Studies in Phenomenology



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NIKOLAI HARTMANN
HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF REAL DIALECTICS

Title in the language of publication: НИКОЛАЙ ГАРТМАН
ГЕГЕЛЬ И ПРОБЛЕМА РЕАЛЬНОЙ ДИАЛЕКТИКИ
Translation from German: EKATERINA ANANIEVA
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 641-669
Language: Russian
Document type: Translation from German
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-641-669 PDF (Downloads: 3351)

Abstract
The article by German philosopher of first half of XX century N. Hartmann gives an idea about his position in the contra-opposition of leading realistic philosophic projects of both XIX and XX centuries. Brought up in neokantinean tradition of Marburg’s school N. Hartmann yet in his early works (Über das Seinsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie vor Plato and Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik) showed his interest by ontology problematic and chose the hard way of polemic and even contra-opposition towards the school which had brought him up. The reasons for such his position were explained in his works published in 1920-1930. The project of “new ontology” polemically targeted not only gnoseologism of neokantian tradition, but also viewed development of phenomenological philosophy in a different way. As one of early strong points of this conception Hartmann chose contra-opposition of logical and ontological reality. Later to this he jointed his interest for cathegorial analysis and to apriorism. That is why categories of ontology turned out to be most primordial points of proclaimed theory. His article “Gegel and the Problem of Real Dialectic” published for the first time in 1935 in Blatter für Deutsche Philosophie allowed N. Hatmann settled his reasons for critic of Hegel’s philosophy, first of all, of Hegel’s dialectic. His called Hegel’s philosophy like phenomenology and this his point of view was naturally argued by Hegel’s interest towards “Phenomenology of Spirit,” but dialectical component of Hegel’s philosophy, as well as interest for categorial analysis allowed Hartmann advance hypothesis about a special significance of “Science of Logic” for giving ground for a realistic ontology. Significantly for that work, as one of opponents of his philosophic program Hartmann chose marxist explanation of Hegel’s philosophy. The latter was also considered by Hartmann as realistic philosophy. This polemics with marxism let go beyond the philosophy of nature into the area of social and follow up a succession of prerequisites advanced by Hartmann in conformity with of different parts of being.

Key words
Phenomenology, realistic dialectics, categories, ontology, Hegel, Marxism.

References

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SAUL KRIPKE AND PHENOMENOLOGY. THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF S. KRIPKE’S ARTICLE “VACUOUS NAMES AND FICTIONAL ENTITIES”

Title in the language of publication: СОЛ КРИПКЕ И ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЯ. ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ ПЕРЕВОДА СТАТЬИ С. КРИПКЕ «ПУСТЫЕ ИМЕНА И ВЫМЫШЛЕННЫЕ СУЩНОСТИ»
Author: ALEXANDER PROKHOROV
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 670-675
Language: Russian
Document type: Preface to the translation
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-670-675 PDF (Downloads: 3269)

Abstract
This paper aims to introduce the translation of Saul Kripke’s influential text to Russian-speaking readers. It shows that the work of American philosopher should be of interest and be useful among the phenomenologists especially. Kripke criticizes the reference theory of Russell and Frege and Hintikka’s logical analysis of the “cogito ergo sum” statement. In both cases he defends his own views on the predicate of existence and shows the change of its status depending on the kind of entity in every particular proposition. The mode of quantifier depends on a given situation which is described in the statement and in some cases the quantifier determines the conditions of the statement’s truth-value. Kripke shows that classical reference theories have no universal meaning; without a set of special stipulations they can only be applicable under limited conditions. He appeals to fiction and myth and writes about fictional characters as a special kind of abstract entities which exist in virtue of the activities of human beings and their interrelations. Kripke scrutinizes the possible relations between a fictional character and his historical prototype. The battery of his examples, his own reference theory including an entity as its core, his ontology of fictional reality and sophisticated philosophical technics are extremely useful materials to explain basic problems of classical phenomenology such as reduction, modification of a phenomenon in imagination, and regional ontologies. All of this provides tools helpful for the practical work of a phenomenologist. In particular, Kripke’s investigations and especially his examples about higher level fictions (fictions within fictions) could be used in the framework of the phenomenology of language when one needs to describe the interlocations of an author, a reader, and a fictional reality before undertaking noetic and noematic analysis.

Key words
Kripke, Husserl, phenomenology, phenomenology of language, reference, reality, fiction, existence, entity.

