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INTRODUCTION

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DALE JACQUETTE
ALEXIUS MEINONG, THE SHEPHERD OF NON-BEING
Moscow: Kanon + ROOI “Reabilitatsiia”, 2023. ISBN 978-5-88373-782-3

Abstract
In my review, I evaluate the first translation of Dale Jacquette’s book entitled Alexius Meinong, The Shepherd of Non-Being into Russian. First of all, I point out the relevance of the publication of this translation. It is conditioned, in my view, by the fact that the person of Alexius Meinong—one of the important representatives of the school of Franz Brentano—still remains undeservedly forgotten and not enough studied in both domestic and foreign history of philosophy. At the same time, studying the legacy of Meinong could shed the light on the peculiarity of the processes that took place in European philosophy at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, as well as show the common sources of such divergent directions in modern philosophy as analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Moreover, philosophy of Meinong could discover some perspectives for modern thought that other philosophers of the past cannot indicate. All these points, in my opinion, are taken into account in Jacquette’s monograph. The advantage of his research is that he reconstructs the philosophy of Meinong, his theory of objects in a very broad historical and philosophical context of both phenomenological (F.Brentano, E.Husserl) and analytical (B.Russell, W.V.O.Quine, D.K.Lewis, S.Kripke) traditions. Systematically, the center of Meinong’s theory of objects is the doctrine of so-called Außersein of the objects, which can be considered not only as existing, but as not yet existing, no longer existing and even impossible. As conclusion, I criticize the translations of some of Meinong/Jacquette terms used in the monograph under review.

Keywords
Alexius Meinong, theory of objects, intentional objects, Außersein, intensionalism, extensionalism, extra-ontology.

References

• Aristotle. (1976). Works in 4 volumes. Vol. 1. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Mysl’ Publ. (In Russian)
• Jacquette, D. (2015). Alexius Meining, The Shepherd of Non-Being. Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer.
• Jacquette, D. (2023). Alexius Meining, The Shepherd of Non-Being. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Kanon + ROOI Reabilitatsiia Publ. (In Russian)
• Mironov, D. (2022). Alexius Meinong’s Semantic Investigations in the Context of Brentanist Philosophy of Language. ESSE: Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 7 (1/2), 22–41. https://doi.org/10.31119/essephts.2022.7.1–2.2 (In Russian)
• Popik, O. (2013). The Theory of Objects by A. Minong and Universal Nature of Logical Laws. Vestinik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, 9 (63), 46–51. (In Russian).
• Seliverstov, V. (2021). Alexius Meinong’s Extraontology. Beyond Being and Non-Being. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, 58 (1), 220–234. (In Russian)
• Vdovina, G. (2022a). Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects Is Looking for a Home. ESSE: Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 7 (1/2), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.31119/essephts.2022.7.1–2.1 (In Russian)
• Vdovina, G. (2022b). The Late Scholastic Roots of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The Philosophy Journal, 15 (1), 5–20. https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-5-20

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NORM, ONTOLOGY, CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: NORMATIVE HEIDEGGERIANISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL CONSIDERATION

Abstract
This article reconstructs the normative strategy of interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in modern analytical philosophy, and also proposes a theoretical framework for understanding this strategy as a historical phenomenon. The article describes the development of the normative direction in the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Its first branch—the socio-normative, or the neopragmatist one—is associated with such philosophers as John Haugeland and Robert Brandom. The second one—the ethico-normative, or postneopragmatist one—branch is represented by Steven Crowell and Sacha Golob. It is shown that the first group of normativists focused mainly on implicit social norms and structures of conformity, while the second—focuses primarily on Kantian ethics and Christina Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, as well as on the inferentialist philosophy of language of Robert Brandom. The conceptual schemes used by each of the representatives of these approaches are reconstructed. The connections of different approaches within the framework of the normative direction with each other are shown. The concept of a relay race is proposed, which can describe normative Heideggerianism as a historical phenomenon. It is shown that the development of normative Heideggerianism can be characterized as theoretical progress in relation to the accuracy of the interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. The grounds for the comparative “progressiveness” of different normative approaches in the updates of the basic normative conceptual scheme that they involve are clarified. It is also shown that the progress of the normative conceptual scheme in the direction of flexibility and adaptation to Heidegger’s text is fraught with a loss of meaningfulness of the very concept of norm. It is argued that the concept of norm, despite the loss of its empirical content, can be used to translate Heidegger’s concepts for pragmatic reasons.

Keywords
Martin Heidegger, normative interpretation, neopragmatism, norm, commitment, practical identity, constitutive standard, relay race, conceptual scheme.

