

<https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-2-479-501>

THE TRANSCENDENTAL AND THE MUNDANE SPHERES: ARE THEY REALLY ONTOLOGICALLY DISCTINCT?

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As implied by the title this article deals with a key question running through the history of philosophy virtually since antiquity. This is the question of the relationship, on ontological grounds, of the transcendental and the mundane “universes” to the extent that the nature of transcendence, even as detached from the metaphysical sphere and recalibrated in terms of immanence in the broadly conceived subjectivist tradition, it is still a highly controversial issue primarily in continental philosophy. This is especially true in view of the obvious incompatibility, at least in a naive sense, of the transcendental and the mundane contexts for which the philosophical discussion on phenomenological grounds is still open. My own arguments on the issue are mainly based on the Husserlian and Heideggerian narratives and also on E. Fink’s approach to the transcendence versus mundanity ontological problematic. On these prompts I set out to defend the position that there are serious reasons to regard the realm of transcendence as ineluctably constrained by mundanity concerns. More concretely I will try to show that there is no way, at least in the context of the phenomenological discourse, to do away with a kind of mundanity influence even in the most pure transcendental level involving the cornerstone of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology which is the concept of absolute ego. My overall approach, more than an attempt at vindicating Fink’s objections as to the purely transcendental level reached after the radical phenomenological reduction, is a demonstration of the conceptual pitfalls or even circularities involved along the way in trying to establish a sound foundation for a purely transcendental ontological level.

Keywords: absolute ego, Dasein, mundanity, operative concept, nature, transcendental reduction.

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ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНАЯ И ЕСТЕСТВЕННАЯ СФЕРЫ: ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНО ЛИ ОНИ ОНТОЛОГИЧЕСКИ РАЗЛИЧНЫ МЕЖДУ СОБОЙ?

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Как указано в заглавии, эта статья обращается к ключевому вопросу, красной нитью проходящему через всю историю философии практически со времен античности. Это вопрос об онтологических основаниях отношения между трансцендентальным и естественным «универсумами» в той мере, в которой природа трансцендентального, даже если отделить ее от метафизической сферы и пересмотреть с точки зрения имманентности в широко понятой субъективистской традиции, все еще остается противоречивым вопросом в континентальной философии. Это особенно верно в виду очевидной несовместимости, по крайней мере, в некоем наивном смысле, трансцендентального и естественного контекстов, к которым все еще обращается философское обсуждение феноменологических оснований. Мои собственные аргументы по данному вопросу основываются, в основном, на нарративах Гуссерля и Хайдеггера, а также на подходе Ойгена Финка к онтологической проблематике трансцендентального и естественного. Исходя из этих предпосылок я стараюсь отстаивать позицию, согласно которой имеются серьезные основания рассматривать область трансцендентального в качестве неизбежно определяемой установками естественной сферы. Говоря точнее, я попытаюсь показать, что невозможно, по крайней мере, в контексте феноменологического дискурса, абстрагироваться от определенного влияния естественной сферы даже на наиболее чистом трансцендентальном уровне, предполагающем краеугольный камень трансцендентальной феноменологии Гуссерля, каковым является понятие трансцендентального *эго*. В целом мой подход является не столько попыткой отстоять возражения Финка по отношению к чисто трансцендентальному уровню, достигаемому после радикальной феноменологической редукции, сколько демонстрацией концептуальных ловушек и даже вариантов порочного круга, с которыми связаны попытки установить твердое основание для чисто трансцендентального онтологического уровня.

Ключевые слова: абсолютное *эго*, *Dasein*, естественная сфера, оперативное понятие, природа, трансцендентальная редукция.

1. INTRODUCTION

My intention in this paper is to show, on account of phenomenologically based arguments, that transcendence and mundanity have, to use a metaphor from physics, an “osmotic” relationship such that it cannot be justified their long held ontological disparity. A major but not sole motivation for the defence of this position is Eugen Fink’s, a Husserl’s disciple, argumentation in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, started under Husserl’s auspices as a further elaboration of his Paris lectures on *Cartesian*

Meditations, on the impossibility of a purely transcendental reduction in view of the disposable means of acceding to it. To achieve my goal I have always had a global view of phenomenology in mind, more concretely a view in terms of which both Husserlian and Heideggerian positions on the issue are accounted for to the extent that they provide a common ground on which to articulate my arguments, of course with an eye to the relevant secondary literature as well. And just as except for the substantial divergences between these two and other continental philosophers' views there may be still found certain compatible approaches on the capital issues of inner temporality and the modes of being-in-the-world in terms of transcendence, I have inquired into the possibility of a consistent foundation of such concepts on phenomenological soil, one that would by necessity be grounded on an inextricable entanglement of transcendence with mundanity.

