Article/Publication Details

WHY PHENOMENOLOGY COULD NOT COMMIT THE LINGUISTIC TURN?

Abstract
Frege and Husserl are traditionally regarded as the precursors of the linguistic turn; however, the importance of their ideas for this event still is not fully comprehended. This article contributes to such comprehension: the principles of the linguistic turn in its analytical interpretation provided by Rorty are applied as an indicator revealing the commonality and difference of Frege’s and Husserl’s positions regarding key issues of their concepts. The connection of the philosophers’ ideas with the linguistic turn is viewed in the context of their interpretation of predicativity, propositionality, contextuality of meaning, and ways of categorization. The analysis conducted gives rise to distinguishing between Frege’s and Husserl’s referential schemes. It is based on the differences in the characteristics of the connection between perception and predication. In conclusion, the arguments against Frege’s and Husserl’s involvement in the linguistic turn are emphasized. These arguments stem from the idea of the primacy of sense over language fundamental for both philosophers who proceed from the fact that certain a priori logical relations underlie utterances or other acts. There is a more solid argument which does not allow considering Frege’s and Husserl’s legacies as its source. This argument consists in the fact that they regard sense as an objective, communicable, and universal phenomenon independent of its carriers, not inherently linguistic, and pre-logical which is due to its intentional nature according to Husserl and logical “indecomposability” of concepts according to Frege.

Keywords
meaning, sense, reference, contextuality, propositionality, meaning-conferring act.

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