Studies in Phenomenology



Article/Publication Details


ONTOLOGY OF THE WILL – GEIGER, PFÄNDER, HUSSERL

Title in the language of publication: ONTOLOGY OF THE WILL – GEIGER, PFÄNDER, HUSSERL
Author: DANIEL NEUMANN
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 11, №2 (2021), 495-516
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2022-11-2-495-516 PDF (Downloads: 1163)

Abstract
A phenomenological approach to the ontology of the will could be rendered along three positions: Firstly, the willing I is completely immanent in its experience, such that one can only will, and know that one wills, by reflecting on the actual experience of willing. Secondly, one could hold that the will, while being analyzable as a conscious phenomenon, is itself a real psychic force driving one’s motivations and actions without one necessarily being aware of it. The third position would argue that the reality of the will is not exhausted by the way it is experienced, but that its real causes are not necessarily part of a complete phenomenological investigation. I discuss the phenomenology of the will of Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl along this realist-transcendentalist spectrum. My basic concern here is a critical examination of the phenomenological approach to an entity beyond experience which is responsible for the experienced volitions. I will proceed in three steps, based on the distinction of volitions into three parts. Firstly, I ask what antecedes a volition in order to determine its phenomenal and ontological causes. Secondly, the analysis of the apperception of willing clarifies in what sense an “I” is experienced as the real or phenomenal cause of its volition. Thirdly, the discussion of the realization of the volition will address the role that this “I” subsequently plays in the process of fulfilling its intent. The paper develops the ways in which the ontology of the “willing I” limits and shapes the conception of the intentional relation between willing and desiring consciousness and its contents.

Keywords
Pfänder, Geiger, Husserl, phenomenology, ontology, will, volition.

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