To start with, consciousness in the Husserlian phenomenology is inseparable from the temporality of sensuousness going as far as to assert that consciousness without original impression, in virtue of *genesis spontanea*, is nothing (Husserl, 1991, 106). In this sense consciousness, sensible impression and time may be thought of as conjugates. It turns out that, as Levinas suggested, even at the primordial level of a living being where the constituting flux reduced to pure immanence would exclude even a suspicion of objectivity, consciousness remains an intentionality, a specific form of which is the retention (or protention) which would be unthinkable without an apprehended correlative (Levinas, 1974, 40).

Further, if mundanity means what is implied by the existence of human beings in the world it may be reasonably said that this state-of-being cannot be transcended insofar as being-in-the-world cannot be alienated from being-in-the-world. This means that being-in-the-world may prove to be the natural ontological condition of a human being. Consequently there can be no way to circumvent it by appealing to the solipsism of an "esoteric" anonymous ego in the pure Husserlian sense without falling to the trap of infinite regressions in terms of which will always emerge a consciousness-of in the actual now.

In fact this is the great enigma of transcendental phenomenology: to reconcile the pure ego as a "disinterested spectator" (Husserl, 1970, 157) and such that it is not at all temporally objective nor can be predicated as such but only by what it is its constituted self, with the same ego as a personal ego which is "existence-in-the-world" and partakes of the world (Husserl, 1973b, 196). The former ego, the absolute ego, as outcome of the most radical and perfect reduction has lost validity for itself as human being or as existing in real terms within the world, yet it is considered to be the pure subject of its intentionalities. Consequently in the sense of an absolute (pure) ego it

may only justify its existence apodictically through its intentionalities “which are apodictically contained within itself and can be opened up” (Husserl, 1970, 256).

Therefore, one might well argue that the question of the transcendence of the absolute ego is transposed to the means of its apodicticity, that is, to the ontic character of intentionality. However, the fact is that the concept of apodicticity is primarily treated by Husserl in a logical sense where truths “have the nature of laws for everything actually or possibly thought as such that falls under the Ideas in question [*that is, within the ideal sphere. — S. L.*]” (Husserl, 2019, 82), therefore it can by no means serve, in this respect, as an ontological explication of the nature of pure ego. It is indicative that in the *Logic and the General Theory of Science*, apodicticity is thought of as a genuine modal concept “equivalent to the concept of validity on the basis of a law” and characterized in specific ways in terms of necessity-meaning in which case Husserl applied a theory of forms-meanings based on the abstract notion of thought-matter. It follows that if we think of a judgment made about consciousness as of a purely apodictic necessity the restricting terms, in contrast with the eidetic bearers of necessity, are “projected” to a particular consciousness, the consciousness “of contingency or actuality, namely, of the contingent restriction of necessity” (Husserl, 2019, 236).

R. Arp in *Husserl, the Transcendental and the Mundane* has confronted the problem of communicability between the transcendental and the mundane in a way that these notions taken as related more to the idiosyncratic language of the reduction itself rather than in “overcoming incarceration within one’s own self” (Arp, 2004a, 177). Furthermore insofar as Husserl’s attempt was to provide for a communication between the phenomenologist and the scientist, the mere fact of communication, according to Arp, would divest transcendental epoché of its transcendental character. If such communication would be true then it could be possible to discard the solipsistic effect borne to the ego by the transcendental epoché. In such case, the argument goes, “the fullness of the epoché never really takes place and Husserl’s theory becomes shoddy” (Arp, 2004a, 177), for as we communicate only in objective terms with one another as well as with our own egos within the natural world, then the kind of reduction involved in the transcendental *epoché* cannot take place in any sense. After all it may well be that mundanity is a state of the human being-in-reality which is intrinsic and constitutive (not constituted), that is, an essential ontic condition of the human being close in content to what Heidegger characterized as the mode of being of Dasein in virtue of being-in-the-world.

Prompted by Fink’s lingering doubts in *The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism* about the feasibility of a radical reduction

to a true transcendence of the pure ego, Arp has conceded to the disjunctive dilemma that “Either the transcendental epochë takes place and no communication is possible or the epochë doesn’t take place and Husserl’s phenomenology is just a fiction or at most an ideal that never can be realized” (Arp, 2004a, 177). However Husserl has on this account, for Wertz (Wertz, 2016), resolved the paradox between the transcendental nature of constituting subjectivity and the being-in-the-world nature of human soul (or personal ego) “by an apperceptive synthesis of identification in which subjectivity appears as a (non-objective) dimension of persons.” Further this synthesis is assumed to begin “with a reflective phenomenological (transcendental) seeing (and critical analysis) of consciousness that is retained in the recognition of the person in the world.” (Wertz, 2016, 147). This is meant as a synthesis of identification of the transcendental consciousness and the person in the world in the sense that the person-in-the-world retains in its consciousness the transcendental “seeing” as the retained form of the reflecting consciousness-of, consequently as now reflected and analyzed. Yet in this apperceptive synthesis of identification that constitutes the person, one passes from the transcendental reflection in terms of pure consciousness to the category of human being in whose mundane condition consciousness functions in real, objective terms.

