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CARTESIAN “I THINK, THEREFORE, I AM” IN THE PERSPECTIVES OF LOGIC AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Abstract
In this article the questions under discussion are the properties of Descartes’s application of the first rule of his method, which requires not to agree with anything that could give rise to doubt. It is well known that Descartes came to the conclusion that only the truth “I think, therefore I am” is undoubted. The article examines the logical status of this truth and reveals that it is an entimeme where the major premise is unstated. An analysis of Descartes’s works shows that the premise that he does not explicitly express is the proposition “If I think, therefore I exist, and if I do not think, then I do not exist.” It follows that Descartes’ complete syllogism would be like this: “I exist if and only if I think; I think; therefore, I exist.” In this paper, the discussion focuses on the proof of the certainty of the position “I exist,” proposed by St Augustin in his treatise The City of God. St Augustin proves the proposition “I am deceived that I exist” to be false in every possible interpretation. Hence the position “I exist” is true in every possible interpretation. According to Descartes, the only undoubted statements are those that are kept within the limits of “I think,” or within the limits of inner experience, while the data of external experience are always dubious. Thus, the statement “I walk” is not obvious, since it can only seem to me that I am walking. At the same time, the judgment “It seems to me that I walk” is undoubtedly. Ancient sceptics also believed that the data of internal experience are doubtless, and the data of external experience are not due to the fact that all objects of the external world are in fact not what they seem to be. However, there is a significant difference between the ancient sceptical approach and that of Descartes. I put forward the view that the ancient sceptics, although they are convinced that the things of the external world are not what they seem, still surely believe that each item in that world exists. But Descartes surpassed both ancient sceptics and academics in their scepticism, since he doubted the very existence of the external world. He was able to imagine that he exists exclusively as a thinking entity with no body, no world around him, and no space to store that world. It is by the fact that Descartes doubts the existence of the external world that he has cleared the way for transcendental philosophy and phenomenology.

Keywords
Descartes, logic, method, Saint Augustine, external experience, internal experience, radical skepticism.

References

• Augustine of Hippo. (1994). The City of God. Vol. 2. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Spaso-Preobrazhen. Valaam. stavropigial. Monastyria Publ. (In Russian)
• Descartes, R. (1989). Works. Vol. 1. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Mysl’ Publ. (In Russian)
• Descartes, R. (1994). Works. Vol. 2. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Mysl’ Publ. (In Russian)
• John Italus. (2013). Aporias. Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Svoe Publ. (In Russian)
• Sextus Empiricus. (1976). Writings. Vol. 2. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Mysl’ Publ. (in Russian)

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LUIS AGUIAR DE SOUSA, ANA FALCATO (ED.)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND VALUES
London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019. ISBN (10): 1-5275-3482-0, (13): 978-1-5275-3482-7

Abstract
The review is devoted to a joint monograph of Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values published in 2019. The peculiarity and novelty of this monograph is that it is devoted not so much to the cognitive and epistemological aspects of phenomenology of intersubjectivity as to ethical, existential and value problems of relations with the Others, presented in various phenomenological concepts. One of the advantages of the work is the pluralistic approach, which allows the reader to get acquainted with the solutions to the problem of intersubjectivity posed by a number of the most prominent phenomenologists, i. e. Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Levinas and others. The book traces the idea that emerging of the topic of intersubjectivity in phenomenology caused a socio-ethical and axiological shift in the phenomenological movement. Considering moving of modern philosophy towards “the intersubjective paradigm” (W. Hösle), the aim of the authors of the monograph to show the relevance and innovation of phenomenology in discussing the problems of the Other, communication and ethics can be assessed as a promising theoretical project. Whereas critics of the phenomenological movement reproached “methodological solipsism” of phenomenology, which develops Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism, a serious analysis of the works of the most prominent representatives of the phenomenological tradition leads the authors of the monograph to the conclusion that a phenomenological subject is social in its essence. The review draws a conclusion that the joint monograph brings into sharp focus that phenomenology is in possession of deep and diverse ways of studying the common being of people and collectively shared values.

Keywords
intersubjectivity, phenomenology, value, ethics, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas.

References

• Apel, K.-O. (2001). The Transformation of Philosophy. Rus. Ed. Moscow. Logos Publishers, 2001. (In Russian)
• De Sousa, L. A., & Falcato, A. (2019). Introduction. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values (L. A. de Sousa & A. Falcato, Eds.). London. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
• Habermas, J. (2001). On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction (B. Fultner, Trans.). Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
• Hösle, V. (1990). An Interview. Questions of Philosophy, 11, 107-113.
• Husserl, E. (1981). Syllabus of a Course of Four Lectures on “Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy”. In E. Husserl (Ed.), Shorter Works (67-74). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Husserl, E. (2004). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Vladimir Dal’ Publ. (In Russian)
• Levinas, E. (2000). Totality and Infinity. In Izbranniye raboty (66-291). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Universitetskaya kniga Publ. (In Russian)
• Levinas, E. (2006). God and Philosophy. In Emmanuel Levinas: Put’ k drugomu (203-232). Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo SPbGU Publ. (In Russian)
• Loidolt, S. (2017). Value, Freedom, Responsibility: Central Themes in Phenomenological Ethics. In D. Zahavi (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook for the History of Phenomenology (696-716). London. Oxford University Press.
• Motroshilova, N. V. (1992). Vittorio Hösle: Sketches for a Philosophical Portrait. In Vittorio Hyosle: nabroski k filosofskomu portretu (171-217). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)
• Vattimo, G. (2002). The Transparent Society. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Logos Publ. (In Russian)
• Welz, C. (2016). Trauma, Memory, Testimony. Phenomenological, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives. In R. Illman & B. Dahla (Eds.), Jewish Studies in the Nordic Countries Today (104-133). Turku. The Donner Institute, Åbo Akademi.
• Zahavi, D. (2001). Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 5-7.

