treten in ein Zimmer und sehen die armut oder den Reichtum, die Liederlichkeit oder den Geschmack der Bewohner. Wir sehen ein Gesicht, eine Gestalt in der Bewegung, vielleicht gar nur von rückwärts, und wissen doch eben damit schon unmittelbar etwas vom Seelenleben des Menschen, von seinem Charakter, seinem Schicksal (Hartmann, 1966, 43).

This additional meaning Hartmann explains as not created by imagination or reflection, but appearing by the experience of the syntheses of perception. These syntheses are direct and do not require intellectual activity. In perception, what is visible is always lead by what is invisible. Invisibility which is expressed by that which is visible is the most important part of perception. So perception to Hartmann is not only sensible. It also encompasses the intuitive insights, which are born not from reflection and contemplation, but occur with sensible perception. Similarly, like Wilhelm Schapp's *Phenomenology of Perception* (1910), Hartmann notes that in everything we see visible and invisible qualities. For example, we see an object's strength and elasticity, their weight and resistance to movement (Hartmann, 1966, 45). This shows that in perception, senses are overlapped and the synesthetic aspects of perception can be discussed. On the other hand, attentiveness not only shows the consciousness' direction but also its intensity. Interest steers attention away in one or another direction and that is why the field of perception is irregular. Perception is directed at those components that are valuable to the perceiver. However, it is not any less important

that perception is a self-transcending action. Perception steps beyond its own limits and moves to what is not directly given in it. Predrag Cickovacki rightly emphasises that Hartmann focuses his attention not on the object that appears, but on the way in which it appears.

> The secret of art consists in this relationship of appearing. The real and material layer enables the appearance of something that is neither real nor material, and these two layers appear organically integrated and harmonious. The material layer forms the "foreground", and the irreal layer provides the "background", What lies in the background is never realized or materialized by and through the foreground. It is only made to appear, to become apparent, to shine through. The essence of art is not in the object that appears, but in the way in which it appears; it is not in the *what* but in the *how* (Cickovacki, 2014, 96–97).

Speaking about the specifics of aesthetic perception, Hartmann stresses that this perception refutes the pragmatic goals of everyday life. Unlike natural everyday perception, aesthetic perception does not require refuting direct sensible data and does not orientate to what exists objectively. Aesthetic perception is a direct immersion into the sensible and feelingly experienced qualities of things. However even focusing on the sensible surface, aesthetic perception does not deny meaningful depth. According to Hartmann, aesthetic expression defines itself and expresses itself (Hartmann, 1966, 54). On the other hand, aesthetic perception intensifies regular perception, because it opens what was unnoticed before, what slipped away from the senses by not giving that attention. That is how the expansion of the conscious happens. The most important characteristic revealed by Hartmann about creation of the aesthetic object and the aesthetic object's perception is derealisation or dematerialization. The aesthetic object's meaning or value is only revealed by performing an action of that nature, which can be compared to phenomenological reduction. It is a reflection on the givenness of the object and on the way in which it appears.

4. PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION IN SESEMAN'S AESTHETIC

Sesemann stresses that any kind of aesthetic theory's basis is direct aesthetic perception. Because aesthetic perception is directed to an object of beauty, it depends on the attitude of the conscious. Without this specific attitude, experiencing beauty is impossible. It is not enough to observe an object, in which beauty expresses itself. Beauty is experienced in a specially perceived act, which differs from regular perception. Sesemann points out that aesthetic experience is available directly only for the subject experiencing it itself. In other words, it is approachable from a first-per-

son perspective. To others it can be provided only indirectly by linguistically mediated expressions. Does this mean that aesthetic experience is closed in the subjective conscious? No. According to Sesemann, the aesthetic experience of others can be used, but only after verifying it with our own experience, i. e. after reactualisation of aesthetic perception itself. The intersubjectivity of aesthetic experiences ensures an opportunity to repeat aesthetic experiences (Sesemann, 2007, 8). Sesemann avoids aesthetic experience's subjectivisation and relativisation, because his basis is founded in the aesthetic perception's object. In other words, other aesthetic experiences and intersubjective accessibility guarantees a chance to repeat them and experience as your own acts, and the repetition is possible only because the acts themselves are directed to those very same objects, who using their structures provide to an experiencing subject instructions and does not allow them to be perceived unwarranted. From another side, Sesemann stresses that perception depends on a predominant attitude of consciousness; it is within the latter that the basis of the peculiarity of aesthetic perception must be sought (Sesemann, 2007, 21).