In virtually the same vein, the way Husserl generally addressed the relation between the transcendental and the mundane indicates by the ambiguities and overlappings that appear so often in his texts that the question of the relationship of pure transcendence vs. mundanity is indeed a quite perplexing one that may well push phenomenological thought to the edge.

2. OPENING THE DISCUSSION ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL AND THE MUNDANE

Even in the strictest sense of the transcendental *epochë*, Husserl never actually counted out the world in performing the reduction to an absolute, self-constituting subjectivity and the eidetic intuitions associated with it. At the same time cognizant of the intricacies implied by the transcendental character of the absolute ego *vis-à-vis* the world, he drew attention to the fact that the ego’s belonging to a fully isolated from the world sphere-of-being does not refer to an isolation in natural sense as if the transcendental ego had a separate actual or potential existence. Yet nowhere in his texts to the end of his life was Husserl actually able to overcome a constant relapse to the vagueness of the ontic character of the transcendental ego in view of the surrounding life-world and the relativity in the application of the linguistic terms proper

to its description¹. For instance, in the *First Philosophy* (Part II) Husserl referred to the transcendental being as fully self-enclosed and yet, thanks to its authentic sense of mundane experience and its own self-implementing capacity, experienceable as animation of a body. In this sense the transcendental ego thought of as purely in itself is implementing by itself a self-objectification and is being attributed by itself the meaning-forms “human soul” and “objective reality” (Husserl, 1996, 76–77). It was largely in this context that Eugen Fink explicitly pointed out the impossibility of transcending the life-world even after the transcendental *epoché*:

The transcending of the world which takes place in performing the phenomenological reduction does not lead outside of or away from the world to an origin which is separate from the world [...] as if leading to some other world; the phenomenological transcending of the world, as the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity, is at the same time the retention of the world within the universe of absolute “being” that has been exposed. (Fink, 1970, 99, as cited in Arp, 2004b, 224)

Further, to the extent that transcendental reduction makes that the transcendence of the real, objective world re-emerges as the immanent transcendence of the absolute origin of subjectivity together with the a priori modes by which it may constitute itself as factual (or empirical) ego in the world, all predicative activity according to the norms of language and logic ought to be exempt from the transcendental level, consequently it must belong to the sphere of the natural attitude.

For instance, it is the square difficulty to explain the relationship between the empirical and the anonymous pure ego of the radical reduction in terms other than mundane ones that is conducive to making Husserl’s undertaking of bridging the worlds of the transcendental and the mundane problematic or even intractable. For if we are going to have an explication of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental ego one must first have a clear picture of what is meant by the transcendental ego itself, a concept often applied by Husserl in a quite ambiguous fashion. As it stands, in some places it is conceived in the sense of a reflective ego, namely “as transcendental ego in terms of everything intentionally implied therein,” the ego in terms of which “this world, with all its objects, [...], derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological *epoché*”². In other places it is conceived in the sense of a non-reflective absolute origin of subjectivity, and consequently of inner time, whose “existence” is apodictically given

¹ For the relativity of linguistic terms concerning the absolute subjectivity see: (Husserl, 1991, 79).

² See resp.: (Husserl, 1970, 258), and (Husserl, 1982, 26).

by the logical necessity of the (transcendental) origin of an ego reflecting upon itself, a task eventually proved to be an arduous one and attested as such by the linguistic inconveniences or neologisms called upon in the face of it (see, e.g.: Husserl, 2006, 16, 36). In Fink's view phenomenological knowledge must ineluctably refer to the world to express (absolute) subjectivity in a mundane language, in terms of an "enworlding" (*Verweltlichkeit*) that must necessarily apply to such phenomenological insights, as the self-constituting absolute subjectivity, the linguistic norms (e.g., predicativity, modalities, etc.) proper to existents-in-the-world, something obviously incompatible with their proper self as transcendencies. Consequently as predication is accomplished in the medium of a language and as language has its "home" in the natural attitude where all concepts are concepts of being, the only way a human being can refer to a being in general is in the form of existent, in which case the only interpretation of his experience of the existent and his bearing toward existence is through "questioning it, appealing to it, desiring it, commanding it" (Fink, 1995, 85).

Terms like: flux of consciousness, retention and protention, self-constituting subjectivity, synthese of identification, connection with other consciousness in empathy (*Einfühlung*), transcendental ego, intentionality, phenomenological perception (*Wahrnehmung*), etc, are phenomenological terms whose content derives its meaning solely by virtue of the analogical relationship they bear with concrete modes of being in the world. Yet in spite of the analogy with the world as existent and therefore as susceptible to predicative linguistic formulations, the predicative linguistic universe in its own terms as inseparable with being-in-the-world will ever be deficient with regard to the absolute consciousness itself insofar as the latter refers ontologically to "nothing" in real world terms.

