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SELF AND BODY. HUSSERL'S AND LEVINAS' DEBATES WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISM

Abstract
The article follows some lines of thought in Husserl and Levinas, their texts namely in which the close relation between the self and body should be grasped as one of the topics where the idealistic approach to subjectivity is abandoned. Already in Husserl one can find reflections on the significant affective-bodily dimension of the transcendental subjectivity itself which is one of the ways he overcomes the classical dualistic modern philosophical tradition. Levinas went even further in his critical debate with this classical thinking and — in certain continuity with Husserl — gave a new account of the affective-bodily constitution of the singularity of human subjectivity. In both cases the singularisation of the self pass through an intersubjective constitution of the own body that is an event for Levinas that precedes an egoic consciousness. But in both cases there is a problem that the theories cannot solve: the body as mine has to be presupposed. There is a certain self-preceding of the lived body that seems to function as a basis for the self-awareness in the lived experiences, a factical basis that not only relativizes an idealistic point of departure in a pure I but also destabilize any attempt to build a system upon the phenomenological accounts of the relation between the body and the self. The transcendental-phenomenological reductions, the genetic ones in Husserl, and the ethical ones in Levinas, lead to more (Levinas) or less (Husserl) radical divergences with the projects of totalizing systems in the style of the German idealism.

Key words
Subjectivity, self, corporeal / Leib, body / Körper, affectivity, sensuousness, singularity.

References

• Franck, D. (1981). Chair et corps. Sur la phénoménologie de Husserl. Paris: Minuit.
• Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischer Philosophie (Hua XV). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973a). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil (1921–28) (Hua XIV). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973b). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil (1929–35) (Hua XV). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (2008). Lebenswelt. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil (1929–35) (Hua XXXIX). Dodrecht: Springer.
• Levinas, E. (1989). Humanismus des anderen Menschen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
• Levinas, E. (1997). Vom Sein zum Seienden. Freiburg, München: Karl Alber.
• Levinas, E. (1998). Jenseits des Seins oder anders als Sein geschieht. Freiburg, München: Karl Alber.
• Lohmar, D. (2009). Eine Geschichte des Ich bei Husserl. Mit Bemerkungen zum Ur-Ich in Husserls späten Zeitmanuskripten. In M. Pfeiffer, & S. Rapic (Eds.), Das Selbst und sein Anderes: Festschrift für Klaus Erich Kaehler (162–181). Freiburg, München: Karl Alber.
• Tengelyi, L. (2014). Expérience de la singularité. Paris: Hermann.

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«BEING OUTSIDE-ITSELF» IN SCHELLING AND HEIDEGGER

Abstract
The author of the article framed the question of the possible relevance of the treatment of the Schelling's philosophy in the context of a phenomenological one. Thereby, he points its problematic character, referencing Husserl's treatment of German idealism after Kant (including the thought of Schelling) as the romantic idealism. At the same time, he also states the influence of Schelling on the few phenomenologists who made their careers after Husserl. The article's author reviews the concept of the «being outside-itself» or «ecstasy» in Schelling and Heidegger (as one of the phenomenologists) for the further concretization of the theme. The ecstasy in Schelling is the new name for the idealistic intellectual intuition, by which a singular subject loses its own position as subject and thereby gets to the position of the absolute subject. The absolute subject is one which cannot be an object already. Schelling identifies the ecstasy understood in this way with the wondering as philosophical initiation in Ancient Greece. Such ecstasy leads to unknowing knowledge in Schelling's words. The concept of being outside-itself means the structural element of being of human Dasein, i.e. of temporality in Heidegger. This philosopher thinks that a human being is always already outside itself ontologically, before any intuition both sensual and intellectual. The human subject is not closed in on itself, for then it has to transcend from its immanence to the outside. It is always outside itself, it is ecstatic. In its ecstasies, it is always in the world, instead of being inside the world and other people. Heidegger bases his critique of the traditional metaphysics of the subject on such understanding of the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e. of the true «subject». In conclusion, the article's author states that the approaches to the problem of being outside-itself of both mentioned philosophers are in principle, quite different. Schelling tries to rehabilitate the subjectivity by the reduction of the singular subject to the absolute one. On the contrary, the finitude of human Dasein is the necessary condition of its being in Heidegger. The ecstasy is interiorization in Schelling, but it is exteriorization, which has been always already realized, in Heidegger. However, the author of the article also pinpoints a certain isomorphism of the treatments of ecstasy in both thinkers. In the different ways they attempt to overcome the crisis of the understanding of the subject as closed in itself, create the conditions of this isomorphism.

Key words
Being outside-itself, ecstasy, intellectual intuition, wondering, Dasein, temporality, existence, metaphysics, German idealism, phenomenology.

