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LANGUAGE, DESCRIPTION AND NECESSITY. WAS WITTGENSTEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGY A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY?

Abstract
In this article we would like to prove that the so-called Ludwig Wittgenstein’s phenomenology was not the phenomenology in Husserlian sense. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought is most often associated with analytical philosophy, pragmatism or a specific metaphilosophical programme. Conversely, the philosopher is rarely considered as belonging to the phenomenological school. What remains problematic is whether 1) Wittgenstein did in fact practice some form of phenomenology and, if so, 2) what school of thought should it be related to? Both problems may be brought down to one basic question of 3) what is phenomenology? The answer to this last question, albeit tentative, will help us answer questions one and two. We can give a preliminary answer to our third question. We could say the following: phenomenology is a method to describe what is given for description and how it is given in terms of analysing the conditions under which an object may appear. As such, it is a transcendental way to encapsulate conditions determining the possibility of any experience. We may ask now whether Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist by this definition of phenomenology. If we conclude that he was not, we will try to answer our second question – can we talk of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology in any other sense, much as we do in the case of phenomenologies of Mach, Einstein or Austin. Ludwig Wittgenstein used the word phenomenology to describe his philosophy twice. First, in his notes from 1929 which later served as material for the posthumously published Philosophische Bemerkungen, and then in 1951 in a collection of notes published as Bemerkungen über die Farben. Let us consider what he wrote in 1929.

Key words
Description, grammar, Husserl, phenomenology, phenomenological language, philosophical methods, space, Wittgenstein.

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