As a matter of fact even within the realm of pure phenomenological insights one must be willing to take recourse to mundane expressions to leave open a path of communication with the sphere of being, a notable example being Patočka's explication of the relationship of the pure ego with the ego in reflection as being only possible through a kind of retention that establishes "pre-reflectively" a distance between the pre-reflective ego and the ego in act without founding, in spite of that, two distinct egos (Patočka, 1992, 166). The subtlety here is that one needs to apply a notion of retention, initially conceived as the a priori mode of passing original impressions from the world of experience into primary memory, to the mode pure ego may "recognize" itself. Furthermore one has to contend with the controversial assumption that pure ego must be identical with the ego-in-act (as reflecting) which may prove a self-contradictory one if the pure ego, being the anonymous absolute origin of subjectivity, is regarded as non-identifiable with the personal ego, i.e., the ego-in-act. Wertz, for in-

stance, is critical of the performance of phenomenological reduction on the following grounds:

Subjectivity is no-thing, is pregiven implicitly in everything, and can be observed and rationally analyzed only through a very distinctive transcendental reduction of the lifeworld that reveals its “irreal” realm of meaning as the way the lifeworld shows itself to consciousness; it can only be known through descriptive explication that may require metaphor, which ambiguously characterizes its flowing and changing synthesis of horizons. (Wertz, 2016, 159)

Generally the notion of constitution in terms of the transcendental reduction is not exempt from the criticism of those who judge the field of phenomenological reduction as inextricably linked with that of mundane experience. I specifically refer to Hamauzu who points, from positions that appear to re-evaluate phenomenology in relation to the natural attitude, to the inconsistent way Husserl used the term constitution, especially the transcendental sense of self-constitution. More concretely he claims that:

When he [Husserl. — S.L.] says, “The world constitutes itself in the transcendental subjectivity,” the latter is no subject constituting the world. When he says, “In the transcendental ego alter ego constitutes itself,” the former is no subject constituting alter ego. It denotes only the field where the world or the alter ego constitutes itself. (Hamauzu, 2010, 105)

Given the linguistic twists common in Husserl’s narrative relative to the transcendental ego, Hamauzu’s argument above can be taken neither as outright invalid nor at face value. Rather it is indicative of the perplexities involved in view of Husserl’s constant relapse to ambiguities or to a kind of “circular movement” (*Kreisbewegung*)³ when it comes to providing a presuppositionless foundation for the transcendental ego.

3. WHY HUSSERL FAILED TO RID TRANSCENDENTAL EGO OF MUNDANITY CONSTRAINTS?

It is not unusual among phenomenologists to concede that the nature of the Husserlian transcendental ego remains the “black hole” of transcendental phenomenology in spite of the laborious efforts of Husserl himself to clarify this concept in the

³ By the term *Kreisbewegung* Taguchi has characterized the circularity in the reference of the absolute ego, as streaming present, to itself as witnessing and witnessed, time-constituting and time-constituted. See: (Taguchi, 2006, 188).

years following *Phenomenological Investigations*. In what follows I am going to refer to certain Husserlian texts where the conceptual overlappings or circularities and the incessant recourse to analogies with the natural attitude in the transcendental discourse seem to undermine the feasibility of the reduction to the pure transcendence of absolute subjectivity. Yet in view of the grave significance of the question and the ensuing more general problematic on the bounds of phenomenological reduction it would be opportune to refer and comment first on the views of E. Fink in his article *Operative Concepts in Husserl's Phenomenology* (Fink, 1981).

Even as Fink was respectful enough to his great mentor to acknowledge the integrity and far-sightedness of Husserl's philosophical attitude, he nonetheless seems prone to commit a "patricide" in disguise by questioning the very essence of the Husserlian doctrine, namely the consistency of the transcendental discourse in and after the performance of phenomenological reduction. He does so by appealing to a rather uncommon in mainstream philosophical discourse term, that of an operative concept, in contradistinction with thematic concepts these latter being those concepts "in which thought fixes and preserves what is being thought." In Fink's narrative philosophers think through "certain cognitive presentations toward the basic concepts which are essentially their themes," in a way that these cognitive presentations are not and cannot be thought in their own right but only as "intermediate lines of thought to set up that which they are thinking about." Talking in more concrete terms Fink displayed the philosophical audacity to subvert the thematic concept of the world as totality insofar as this cannot be conceived but in a finite perspective "because concepts are expended in its formulation, concepts which, as a result, remain in the shadow" (Fink, 1981, 59).