Usually discussing the aesthetic object's perception, the role of sensible perception is highlighted. Without sensible expression aesthetic objects could not exist. Therefore, the aesthetic plane is associated with direct participation in sensible expression. Sesemann shows two things: first, that sensible expression is inseparable from meaning, and second, that the meaning expresses itself through sensible material and the sensible material itself forms the meaning.

Sesemann's analysis of poetic language shows that in poetry a word is uplifted as a sensible domain in the first plan (Sesemann, 2007, 22–25). The word's sensible expression itself gains an aesthetic value, because as a tool of depiction, it is not only a tool, but also a goal. These opinions about the poetic word and in its sensible, rhythmic expression, incarnated meaning reminds us of the analysis performed by Heidegger. He stated that exactly the poetic word reveals language's nature. The poetic word becomes an end in itself and absorbs the meaning into itself. Meaning lives in the sensible thickness of the words, because in poetic speech the rhythmic-acoustic word's structure becomes a tangible reality and gains spontaneous value:

> Having acquired the value and power of pure expression, a word absorbs into itself its meaning and coalesces so closely with it that the sound and its meaning become a genuine organic unity. Or, differently put, the relation of that word to its meaning becomes *immanent,* the word comes to express its meaning directly in such a way that the meaning not only is expressed through it but also is embodied in it. Ensouled by meaning the sound is transfigured; it awakes to a new independent and intrinsically valuable life; it gets a *magic power,* i. e., an ability *magically* to affect the listener, to enchant him with its sonic and expressive appearance (Sesemann, 2007, 24).

Husserl in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* first volume separated sensible matter and the intentional form. It was stated that primary sensible material gains form only through intentional meaning setting acts. However already in Wilhelm Schapp's (1884–1965) *Phenomenology of perception* (1910) the connection between sensible material and intentional meaning was stressed. Sesemann looking into specificity of aesthetic perception states that this perception is formed not from separate senses, to which a certain meaning is prescribed, but from the very beginning in our perception things manifest itself as a unity, where each element is an element of the whole.

> We perceive not separate sensations or their combinations but *things* and *phenomena*; these things and phenomena always constitute a certain unity of diversities (of different sense-data) and differ from each other in their shape, size, spatial relations, and internal structure. The perception of this external structure of objects is a certain *perceptual act*, for every structure not only consist of a multitude of elements (individual sensations) but also manifest itself as a unity, where each element (each part) is not only what it is when taken separately but also what it means as an element (part) of the whole (Sesemann, 2007, 19).

Perception is not a collection of separate sensible elements, but exists as a totality. That is how perception was explained by Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Sesemann goes even further. He states that perception's act is not satisfied by only the data, which is gained by direct impressions, but leans on already gathered experience. In other words, with perception, in time, sensible data is connected with perception's schemes, which determine the connection between separate elements and purpose. These schemes allow adding additional data and organizing them in a certain direction. Sesemann states that "in every sensory perception, no matter if it is right or not, we perceive *more* than we have felt" (Sesemann, 2007, 19). In my opinion, experience schemes are nothing else but Husserl's described mechanisms of constitution. An object's meaning as a setting of the whole in perception does not require a whole series of operations to be repeated, but allows to constitute another meaning schematically.

Sesemann draws a parallel between the perception of aesthetic expressions and the other expressions of a person's perception. According to Sesemann, to understand another person's spiritual life, it is unnecessary to rely on deductions by analogy, as traditional theories claim. Meaning lives inside expression and not outside of it. That is why expressions do not have to be recognized in a way that we would like, in order to reconstruct beyond their harboured meanings. Aesthetic depiction destroys opposition between sensible, material, bodily plane and the non-sensible, spiritual plane. Sesemann states that empathy cannot be explained relying on analogy's theory

or the concept of psychological projection. The former presupposes a radical separation and confrontation between the subject and object. Sesemann states that empathy is important for aesthetic perception because it is based on the expressive forms of the world (Sesemann, 2007, 50). To have empathy means to feel oneself together with others, to feel the others in a connection with yourself. The dynamics of the world's expressions directly reveal liveliness, which pulls in the bodily perceptive subject with all of his senses as a whole. Echoing feelings are experienced not through the distance of visual sight, but through direct and contagious vibrations of bodily contact. The primordial perceived world reveals itself not in a mental, but sensual plane. That is why aesthetic feelings are better expressed not by the depiction of objects, but the creation of dynamic line, colour and sound atmospheres. Diving into this vital dynamic is possible, if the perceiving subject abstains from his pragmatic interests and habits and gains the attitude of aesthetic contemplation.

