Studies in Phenomenology



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INTRODUCTION: TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Title in the language of publication: INTRODUCTION: TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
Author: CLAUDIA SERBAN, IULIAN APOSTOLESCU
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  9-12
Language: English
Document type: Editorial
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-9-12 PDF (Downloads: 3510)

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SARA HEINÄMAA, MIRJA HARTIMO, TIMO MIETTINEN (EDS.)
“PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL”
Routledge, New York (Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 1), 2014. ISBN 978-0-415-86988-1

Title in the language of publication: SARA HEINÄMAA, MIRJA HARTIMO, TIMO MIETTINEN (EDS.)
“PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL”
Routledge, New York (Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 1), 2014. ISBN 978-0-415-86988-1
Author: Iulian Apostolescu
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  240-246
Language: English
Document type: Review
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-240-246 PDF (Downloads: 3217)

Abstract
What can phenomenological reflection contribute to the ongoing discussion of transcendental thought? What kind of transcendental philosophy is phenomenology? Why does Husserl’s unfinished project merit the name transcendental? Can the notion of transcendental phenomenology be defended today, and is Husserl right in insisting upon its uniqueness and indeclinability? To what extent is the very idea of transcendental phenomenology deeply committed to metaphysical prejudices that we have to renounce the transcendental project in favour of other projects? To what extent is speculative realism in a position to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework? This impressive collection of essays is a lucid, insightful and important attempt to answer these questions. Not only does it give new insight into the transcendental character of phenomenology, but it also outlines the dynamic development of phenomenology as a continuing and expanding domain of research. The editors claim that this volume “is motivated by the insight that the novel interdisciplinary situation in which phenomenology conducts fruitful exchanges with several empirical sciences demands that we reconsider thoroughly the fundamental methodological questions concerning the transcendental character of phenomenological inquiries. Phenomenology and the Transcendental brings together original articles that together clarify the transcendental aspects of phenomenology and outline new transcendental versions of phenomenology in distinction from the naturalistic, vitalist, and poststructuralist approaches that dominate philosophy at the moment”. In this review, I provide a brief overview of the contributions to this volume to show how the transcendental standpoint is indispensable for genuine phenomenology and philosophical reasoning in general.

Key words
Transcendental, phenomenology, subjectivity, world, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger.

References

  • Da Silva, J.J. (2017). Mathematics and Its Applications. A Transcendental-Idealist Perspective. Switzerland: Springer.
  • Engelland, C. (2017). Heidegger’s Shadow: Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn. New York: Routledge.
  • Gardner S., & Grist, M. (Eds.). (2015). The Transcendental Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Heinämaa, S., Hartimo, M., Miettinen, T. (Eds.). (2014). Phenomenology and the Transcendental. New York: Routledge.
  • Honenberger, P. (Ed.). (2016). Naturalism and Philosophical Anthropology: Nature, Life, and the Human between Transcendental and Empirical Perspectives. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Husserl, E. (1988). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
  • Kim, H., & Hoeltzel, S. (Eds.). (2016). Transcendental Inquiry: Its History, Methods and Critiques. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Luft, S. (2011). Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
  • Staiti, A. (2014). Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Zahavi, D. (2017). Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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CHAD ENGELLAND
“HEIDEGGER’S SHADOW. KANT, HUSSERL, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN”
Routledge, 2017. ISBN 9781138181878

Title in the language of publication: CHAD ENGELLAND
“HEIDEGGER’S SHADOW. KANT, HUSSERL, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN”
Routledge, 2017. ISBN 9781138181878
Author: Paul Slama
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  234-239
Language: English
Document type: Review
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-234-239 PDF (Downloads: 3116)

Abstract
This review presents historical and philosophical hypotheses of Chad Engelland's book by first considering the general thesis of a Heidegger transcendental philosopher, then emphasizing the importance of this theme for the treatise Sein und Zeit (1927), finally considering promises and aporia of such an interpretation for the second Heidegger. Heidegger first endorsed the program of a certain transcendental philosophy, to reject it in a second part of his work. Each time, the problem is to know what type of transcendental philosophy it is, which implies asking the question of Heidegger's relation to both transcendental philosophy of Kant and transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Does the thought of utensility or authenticity in Being and Time refer to a transcendental questioning? And is it a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental? But also, can the thought of Ereignis and of the last God be so, as C. Engelland thinks? The reviewer insists on the importance of understanding the role of intuition in phenomenology’s relationship to Kant, but also on the link made by Heidegger between Kant's first and second Critiques, that is, between the theory and practice. Finally, it shows from the book the role of affectivity, not without indicating possible extensions including the analysis of neokantism, or Hölderlin.

Key words
Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, transcendental phenomenology.

References

  • Cohen, H. (1907). Kommentar zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Leipzig: Durr.
  • Cohen, H. (1885). Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhanlung.
  • Engelland, C. (2017) Heidegger’s Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental Turn. London: Routlege.
  • Heidegger, M. (1977). Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
  • Heidegger, M. (1984). Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
  • Heidegger, M. (1989). Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
  • Heidegger, M. (1991). Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
  • Heidegger, M. (1997). Besinnung. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
  • Heidegger, M. (2006). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
  • Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Hua III/1-2). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

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BÉATRICE LONGUENESSE
“I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN”
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-966576-1

Title in the language of publication: BÉATRICE LONGUENESSE
“I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN”
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-966576-1
Author: Claudia Serban
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  228-233
Language: English
Document type: Review
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-228-233 PDF (Downloads: 3081)

