Studies in Phenomenology



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THE TENACITY OF “VICIOUS CIRCULARITY” IN KANT AND HUSSERL: ON TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND CATEGORIAL INTUITION

Title in the language of publication: THE TENACITY OF “VICIOUS CIRCULARITY” IN KANT AND HUSSERL: ON TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND CATEGORIAL INTUITION
Author: Vedran Grahovac
Issue: HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology.
Vol. 7, №1 (2018),  32-56
Language: English
Document type: Research Article
DOI : 10.21638/2226-5260-2018-7-1-32-56 PDF (Downloads: 2879)

Abstract
In this paper, I explore the strategy of circularity employed by Kant and Husserl in their treatment of categoriality. I focus on the relation between transcendental and metaphysical deductions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and on the problem of “epistemic foundationalism” and categoriality in Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation. I propose that the strategy of circularity is manifested through the peculiar self-enclosure of the categories of transcendental deduction vis-à-vis metaphysical deduction (Kant) and categorial intuition vis-à-vis sensuous intuition (Husserl). Although it is usually regarded as a deficient and damaging occurrence in argumentation, circularity appears to be a crucial component in the analysis of both thinkers. The analytical realms recognized by both these thinkers, is acknowledged as continually dependent upon the self-evidential “contingency” of the realms they are supposed to hierarchically overarch. The strict separation between the transcendental and phenomenological realms and their addressees appears to be founded on mutual circularity, where the relation between investigator and investigated extends beyond their separation and reconciliation. Both Kant and Husserl, through the circular relationship with empiricism-rationalism and psychologism radically re-articulated the logic-ontology and founding-founded polarities.

Key words
Kant, Husserl, circularity, categoriality, categorial intuition, metaphysical deduction, transcendental deduction.

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