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N. HARTMANN’S QUESTION OF “BEING AS BEING” AND M. HEIDEGGER’S QUESTION OF “THE MEANING OF BEING”: TWO VIEWS OVER ONTOLOGY

Abstract
The article addresses two versions of returning to ontology and two views on the nature of ontology. The aim of the article is to reveal the way two 20^th century philosophers—Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger—saw the meaning and purpose of ontology, as well as the answer to the question as to why each of them thought that the other’s ontological approach was fundamentally flawed. My investigation is based on Hartmann’s book Ontology: Laying the Foundations and Heidegger’s book Being and Time. Hartmann’s option of returning to ontology implies the question about being as being. It is impossible to reduce being as being (being as such) to being in some definite, limited sense. Thus, being as being possesses absolute universality and cannot be defined, albeit one can distinguish some structure in it. Not only being is always both being-there (Dasein) and being-so (Sosein), but being is also always either real or ideal. Hartmann is certain that the restriction of being as being to being in some definite sense and the miscomprehension of that four-component system leads up to various errors. According to Hartmann, Heidegger misses the ontological question because he puts the question on being as it is given instead of that on being as it is in itself. According to Heidegger, Hartmann misses the ontological question because he stays on the grounds of the unrestricted speculations instead of understanding being and its meaning by means of being itself. The question arises as to who of them is right. As a matter of fact, there are no arguments that both philosophers would deem acceptable. Each of them is deaf to the opponent’s opinion. In addition, we are not obligated to accept neither Heidegger nor Hartman’s opinion because there are certainly more than just two views on ontology.

Key words
Ontology, being, meaning of being, being as being, phenomenology, world, Dasein.

References

• Dreyfus, H. (1990). Being-in-the-World. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, London: The MIT Press.
• Gartman, N. (2003). K osnovopolozheniyu ontologii [Towards the Foundation of Ontology]. St Petersburg: Nauka. (in Russian).
• Gorner, P. (2007). Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Khaideger, M. (1997). Bytie i vremya [Being and Time]. Moscow: Ad Marginem. (in Russian).
• Kherrmann, F. V. fon. (2000). Ponyatie fenomenologii u Khaideggera i Gusserlya [Heidegger’s and Husserl’s Сoncepts of Phenomenology]. St Petersburg: Propilei. (in Russian).
• Landmann, M. (1943). Nicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3(4), 393-423. doi:10.2307/2102844
• Smith, J. (1954). Hartmann’s New Ontology. The Review of Metaphysics, 7(4), 583-601.
• Taubes, J. (1952). The Development of the Ontological Question in Recent German Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics, 6(4), 651-664.

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NICOLAI HARTMANN ON THE VALUE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Abstract
I argue that Hartmann’s engagement in the question of the value of aesthetic experience (especially as addressed in Chapter 35 of his Aesthetics) is a specific reinterpretation of the standpoint that we come across in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. Hartmann completed his Aesthetics at the end of World War II and some of the central claims in his work echo Nietzsche’s standpoint, as presented in the early work on tragedy, which Nietzsche completed during the Franco-Prussian war. Both studies invite us to ask: what are we to expect from philosophy under such circumstances? Like Nietzsche, Hartmann holds the view that 1) our lives are intrinsically meaningless, that 2) the world is indifferent to meaning, and that 3) aesthetic experience has value insofar as it bestows meaning both on the world and on human existence. Despite the far-reaching thematic and stylistic differences between Hartmann and Nietzsche, both thinkers see aesthetics not as a form of apolitical escapism, but as a direct way of confronting the fundamental problem, which concerns “the sense and meaning of the world and of human life.” They both leave us with the paradoxical and provocative thesis that aesthetic experience is exactly what is needed at the times of political crises.

Key words
Аesthetic experience, aesthetic values, aesthetic qualities, aesthetic creativity, aesthetic meaningfulness, Hartmann, Nietzsche.

References

• Hartmann, N. (2014). Aesthetics. Berlin, Boston: de Gruyter.
• Nietzsche, F. (2000). The Birth of Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sartre, J. P. (2004). The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination. London, New York: Routledge.
• Scheler, M. (1992). The Meaning of Suffering. In M. Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing (82-115). Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.

