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ТHE REVIEW OF ТHE INТERNAТIONAL SCIENТIFIC WORKSHOP “ТHE ТRANSCENDENТAL ТURN IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY — 8: ТRANSCENDENТAL MEТAPHYSICS, EPISТEMOLOGY, TRANSCENDENTAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND ARIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE”
(April 20–22, 2023, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract
This article presents a review of papers of the international scientific seminar “Transcendental Turn in Modern Philosophy — 8: Metaphysics, epistemology, transcendental cognitive science and artificial intelligence,” which was held on April 20–22, 2023 in Moscow. The topics reviewed were the following: “Transcendental Philosophy: Ontology, Metaphysics of Experience or Epistemology,” “Transcendentalism, Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence,” “Reception and Development of Transcendental (Phenomenological) Approach in Modern Philosophy,” as well as “Transcendental Phenomenology: Ontology and/or Gnoseology”. The author analyzes the presentations of the participants, grouping them around the following thematic and problematic nodes: the transcendental foundations of cognitive sciences, the understanding and status of the transcendental unity of apperception, the relationship between gnoseology and ontology in phenomenological research, receptivity and construction in forming the subject of knowledge, etc. This approach makes it possible to identify different, sometimes opposing positions of the participants on the same question and to outline ways to overcome the contradictions.

Keywords
transcendentalism, metaphysics, ontology, gnoseology, consciousness, phenomenology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, Kant, Husserl.

References

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ORTEGA Y GASSET AND THE QUESTION OF THE BODY

Abstract
My essay is devoted to the very early and attractive understanding of the lived body in Ortega y Gasset’s thought. I focus especially on the text “Vitality, Soul, Spirit” of 1925, which can be considered a proto-phenomenological approach to the issue of embodiment. Ortega identifies “vitality” with “the intrabody” and makes the latter the founding dimension of subjectivity, at the basis of the affective sphere (“soul”) and at the basis of the intellectual and volitional sphere (“spirit”). In a manner very close to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, he also shows how the body is the only reality of which there is simultaneously external perception, as if it were just another thing in the world that everyone else can see, and internal perception, which only the self can have and feel. The study also points out, however, the two major difficulties that I detect in Ortega’s precocious attempt. A first doubt concerns the too sharp stratification of vitality, soul and spirit, as can be seen in the analysis of the experiences of pain and of mobility. A second doubt concerns the ontological hesitations surrounding Ortega’s position, which is torn between a coherent phenomenological perspective and a vitalist position in which my body is only an emanation of the lifestream of the universe.

Keywords
Ortega y Gasset, body, phenomenology, vitality, first-person perspective, vitalism, pain, self-movement.

References

• Buytendijk, J. J. (1948). Über den Schmerz (H. Plessner, Trans.). Bern: Hans Huber Verlag.
• Cerezo, P. (1984). La voluntad de aventura. Aproximamiento crítico al pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset. Barcelona: Ariel.
• Gaos, J. (2013). La profecía en Ortega. In José Lasaga (Ed.), Los pasos perdidos. Escritos sobre Ortega (57-126). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
• Lasaga, J. (1992). Sobre la superación de la dualidad cuerpo/espíritu en el pensamiento de Ortega. In J. San Martin (Ed.), Ortega y la fenomenología. Madrid: UNED, 193-202.
• García-Baró, M. (2012). Sentir y pensar la vida. Ensayos de fenomenología y filosofía española. Madrid: Trotta.
• Gobbi, G. (2022). “Introduzione” to Ortega y Gasset J. Il corpo tra symbolon e psyché. Meltemi: Milano.
• Gutiérrez Simón, R. (2016). Dimensiones del cuerpo y conocimiento moral en Ortega y Gasset. Azafea. Revista de Filosofía, 18, 227-244.
• Laín Entralgo, P. (1989). El cuerpo humano. Teoría actual. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.
• Orringer, N. (1999). La corporalidad en Ortega y Gasset. Pamplona: Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (2004a). Vitalidad, alma, espíritu. In Obras completas II (566-592). Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset/Taurus.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (2004b). Meditaciones del Quijote. In Obras completas I (747-825). Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset/Taurus.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (2004c) “El Quijote” en la escuela. In Obras completas II (401-427). Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset/Taurus.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (2004d) Sobre la expresión fenómeno cósmico. In Obras completas II (680-695). Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset/Taurus.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (2009) La razón histórica [Curso de 1940]. In Obras completas IX (477-558). Madrid: Fundación José Ortega y Gasset/Taurus.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (1954). Vitalität, Seele, Geist (GA 1) (H. Weyl, Trans.). Stuttgart: DVA.
• Ortega y Gasset, J. (1961). Meditations on Quixote (E. Rouge & D. Marín, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton.
• Parente, L. (In press, 2023). El cuerpo: punto cero de fluir cósmico. Una lectura orteguiana. Estudios orteguianos, 46.
• San Martin, J. (Ed.). (1992). Ortega y la fenomenología. Madrid: UNED.
• San Martin, J. (1994). Ensayos sobre Ortega. Madrid: UNED.
• San Martin, J. (1998). Fenomenología y cultura en Ortega. Madrid: Tecnos.
• San Martin, J. (2012). La filosofía de Ortega y Gasset. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
• Serrano de Haro, A. (2013). Apariciones y eclipses del cuerpo propio. In J. Zamora Bonilla (Ed.), Guía Comares de Ortega y Gasset (311-327). Granada: Comares.

