- 29 December 2015
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ON THE BORDER OF SELF-APPEARANCE. SELF-AFFECTION AND REFLECTION IN THE REMEMBERING IN KANT AND HUSSERL
Title in the language of publication: |
AN DEN GRENZEN DER SELBSTERSCHEINUNG. SELBSTAFFEKTION UND REFLEXION IN DER WIEDERERINNERUNG BEI KANT UND HUSSERL |
Author: | Guillermo Ferrer |
Issue: |
HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology. Vol. 4, №2 (2015),  87-98 |
Language: | German |
Document type: | Research Article |
DOI : 10.18199/2226-5260-2015-4-2-87-98 | PDF (Downloads: 3350) |
Abstract
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of
a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness. To this
end, a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects
the inner sense is necessary. Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear
to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession
on the space, thus inasmuch as I am conscious, at least implicitly, of my activity of the drawing.
Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering, I will hypothesize the idea that
a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection;
however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self
shall be set. Because of these limits, the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes»
of my life-history, namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past. Also, in this
respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself.
From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection
on my past, the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory
to some extent with substitutes. In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation
of phantasy and imagination.
Key words
Self-affection, reflection, past I, Self, irrevocability, substitutes, phantasy.
References
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