More than an impediment to the phenomenological doctrine proper these "shadowy" concepts are meant by Fink as a problem of the philosophical thought in traditional ontological sense and in whatever particular forms they may assume, e.g., in the epistemology of philosophical knowing, the methodology of its method, the reflection on implicit presuppositions and the linguistic metatheory, etc. And certainly they throw the shadow of doubt to the whole Husserlian conception of the mode of being of the transcendental ego as objective totality in presentification (*Gegenwärtigung*) and the world as presently given in one's own living present as appearing. From the time of *Logical Investigations* in which infinity was "fathomed" as a totality in immanence with no bearing to the real spatiotemporal infinity to the late texts on time constitution where the world as life-horizon is reduced to the essence of ego, as the "lowest ground" of living experience which is a presupposition for all reflection, Husserl had always strived to set up a consistent ego-based transcendental field to

conjure the demons of these allegedly shadowy cognitive “presentations” toward the basic thematic concepts⁴. To come to terms with this challenge Husserl had to concoct an ego-pole whose mode of being would, on the one hand, account for the objective unity of time in the intentional forms of retention-protention and the reproduction of memories at will and, on the other, would be itself “pre-existing” (*vor-seiendes*) to its own self as time-constituting so as to avoid the trapping of the endless regression reflecting-reflected. As a matter of fact since the transcendental ego is time-constituting, an endless regression reflecting-reflected could be transposed to an endless regression of the being of time originally experienced as temporal flow, since the flow would have to be itself in time and then that time to be again experienced as flow and so on. In these terms could be also presumably resolved the enigma of the in-between “existing” say, between my actual living present and the not yet fulfilled future or between my actual (living) present and the passing present (Husserl, 2006, 44). Yet the question of the distinctness between the pure ego as an absolute origin beyond temporality and the factual or personal ego as ego-in-act was in fact never clarified and remains to this day one of the thorniest questions of transcendental phenomenological thought⁵. The very act of transcendental reduction, one might add moreover, to the extent that it is a practice intersubjectively implemented potentially anytime and in a region of the lifeworld whatsoever implicitly refers by itself to the mundane sphere.

According to Fink the non-eliminable residuum between the thematic activity of an ego-consciousness and the athematic conceptual medium through which a thematic object is what it is in original givenness and, in parallel terms, the non-eliminable residuum between the transcendental ego acting in the living present and its presumptive pure self, for all of Husserl’s elaboration are left thematically unclarified. In this sense “The constitution of the mundane character of the subject, in which it conceals its originality as prior to the world, was not carried out by Husserl in a sufficiently explicit and convincing manner” (Fink, 1981, 64). In fact Husserl took concepts from the glossary of the mundane sphere, e.g. constitution, retrospective

⁴ An example of the relation between the thematic and the ‘shadowy’ operatives mentioned by Fink is the dialectical relation between the Parmenidean $\epsilon\nu$ (one) and $\delta\nu$ (being) as complementary and reciprocally defined. A more detailed discussion from a phenomenological standpoint of the dialectical relation between these fundamental concepts in the Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* can be found in (Livadas, 2012).

⁵ I quote, a propos, from Husserl’s *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution*: “In the stream of the living present it is [the ego-pole. — S. L.] the identically persisting pole with regard to the change of immanent temporal occurrences. I always said: This pure ‘ego’ is abstract, it is concrete only through the content of the streaming present” (Husserl, 2006, 53, my translation — S. L.).

apprehension⁶, intentional perception, etc., to designate the intentional activity of the transcendental subject with regard to the world of things which, even as taken in their proper sphere, are characterized by an inherent indeterminacy in the sense that they cannot be brought to a knowable completion meant as a finitistically surveyable state of affairs. Evidently these concepts are divested of any meaning except in reference to what is constituted within the world for otherwise and in an absolute sense of transcendental constitution they would be just meaningless linguistic expressions. It is telling that in spite of Fink's recognition of Husserl's "extremely fruitful" undertaking of exhibiting and clarifying the intentional attributes of transcendental subjectivity, he still pointed out that "The connection between speech and the transcendental-phenomenological understanding of Being remains in the dark" (Fink, 1981, 68).

Witnessing to the difficulties of Husserlian phenomenology to enter the description of the transcendental universe exclusively in the latter's terms is Husserl's characterization in the *First Philosophy* (Second Part) of the ego-in-act as "self-forgetful" (*selbstvergessenes*) so as to conceptually allow for a second degree reflection of a correspondingly reflecting and in turn again "self-forgetful" ego acting again in the streaming present as the identical ego of retentions and a-thematic protentions, in a way that each new higher-order reflection makes appear a "lower" degree acting ego and so on (Husserl, 1996, 89).

Evidently one comes across the same pending question of an endless regression reflecting-reflected running through all transcendental schemes which is in fact the inconclusive attempt to eliminate the "vacuity" between the reflecting and reflected ego without falling into objectivity and therefore naturalistic concerns. It would not do either Husserl's idea of a ramification into the energetic (*patente*) and passive (*latente*) ego, as a possible alternative to the ambiguities associated with the terminological use of "self-forgetfulness," in the sense that the energetic ego as a reflecting ego in implementing an act can make the prior passive ego an object of its act, which means an intentional object of its prior passive self. In the face of this rather schematic division remindful of Aristotle's ramification to the energetic and passive mind in *De Anima*⁷, Husserl was disposed to state that the "various" act-poles are evidently the same iden-

⁶ By this term, i.e., *rückgreifendes Erfassen* in the original, Husserl meant an act of the constituting ego whose content is the thematization of a collection of abstract objects, pre-constituted by the polythetic act of colligation, into an identifiable and re-identifiable meaning-object, e.g., a set or a class of elements in mathematics. See: (Husserl, 1973a, 246–247).