5. STRUCTURE OF THE AESTHETIC OBJECT

Sesemann analyses not only aesthetic perception, but also the aesthetic object. Because the objectivity of aesthetic perception stems from the same aesthetic object, without this object's analysis, the aesthetic simply cannot be imagined. As we can see in his "Aesthetic", Hartmann also stresses the aesthetic object's structural analysis:

> Der Weg von einem vorläufigen Bruchstück der Aktanalyse führt daher hinüber zur Strukturanalyse des Gegenstandes; er kann bestenfalls über sie, und nur über sie, zur Wertanalyse führen. Die Strukturanalyse des Gegenstandes ist für das Anliegen der Ästhetik zentral gelagert, und die wichtigsten Aufschlüsse sowohl für das weitere Aktproblem als auch für das Wertproblem — soweit wir uns ihm bei der heutigen Problemlage nähern können — liegen in erster Linie bei ihr (Hartmann, 1966, 82).

Hartmann analysing the aesthetic object's structure focuses his attention to the foreground's and background's relationship and also the aesthetic object's multilayeredness. On the other hand, Sesemann's analyses are more articulated and they are expanded upon a bit differently than in Hartmann's philosophy. Firstly, it is necessary to note that Sesemann highlights not only the intentional aesthetic object's nature, that is its dependence from aesthetic perception, but also the opposite dependence. Sesemann states that the sensory unity of the aesthetic object has certain special necessities, when perception's intentions have diverted from the sensible unity of the object, the act of perception loses its aesthetic nature. This kind of aesthetic object's structure's and aesthetic perception's correlation is Sesemann's analyses motif. Sese-

mann's approach is interesting in that he explores correlation between aesthetic structure and aesthetic intuition.

By analysing the aesthetic object's structure, Sesemann describes the aesthetic object's static and genetic unity, components and dominant's importance. Sesemann states that components are an integral part of aesthetic objects, which are varied depending on the nature of the art. In music — tones and their intervals, in poetry — words, in drawing — lines, in painting — colours and light; however, all the arts without exception have a common rhythmic dynamic. These elements can be connected as opposites or as symmetrical unity. The singularity of an aesthetic object relies on characteristic composition of components and their relationships. However, the totality of the aesthetic object is formed not only from different elements, but also from those who have to accomplish a predominate role. This leading factor is called the *dominant* and is the main formative principle of the aesthetic object. The other components are in one way or another subordinated to it and perform an auxiliary function in helping to realize the expressive unity of the totality. Sesemann notes that the dominant constitutes

> the framework or skeleton of the entire composition on which its organic unity depends (for example, in a drawing this might be the contours, the rhythmic or symmetrical harmony of the lines; in painting, the contrast between light and shadow or a harmonious balance of colors). But at other times the aesthetic object reveals several layers, or planes, making up something like one hierarchical system, so that the dominant determines the front plane, whereas the other components are distributed throughout the back planes (Sesemann, 2007, 34).

Hartmann and Sesemann argue that the aesthetic form of the object is on one hand dependant on sensory matter; on the other hand, it forms the content of the aesthetic object. So Hartmann and Sesemann are talking about the fact that the structure of aesthetic object includes all three of these moments. The structure of the aesthetic object is associated with aesthetic perception, but the authors understand aesthetic perception differently. Hartmann argues that aesthetic contemplation begins with the sensory act and transforms it into a creative one. These two aesthetic perception levels are consistent with the structure of the aesthetic object in which reality and irreality are compatible. Sesemann understands this a little bit differently. He understands aesthetic insight as the coexistence of sensible and categorical intuition. According to Sesemann, beauty expresses itself in immediate intuition and intuition is always understanding. Sesemann argues that intuition precedes conceptual reflection. However, pre-reflective intuition catches the aggregate value of objects. An object's contents are associated with sensory expression; therefore, the sensory-resolution level builds

up the awareness of the object's meaning. These levels are intertwined like the sounds of the word, its rhythm and its meaning. Such a link is most obviously manifested in poetry, but in everyday conversation it goes unnoticed because there it is not so important. Only by understanding poetic language do we spontaneously associate sensory expression and the meaning of the content. According to Sesemann, these two levels build up the third — the symbolic.

