Article/Publication Details
Views: 3521

BEARING ONE’S SHADOW: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FROM KANT, THROUGH HUSSERL, TO MERLEAU-PONTY

Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of “the transcendental” has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl’s “transcendental turn,” although significantly altering Kant’s original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions – from Kant’s “transcendentalism of faculties”, through Husserl’s “transcendentalism of pure consciousness,” to Merleau-Ponty’s “transcendentalism of the flesh” – arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist “thought style.” In the final section, we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the “truth of naturalism”, while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (“transcendentalizing”) nature.

Key words
Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, transcendental philosophy, naturalized phenomenology, phenomenologized nature, epoché, phenomenological reduction.

References

• Apostolopoulos, D. (2017). Intentionality, Constitution, and Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of ‘The Flesh’. European Journal of Philosophy, 25 (3), 677–699.
• Carman, T. (1999). The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical topics, 27 (2), 205–26.
• Depraz, N., Varela, F., & Vermersch, P. (2000). The Gesture of Awareness: An Account of its Structural Dynamics. In M. Velmans (Ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps (121-136). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
• Fleck, L. (1986). The Problem of Epistemology. In R.S. Cohen & T. Schnelle (Eds.), Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck (79–112). Dordrecht, Reidel.
• Gardner, S. (2015). Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendental Theory of Perception. In S. Gardner & M. Grist (Eds.), The Transcendental Turn (294–323). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
• Heinämaa, S. (1999) Merleau-Ponty’s Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition, Passion and Philosophy. Synthese, 118 (1), 49–68.
• Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1969). Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and Judgement. Evanson: Northwestern University Press.
• Husserl, E. (1974). Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5 (3), 9–56.
• Husserl, E. (1977). Phenomenological Psychology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Inkpin, A. (2016). Was Merleau-Ponty a “Transcendental” Phenomenologist? Continental Philosophy Review, 50 (1), 27–47.
• Kant, I. (1912). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic and the Letter to Marcus Herz, February 1772. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Kant, I. (1989). Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kern, I. (1964). Husserl und Kant. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Kingwell, M. (2000). Husserl’s Sense of Wonder. The Philosophical Forum, XXXI (1), 85–107.
• Luft, S. (2007). From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Trascendental Idealism in Husserl and Kant. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15 (3), 367–394.
• Luft, S. (2012). Husserl’s Method of Reduction. In S. Luft & S. Overgaard (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology (243–253). London, New York: Routledge.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964a). Einstein and the Crisis of Reason. In Signs (192–197). Indianapolis: Northwestern University Press.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964b). Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man. In The Primacy of Perception, and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics (43–95). Indianapolis: Northwestern University Press.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964c). The Philosopher and His Shadow. In: Signs (159–181). Indianapolis: Northwestern University Press.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge.
• Moran, D. (2005). Edmund Husserl, Founder of Phenomenology. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Pollard, C. (2014). Is Merleau-Ponty’s Position in Phenomenology of Perception a New Type of Transcendental Idealism? Idealistic studies, 44 (1), 119–138.
• Reynolds, J. (2017). Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian Knot: Transcendental Phenomenology, Science, and Naturalism. Continental Philosophy Review, 50 (1), 81–104.
• Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Zahavi, D. (1994). Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Body. Études Phénoménologiques, 19, 63–84.
• Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Zahavi, D. (2004). Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3, 331–347.
• Zahavi, D. (2010). Naturalized Phenomenology. In D. Schmicking & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences (3–19). Dordrecht: Springer.