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THE CASE OF SCHELLING’S LIBERTARIAN ANARCHISM. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INSURMOUNTABILITY OF THE PARTICULAR WILL IN THE YEARS 1809-1810

Abstract
This paper refers to the connection between the metaphysical duality of ground and existence and inner dynamic of the particular will of man. We will analyse how the metaphysical monism, which Schelling attributes to Spinoza and later to Hegel, is responsible for the abolition of the freedom of the human individual, because it does not account for the existence of evil, and consequently reduces it to the existence of a higher order reference system that over and predetermines the individual (1). We will first scrutinise the principles of separation and union, ground and understanding from the human point of view, namely as the will of ground and love, as particular and universal will (2). The will of man reveals itself as the culmination and model of the will that permeates nature, an essential aspect of the process of God’s revelation and becoming. The link between the principles of separation and union shows us the difference that Schellingian thought establishes between man and God, the real and the ideal. While God, or the purely ideal principle, precedes the separation in a logical-ontological sense, the will of man remains always in an indissoluble tension between the principles, since it is unable to overcome the opposition between good and evil that is characteristic of freedom. The good remains one of the results of human freedom and thus of the particular will of man. The good lies for Schelling not in the simple actualization of the general, but in the moment ineradicable particularity needed for the attainment of a real and effective principle (3). It is to this insurmountability of the particular will in the process of the constitution of man that our proposal of Schelling’s libertarian anarchism refers. The connection of this thesis with the critique of the State is also discussed (4).

Keywords
Schelling, particular will, separation, God, good, evil, libertarianism, anarchism.

References

• Barth, U. (2011). Annäherungen an das Böse. Naturphilosophische Aspekte von Schellings Freiheitsschrift. In C. Danz & J. Jantzen (Eds.), Gott, Natur, Kunst und Geschichte Schelling zwischen Identitätsphilosophie und Freiheitsschrift (169-184). Göttingen: Vienna University Press.
• Beiser, F. C. (2002). German Idealism. The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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• Bowie, A. (1993). Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. An Introduction. Londres: Routledge.
• Brata Das, S. (2016). The Political Theology of Schelling. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Cardona, L. F. (2001). Acto inteligible y realidad individual del “malum morale”. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 57 (3), 503-526.
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• Dallmayr, F. (2019). Post-Liberalism: Recovering a Shared World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Duque, F. (2014). Schelling: filosofía de la revelación como dialéctica de la historia. Contrastes, 19, 27-59.
• Fichte, J. G. (1966). Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. In E. Fuchs, H. Gliwitzky, R. Lauth & P. K. Schneider (Eds.), Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (GA I/3) (313-460). Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
• Fischbach, F. (2001). La pensée politique de schelling. Les Études philosophiques, 56, 31-48.
• Gaudio, M. (2009). Schelling. En el vientre de Dios. In B. von Bilderling (Ed.), Tras los pasos del mal. Una indagación en la filosofía moderna (229-254). Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
• Heidegger, M. (1988). Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (GA 2). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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• Irlenborn, B. (2000). „Das Gute ist das Böse“: Die Depotenzierung des Bösen in Schellings „Freiheitsschrift“ vor dem Hintergrund der abendländischen Privationslehre. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 42, 155-178.
• Kant, I. (1912). Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte. In Kants gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VIII (107-124). Berlin / Göttingen: Preußische / Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften.
• Kain, P. J. (1990). Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 7 (3), 315-334.
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• Noller, J. (2020). “Will is Primal Being”: Schelling’s Critical Voluntarism. In M. Kisner & J. Noller (Eds.), The Concept of Will in Classical German Philosophy: Between Ethics, Politics, and Metaphysics (181-202). Berlin: De Gruyter.
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• Schelling, F. W. J. (1858). Philosophie der Offenbarung. Erstes Buch. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW XIII (1-530). Stuttgart: Cotta.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1859a). Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW IV (105-212). Stuttgart: Cotta.
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• Schelling, F. W. J. (1860a). Philosophie und Religion. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW VI (11-70). Stuttgart: Cotta.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1860b). Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses zwischen der Naturphilosophie und der verbesserten Wissenschaftslehre. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW VII (1-130). Stuttgart: Cotta.
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• Schelling, F. W. J. (1860e). Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW VII (421-484). Stuttgart: Cotta.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1860f). Briefwechsel mit Eschenmayer bezüglich der Abhandlung „Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit etc.“. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW VIII (145-189). Stuttgart: Cotta.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1860g). Die Weltalter. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW VIII (195-344). Stuttgart: Cotta.
• Schelling, F. W. J. (1861). Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. In K. F. A. Schelling (Ed.), Schellings Sämtliche Werke (XIV-Bände), SW X (1-200). Stuttgart: Cotta.
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JUAN DAVID GARCÍA BACCA’S READING OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY. FROM INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO DEATH-FIGHTING CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract
The Navarre-Venezuelan philosopher Juan David García Bacca is one of the most notable and original figures of Spanish-speaking thought, although his work has not yet received the attention it deserves. One of the pillars of his philosophy consists of what he calls a transfinite anthropology that considers man as an entity that strives to enhance his being. This anthropological approach is based on a phenomenology of nature that emphasizes the becoming and the transformations that man effects in the world. In this philosophical context, García Bacca soon became interested in the work of Husserl, Scheler y Heidegger. This article deals with the way in which García Bacca describes and values Husserl’s descriptions of intentional consciousness. The problem that García Bacca poses to transcendental phenomenology concerns neither the reality of pure consciousness nor its objective scope. García Bacca is interested in finding out if there is a potentiation of the being of consciousness superior to or deeper than the self-reflection proper to the transcendental attitude. He discovers this potentiation in the notion of an “agonic consciousness” that resists the representation of its annihilation, and whose philosophical antecedent is found in the work of Miguel de Unamuno. Without sharing all of García Bacca’s interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, the author of the article considers that it nevertheless raises relevant questions concerning the facticity and necessity proper to the transcendental subject.