⁷ In *De Anima* Aristoteles conceived of the mind as being of two sorts, the energetic mind (*ποιητικός νοῦς*) and the passive mind (*παθητικός νοῦς*). The latter is the part upon which everything is acted-on (*τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι*), whereas the former is the one which makes everything as acted upon and therefore makes the potentially being as actually being (*τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν*). The energetic mind is

tical ego, by virtue of its “appearances” in every implementing act and in all distinct modes of each of its “appearances.” However even in leaving aside the mundane sense of the term “appearance” and its lax use in this context, there is no convincing answer in transcendental terms, not to say in plain objective terms, regarding the “deficiency” of transcendence between the *patente* and the *latente* ego, in other words between the ego-in-act and its “pre-existing” pure self.

Indicative of the recurring circularities in the description of the transcendental ego as pole of the immanent temporal unity and its non-extensive distancing with any other ego is the following: on the one hand, there is no possible continuity from my ego-pole, namely, from my continuous substratum of inactive intentionality and my intentional acts toward another ego-pole and, on the other, the “external” continuity in the temporal flux of these acts is a correlate of the “un-continuity” (*Gegenkontinuität*) of the ego-pole being in identical association with itself (Husserl, 1973c, 577).

As Husserl intended time and again, the ego as pure self was not attributed of a temporally enduring character in contradistinction to itself as object (with regard to itself) partaking of a duration as presentified, passed by, etc. Thus while the ego in authentic sense has no duration, its self-image as constituted is temporally persisting and its identical being is grounded in extensive temporality. Yet there is no way to apprehend the authentic ego but as its self-image in objectivity which is of course not itself, otherwise the only way to be derived would be solely by logical necessity in virtue of *prima causa*. In these terms it may seem plausible Husserl’s otherwise paradoxical position that the ego is in itself and with itself in inner “continuity” which is fundamentally different from the external, the extensive continuity and such that the persisting ego of inner “continuity” is the same as in the extensive continuity of its life, the same in the unity of its external appearances and in the orienting itself thematically, etc. The same ambivalences seem to show up in Husserl’s assertion that the determinateness, the orientability of the ego as self-determination of the ego-pole are non-temporal in character in admitting at the same time that the self-orientation and the orientation toward an object-pole within temporal unity are themselves temporal, as proceeding within immanent temporality and capable of being thematically posited in reflective fashion, thus turning the ego-pole into an object-pole and so on (Husserl, 1973c, 578).

In the *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* (Third Part) and in a kind of conceptual “acrobatics” the enduring ego is posited not as temporal in the natural sense of a

said to be separate, immiscible and incorruptible, being in its essence energy. See: (Aristotle, 1956, 430², 72).

“thingness” temporality but in a new vague sense, that is, as relatively temporally enduring (*zeitlich relativ Bleibendes*). At some point Husserl seems to want to rid himself of transcendental preoccupations with the pure ego altogether by simply characterizing the pure ego-pole as something abstract⁸, which “is” what it is in its affections and actions, its corresponding habitualities and the whole concrete background of its flux of consciousness (Husserl, 1973c, 575, 541). It is of no wonder therefore that Husserl marveled at the wondrous way the absolute transcendental subjectivity is fully congruent (or even coincidental upon thematization) with the human psychic ego, that is, “with myself as performing the phenomenological reduction, as ‘pure’ ego whose purity however is abstract in the world, derived through abstraction from all psychophysical” (Husserl, 1973c, 550, my translation.—S. L.).

As known the Husserlian conception of the pure ego itself and in relation with inner temporality was left in suspense to the end especially concerning the *Bernau Manuscripts* and the *Late Texts on Time Constitution*⁹. Husserl’s undertaking, in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, to describe the primary process (*Urprozess*)—i.e., the absolute ego of consciousness—as a transcendental time-constituting process that cannot be apprehended by reflection (and thus generate an endless regression of hierarchies of egos) and such that being and constituted-in-being in it are inseparable, proves to be again a phenomenological *cul de sac*. It seems utterly meaningless to talk about a temporal process or state-of-affairs as constituted prior to any reflection “without the attentive regard of a time-constituting consciousness” (Livadas, 2019, 580–581). Consistent in this sense is Fink’s aporia:

How in the end the temporality of the analytical situation has to be conceived, whether we finally have to show an “overarching” transcendental stream of life in which phenomenologizing stands in discordant unity with its theme, together with it but certainly in a way “altogether different” from the way an act of reflection usually stands together with its object—this remains open. (Fink, 1995, 53)

4. WHY HEIDEGGER’S TRANSCENDENCE-IN-MUNDANITY LEAVES THE QUESTION OF BEING IN SUSPENSE

Heidegger’s deviation from the Husserlian doctrine of transcendental ego was in a certain sense a way to address the enigma of an immanent transcendence (i.e., the transcendental ego) which could be in terms of reciprocity with the objective world and at the same time isolated from it in being its pure self. However, in

⁸ He has also done it elsewhere; see, e.g., fn 5.