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OLD AND NEW COPERNICAN COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Abstract
This paper deals with Nicolai Hartmann’s realism in light of its contemporary critics and recent concepts of realism. The main topic of the article is the so-called Copernican counter-revolution, which is the decisive factor both in Hartmann’s ontology and in the recent realist projects. In Hartmann’s text the Copernican counter-revolution means the rehabilitation of ontology, which is realized through the critique of the one-sided epistemological interest of logical idealism. We enter on the same path following the program of new realism, which arises against constructivism. While Maurizio Ferraris emphasizes the distinction between epistemological and ontological perspective and wants to identify those application fields, the point of Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology is the coequality of beings. He achieves an anti-Copernican perspective, which means that the human-world relation loses its priority. He also invents a litmus test of realist theories: A true realism should treat all relations between beings equally. Initially I’m examining Hartmann’s realism, also called realism ‘without ism,’ in its contemporary context, followed by the analysis of the acts that can provide the givenness of reality. These examinations will highlight the similarities between Ferraris’ and Hartmann’s realism, especially the ontologically motivated conception of the act of cognition, correspondingly the concept of resistance. In the subsequent analysis of experience of resistance, Max Scheler’s concept is highly relevant. Scheler’s ideas are based on the critique of Wilhelm Dithey’s and Martin Heidegger’s definition of resistance. The last chapter submits Hartmann’s realism to Harman’s litmus test, whereby Hartmann’s realism proves itself to be a sustainable, modern theory.

Key words
Copernican counter-revolution, realism, litmus test, resistance of reality, ontology, Hartmann, Harman, Ferraris.

References

• Boros, B. (2015). Selbstständigkeit in der Abhängigkeit. Nicolai Hartmanns Freiheitslehre. Würzburg: Ergon.
• Dilthey, W. (1924). Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Außenwelt. In W. Dilthey, Die geistige Welt, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. V (90-138). Leipzig, Berlin: B. G. Teubner.
• Ferraris, M. (2014a). Manifest des neuen Realismus. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
• Ferraris, M. (2014b). Politik und Philosophie von der Postmoderne zum Neuen Realismus. In Chr. Riedweg (Ed.), Nach der Postmoderne. Aktuelle Debatten zu Kunst, Philosophie und Gesellschaft (61-82). Basel: Schwabe Verlag.
• Ferraris, M. (2014c). Was ist der Neue Realismus? In M. Gabriel (Ed.), Der neue Realismus (52-75). Berlin: Shurkamp.
• Harman, G. (2005). Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things. Chicago: Open Court.
• Harman, G. (2012). Über Stellvertretende Verursachung. Speculations, III, 210-240.
• Harman, G. (2015). Vierfaches Objekt. Berlin: Merve Verlag.
• Hartmann, N. (1931). Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsges.
• Hartmann, N. (1958a). Systembildung und Idealismus. In N. Hartmann, Kleinere Schriften. Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie. Band III (60-78). Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1958b). Über die Erkennbarkeit des Apriorischen. In N. Hartmann, Kleinere Schriften. Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie. Band III (186-220). Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1962). Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N (1965a). Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1965b). Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag.
• Kluck, S. (2012). Entwertung der Realität. In G. Hartung, M. Wunsch, & Cl. Strube (Eds.), Von der Systemphilosophie zur systematischen Philosophie — Nicolai Hartmann. (195-218). Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Scheler, M. (1927). Idealismus-Realismus. Philosophischer Anzeiger, 2, 255-324.

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND BEING-IN-ITSELF IN HARTMANN’S ONTOLOGY: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS

Abstract
Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the context of debates over new realisms in Continental philosophy. To answer it, the paper highlights five important points. First, Hartmann’s own distinction between the phenomenological school of thought and phenomenological method must be preserved. He does not accept the sweeping humanistic opposition between the sciences and phenomenology, and yet (like the phenomenologists) he employs a method that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of metaphysical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some important qualifications. Secondly, he rejects the phenomenological reduction because it identifies the natural attitude with a metaphysical standpoint and it advocates instead a ‘naïve consciousness’ free of metaphysical assumptions. Thirdly, his assessment of phenomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition as a transcendent act. He finds that phenomenology fails to adequately account for the whole phenomenon of cognition, especially its characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, Hartmann grants the irreducibility of phenomena, but holds that they are characteristically unstable, referring to something beyond themselves and forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine or not. There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, the concept being-in-itself is merely a counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which we do not need for the purposes of ontology. Based on this reassessment, it is concluded that Hartmann employs some form of the phenomenological method but cannot be identified as a phenomenologist.

