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KLAUS KAEHLER
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS PHENOMENA: LEIBNIZ, KANT, HUSSERL

Abstract
The article treats the notion of consciousness in three theories: those of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl. Klaus Kaehler tends to examine how these three doctrines relate to each other and whether it is possible to register a linear development among them. Though Kaehler un- derlines difficulties in comparing views of these philosophers, he draws some informative parallels between them. The author starts off by mentioning Leibniz as the bearer of the initial understanding of consciousness and emphasizing that Leibniz' monadology contains the basic form of the ideas which will be later expressed by Kant and Husserl. Defining consciousness as the notion of the being's mode, and accordingly, the structure of the subject, Kaehler unfolds the interpretation of this notion both before the transcendental turn and after it. He holds Leibniz to be responsible for the transcendental turn, as Kaehler finds a crucial element of Leibniz' theory: the dependence of each and every being from the independent substantial unity (the monad). According to Leibniz, the outer world exists only in the form of mutual self-representation of the monads. What Kant does, according to Kaehler, is that he on the basis of Leibniz notes that not only an existing individual substance, but the finite reason-subject should be considered in its limits. As a result, everything existing is determined by the immanent structure of the subjectivity. Husserl in his turn insists on examining the activities and intentionality of the consciousness. sort of substantiality or relation from this notion.

Key words
Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, consciousness, transcendental turn, reason, perspectivism.

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