⁹ See resp.: (Husserl, 2001; Husserl, 2006).

spite of Heidegger's laborious efforts to endow the being of *Dasein* with a kind of transcendence within-the-world in virtue of its kind of "throwing" into the world, he was eventually unable to get ridden of the "deficiency" between pure transcendence and its objectifying self, even though he was more inclined than Husserl to do justice to what is implied by the presence of *Dasein* as unfolding itself in the temporal awhileness within-the-world. Even if the concept of being is meant in terms of presence in actuality and eventually in terms of time—of course not in the traditional meaning of time—the "unthought" (*Ungedachte*) of metaphysics retains its non-eliminability in the phenomenologically founded interrelation of being with time. In Heidegger's understanding the "unthought" is presented in the *What is called Thinking? (Was heist Denken?)* as more than a mere defectiveness of metaphysics, or presumably a wrong path taken; it implicitly leads to a non-objectifiable residuum of transcendence:

...And does not this show, then, that something was left unthought at the very core of the definition which is regarded as guiding all Western metaphysics—something essential in the essential nature of Being? The question *Being and Time* points to what is unthought in all metaphysics. Metaphysics consists of this unthought matter; what is unthought in metaphysics is therefore not a defect of metaphysics. Still less may we declare metaphysics to be false, or even reject it as a wrong turn, a mistake, on the grounds that it rests upon this unthought matter. (Heidegger, 1968, 103)

In this sense the "unthought" of a thought is not a defect adjoined to the "thought of." The "unthought" is just the un-thought, and further the more original a thought has been the more plentiful its "unthought." For Heidegger this is emphatically the highest "gift" a thought has to offer. In fact in whatever disguise this kind of "unthought" may be accounted for, e.g., in the sense of the residuum of an objectivating thought, it runs through Heidegger's texts as the common denominator of the characteristics of the being of *Dasein*, as "property" of something not objectively present in the naive sense. More concretely it may be meant as an existential way to be in view of *Dasein*'s everydayness, i.e., on account of its being-in-the-world, in the mode of being itself as always its "there," in "entanglement" and in temporal awhileness. In *Being and Time* and in a more explicit fashion *Dasein* is described as evading the being that is disclosed in moods (*Stimmung*) in an ontic and existentiell way: Ontologically and existentially: this means that in that to which such a mood pays no attention *Dasein* is unveiled in its being delivered over to the there. In the evasion itself there is something disclosed (Heidegger, 1996, 127).

Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), as an existential fundamental way in which *Dasein* becomes its "there," is described not only as disclosing *Dasein* in the mode of being

in-the-world¹⁰ but also as the existential kind of being in which *Dasein* evades its own self while continuously delivering itself to the world.

As it happened with Husserl's transcendental project in which the transcendence of the ego is inseparable from the question of the origin of temporality, Heidegger was likewise committed to a sharp account of temporality (in its ecstatic and horizontal unity) in order to make the existential and ontological possibility of the fundamental constitution of *Dasein* intelligible. Of course, the temporality of *Dasein* is inextricable associated with its spatiality in the existential sense of the being of "care," that is, in the sense of "factically entangled existing." This said, making room for the objective presence of the *Dasein* in the world, as brought up by directionality and de-distancing, is grounded in a kind of presentification that "belongs to the unity of temporality" through which directionality can be founded too. In short, Heidegger ultimately reduced the existential ways *Dasein* makes itself present in the world and the way it discloses itself to the world as taking care of, to the modes of its temporality and more deeply to the essence of temporality itself. Yet as I'll try to show next, Heidegger gets trapped in this undertaking in the same ontological "vacuities" that had to face Husserl in his attempt to secure a presuppositionless foundation for the transcendental ego that would make its pure self identical with its self-in-act.