References

  • Gogotishvili, L. A. (2006). Nepryamoe govorenie [Indirect Speaking]. Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskikh kul’tur. (in Russian).
  • Gusserl’, E. (2015). Idei k chistoi fenomenologii i fenomenologicheskoi filosofii. Kn.1: Obshchee vvedenie v chistuyu fenomenologiyu [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Vol.1: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology]. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt. (in Russian).
  • Kripke, S. (2011). Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities. In Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers. Vol.1 (52–74). New York: Oxford University Press.

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THE PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION OF N. HARTMANN’S ARTICLE “HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF REAL DIALECTICS”

Title in the language of publication: ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ К ПУБЛИКАЦИИ ПЕРЕВОДА СТАТЬИ Н. ГАРТМАНА “ГЕГЕЛЬ И ПРОБЛЕМА РЕАЛЬНОЙ ДИАЛЕКТИКИ”
Author: EKATERINA ANANIEVA
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 632-640
Language: Russian
Document type: Preface to the translation
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-632-640 PDF (Downloads: 3228)

Abstract
The article by German philosopher of first half of XX century N. Hartmann gives an idea about his position in the contra-opposition of leading realistic philosophic projects of both XIX and XX centuries. Brought up in neokantinean tradition of Marburg’s school N. Hartmann yet in his early works (Über das Seinsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie vor Plato and Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik) showed his interest by ontology problematic and chose the hard way of polemic and even contra-opposition towards the school which had brought him up. The reasons for such his position were explained in his works published in 1920-1930. The project of “new ontology” polemically targeted not only gnoseologism of neokantian tradition, but also viewed development of phenomenological philosophy in a different way. As one of early strong points of this conception Hartmann chose contra-opposition of logical and ontological reality. Later to this he jointed his interest for cathegorial analysis and to apriorism. That is why categories of ontology turned out to be most primordial points of proclaimed theory. His article “Gegel and the Problem of Real Dialectic” published for the first time in 1935 in Blatter für Deutsche Philosophie allowed N. Hatmann settled his reasons for critic of Hegel’s philosophy, first of all, of Hegel’s dialectic. His called Hegel’s philosophy like phenomenology and this his point of view was naturally argued by Hegel’s interest towards “Phenomenology of Spirit,” but dialectical component of Hegel’s philosophy, as well as interest for categorial analysis allowed Hartmann advance hypothesis about a special significance of “Science of Logic” for giving ground for a realistic ontology. Significantly for that work, as one of opponents of his philosophic program Hartmann chose marxist explanation of Hegel’s philosophy. The latter was also considered by Hartmann as realistic philosophy. This polemics with marxism let go beyond the philosophy of nature into the area of social and follow up a succession of prerequisites advanced by Hartmann in conformity with of different parts of being.

Key words
Phenomenology, realistic dialectics, categories, ontology, Hegel, Marxism.

References

  • Gornstein, T. N. (1969). Filosofia Nicolaja Gartmana (Kriticheskij analiz osnovnych problem ontologii) [N. Hartmann’s Philosophy (Critical Analysis of the Main Problems of Ontology)]. Leningrad: Nauka. (in Russian).
  • Harich, W., & Morgenstern, M. (Eds.). (2004). Nicolai Hartmann — Größe und Grenzen. Versuch einer marxistischen Selbstverständigung. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
  • Hartmann, N. (1957). Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte. In Kleinere Schriften, Bd.II (323-346). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
  • Hartmann, N. (1908). Über das Seinsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie vor Plato (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). Universität Marburg, Germany.
  • Hartmann, N. (1909). Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik. Gießen: Töpelmann.
  • Kuhn, H. (1951). Nicolai Hartmann’s Ontology. The Philosophical Quarterly, 1(4), 289-318.
  • Landmann, M. (1943). Nicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3(4), 393-423.
  • Morgernstern, M. (2013). Vom Idealismus zur realistische Ontologie. Das Frühwerk Nicolai Hartmanns. Philosophia, 5, 3-35.
  • Peterson, K. R., & Poli, R. (Eds.). (2016). New Research on the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Berlin: De Gruyter.
  • Poli, R., Scognamiglio, C., & Tremblay, F. (Eds.). (2011). The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Berlin: De Gruyter.
  • Schilling, K. (1951). Bemerkungen zu Nicolai Hartmanns Ontologie. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Vol. 39, 4, 533-555.
  • Tengelyi, L. (2012). Nicolai Hartmanns Metaphysik der Freiheit. In G. Hartung, M. Wunsch, & C. Strube (Eds.), Von der Systemphilosophie zur systematischen Philosophie — Nicolai Hartmann (277-297). Berlin–Boston: de Gruyter.
  • Wunsch, M. (2012). Kategoriale Gesetze. Zur systematischen Bedeutung Nicolai Hartmanns für die moderne philosophische Anthropologie und die gegenwärtige Philosophie der Person. In G. Hartung, M. Wunsch, & C. Strube (Eds.), Von der Systemphilosophie zur systematischen Philosophie — Nicolai Hartmann (153-171). Berlin–Boston: de Gruyter.