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WITTGENSTEIN’S DISAPPEARING IDEALISM

Abstract
The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games” and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative to the general perspective on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.” Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception. Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein's philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism.

Keywords
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bernard Williams, Jonathan Lear, John McDowell, transcendental idealism, relativism, language games, forms of life.

References

• Cavell, S. (2002). Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays. Harvard University, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
• Hutto, D. D. (1996). Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist? In P. Coates & D. Hutto (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (121-153). Bristol, United Kingdom: Thoemmes Press.
• Lear, J. (1982). Leaving the World Alone. The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (7), 382-403.
• Lear, J. (1999). Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
• Malcolm, N. (1982). Wittgenstein and Idealism. In G. Vesey (Ed.), Idealism Past and Present (249–267). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World: With a New Introduction by the Author. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
• McDowell, J. (1998). Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• McDowell, J. (2001). Responses. In M. Willaschek (Ed.), John McDowell: Reason and Nature. Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999 (91-114). Münster: LIT–Verlag.
• Moore, A. W. (2007). Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism. In G. Kahane, E. Kanterian & O. Kuusela (Eds.), Wittgenstein and his Interpreters (174-199). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
• Mulhall, S. (2015). “Hopelessly Strange”: Bernard Williams’ Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Transcendental Idealist. In S. Gardner & M. Grist (Eds.), The Transcendental Turn (322–341). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pears, D. (1987). False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Sacks, M. (2000). Objectivity and Insight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Williams, B. (1990). Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. New York: Penguin Books.
• Williams, B. (1982). Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers (1973–1980) . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
• Wittgenstein, L. (1994). Philosophical Works. Part I. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Gnozis Publ. (In Russian)
• Wittgenstein, L. (2008). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Kanon+ Publ. (In Russian).
• Wittgenstein, L. (2020). Zettel. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Ad Marginem Publ. (In Russian)

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EPOCHE AND ANXIETY. NEUTRALIZATION OF THE WORLD OR THE IMITATION OF EXPERIENCE?

Abstract
This article discusses Husserl’s “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” and early Heidegger’s “fear” and “anxiety” from a conceptual and terminological point of view. The basis for comparing “epoche” and “fear” is their main function of neutralizing the world. The author also considers the way of correlating the epoche and anxiety as philosophical concepts with three types of realizable experience that served as their source. The main points and stages of the introduction of the term “epoche” are highlighted; the main functional differences between the terms “epoche” and “phenomenological reduction” in various works of Husserl are indicated. A number of Husserl’s attempts to transform the methodological principles put forward by him into a description of a special experience of detachment, accessible through moral efforts, courage and honesty, are considered. In this regard, the transformation of Cartesian doubt into the procedure of “epoche” through the artificial procedure of “attempt at doubt” is analyzed. Three types of restrictions on the universality of the epoche are distinguished. Terminological and meaningful relationships between neutralization as a mode of consciousness and the epoche are considered. Two main differences are revealed, with the help of which Husserl tries to transform principles into experience: the difference between positional and neutral consciousness (primary and shadow one) and the difference between an epoche and a quasi-epoche. Husserl’s interpretation of the epoche and reduction as a special experience has two main sources: first, the experience of the imagination, or fantasy, and in this sense the source of the epoche is the quasi-epoche, and not vice versa. Secondly, the postulate of the identity of sensation from the real and illusory object. Heidegger’s distinction between fear and anxiety is critically analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that a common source of the phenomena of anxiety, fear, horror, fright, and so on consists in the collision and mutual penetration of various human worlds. It is impossible to distance oneself from this diversity; further, it is the true source of philosophical reflection.

Keywords
epoche, quasi-epoche, anxiety, neutralization, world, experience, doubt, attempt at doubt, transformation, world.

