Studies in Phenomenology



Article/Publication Details


THE PHENOMENON OF MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION. A VIEW FROM HEIDEGGER’S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY

Title in the language of publication: THE PHENOMENON OF MUSICAL IDENTIFICATION. A VIEW FROM HEIDEGGER’S EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY
Author: CHRISTIAN VASSILEV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №2 (2021), 584-606
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-584-606 PDF (Downloads: 1224)

Abstract
The starting point of the following article are statements by various prominent musical performers of the 20th century who have testified to the life-experience of musical identification, i.e. the experience of unity and oneness with music. The purpose of the article is to explore the phenomenological implications of this experience on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological work. The article compares Heidegger’s early view of phenomenal givenness with that of Edmund Husserl. While Husserl sees phenomenal givenness as constituted by (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger finds primary givenness in the resonance (Mitschwingen) between the I and its lifeworld. I argue that in Heidegger’s early phenomenology it is not the subject, but rather the relatio between I and world, which “constitutes” givenness. This viewpoint allows for the exploration of musical identification as a life-experience. Musical identification suspends the difference between subject and object. In musical identification, it is the relation between “I” and music, which is constitutive of both. Thus, music cannot be adequately grasped in phenomenological terms if it is regarded simply as an object, which is the premise of more traditional phenomenological approaches to music such as Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s. Ingarden and Dufrenne both position music at a distance from the subject, as something to be explored in its objective characteristics, without presupposing the constitutive relation between them. Contrary to them, Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht, Günther Anders and Ilya Yonchev all recognize that the subject-object divide is insufficient for the exploration of musical experience. However, while Eggebrecht ultimately remains within the subject-object-dichotomy, Anders and Yonchev both develop the idea of musical Mitsein, or Being-with-music, which dispenses with the subject-object premise altogether and interprets musical life-experience as a mode of Being within which the sense of the I and musical sense coincide.

Keywords
givenness, life-experience, constitution, relation, Mitsein, subjectivity, attunement, Mitvollzug.

References

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Article/Publication Details


GEORGY CHERNAVIN
PHILOSOPHY OF THE TROLL. THE PHENOMENON OF PAID BOTS
Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2021.
ISBN 978-5-386-13894-3.

Title in the language of publication: РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ ГЕОРГИЯ ЧЕРНАВИНА «ФИЛОСОФИЯ ТРОЛЛЯ: ФЕНОМЕН ПЛАТНЫХ БОТОВ»
Москва: РИПОЛ классик, 2021.
ISBN 978-5-386-13894-3.
Author: MIKHAIL BELOUSOV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №2 (2021), 743-750
Language: Russian
Document type: Book Review
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-743-750 PDF (Downloads: 1189)

Abstract
The review is devoted to Georgy Chernavin’s book Philosophy of the Troll. The Phenomenon of Paid Bots. The central concept of the book–default opinion as an opinion that nobody is behind – is outlined. In the light of the idea of the default opinion Georgy Chernavin seeks to lay bare the anonymous character of the natural attitude and the general positing which belongs to it–“the” world is always there as an actuality. The natural attitude turns out to be the attitude that nobody has ever taken up, since it has always already taken me up and, thus, is taken for granted without my taking part in it. The review analyzes the ambiguity of the troll as interpreted in the book: on the one hand, the troll is the one who expresses someone else’s opinion in the first person, and, in this way, embodies the natural attitude, on the other hand, the troll turns the natural attitude into the professional one, and, therefore, breaks it involuntarily, setting it down as an attitude, that is, moving toward its defamiliarization. Yet the review problematizes the research strategy Georgy Chernavin follows in some respects. In the first instance, this refers to the almost complete reduction of the other to the anonymity, which leaves no room for the meaningful others in the structure of experience. Like Heidegger, Georgy Chernavin relies on the alternative “Me or nobody (das Man)” (despite the problematical character of “me” and “my own” in the book), whereas the other in proper sense and one’s own others remain offscreen. I also try to show the problematical character of the interpretation of the involvement and the noninvolvement, represented in the book. The involvement is treated by Georgy Chernavin only as something that buries philosophical problems in oblivion, and all possibilities of philosophical understanding are attributed to the noninvolvement. I argue that, on the contrary, the involvement in phenomenology is also essential for the non-identity of the self and, thus, is the condition of the possibility of the philosophical problematization, whereas the noninvolvement, as exemplified by the trolls, can turn out to be the source of the default opinions too. In conclusion, I consider the possibility of turning the central argument of the book against the book itself by representatives of other philosophical traditions.

Keywords
troll, opinion, phenomenology, natural attitude, Husserl, others, anonymity.

References

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