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MONADOLOGY, CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE IMMORTAL „I“
(LEIBNIZ, KANT AND HUSSERL)

Abstract
This paper aims to research the different views of Leibniz, Kant and Husserl concerning the immortality of the «I». For this purpose I will read the Monadology from a phenomenological perspective, but taking into account Kants exposition of the Paralogismes in the Critic of Pure Reason. There he points out the illusion which consists in taking the identical, but finally empty representation of the «I» for the givenness of his real substantiality, even his possible persistency after death. Because of this appearance which arises again and again from our very self-awareness we trend to assert that the «I» could persist indefinitely, besides that he couldn’t be annihilated at all due to internal causes or to an antagonism with circumstances of the external world. But in spite of the force of this critic, we can find in Leibniz‘ Monadology and somehow in Husserls‘ writings drafts of another conception of the self- awareness which includes the experience on an organical continuity of the body. In the face of Kants‘ critic, this conception could perhaps raise new phenomenological questions about the relationship of self-awareness, mortality and even immortality of the «I». Thereby I want to show to what extent the question about the giveness or not-giveness of a certain infinity contribute to renew the meaning of a phenomenology of the death and the experience of mortality.

Key words
Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, monad, self-awareness, infinity, immortality.

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