Studies in Phenomenology



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THE PARADOXES OF ANALOGICAL REPRESENTATION: THE ORIGINAL AND A COPY IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION THEORY

Title in the language of publication: ПАРАДОКСЫ АНАЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИ: ОРИГИНАЛ И КОПИЯ В ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ ВООБРАЖЕНИЯ
Author: ELENA DROZHETSKAYA
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 208-228
Language: Russian
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-208-228 PDF (Downloads: 1476)

Abstract
This article deals with a phenomenological standpoint on paradoxicality of image-consciousness (imagination), i.e., an analogical representation in which an image possesses material support. Contrary to tradition, E. Husserl thought of imagination as being both an intuitive and a mediate act. Husserl’s opinion results from paradoxical nature of an image itself: an image (Bildobjekt) appears but it doesn’t exist, while the exhibited thing (Bildsujet)does exist but doesn’t appear in proper sense. The paradoxicality of an image results in its double conflict — with actual present and with Bildsujet. Initially, Husserl considered that the more analogous features an image possesses the less conflict exists between it and Bildsujet, but then his own experience made him change his mind. Examining a wax figure example, he came to the conclusion that this perfectly human-like object is rather a fiction (an illusion) than an image for it is constituted in a position-taking intention, not in a neutralized one. However, despite we’ve got knowledge of illusory nature of such an object our consciousness keeps on fluctuating between an imaging intention and a perceptual one. Unlike Husserl neither J.-P. Sartre nor M. Richir draws a distinction between an image and an illusion. Sartre considers the imaginary in its radical form to be a world of schizophrenic. As for Richir, he supposes the imaginary to be a mass-consumption product being used for ideological manipulations. He follows Plato’s intellectual strategy and characterizes an image as εἴδωλον (simulacre) which represents the reality instead of reaching it. Being saturated by visible an image lacks any gap that would give an impulse to a work of imagination. At the same time, Richir admits that simulacre does relate to art, whereas an artefact doesn’t. An artefact is made by technical device which imitates not reality but consciousness. Thus, an artefact in its turn is not a reality illusion but an illusion of a reality illusion. Its hallucinatory effect makes us believe that we look into a mirror of reality as if a technical agent had better access to it than a human eye does.

Keywords
image consciousness, imagination, imaginary, analogical representation, Bildobjekt, Bildsujet, simulacre, artefact, illusion.

References

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THE PROBLEM OF A PRIORI IN FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: A PRIORI PERFECT AND THE EXISTENTIAL-TEMPORAL CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

Title in the language of publication: ПРОБЛЕМА A PRIORI В ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЙ ОНТОЛОГИИ: АПРИОРНЫЙ ПЕРФЕКТ И ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНО-ТЕМПОРАЛЬНОЕ ПОНЯТИЕ ФИЛОСОФИИ
Author: ANTON VAVILOV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 141-169
Language: Russian
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-141-169 PDF (Downloads: 1592)

Abstract
Based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger the article presents the possibility of actualizing Heidegger’s main question about the meaning of Being in the context of the analysis of so-called “a priori perfect.” During the development of fundamental ontology in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger ponders the approach to Being in the history of philosophy and identifies such a feature of Being as a priori, a kind of antecedence of Being in relation to being. Although tradition invariably understands Being in this way, in it, according to Heidegger, the question is no longer raised either about the sense of such antecedence, or about the temporal basis of this sense, and therefore a priori as the essential character of Being is left in total oblivion. We suggest that it is the problematization of apriority in its temporal origin that can contribute to resolving Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical question of time as the transcendental horizon of any concept of Being that precedes being. In this precedence there is a cherished temporal moment, the comprehension of which allows us to develop the “basic question of metaphysics” about the relationship of Being and time in a more concrete way than Heidegger’s four main themes of the question of Being: the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being (essentia/existentia)); the truth-character of Being; the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being’s variety. Revealing a priori question as the central question of all Heideggers thinking before the “Turn” we attempt to update this question and justify the need for its renewal on the basis of a fundamental ontology. With this task we relate the question of the essence of philosophy in general in its existential-temporal concept since philosophy appears as a temporality-based possible of the questioning return to the “earlier”: to the essential structures of being, knowledge, Being, Dasein. Our analysis is based on the following decisions: (1) Being in relation to being is always pre-understood as “earlier,” and in this understanding a temporal definition operates, hence the main question of fundamental ontology about the relation of Being and time can be developed or at least clarified through the problem of meaning of a priori. (2) The question of the meaning of the “earlier” and of the temporal basis for understanding Being as “earlier,” a priori, is concretized into the question of the conditions for the possibility of any ontology, including the fundamental ontology, which raises the question of the earlier in relation to Being and therefore “lives” in the light of the understanding of the “earlier” as such. (3) This reflexive foundation of the fundamental ontology from itself is a necessary stage on the way of developing its project, if we remember that the main “duty” of the philosopher is to clarify “our inner nature” for the sake of opening the boundaries and conditions of the possibility of philosophy. The conclusion is that the possibilities of fundamental ontology in making sense of Being, time, and philosophy in general are far from exhausted, but await the questions that actualize them and new readings that allow to see the hidden richness of Heidegger’s thought.

Keywords
a priori, perfect, questioning, ontology, fundamental ontology, Being, time, Dasein, Heidegger.

References

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CRISIS OF SCIENCES AND PHENOMENOLOGY: OVERCOMING OR RADICALIZATION?

