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PHENOMENOLOGY AND SYMBOL: FROM HUSSERL TO BACHELARD

Abstract
“Blindness” to the problem of the symbol necessarily follows from the main positions of the research strategy of Husserl phenomenology. However, both noema and noesis, as well as the flow of cogitations in our minds are initially infected with symbolism, and therefore the project of phenomenological description needs a “symbolic correction.” The supposed and experienced object is supposed as a symbolically filled object, and the position of the ego describing, constituting, experiencing its object is not only initially infected with cultural symbolism, but also represents the “assemblage point” of any phenomenon as a “constellation” formation. Symbolism is initially “embedded” in any phenomenon and in any scheme of “pure” consciousness. Correspondingly, the flow of phenomena that can be subjected to both noematic and noetic description proceeds according to various “scenarios,” “schemes,” which are nationally and culturally based, and do not follow the single universal route (Past, Present, Future), which is peculiar only to the new European model of time. This drawback of Husserl’s project was overcome in varying degrees by some phenomenologically oriented philosophers. The author of the article analyzes one of such “symbolic adjustments” by reference to the poetic topology (microphenomenology) of poetic image of the Home in the text of French philosopher G. Bachelard.

Key words
Husserl, phenomenology, image, home, symbol, Bachelard, microphenomenology.

References

• Bachelard, G. (2004). Poetics of Space. In Selected Works: Poetics of Space. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya (ROSSPEN) Publ. (In Russian).
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• Husserl, E. (1994). Collected Works. Vol. I.Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Rus. Ed. Moscow: RIG “Logos”, Izdatel’stvo Gnozis Publ. (In Russian).
• Husserl, E. (1998). Cartesian Meditations. Rus. Ed. St Petersburg: Nauka, Yuventa Publ. (In Russian).
• Husserl, E. (1999). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Rus. Ed. Moscow: Dom intellektual’noi knigi Publ. (In Russian).
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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO QUANTUM MECHANICS: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS BY REVISITING BOHR AND HUSSERL

Abstract
Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation of quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute between realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better understanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of these opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, in many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics has been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion of Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically conceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main philosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to Bohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. Parallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism—epistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains their similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. While Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical explanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading facilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous and interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. We claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of science at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, while they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of Bohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach to science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can eliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical ground for a dialog between them.

Key words
Edmund Husserl, Niels Bohr, phenomenology, phenomena, classical concepts, quantum mechanics, life-world.

References

• Bohr, N. (1929). The Quantum of Action and the Description of Nature. In The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, Vol. I (1987) (92–101). Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press.
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SOUND ONTOLOGY AND THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

Abstract
Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses—namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation.

Key words
Sound, auditory experience, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, sound ontology, sound individuation, consciousness of time (Zeitbewusstseins), temporal extension (Zeitlichkeit), spatial extension (Raumlichkeit).

References

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HUSSERL’S CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF TRUTH

Abstract
This article draws attention to certain features of Edmund Husserl’s theory of evidence and truth which, on closer look, reveal how his thoughts on the nature of experience and cognition are current and relevant even in the early 21st century. Many of his contemporaries and subsequent authors considered Husserl to be a late representative of traditional, modernist metaphysics—an idealist, a foundationalist, and an intellectualist, etc. The publication of his vast unpublished manuscripts has evidently dispelled such charges, and a thorough and attentive perusal of his published works (or works prepared for publication) clearly shows how highly problematic such charges were. In the article I aim to highlight the contextualist character of Husserl’s understanding of evidence and truth, of knowledge and Being. Every insight and every entity in his thought fits into a wider context of further experiences, insights, and entities. This conception is manifest at every level of his experience and knowledge: (1) everyday experiences, (2) scientific and (3) philosophical cognition. The evidence at every level is fundamentally open and contextual, and their correlation constitutes an essentially organic reality. With such formulations Husserl says something quite similar to what is now found under the label ‘epistemic contextualism’ in contemporary analytic philosophy. Next to the contextual character of evidence, the second main thesis of my essay is that Husserl’s stance in this question might serve as a fruitful field of dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy.

Key words
Edmund Husserl, non-foundationalism, contextualism, evidence, apodicticity, truth, phenomenological metaphysics.

References

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Article/Publication Details
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NEO-HUSSERLIAN MEDITATIONS: EXTENDING INTENTIONALITY TO THE OBJECTIVE REALM IN FIRST PHENOMENOLOGY

Abstract
I seek here to return to the original spirit of Edmund Husserl’s “radicalism.” To be radical means to be both rooted in a tradition and to retrace a path back to one’s roots. According to the position I advocate, phenomenology may be reconceived of as an enterprise in realism. Through a creative rereading of one of phenomenology’s founding texts, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, I suggest that phenomenology can indeed provide us with a semantics applicable to realist ontologies, provided we excise phenomenological concepts from their subjectivist framework, providing a new structure with which to analyze reality. Specifically, Husserl’s eidetic Apriori may be reconceived as denoting the inherent dynamism of existents. Movement would be the basis of manifestation, a universal category unconditioned in itself. That which appears need not be synonymous with all that which is given to experience. The eidos is the manifold of coiled movements awaiting manifestation, whilst the a priori is movement in itself. Following Graham Harman’s lead, I expand the scope of the Husserlian idea of intentionality, reconceptualizing it as the directionality pertaining to any process whatsoever. Following Jaakko Hintikka, I take the cogito to be nothing other than performativity in its emergent state. Several different phenomenal horizons can connect to the same type of intentionality. The nonlinear nature of temporality means that even radically distant horizons are capable of sharing in the same intentionality. Once reenvisioned as a “genuine universal ontology” (this is Husserl’s expression), phenomenological semantics can be extended to include any and all types of existents. First phenomenology need not maintain the primacy of perception or subjectivity.

Key words
Eidos, Graham Harman, Edmund Husserl, intentionality, phenomenology, realism, speculative realism.

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