Abstract
The review provides an outline of Béatrice Longuenesse’s latest book: I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again (Oxford University Press, 2017), which attempts to offer “a more systematic exploration of Kant’s account of self-consciousness”, with a particular focus on “its relation to contemporary analyses of self-consciousness” (Longuenesse). Longuenesse’s recent analyses have indeed the major interest of orchestrating a fecund dialogue between Kant’s comprehension of the I and several key interlocutors, from Wittgenstein to Freud and including Sartre, Anscombe, Evans and others. Thus, the first section of the book originates in twentieth-century debates and challenges the claim that bodily self-consciousness is the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness. The second section of I, Me, Mine provides a thorough discussion of Kant’s view on the “I think”, on self-consciousness and personhood, and continues to plead for a genuine form of self-consciousness independent from the consciousness of one’s body. Yet, a more general objective of the book progressively emerges: that of a “naturalization of the notion of person”, by showing that “Kant’s criticism of the paralogism of personhood opens the way to substituting for the rationalist concept a rich and complex concept of a person as a spatiotemporal, living entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for autonomous self-determination” (Longuenesse). This naturalization of the Kantian concept of subjectivity is set in motion, within the last section of the book, with the unexpected assistance of Freud’s account on the ego and the super-ego.

Key words
Kant, I, self-consciousness, apperception, person, naturalization, Freud.

References

  • Longuenesse, B. (2017). I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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EMMANUEL KANT
« PRINCIPES METAPHYSIQUES DE LA SCIENCE DE LA NATURE »
Introduction, traduction et notes par A. Pelletier, Paris: Vrin, 2017. ISBN 978-2-7116-2544-4

Title in the language of publication: EMMANUEL KANT
« PRINCIPES METAPHYSIQUES DE LA SCIENCE DE LA NATURE » Introduction, traduction et notes par A. Pelletier, Paris: Vrin, 2017. ISBN 978-2-7116
Author: Eric Beauron
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  223-227
Language: French
Document type: Review
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-223-227 PDF (Downloads: 3054)

Abstract
In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant develops what the Critique of Pure Reason calls the “rational physiology”, which is the metaphysics of corporeal nature. The aim of this text is to specify the object in general as matter and as the “movable in space” and, for this purpose, to take into account the various properties that make possible the material donation of the object, such as rest, speed, direction, impenetrability, attraction, repulsion, etc., the so-called predicables of the pure understanding (§ 10 of the CPR). Those predicables constitute the properties that are indeed necessary to ground the natural science (mathematical physics) and are here examined from a transcendental point of view thanks to the system of the categories and principles of the Analytics of Principles. The structure of the book is thus the following: Phoronomy deals with quantity (Axioms of Intuition), the Dynamics with quality (Anticipations of Perception), the Mechanics with relations (Analogies of Experience) and the Phenomenology with modalities (Postulates of Empirical Thought). What Kant seeks to account for, then, is the applicability of the mathematics that make the intuitive and apodictic certainty possible thanks to the construction of the object in an a priori intuition. The methodological problem concerns the possibility of this a priori construction, which must be here realized in the realm of existence. How to connect the empirical properties of the object to the necessary and universal principles provided by the categories in order to account for the possibility of the mathematical construction of the object? The metaphysics of the corporeal nature is different from the transcendental cognition of the pure nature in general because it considers the transcendental schematism from the point of view of space and not of time.

Key words
Kant, natural science, rational physiology, objective reality of the categories, transcendental schematism, transcendental epistemology, space, matter, force.

References

  • Förster, E. (2000). Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus postumum. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.
  • Friedman, M. (2013). Kant’s Construction of Nature. A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, E. (1980). Critique de la raison pure. Paris: Gallimard.
  • Kant, E. (2017). Principes métaphysiques de la science de la nature. Paris: Vrin.
  • Kerszberg, P. (1999). Kant et la nature. Paris: Les Belles-Lettres.
  • Vuillemin, J. (1955). Physique et métaphysique kantiennes. Paris: PUF.

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THE MATERIAL RESIDUE.
KANT AND HUSSERL ON AN ASPECT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE

Title in the language of publication: THE MATERIAL RESIDUE.
KANT AND HUSSERL ON AN ASPECT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE
Author: Francesco Pisano
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  98-120
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-98-120 PDF (Downloads: 3222)

Abstract
Husserl’s late claim of that transcendental logic is self-founded stands in a puzzling relation with the facticity of nature. This relation concerns issues such as the traceableness of a “living present” in the immanence of living consciousness. The article considers this matter through a specific perspective, gained by reference to the project of a transcendental foundation of the science of nature. This project requires the problematic possibility of a formal determination of facticity. One could characterize the phenomenological finding of a “living present” as Husserl’s attempt to resolve the discrepancy between fact and form in a “living being” which consists of both actual materiality and transcendental ideality. This conciliatory solution remains questionable, given the impossibility to provide an a priori foundation of this synthetic moment through the self-reflexive movement of transcendental logic. However, the systematic project of transcendental phenomenology as such entails the question concerning the a priori foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts. It seems, then, to require a solution of this sort. The problem of grounding the scientific knowledge of natural facts dates back at least to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. So does the need for the definition of an empirical moment of this grounding. A discussion of Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft presents an aporetic facet of the way in which transcendental philosophy responds to this need. An analogous impasse occurs in Husserl’s mature work. The concept of “living present” holds a central role in defining Husserl’s stance towards this stalemate. The analysis of this role aims to clarify both Husserl’s specific position in the broader context of transcendental philosophy, and an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature. I conclude that this foundation must encompass a factual, non-formalizable element: a material residue, required in order to complete its reflexive movement.

Key words
Phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, philosophy of science, science of nature, a priori, living present, Kant, Husserl.

References

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  • Bunge, M. (1967). Foundations of Physics. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
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  • Husserl, E. (1973). Cartesianische Meditationen (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
  • Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Hua XVII). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
  • Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Hua III/1). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
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  • Kant, I. (1781). Сritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
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