References

• Chernyakov, A. G. (2001). Ontologiya vremeni. Vremya i bytie v filosofii Aristotelya, Gusserlya i Khaideggera. [Ontology of time. Time and being in the philosophy of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger]. St Petersburg: St Petersburg School of Religion and Philosophy. (in Russian).
• Heidegger, M. (1976). Wegmarken (GA 9). Frankfurt a. Main: V. Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1978). Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik in Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26). Frankfurt a. Main: V. Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (1989). Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). Frankfurt a. Main: V. Klostermann.
• Heidegger, M. (2013). Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA 73). Frankfurt a. Main: V. Klostermann.
• Heinz, M. (1982). Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität. Die Konstruktion der Existenz und die Grundlegung einer temporalen Ontologie im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers. Würzburg, Amsterdam: Königshausen & Neumann.
• Husserl, E. (1956). Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Erste Teil (Hua VII). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Iber, C. (1994). Das Andere der Vernunft als ihr Prinzip. Grundzüge der philosophischen Entwicklung Schellings mit einem Ausblick auf die nachidealistischen Philosophiekonzeptionen Heideggers und Adornos. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
• Leinkauf, T. (1998). Schelling als Interpret der philosophischen Tradition. Münster: Lit.
• Ohashi, R. (1975). Ekstase und Gelassenheit: zu Schelling und Heidegger. München.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1858). Philosophie der Offenbarung. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'scher.
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• Schelling, F. W. J. (1969). Initia philosophiae universae. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (2005) System des transcendentalen Idealismus. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Bd 9. Tbd 1. Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzbog.
• Schulz, W. (1975). Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings. Pfullingen: Neske.

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TO THE CONCEPT OF «ALIENATION» IN HUSSERL AND HEGEL

Abstract
The article deals with alienation as a difference between subjectivity and itself. Based on the comparative analysis of the concept in Phenomenology of Spirit and The Crisis of European Sciences the study treats the difference as a presupposition underlying both phenomenology and German Idealism and reveals its heuristicity. The first section explicates the conceptual horizon of the alienation problem in Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the interpretation of Kantian concept of selfconsciousness in German Idealism. The article analyzes two aspects of the concept motivating the interpretation: self-consciousness as a spontaneous act and both as the condition and result of the synthesis. The second section demonstrates the correlation between these aspects and two dimensions of alienation in Phenomenology of Spirit: the self-assertion of the subject as object, i.e. as other for itself, and transition from the subject to a predicate, also treated as the self-assertion of the one (subject) as other (predicate). So the research shows that Hegel identifies actuality of the subject with becoming itself as becoming other for itself. In its completeness it appears to be suspended (not eliminated) alienation. The last section is devoted to alienation as the constitution of another ego in Crisis and compares Husserlian and Hegelian understanding of the phenomenon. Unlike Hegel, Husserl discovers irreversibility of alienation, as the difference between ego and alter ego is not the one between ego and itself. Yet the concepts of the primal I (Ur-Ich) and temporalization as the difference of the I from itself suggest that the difference between ego and alter ego is grounded in the one of the I from itself. The heuristicity of the grounding is the suspension of the adequate evidence principle. The difference of ego from itself in intersubjective and temporal experience as the fundamental difference is constituted insofar as immediate perception is slipping away.

Key words
Alienation, phenomenology, German Idealism, consciousness, difference, I, оther.

References

• Fikhte, I. G. (1993). Osnova obshchego naukoucheniya [Foundations of the entire science of konwledge]. In Fikhte, I.G. Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh. Tom 1 [Collected Works in 2 Volumes. Volume 1] (65–337). Moscow: Mifril. (in Russian).
• Hegel, G. W. F. (1978). Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive Logik. Hamburg: Meiner.
• Hegel, G. W. F. (1987). Phänomenologie des Geistes. Stuttgart: Philip Reclam jun.
• Husserl, E. (1973a). Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen (Hua II). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973b). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1976). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (Hua VI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Kant, I. (2006a). Kritika chistogo razuma [Critique of Pure Reason]. In Kant I. Sochineniya na nemetskom i russkom yazykakh. Tom II. Chast' 2. 1-e izdanie (A), 1781 [Collected Works on German and Russian languages, Volume 2 (2), 1781]. Moskow: Nauka.
• Kant I. (2006b). Kritika chistogo razuma [Critique of Pure Reason]. In Kant I. Sochineniya na nemetskom i russkom yazykakh. Tom II. Chast' 1. 2-е izdanie (B), 1787 [Collected Works on German and Russian languages, Volume 2(1), 1787]. Moskow: Nauka.
• Shelling, F. V. I. (1987). Sistema transtsendental'nogo idealizma [System of transcendental Idealism]. In Shelling, F. V. I. Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh. Tom 1 [Collected Works in 2 Volumes. Volume 1] (227–489). Moscow: Mysl'. (in Russian).

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ON THE BORDER OF SELF-APPEARANCE. SELF-AFFECTION AND REFLECTION IN THE REMEMBERING IN KANT AND HUSSERL

Abstract
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To this end, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects the inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession on the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing. Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea that a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection; however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self shall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes» of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in this respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself. From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection on my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory to some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation of phantasy and imagination.

Key words
Self-affection, reflection, past I, Self, irrevocability, substitutes, phantasy.

References

• Allison, Henry E. (2015). Kant's Transcendental Deduction. An Analytical-Historical Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Ferrer, G. (2015). Protentionalität und Urimpression. Elemente einer Phänomenologie der Erwartungsintentionen in Husserls Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
• Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926 (Hua XI). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935 (Hua XV). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1980). Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898–1925) (Hua XXIII). Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Kant, I. (1998). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
• Kern, I. (1964). Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
• Lohmar, D. (2008). Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasien. Untersuchungen der Psychologie, cognitive Science, Neurologie und Phänomenologie zur Funktion der Phantasie in der Wahrnehmung. Dordrecht: Springer.
• Richir, M. (2000). Phénoménologie en esquisses. Nouvelles fondations. Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon.
• Ricœur, P. (1985). Temps et récit 3: Le temps raconté. Paris: Seuil.

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WHAT IS A PROBLEM?

Abstract
What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or otherwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even possible. For being's way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatsoever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect.

Key words
Apodeictic, aspect, assertoric, being, implication, problematic, suspension, time, unity.

References

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