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OLD AND NEW COPERNICAN COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Abstract
This paper deals with Nicolai Hartmann’s realism in light of its contemporary critics and recent concepts of realism. The main topic of the article is the so-called Copernican counter-revolution, which is the decisive factor both in Hartmann’s ontology and in the recent realist projects. In Hartmann’s text the Copernican counter-revolution means the rehabilitation of ontology, which is realized through the critique of the one-sided epistemological interest of logical idealism. We enter on the same path following the program of new realism, which arises against constructivism. While Maurizio Ferraris emphasizes the distinction between epistemological and ontological perspective and wants to identify those application fields, the point of Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology is the coequality of beings. He achieves an anti-Copernican perspective, which means that the human-world relation loses its priority. He also invents a litmus test of realist theories: A true realism should treat all relations between beings equally. Initially I’m examining Hartmann’s realism, also called realism ‘without ism,’ in its contemporary context, followed by the analysis of the acts that can provide the givenness of reality. These examinations will highlight the similarities between Ferraris’ and Hartmann’s realism, especially the ontologically motivated conception of the act of cognition, correspondingly the concept of resistance. In the subsequent analysis of experience of resistance, Max Scheler’s concept is highly relevant. Scheler’s ideas are based on the critique of Wilhelm Dithey’s and Martin Heidegger’s definition of resistance. The last chapter submits Hartmann’s realism to Harman’s litmus test, whereby Hartmann’s realism proves itself to be a sustainable, modern theory.

Key words
Copernican counter-revolution, realism, litmus test, resistance of reality, ontology, Hartmann, Harman, Ferraris.

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