Title in the language of publication: КРИЗИС НАУК И ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ: ПРЕОДОЛЕНИЕ ИЛИ РАДИКАЛИЗАЦИЯ?
Author: MIKHAIL BELOUSOV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 40-72
Language: Russian
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-40-72 PDF (Downloads: 1532)

Abstract
In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I want to show that Husserl seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the life-world. To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations, and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by Husserl in Crisis—the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the life-world can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and the problematical character of the life-world.

Keywords
crisis of European sciences, epoche, life-world, objective world, Husserl, idealization, historicity.

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V. SESEMAN’S “PURE KNOWLEDGE” CONCEPT

Title in the language of publication: КОНЦЕПТ «ЧИСТОГО ЗНАНИЯ» В. СЕЗЕМАНА
Author: VLADIMIR BELOV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 190-207
Language: Russian
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-190-207 PDF (Downloads: 1397)

Abstract
Although the concept of “pure knowledge” is one of the most interesting and singular concepts in the philosophical work of Vasily Seseman (1884-1963), it can only be presented after a comprehensive analysis of the philosopher’s numerous works devoted to ontological, epistemological and logical problems. Seseman believes that the main philosophical trends at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology, could not present this concept, although they did try. According to the philosopher, the main reason for the inability of neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology to start talking about pure knowledge is their inability to assert the essential difference between objective and non-objective knowledge. Sesemann pays special attention when substantiating his concept of “pure knowledge” to the difference between his approach and that of the founder of modern phenomenology. The philosopher points out that even Husserl, who concentrated attention on the specifics of inner experience, puts this specific, in the end, in dependence on the process of cognition and reflection, completely ignoring its ontological foundations. While pure knowledge, according to Seseman, is neither non-objective, nor objective knowledge, nor non-objective, nor objective being, it, in fact, is non-knowledge and non-being. It is precisely this understanding by the philosopher of this phenomenon that allows him to characterize pure knowledge as premiseless and limitless and, in general, as free from any ontological or epistemological determinations. However, on the other hand, Sesemann insists that the phenomenon of pure knowledge has the meaning of not just a regulatory idea, an infinitely distant ideal, but also a real constitutive meaning, as a principle that reveals and determines the human striving for knowledge as an interconnected and necessary process that ascends from the onto-gnoseological stage of non-objective knowledge to the epistemological, and then the logical stage of objective knowledge.

Keywords
Seseman, pure knowledge, attitude, phenomenology, intuitionism, experience, phenomenon, objective and non-objective knowledge.

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ABOUT “GUARDING THE HIDDENNESS” AND THE QUESTION OF THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN BEING. PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO A BASIC ETHICAL CONCEPT

Title in the language of publication: VOM „HÜTEN DER VERBORGENHEIT“ UND DER FRAGE NACH DER WÜRDE DES MENSCHEN. PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHE ZUGÄNGE ZU EINEM ETHISCHEN GRUNDBEGRIFF
Author: JOHANNES VORLAUFER
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 93-113
Language: German
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-93-113 PDF (Downloads: 1354)

Abstract
Against the background of worldwide, intentional or unintentional everyday violations of human dignity and the epochal need to experience oneself as a human being in one’s specific way of being, this article attempts to pursue the question of human dignity and its concealment. On the one hand, it seeks to ask whether human dignity has become obsolete due to social and epochal developments and preconditions and whether it can only appear and be experienced as antiquated in the context of a technological language or an administered world. On the other hand, it asks whether ethical and anthropological thinking have not sufficiently experienced, thought, and conceptualized man. From the context of these perspectives that determine the question of dignity, Heidegger’s article seeks to take up Heidegger’s repeated search for an original ethics based on Heraclitus’ fragment 119, and from this point of view to ask for a perhaps deeper and more adequate understanding of human dignity. At the centre of this is Heidegger’s thesis that human dignity is based on the protection of the unhidden and, ever before, the hiddenness of all beings. Without wanting to ignore the difficulty and complexity of Heidegger’s thinking, the author seeks to find access to this understanding of our dignity based on the experience of personal encounters.

Keywords
phenomenology, original ethics, concealment and non concealment, numerical thinking, thinking in values, nihilism, emancipation, dignity oblivion, function.

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CAUSES OF WAR

Title in the language of publication: KRIEGESURSACHEN
Author: PETER TRAWNY
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №1 (2021), 441-454
Language: German
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-1-441-454 PDF (Downloads: 1405)

Abstract
Since the beginning of its history philosophy deals with the question for the meaning of war. This question, however, was always understood as the question for the causes of war: Why is there war? Where does it come from? The article presupposes that only this question and the attempts to respond to it can shed light onto the interpretation of the historical reality of war, which is finally the only reason to reflect on its causation. The article refers to a set of notions and texts, which belong to a discourse on war unfolding through the centuries of European thinking. These notions are: contradictions (Heraclitus), body (Plato), justice (nature) (Cicero), nature (Hobbes), right (Hegel), politics (Clausewitz), and morals (C. Schmitt). Even if this sequence is only one possible sequence of the philosophical reflection on warfare, I consider it to be one of greater importance. We see, how a plurality of causes creates a context, in which we could try to analyze actual events: For it is evident that no war has only one reason. And the article has finally one other intention, namely to show that probably every possible sequence of causes of war will have the same consequence. This con-sequence will be the final destruction of the world, the coming of the ash.

Keywords
war, pólemos, sōma, bellum iustum, bellum omnium in omnes, freedom, absolute war, absolute hostility.

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