References

• Descartes, R. (2018). Meditations on First Philosophy (J. Veitch, Trans.). Global Grey ebooks. Retrived from https://www.globalgreyebooks.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy-ebook.html
• Druskin, I. (1995). The Vision of Non-Vision. St Petersburg: Kedr, Zazerkal’e Publ. (In Russian)
• Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil. Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion (Hua VIII). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). L.: George Allen & Unwin LTD. N.Y.: The Macmillan Company.
• Husserl, E. (1970). Logical Investigations, vol. I (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
• Husserl, E. (1973a). Die Idee der Phanomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen (Hua II). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1973b). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Hua I). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Hua III/1). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Bd.II. T.1 (Hua XIX/1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Heidegger, M. (1976). Wegmarken (GA 9). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
• Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1996). Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Meiner.
• Fink, O. (1981). Operative Concepts in Husserl’s Phenomenology. In W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan & L. E. Winters (Eds.), Apriori and World. European Contributions to Husserlian Phenomenology (56-70). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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TEMPORALITY OF THE “POROUS SELF” BY J. RIVERA

Abstract
The article analyzes the philosophical concept of the “porous self” of J. Rivera. The originality of this concept in the post-phenomenological project is determined by the role of theological constructions that modify the primal experience of self-consciousness. This modification allows us to interpret the phenomenological description of the human self as different from the classical — “porous” temporality, i.e., correlating through “two entrances”—the internal and external—with eternity. Within this approach, the primary phenomenon of the constitution of the "porous" self becomes the inner word (Verbum interior), which in the appeal to eternity turns out to be the original self-awareness of the self as a temporality. The secondary phenomenon of the constitution of the “porous” self is not the mundane temporality of M. Heidegger, but Epektasis as an intense striving towards the end of time in General. The worldly temporality of the self, transformed by faith, is phenomenologically revealed as open to eternity in each of its moments. The third phenomenon of the temporality of the self is Memoria, whose interpretation reveals how the structure of the inner consciousness of time by E. Husserl can be framed ontologically and harmoniously integrated into the theological concept. The article shows how, based on this understanding of both the internal and external openness of the “porous” self for eternity, the integral structure of its temporality is formed. The temporality of the porous self is a modification of Husserl’s time diagrams and the intertwining of two streams of temporality at the same time from past to future and from future to past, which itself constitutes a phenomenal field of events of self. This understanding of temporality sets new perspectives for the phenomenological analysis of subjectivity.

Keywords
porous self, double entry, retention, protention, memory, Augustine, Husserl, interiority, exteriority, double intentionality.

References

• Augustine. (2006). The Confessions. Rus. Ed. Minsk: Kharvest Publ. (In Russian)
• Chernavin, G. I. (2010). Genesis of Time-Consciousness and Primary Facticity: To Husserl’s Phenomenological Metaphysics of Time. Logos, 5 (78), 125–137. (In Russian)
• Descartes, R. (1897-1912). Qeuvres de Descartes. Publiees par Ch.Adam et P.Tennery. L.7. Paris.
• Descartes, R. (1994). Writings. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)
• Descombes, V. (2011). Le complément de sujet. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie Publ. (In Russian)
• Gondek, H.-D., & Tengelyi, L. (2011). Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
• Henry, M. (2011). The Phenomenology of Life. Logos, 3 (82), 172-185. (In Russian)
• Henry, M. (2014). Non-Intentional Phenomenology. In (Post)fenomenologiia: novaia filosofiia vo Frantsii i za ee predelami (43-57). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)
• Hefty, K. (2018). Review of the Book “The Contemplative Self after Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology”, by J. Rivera. The Journal of Religion, 98 (2), 294-296.
• Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passive Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926) (Hua XI). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1994). The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Logos Publ. (In Russian)
• Husserl, E. (1999). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Vol. 1. Rus. Ed. Moscow, Dom intellektual’noi knigi Publ. (In Russian)
• Husserl, E. (2006a). The Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Nauka Publ. (In Russian)
• Husserl, E. (2006b). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934): Die C-Manuskripte (Hua VIII) (D. Lohmar, Hrsg.). Dordrecht: Springer.
• Husserl, E. (2006c). The Idea of Phenomenology. Five Lectures. Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Gumanitarnaia Akademiia Publ. (In Russian)
• Mamardashvili, M. K. (2000). The Aesthetics of Thinking. Moscow: Moskovskaia shkoly politicheskikh issledovanii Publ. (In Russian)
• Maldiney, H. (2014). About Transpossibility. In (Post)fenomenologiia: novaia filosofiia vo Frantsii i za ee predelami (151-203). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)
• Marion, J.-L. (2010). La Croisee Du Visible. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia Publ. (In Russian)
• Marion, J.-L. (2014). The Saturated Phenomenon. In (Post)fenomenologiia: novaia filosofiia vo Frantsii i za ee predelami (63-99). Rus. Ed. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)
• Rivera, J. (2013). Figuring the Porous Self: St Augustine and the Phenonenogy of Temporality. Modern Theology, 29 (1), 83-103.
• Rivera, J. (2015). The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology. University of Notre Dame, Indiana.
• Rivera, J. (2019). We-Synthesis Husserl and Henry on Empathy and Shared Life. Research in Phenomenology, 49, 184–208.
• Yampolskaya, A. V. (2014a). From Passivity to Affectivity. In (Post)fenomenologiia: novaia filosofiia vo Frantsii i za ee predelami (229-240). Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)
• Yampolskaya, A. V. (2014b). Translator’s Preface to “Non-Intentional Phenomenology”. In (Post)fenomenologiia: novaia filosofiia vo Frantsii i za ee predelami (39-42). Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt Publ. (In Russian)