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NATURE AS EXPRESSIVE SYNTHESIS: THE SENSIBLE AWAKENING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL BETWEEN KANT, HUSSERL AND MERLEAU-PONTY

Abstract
The critical insights of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology evolve out of a tension in the nature of consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is a synthetic activity or intentional that discloses the horizon in which meanings and objects have conditions of possibility. On the other hand, in perception we find the workings of sense that point to a dynamic, expressive origin prior to the pure activity of consciousness. Our investigation is concerned with explaining how this passivity of consciousness is itself a synthesis that arises out of our expressive bodily nature. There is a clear logical connection between the ways Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceive of a synthesis within sensibility and bodily affectivity, where each thinker requires us to conceptualize nature as a mode of expressivity, with the implication that transcendental conditions of possibility must, mysteriously, happen within the very intercorporeal and temporal fields that they render possible.

Key words
Phenomenology, transcendental idealism, Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, consciousness, temporality.

References

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BEARING ONE’S SHADOW: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FROM KANT, THROUGH HUSSERL, TO MERLEAU-PONTY

Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of “the transcendental” has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl’s “transcendental turn,” although significantly altering Kant’s original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions – from Kant’s “transcendentalism of faculties”, through Husserl’s “transcendentalism of pure consciousness,” to Merleau-Ponty’s “transcendentalism of the flesh” – arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist “thought style.” In the final section, we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the “truth of naturalism”, while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (“transcendentalizing”) nature.

Key words
Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, transcendental philosophy, naturalized phenomenology, phenomenologized nature, epoché, phenomenological reduction.

References

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RETHINKING SPATIOTEMPORAL EXTENSION: HUSSERL’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS

Abstract
In this text, I intend to demonstrate the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for the debate on Cantor’s continuum hypothesis. Once described the classical formulation of this problem by Cantor, Dedekind, Zermelo-Fraenkel, and Hilbert, I observe that the current discussion about this issue is characterized by the opposition between a Platonist (Gödel) and a formalist (Cohen) solution. Although this latter is widespread among mathematicians, a few of them still think that the continuum conjecture is relevant for a philosophical foundation of set theory and, in general, for a scientific description of reality. Most of them have been somehow inspired by Husserl's phenomenology. This is the case, for instance, for Weyl and Gödel himself, even if both of them gradually abandoned phenomenology for, respectively, constructivism/predicativism and Platonism. My aim in this text is to reconstruct this “minor” history, in order to show how Husserl’s account of the continuum, developed in different ways by Weyl and Gödel, remains the unique radical attempt to found mathematical formalization on intuition. Although the continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-experiences and the flowing of the intuitive data, is a real leitmotiv of the phenomenological method as a whole, it plays a peculiar role in the early Husserl, notably in his lectures of 1891 on Philosophy of Arithmetic, those of 1905-1908 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and those of 1907 on Things and Space. In these texts, there emerges a theory of how the concept of the continuum originates in the intuition of concrete data: more precisely, the intuition of continuity is conceived as the phenomenological condition for any mathematical formalization of the continuum. This does not entail that Husserl is not committed to the problem of a rigorous formalization of the continuum. Rather, as demonstrated by his in-depth inspection of spatial perception and time-consciousness, he is fully aware of the limits of any attempt of formalizing continuity (the same limits Weyl will emphasize concerning Cantor-Dedekind’s axiom). Accordingly, it is precisely for its attempt to keep together intuition and formalization that transcendental phenomenology still plays a relevant role in the current debate about the foundation of mathematics.

Key words
Continuum, set theory, platonism, formalism, intuition, time-consciousness.

References

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NEW WAYS TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY:
WHY EPISTEMOLOGY MUST BE A DESCRIPTIVE AND EIDETIC STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract
Husserl has spilled much ink motivating the transcendental reduction that is supposed to pave the way for the ultimate, subjective science, i.e., transcendental phenomenology. However, Husserl’s original ways to the transcendental reduction are problematic. One such issue concerns the (in)fallibility of apodictic evidence. If apodictic evidence must be infallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology seems to be unattainable. However, if apodictic evidence is fallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology is not as well-motivated as seemingly implied by Husserl’s Cartesian way. In the present paper, I put forward new ways to transcendental phenomenology that are based on arguments in current analytic epistemology. I show that the new evil demon problem, Laurence BonJour’s example of clairvoyance, and the phenomenon of blindsight can not only be used to make a case against reliabilism, but also to motivate the core ideas of transcendental phenomenology. The underlying conviction of this paper is that any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology. The thesis of this paper is that one such way to transcendental phenomenology can be found by engaging in current epistemological debates. I exemplify this new way to the reduction by discussing concrete problems, putting particular emphasis on the new evil demon problem as it allows us to motivate a phenomenological version of epistemic internalism, according to which two experiences that are phenomenologically identical are also justificationally identical, which means that they justify the same beliefs to the same degree.

Key words
Transcendental phenomenology, epistemology, Husserl, transcendental reduction, phenomenological epistemology.

References

• Berghofer, P. (2018a). Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters. Husserl Studies, 1-26. doi: 10.1007/s10743-018-9225-8
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TRANSCENDENTALISM AND NATURALISM: A REREADING OF KANT AND HUSSERL

Abstract
This paper aims to highlight the fact that Kantian philosophy and phenomenology do not only tend to disclose the structures of a priori knowledge. Contrariwise, we suggest that the transcendental may also be understood by a detour towards the empirical. Our first example concerns Kant as he developed a certain prefiguration of the phenomenological considerations and described a way to consider the subject in a naturalistic way by introducing the notion of Selbstsetzung in his latest work. By comparing the way Kant and Husserl thought the need to consider that the subject is embodied in the world, we also point out that Husserl improved the Kantian problematic of the Selbstsetzung as he described a transcendental and scientific method to apprehend the life of the subject. Nevertheless, this method may also be defined as a “phenomenological naturalism” in so far as the questions Husserl brings to light can be seen as the seeds of the current attempt to naturalize phenomenology. In this context, we aim to demonstrate that Kant’s first comprehension of the Selbstsetzung prefigures the development of the phenomenological turning point from a static to a genetic method. Furthermore, this genetic method may be conceived as an original form of naturalism which is able to illuminate the current cognitive sciences by focusing on the first-person perspective and on crucial themes like the flesh, consciousness, etc. Eventually, we conclude that this turning point may have been an inspiration for the naturalization of phenomenology.

Key words
Phenomenology, naturalism, Kant, Husserl, transcendental, practical philosophy, epistemology.

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