References

• Bartky, S. L. (1970). Originative Thinking in the Later Philosophy of Heidegger. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30 (3), 368–381. https://doi.org/10.2307/2105602
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• Brandom, R. B. (1983). Heidegger’s Categories in “Being and Time”. The Monist, 66 (3), 387–409. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198366327
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• Brandom, R. B. (1997). Dasein, the Being That Thematizes. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 5 (1/2), 1–38. https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche199751/24
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• Crowell, S. G. (1981). Truth and Reflection: The Development of Transcendental Logic in Lask, Husserl, and Heidegger (Doctoral Thesis). New Haven: Yale University.
• Crowell, S. G. (1999). Phenomenology and the Question of Being: Heidegger. In S. Glendinning (Ed.), The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy (283–295). Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni versity Press.
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• Haugeland, J. (1982). Heidegger on Being a Person. Nous, 16 (1), 15–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215406
• Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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• Haugeland, J. (1998a). Toward a New Existentialism. In J. Haugeland, Having Thoughts. Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (1–6). Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.
• Haugeland, J. (1998b) Truth and Rule-Following. In J. Haugeland, Having Thoughts. Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (305–361). Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.
• Haugeland, J. (2005). Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger. European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (13), 421–428. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2005.00237.x
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HUSSERL, AJDUKIEWICZ, AND BLAUSTEIN ON MEANING

Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the reception of Husserl’s theory of meaning by Ajdukiewicz and Blaustein, two members of the analytically-oriented Lvov-Warsaw School, who, in different ways, were attracted to and confronted with Husserl’s phenomenology. The discussed hypothesis is that Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation of Logical Investigations, and his original theory of meaning influenced both Blaustein’s critical reading of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his account of meaning-intention. After outlining the central elements of “First Logical Investigation” the paper shows how it is interpreted by Ajdukiewicz in his Lvov lectures on logic and in his directival theory of meaning. What emerges is a psychological-descriptive interpretation of Husserl’s concept of meaning, and a reconsideration of his theory of intentionality within the inferential structure of beliefs in premises that motivates a person who speaks a language to believe in conclusions of a certain form. This leads Ajdukiewicz to his own original conventionalist account of meaning which is based on the identification of three main directives of meaning that represent the matrix of a given language, i.e., the grid in which each meaning finds its place. These elements allow one to demonstrate how Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation resonates in Blaustein’s critique of Husserl in his early writings, where, in addition to a psychological-descriptive reading of phenomenology we also find a conventionalist conception of meaning acts and signitive presentations. According to Blaustein, a sign can represent an object only through the conventions arising from the directives of meaning that belong to a given natural language.

Keywords
Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, Blaustein, Meaning, Phenomenology, Intentionality, Directival Theory of Meaning, Lvov–Warsaw School.

References

• Ajdukiewicz, K. (1935). Der logistische Antiirrationalismus in Polen. Erkenntnis, 5, 151–164.
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• Ajdukiewicz, K. (1993). Kategorie syntaktyczne i antynomie logiczne. Filozofia Nauki, 1 (1), 163-184.
• Ajdukiewicz, K. (2014). Wykłady Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza z semantyki logicznej w Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie w roku akademickim 1930/1931. Filozofia Nauki, 22 (1), 143–158.
• Ajdukiewicz, K. (2017). Konspekt wykładów z logiki wygłoszonych na Uniwersytecie Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie w roku akademickim 1924/1925 sporządzony przez Stefana Ołeksiuka. Filozofia Nauki, 25 (2), 137–159.
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SINN AND ITS SHADOW. TERMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF HUSSERL’S CONCEPTION OF NOETIC-NOEMATIC STRUCTURES OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract
The methodological premise of the investigation is the meta-difference between foreground and background as a necessary element of any difference, including the difference between conceptual and terminological types of analysis of philosophical texts. The topic of terminological analysis is the function of the terms that make up the framework of concepts, the methods and justifications for their introduction. The role of D.Hume, who was the first to draw attention to the difference in the meaning of the same word in natural and philosophical languages, is noted. More general questions are formulated regarding the prerequisites of terminological analysis: what is a term, what experience underlies the very process of introducing terms, are terms a necessary building material of philosophical texts or a necessary evil? The prerequisites for terminological analysis include the differences between a term and a word, as well as a term and a metaphor. Husserl’s concept of noetic-noematic structures is considered in terms of the difference between conceptual and terminological dimensions. The research focuses on the functions of “sense” as an intermediary between natural language and philosophical terminology. The prerequisites for the introduction of the terms “noesis” and “noema” are identified; in the first case, this is the traditional scheme of hylomorphism, in the second, the postulate of the identity of what is perceived during normal and abnormal perception. A comparison is made between Husserl’s expression “sense does not burn” with M.Bulgakov’s aphorism “manuscripts do not burn.” Husserl’s division of two types of consciousness (positional and neutral or shadow) reveals the incorrectness of Husserl’s description of the difference between the foreground and background of perception. Husserl’s description of “neutralization” is subjected to critical analysis using the example of the perception of Durer’s engraving. The final section of the article examines attempts to correlate the meaning of the word “sense” with experience, compares the role of the terms “sense” and “concept,” and also analyzes Husserl’s “generalization of the idea of meaning,” or expansion of the meaning of the term “sense.” Finally, a distinction is made between a methodology of separation, which corresponds to the boundary-setting function of terms, and a methodology of differentiation of differences, which implies the differentiating function of terms.

Keywords
noesis, noema, experience, term, quotation marks, sense, perception, hallucination.

References

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