Key words
Nicolai Hartmann, phenomenology, being-in-itself, cognition, phenomenological method, transcendent act, phenomenal transcendence, natural attitude, natural realism, metaphysics.

References

• Hartmann, N. (1949). Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1965). Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (2014). Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus. In G. Hartung & M. Wunsch (Eds.), Nicolai Hartmann: Studien zur neuen Ontologie und Anthropologie (15-64). Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (2017). The Megarian and the Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of Modality. Axiomathes, 27 (2), 209-223.
• Husserl, E. (1960). Phenomenology. In R. M. Chisholm (Ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (118-128). Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
• Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Meillassoux, Q. (2014). Time Without Becoming. In A. Longo (Ed.), Time Without Becoming. Middlesex: Mimesis International.
• Möckel, C. (2012). Nicolai Hartmann — ein Phänomenologe? Zu den Termini Phänomen und Phänomenologie. In G. Hartung, C. Strube & M. Wunsch (Eds.), Von der Systemphilosophie zur systematischen Philosophie: Nicolai Hartmann (105-127). Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Sparrow, T. (2014). The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Spiegelberg, H. (1960). The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. Volume 1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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ON THE RECEPTION OF N. HARTMANN IN FRANCE. THE PROBLEM OF THE REAL: PER SE BEING OR TRANSOBJECTIVITY?

Abstract
The article aims to show some particularities of the reception of Nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy in post-war France. In my viewpoint, one of the recurrent problems in Hartmann’s philosophy is the status of ‘real being’ on all its levels (Gegebenheit, trans-objectivity, historical, natural being, etc.). According to Hartmann, ontology does not deal with a particular being, but rather with the transcendence of the real toward trans-objectivity. With that in mind, Hartmann seems to give solutions to many philosophical problems and difficulties engendered by the interaction of realism and spiritualism, phenomenology and criticism, by showing the multiplicity of forms of the real under the conditions of subject-object relation. It is shown in the article that Hartmann’s new ontology of the real does not completely go outside of the framework of the classical metaphysical and anthropological conception of the world. As such, our approach is not purely historical, but also hypothetical and theoretical. The article presents the following conclusions as regards Hartmann’s ontology: 1) the question about the real was considered as one of the most important questions in Hartmann’s ontology by its French interpreters, 2) these interpreters connected the question of the real with that of the irrational (Vuillemin), the multi-level structure of Being (Breton) or the intentional flow of phenomena (Gurvich), 3) the question about inter-objectivity was not discussed by Hartmann, nor by his French interpreters.

Key words
Real, per se being, transobjectivity, irrational, metaphysics, given, knowledge, Cogito.

References

• Breton, S. (1962). L’Être spirituel: Recherches sur la philosophie de Nicolaï Hartmann. Lyon, Paris: Emmanuel Vitte.
• Embree, L. (Ed.). (1997). Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Dodrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Gurvitch, G. (1930). Les tendances actuelles de la philosophie allemande: E. Husserl, M. Scheler, E. Lask, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger. Paris: Vrin
• Hartmann, N. (1912). Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht.
• Hartmann, N. (1921). Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1932). Zum Problem der Realitätsgegbenheit, Philosophishe Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft. Berlin: Pan-Verlag.
• Hartmann, N. (1935). Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Hartmann, N. (1947). Les Principes de la Métaphysique de connaissance, t.I, t.II. Paris: Aubert Montaigne.
• Tertulian, N. (2003). Nicolai Hartmann et Georg Lukács. Une alliance féconde. Archives de Philosophie, 66, 663-698.
• Vuillemin, J. (1950). La dialectique négative dans la connaissance de l’existence (Note sur l’épistémologie et la métaphysique de Nikolaï Hartmann et de Jean-Paul Sartre). Dialectica, 4 (1), 21-42.