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ON THE RECEPTION OF N. HARTMANN IN FRANCE. THE PROBLEM OF THE REAL: PER SE BEING OR TRANSOBJECTIVITY?

Abstract
The article aims to show some particularities of the reception of Nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy in post-war France. In my viewpoint, one of the recurrent problems in Hartmann’s philosophy is the status of ‘real being’ on all its levels (Gegebenheit, trans-objectivity, historical, natural being, etc.). According to Hartmann, ontology does not deal with a particular being, but rather with the transcendence of the real toward trans-objectivity. With that in mind, Hartmann seems to give solutions to many philosophical problems and difficulties engendered by the interaction of realism and spiritualism, phenomenology and criticism, by showing the multiplicity of forms of the real under the conditions of subject-object relation. It is shown in the article that Hartmann’s new ontology of the real does not completely go outside of the framework of the classical metaphysical and anthropological conception of the world. As such, our approach is not purely historical, but also hypothetical and theoretical. The article presents the following conclusions as regards Hartmann’s ontology: 1) the question about the real was considered as one of the most important questions in Hartmann’s ontology by its French interpreters, 2) these interpreters connected the question of the real with that of the irrational (Vuillemin), the multi-level structure of Being (Breton) or the intentional flow of phenomena (Gurvich), 3) the question about inter-objectivity was not discussed by Hartmann, nor by his French interpreters.

Key words
Real, per se being, transobjectivity, irrational, metaphysics, given, knowledge, Cogito.

References

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