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CHAD ENGELLAND
“HEIDEGGER’S SHADOW. KANT, HUSSERL, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN”
Routledge, 2017. ISBN 9781138181878

Abstract
This review presents historical and philosophical hypotheses of Chad Engelland's book by first considering the general thesis of a Heidegger transcendental philosopher, then emphasizing the importance of this theme for the treatise Sein und Zeit (1927), finally considering promises and aporia of such an interpretation for the second Heidegger. Heidegger first endorsed the program of a certain transcendental philosophy, to reject it in a second part of his work. Each time, the problem is to know what type of transcendental philosophy it is, which implies asking the question of Heidegger's relation to both transcendental philosophy of Kant and transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Does the thought of utensility or authenticity in Being and Time refer to a transcendental questioning? And is it a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental? But also, can the thought of Ereignis and of the last God be so, as C. Engelland thinks? The reviewer insists on the importance of understanding the role of intuition in phenomenology’s relationship to Kant, but also on the link made by Heidegger between Kant's first and second Critiques, that is, between the theory and practice. Finally, it shows from the book the role of affectivity, not without indicating possible extensions including the analysis of neokantism, or Hölderlin.

Key words
Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, transcendental phenomenology.

References

• Cohen, H. (1907). Kommentar zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Leipzig: Durr.
• Cohen, H. (1885). Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhanlung.
• Engelland, C. (2017) Heidegger’s Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn. London: Routlege.
• Heidegger, M. (1977). Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1984). Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1989). Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1991). Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1997). Besinnung. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (2006). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
• Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Hua III/1-2). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

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BÉATRICE LONGUENESSE
“I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN”
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-966576-1

Abstract
The review provides an outline of Béatrice Longuenesse’s latest book: I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again (Oxford University Press, 2017), which attempts to offer “a more systematic exploration of Kant’s account of self-consciousness”, with a particular focus on “its relation to contemporary analyses of self-consciousness” (Longuenesse). Longuenesse’s recent analyses have indeed the major interest of orchestrating a fecund dialogue between Kant’s comprehension of the I and several key interlocutors, from Wittgenstein to Freud and including Sartre, Anscombe, Evans and others. Thus, the first section of the book originates in twentieth-century debates and challenges the claim that bodily self-consciousness is the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness. The second section of I, Me, Mine provides a thorough discussion of Kant’s view on the “I think”, on self-consciousness and personhood, and continues to plead for a genuine form of self-consciousness independent from the consciousness of one’s body. Yet, a more general objective of the book progressively emerges: that of a “naturalization of the notion of person”, by showing that “Kant’s criticism of the paralogism of personhood opens the way to substituting for the rationalist concept a rich and complex concept of a person as a spatiotemporal, living entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for autonomous self-determination” (Longuenesse). This naturalization of the Kantian concept of subjectivity is set in motion, within the last section of the book, with the unexpected assistance of Freud’s account on the ego and the super-ego.

Key words
Kant, I, self-consciousness, apperception, person, naturalization, Freud.

References

• Longuenesse, B. (2017). I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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EMMANUEL KANT
« PRINCIPES METAPHYSIQUES DE LA SCIENCE DE LA NATURE »
Introduction, traduction et notes par A. Pelletier, Paris: Vrin, 2017. ISBN 978-2-7116-2544-4

Abstract
In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant develops what the Critique of Pure Reason calls the “rational physiology”, which is the metaphysics of corporeal nature. The aim of this text is to specify the object in general as matter and as the “movable in space” and, for this purpose, to take into account the various properties that make possible the material donation of the object, such as rest, speed, direction, impenetrability, attraction, repulsion, etc., the so-called predicables of the pure understanding (§ 10 of the CPR). Those predicables constitute the properties that are indeed necessary to ground the natural science (mathematical physics) and are here examined from a transcendental point of view thanks to the system of the categories and principles of the Analytics of Principles. The structure of the book is thus the following: Phoronomy deals with quantity (Axioms of Intuition), the Dynamics with quality (Anticipations of Perception), the Mechanics with relations (Analogies of Experience) and the Phenomenology with modalities (Postulates of Empirical Thought). What Kant seeks to account for, then, is the applicability of the mathematics that make the intuitive and apodictic certainty possible thanks to the construction of the object in an a priori intuition. The methodological problem concerns the possibility of this a priori construction, which must be here realized in the realm of existence. How to connect the empirical properties of the object to the necessary and universal principles provided by the categories in order to account for the possibility of the mathematical construction of the object? The metaphysics of the corporeal nature is different from the transcendental cognition of the pure nature in general because it considers the transcendental schematism from the point of view of space and not of time.

Key words
Kant, natural science, rational physiology, objective reality of the categories, transcendental schematism, transcendental epistemology, space, matter, force.

References

• Förster, E. (2000). Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus postumum. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.
• Friedman, M. (2013). Kant’s Construction of Nature. A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kant, E. (1980). Critique de la raison pure. Paris: Gallimard.
• Kant, E. (2017). Principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature. Paris: Vrin.
• Kerszberg, P. (1999). Kant et la nature. Paris: Les Belles-Lettres.
• Vuillemin, J. (1955). Physique et métaphysique kantiennes. Paris: PUF.