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Views: 4246


FROM HAPPINESS TO BLESSEDNESS: HUSSERL ON EUDAIMONIA, VIRTUE, AND THE BEST LIFE

Title in the language of publication: FROM HAPPINESS TO BLESSEDNESS: HUSSERL ON EUDAIMONIA, VIRTUE, AND THE BEST LIFE
Author: MARCO CAVALLARO, GEORGE HEFFERNAN
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 353-388
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-353-388 PDF (Downloads: 6170)

Abstract
This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of self-reflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fifth part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics.

Key words
Husserl, phenomenology, limit problems, eudaimonia, happiness, blessedness, virtue.

References

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  • ADDENDA: UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS OF HUSSERL

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Article/Publication Details
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS: SCHÜTZ VERSUS DÜPPE

Title in the language of publication: PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS: SCHÜTZ VERSUS DÜPPE
Author: PETR ŠPECIÁN
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 613-631
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-613-631 PDF (Downloads: 4003)

Abstract
The article explores novel directions in the phenomenology of economics. It analyzes how the approaches of Till Düppe and Alfred Schütz, both inspired by Edmund Husserl, may shed light on the historical development of economics. I examine the substance and meaning of economics in the context of the forceful criticism of the whole discipline recently raised by Düppe. This examination uncovers important weaknesses and omissions inherent in Düppe’s argument against the economists’ scientific aspirations. The analysis of the social scientific endeavors by Alfred Schütz who develops a phenomenologically informed ‘telescopic’ concept of an ideal type is then shown to be a more fruitful and methodologically rigorous way towards understanding the developments within economics. The Schützian view permits us to see how abstract economic models originate in the experience of the life-world and are continuous with it. Accordingly, the historical development of economic science may be viewed as consisting from two broadly defined phases, where at first the formalism is steadily increasing (the ‘zooming out’ phase) and later the discipline converges back to context-specific empirical examinations (the ‘zooming in’ phase). A case study concentrating on the economic theory of politics illustrates that both the drive towards abstraction that has culminated around 1950s and the more recent ‘zooming in’ is methodologically legitimate from the phenomenological point of view. I conclude that economics has never been completely severed from the paramount reality of the everyday life and for decades the interconnection has been growing stronger by the day.

Key words
Alfred Schütz, crisis of science, formalism, historicism, life-world, phenomenology of economics, telescopic ideal type.

References

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Article/Publication Details
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PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CARE FOR THE SOUL

Title in the language of publication: PATOČKA’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CARE FOR THE SOUL
Author: JAN JOSL
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 8, №2 (2019), 602-612
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-2-602-612 PDF (Downloads: 3193)

Abstract
The Socratic theme of care for the soul expresses in Patočka’s late thought his desire to keep the understanding of human existence as a place of turn, metanoia, of struggle between authenticity and inauthenticity. This tendency not only goes against Heidegger and his late philosophy, but is also opposed to Patočka’s own earlier project of asubjective phenomenology as well. This essay argues, firstly, that the importance of subjectivity and existential dimension is still present in art and secondly, that art represents for Patočka sort of care for the soul. The argument has three stages. First, I demonstrate what Patočka means by soul or experience of soul and how we should understand the term ‘care.’ I argue that what Patočka understands under the concept of soul consists has freedom, krisis, and physis as its main features. The second part demonstrates that in Patočka’s view, these features are present in art. The last part compares art and philosophy as two kinds of care for the soul and demonstrates the limits of art as care of the soul. My conclusion is that art represents for Patočka a limited form of care for the soul compared to philosophy. However, according to Patočka, in current situation it is the only way of care for the soul that is left.

Key words
Phenomenology, aesthetics, Jan Patočka, art, care for the soul, Socrates, Plato.

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