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THE VARIETY OF INVARIANCE IN FORMAL AND REGIONAL ONTOLOGIES

Abstract
The paper examines the invariance principles proposed by the analytical and phenomenological traditions for demarcating the boundaries of formal and regional ontologies. The principle of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations, generalizing Alfred Tarski’s criterion for logical concepts, is extended to formal ontology as the theory of manifolds in its phenomenological interpretation. Isomorphism types, which are abstract individuals of the highest order, hypostases of forms of all possible ontologies, are considered as model-theoretical analogs of manifolds. The correlativity of the phenomenological principles of demarcation of ontological regions and the criterion of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations is demonstrated, leading to the convergence of logic and formal mathematics in both traditions and, at the same time, to the exclusion of geometry from formal ontology. Particular attention is paid to the discussion of the analytical and phenomenological traditions of the synthetic (material) a priori and the contribution that Wittgenstein’s doctrine on internal relations at different stages of its evolution makes to this discussion. The paper reveals the basis for later Wittgenstein’s criticism of his earlier project of creating a phenomenological language for expressing internal regional relations (such as the colours exclusion). The paper shows how Wittgenstein’s doubts about the possibility of an ideal notation based on the dichotomy of the logical and phenomenological led him to the study of invariants arising in language games. These invariants are not determined by the special properties of the categorical objects of formal ontology or the structures of regional subject matter, but are stable equilibria generated by the “consensus of actions.” New perspectives are outlined that are opened for logic and phenomenology by switching focus from the invariants of ontological structures to the invariants of structured interactions of various agents.

Keywords
invariance, formal ontology, regional ontology, manifold, isomorphism, internal relation, language game.

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