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THE MATERIAL RESIDUE.
KANT AND HUSSERL ON AN ASPECT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE

Abstract
Husserl’s late claim of that transcendental logic is self-founded stands in a puzzling relation with the facticity of nature. This relation concerns issues such as the traceableness of a “living present” in the immanence of living consciousness. The article considers this matter through a specific perspective, gained by reference to the project of a transcendental foundation of the science of nature. This project requires the problematic possibility of a formal determination of facticity. One could characterize the phenomenological finding of a “living present” as Husserl’s attempt to resolve the discrepancy between fact and form in a “living being” which consists of both actual materiality and transcendental ideality. This conciliatory solution remains questionable, given the impossibility to provide an a priori foundation of this synthetic moment through the self-reflexive movement of transcendental logic. However, the systematic project of transcendental phenomenology as such entails the question concerning the a priori foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts. It seems, then, to require a solution of this sort. The problem of grounding the scientific knowledge of natural facts dates back at least to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. So does the need for the definition of an empirical moment of this grounding. A discussion of Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft presents an aporetic facet of the way in which transcendental philosophy responds to this need. An analogous impasse occurs in Husserl’s mature work. The concept of “living present” holds a central role in defining Husserl’s stance towards this stalemate. The analysis of this role aims to clarify both Husserl’s specific position in the broader context of transcendental philosophy, and an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature. I conclude that this foundation must encompass a factual, non-formalizable element: a material residue, required in order to complete its reflexive movement.

Key words
Phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, philosophy of science, science of nature, a priori, living present, Kant, Husserl.

References

• Aristotle. (1831). Aristoteles Graece ex recognitione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Volumen prius. Berlin: Berolini.
• Benjamin, W. (1985). Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. VI. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
• Bunge, M. (1967). Foundations of Physics. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
• Derrida, J. (1993). La Voix et le Phénomène : Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• Falcon, A. (2005). Unity without Uniformity: Aristotle and the Science of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Heelan, P. A. (1987). Husserl’s Later Philosophy of Natural Science. Philosophy of Science, 54 (3), 368-390.
• Held, K. (1966). Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des Transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, Entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Hintikka, J. (1992). Kant on the Mathematical Method. In C. J. Posy (Ed.), Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Modern Essays (21-42). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Husserl, E. (1954). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1969). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917) (Hua X). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1973). Cartesianische Meditationen (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Hua XVII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Hua III/1). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden (Hua XIX/1). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (2001). Die „Bernauer Manuskripte“ über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18) (Hua XXXIII). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Kant, I. (1781). Сritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
• Kant, I. (1902). Vorkritische Schriften I: 1747–1756. Berlin: Reimer.
• Kant, I. (1904). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin: Reimer.
• Kant, I. (1911). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Aufl. 1781), Prolegomena, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. Berlin: Reimer.
• Kant, I. (1936). Opus Postumum. Erste Hälfte. Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Kant, I. (1938). Opus postumum. Zweite Hälfte. Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Kant, I. (1942). Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, Rostocker Kantnachlass, Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik. Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Kant, I. (2004). Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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• Tengelyi, L. (2005). Experience and Infinity in Kant and Husserl. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 67 (3), 479-500.
• Toraldo di Francia, G. (1981). The Investigation of the Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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BEYOND THE GENESIS, TOWARD THE ABSOLUTE.
EUGEN FINK’S ARCHITECTONIC FOUNDATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY BETWEEN A META-CRITIC OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE AND HIS OWN PROJECT OF A DIALECTICAL MEONTIC

Abstract
While Eugen Fink was working on the revision of Husserl’s five Cartesian Meditations and preparing them for publication as a magnum opus for the German public, which – as Husserl itself claimed – required a truly phenomenological counterweight to Heidegger’s Being and Time, he not only sought a presentation of the vivid and most actual insights that guided the phenomenological philosophy but also stressed the urgent need to integrate their achievements in order to overcome their philosophical naiveté. This was due to the initial (and inevitable) exclusion of the deepest issues concerning phenomenology as a whole transcendental system, and particularly those regarding the total reach of evidence toward the transcendental field of experience. This sort of incompleteness had to be overcome by a solid “critic of the transcendental reason”. But, whereas for Husserl the task of self-criticism was directed at an examination of the evidences acquired in the transcendental attitude, for Fink it turned out to be a totally different challenge that ended up in an innovative vertical displacement of the horizontal structure of Husserl’s phenomenology. From the very beginning, Fink truly worked on a large-scale system of phenomenological philosophy and on an architectonic conception of the different stages of the pure phenomenology, in which the regressive phenomenology (transcendental aesthetic and analytic) was followed by a new progressive phenomenology (transcendental dialectic) endowed with a “constructive” method. The following article explores the emergence and relates the main topics of such constructive integration of phenomenology, whose conceptuality was only briefly foreshadowed in the famous VI Cartesian Meditation and, nonetheless, systematically developed in the large amount of Fink’s private notes that constitute his own meontic philosophy.

Key words
Eugen Fink, phenomenology, architectonics, constructive phenomenology, meontic.

References

• Bruzina, R. (1993). The Revision of the Bernau Time-Consciousness Manuscripts: Status Questionis – Freiburg (I). Alter, 1, 357-384.
• Bruzina, R. (1994). The Revision of the Bernau Time-Consciousness Manuscripts: New Ideas Freiburg, 1930-1933 (II). Alter, 2, 367-395.
• Bruzina, R. (2004). Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology,1928 – 1938. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
• Bruzina, R. (2006). Hinter der ausgeschriebenen Finkschen Meditation: Meontik – Pädagogik. In A. Böhmer (Ed.), Eugen Fink: Sozialphilosophie – Anthropologie – Kosmologie – Pädagogik – Methodik (193-219). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
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