Keywords
consciousness, intentionality, reflexion, agony, death, potentiality, subjeсt, transcendentality, facticity.

References

• Abellán, J. L. (1998). El exilio filosófico en América. Los transterrados de 1939. Mexiko: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
• Baudelaire, C. (1982). Die Blumen des Bösen (T. Robinson, Trans.). München: Diogenes.
• Beorlegui, C. (1998). La conciencia agónica. Originalidad filosófica de Unamuno. Cultura, 82, 95-116.
• Ferrer, G., Schmich, N., & Pérez-Gatica, S. (2022). Phänomenologie in Spanien und Hispanoamerika. Ein Lesebuch (G. Ferrer, N. Schmich & S. Pérez-Gatica, Eds., N. Schmich & G. Ferrer, Trans.). Baden Baden: Verlag Karl Alber.
• García Bacca, J. D. (1963a). Metafísica natural estabilizada y problemática metafísica espontánea. Mexiko: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
• García Bacca, J. D. (1963b). Siete modelos de filosofar. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela-Facultad de Filosofía y letras.
• García Bacca, J. D. (1990). Nueve grandes filósofos contemporáneos y sus temas. Bergson, Husserl, Unamuno, Heidegger, Scheler, Hartmann, W. James, Ortega y Gasset, Whitehead. Barcelona: Anthropos.
• García Bacca, J. D. (2003). Introducción literaria a la filosofía. Barcelona: Anthropos/Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Universidad Pública de Navarra.
• Heidegger, M. (1977). Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
• Leyva, G. (2018). La filosofía en México en el siglo XX. Un ensayo de reconstrucción histórico-sistemática. Mexiko: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
• Tengelyi, L. (2014). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber.
• Unamuno, M. (1925). Das tragische Lebensgefühl (R. Friese, Trans.). München: Meyer & Jensen Verlag.
• Zirión, A. (2009). La fenomenología en México. Historia y antología. Mexiko: UNAM.

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I HAVE ALL SORTS OF VOICES IN MY HEAD
MEDITATIONS ON GEORGY CHERNAVIN’S BOOK THE CONSCIENCE’S DOUBLE
Chernavin G. The Conscience’s Double. Moscow, 2023. (In press)

Abstract
The review analyzes the book The Conscience’s Double by Georgy Chernavin. I focus on the concepts of false twins of conscience, guilt, and duty in the extended context of philosophical and artistic discourse. The problem of the difference between conscience and its ersatz forms, which give rise to a distorted ethical consciousness, is considered. The main emphasis is opportunistic conscience, neurotic guilt, and false debt. The review suggests that Chernavin’s book studies the “sad theory” of moral disorientation and requires the supplementation with a hypothetical “cringe theory.” In this case, the “sad theory” makes it possible to expand the phenomenological discourse by including a discussion of conscience, illustrating the uncertainty of the boundaries between the phenomenological and the symbolic, and highlighting the subject’s dependence on what they are not. In this work, there is a potential for developing an original ontology of the relationship between conscience and its evil counterpart, especially between a “spiritually sighted” and a “blindly corporeal” person. The scrutinized guilt for the lost absence of guilt is an experience that, although not lived, is important for the subject’s self-constitution. This experience, like the inner side of the subject, determines its conscious functioning and forms something like a Mobius strip. An Evil Genius makes this bond, and I am trying to conceptualize their “weakened” being.

Keywords
conscience, debt, guilt, paralyzing compass, symbolic institution, symbolic misadventure.

References

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