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TRANSCENDENTAL SOLIPSISM

Abstract
In the article I intend to demonstrate that the Cartesian rule never to accept anything unobvious and doubtful for true ends up with solipsism. Confines himself to this rule Descartes obtains an elemental and absolute truth of “I think, therefore I am”. However, the doubtless existence of my ego does not imply the doubtless existence of the other egos. Descartes tried to find a way out by composing the ontological argument for the existence of God. This argument cannot be recognized as sound since by no means all of it transitions are doubtless just as cogito ergo sum is. As a result Descartes failed to eliminate the solipsism problem. At a later stage Husserl trying to overcome relativism and skepticism, being convinced that each truth is an absolute and believing that all absolute truth must be doubtless attempted to discover such truth. Husserl’s procedure of the phenomenological reduction appeared to be an improved version of Descartes’s method of doubts. It delivers the result that the only existence of transcendental ego and everything that is immanent to it is doubtless. This result corresponds to the Cartesian thesis of the obviousness of sum cogitans. According to Husserl the autonomous existence of God and nature turn out to belong to the domain of doubtful transparentness. As for the existence of other egos, according to Husserl it is transcendental and doubtless at the same time. The sum cogitans appresentation which is an analogical apperception bears witness for that fact. From my point of view, nevertheless, an argumentativeness of the analogical apperception is no better than that of Descartes ontological argument. It cannot provide rationalization for the thesis that the transcendental existence of other egos is obvious and doubtless. Thus, the transcendental solipsism stays ambiguous. In the end of the article I am analyzing the two main characteristics of sum cogitans: its contingency and discreteness.

Key words
Skepticism, Descartes, methodological doubt, Husserl, phenomenological reduction, analogous apperception.

References

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