3. *Symbolic (general or historical) meaning.* Indirect meaning.	And its valuational and objective emotive content.
2. *Direct meaning (content)* (action, event, state).	And its inner emotional side.
1. *Purely sensory structure (form).* The plane and its elements (lines, colors, light, shadows), three-dimensional space and bodies (the spatial function, i. e., depth-representation, of lines, colors, light, shadows).	And its special expressiveness (harmony, dynamism, and so on).

(Sesemann, 2007, 67)

Sesemann, just like Hartmann, has a dialogue with formalist art theory. He argues that the concept of form is insufficient, because the form is associated as much with matter as with the content of the object. Instead of the split between form and matter, Sesemann offers the concept of sensory structure.

> Talk of structure pays equal attention both to the arrangement of elements (or parts) and to their nature, for structure is an internal, or organic, totality, in which the relations among the elements are closely tied to their essential qualities; it embraces not only that which is usually called form but also the matter that is being formed. From this, it is clear that form, understood as the ordering principle of an aesthetic object, is nothing other than its sensible structure. After all, we have seen that the aesthetic form includes the sensory qualities of the processed material elements. This was also confirmed for us by an analysis of visual perceptions: the visible image of things (especially the proximal image), based on optic and kinesthetic (eye movement) data, is to some extent *modeled,* i. e., it doesn't end just with the body's contours (its geometric delineation), but also reveals somewhat the relations of its parts or elements and their material nature (hardness or softness, tenderness or roughness, lightness or heaviness, and so forth).
>
> That is why in painting the artist, if he is not content with a plane geometric delineation of things, reproduces to some extent their sensory structure. The difference is only that in a work of art not only the structure of the represented object gets reflected but also the material nature of the means (canvas, paint, marble, bronze, and so on) used by the artist (Sesemann, 2007, 74–75).

Speaking of the creative act, Hartmann emphasizes its irrationality, that's why he puts focus on the structure of the aesthetic object and its corresponding analysis of aesthetic perception. Meanwhile Sesemann notes that the creative act is characterized by a desire to create the kind of sensory sturcture of an aesthetic object that could target the potential perceiver. The understanding of the relation between form (sensory structure) and content is very significant for the description of an aesthetic object. Sesemann argues that in a work of art, *what* is presented cannot be radically separated from *how* it is presented.

6. CONCLUSION

In Hartmann's statement, the aesthetic object's structure is composed of an overlapping of a multilayered reality and irreality. This structure of the object is directly connected with aesthetic perception because it is ambivalent, while appearance of meaning is dependant on the perceiver's attentiveness and abilities. In aesthetic perception, the divide between sensible experience and meaning is removed. Aesthetic perception does not refute regular perception but intensifies it by revealing new opportunities in the former. Aesthetic perception is possible only in refusing a purely theoretical or purely pragmatic attitude. The most important of Hartmann's characteristics of the creation of the aesthetic object and the aesthetic object's perception is derealisation or dematerialisation. The aesthetic object's meaning and value are only revealed by doing that kind of phenomenological reduction. Sesemann's aesthetics' many aspects are similar to that of Hartmann's. In that way, Sesemann stresses the objectivity of aesthetic perception and emphasizes much more the aesthetic object and aesthetic perception correlation. Sesemann analyses the aesthetic object's structure more deeply. Sesemann and Hartmann analyze the aesthetic object and aesthetic act by emphasizing their connection. This connection relates to what is described in Husserl's phenomenology as the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act. This correlation can be discovered only by using the phenomenological method: by doing phenomenological reduction. It is a reflection on the givenness of the object and on the way in which it appears. Phenomenological aesthetics have to reveal how the structure of aesthetic objects is connected with its experience and what the necessary conditions of aesthetic experience are. The phenomenological description reveals beauty as a virtual connection with the valuating subject's intuition and special attitude. Sesemann's performed reduction brings us back to the primal conditions of aesthetic object expression, which lies as much as in the object's structure as in his demands obeying art comprehending the subject's

attitude. Both authors stress that the objectivity of aesthetic value does not refute the subject's participation. Aesthetic objectivity is the logic of objects' expressions to the subject itself.

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