In *Being and Time* world time, as the time in which innerworldly beings are encountered, is claimed to have through the horizontal and ecstatic unity of temporality, the same transcendence as the world. Further, insofar as world time is made public through the disclosedness of the world to the *Dasein* and as this latter "encounters" innerworldly beings within time in the mode of temporally taking care of, world time is at the same time more "objective" than any possible object (by becoming ecstatically and horizontally objectified in being-together-with) and more "subjective" (by making possible the being of the factual existing self of *Dasein* as caring) than any possible subject. In virtue of these presumptive properties it follows that world time is not objectively present neither "inside" the subject or the object nor "outside" the subject or the object. Rather it may be said to be "*prior*" to every subjectivity and objectivity as the condition of the "*prior*" itself and then to their appellation as such (Heidegger, 1996, 384–385). However as one may ask about the "being" of the "*prior*" and thus according to Heidegger "bump into the same 'limit' that already posed itself [...] of the connection between truth and being," this becomes a way to find oneself once again in the impasse reached in every phenomenological quest touching on the transcendental origin of absolute being: a presuppositionless postulation of being

¹⁰ That is, in terms of thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) into and dependence (*Angewiesenheit*) on the world.

which is “*prior*” to itself and at the same time it is identically itself in self-objectification in a way that may become expressible in mundane terms without eluding toward its absolute self.

If subjectively founded temporality, Husserl’s severe critique of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as reducing the transcendence of the subject to “anthropology” notwithstanding, is a common denominator of both philosophers’ view of the foundation of transcendental being then nothing is changed as to the essential content of this ontological query. For in spite of Heidegger’s efforts to make temporality account for the way *Dasein* is thrown as disclosedness to the world in being-there with other beings and itself, he was actually putting being and temporality in a circular “collocation.” On the one hand, the persistent self of changing experiences points to something objectively present in time yet undetermined and “unthinglike.”

On the other hand, “even the vulgar interpretation of the ‘connectedness of life’ does not think of a framework spanned ‘outside’ of *Dasein* and embracing it, but correctly looks for it in *Dasein* itself” (Heidegger, 1996, 343). In other words, *Dasein*’s connectedness of experiences cannot be thought in terms of an objectively present interval out of the momentarily given real nows but stretches along *Dasein*’s existence in a way that the “between” of each past and of each yet-to-come already lies in the being of *Dasein*. In other words there is something “unthinkable,” i.e. a kind of temporality, underlying the connection of the life of *Dasein*, while the same kind of temporality as the constant “between” birth (in virtue of already past) and death (in virtue of yet to come) is inseparable from the being of *Dasein*.

Paradoxical as it may seem, time as a phenomenon founded in *Dasein* itself is associated in Heidegger’s *The Concept of Time (Der Begriff der Zeit)* with the facticity of *Dasein* so long as facticity, conceived in its most possible authenticity as the running ahead of the ultimate possibility of death, can reveal the facts of the phenomenon of time on the condition that time is in *Dasein* (Heidegger, 2011, 42–43). It follows that in Heidegger’s rhetorical question of how one gets from *Dasein* to time the answer is that, in explicating the ontological characteristics of *Dasein* in terms of the running ahead and constantly fleeing its ultimate possibility of death while finding itself in the authentic sense of its resolve (*Entschlossenheit*) toward the world, one has “already laid bare the phenomenon of time in terms of its genuine meaning. [...] If this is borne out of phenomena, our preceding analysis of the ontological characteristics of *Dasein* has at the same time brought out the ways in which ‘time’ exists” (Heidegger, 2011, 47–48).

It turns out that in the authentic sense of running ahead to its ultimate possibility *Dasein* is characterized as futural, while by being the projection of its own self

toward the future is at once its own past and present, in other words not a being in time but constitutive of time itself [*Das jeweilige Dasein selbst (ist) die Zeit* (The specific Dasein itself is time)]¹¹. On these grounds Heidegger was quite assertive about the inherence of temporality in the facticity of *Dasein* in stating that these different modes of temporalness as constitutive-ontological possibilities of *Dasein* reveal that facticity is temporality (Heidegger, 2011, 52).

Therefore, if temporality is considered the foundation of *Dasein* then temporality far from being a presuppositionless origin of the transcendence of *Dasein* proves to be conditioned on the very facticity of *Dasein* insofar as *Dasein* presents itself as a temporalness which encounters in circumspection “time” in worldly terms as significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*), in the sense that out of the “outgoing” caring temporalness “time” exists in its world. “Time” is even allowed the peculiar personification, in a purely Heideggerian literary style, of the being of “nobody” („*Die Zeit*“ ist das Sein des „Niemand“) which is encountered in terms of presencing immersion within the world. In these terms the Heideggerian conception of time leads to the individuation of *Dasein* inasmuch as by the futuralness (*Zukünftigsein*) of the running ahead toward its ultimate possibility *Dasein* acquires the authenticity of its being that delivers it from the state of “anyone” (or “one”; in German original: *Man*) to the state of the unique thisness and the one-time-ness (*Diesmaligkeit*) of its thereness that make it “entirely non-substitutable by any other being” ((Heidegger, 2011, 70).

Furthermore on such grounds one may rightfully set claims to a possible epistemological relevance of *Dasein* as pertaining to the peculiar foundation of its spatio-temporality. For in spite of Heidegger’s conviction that the in-being of *Dasein* should be understood as being-involved-with, defined each instance as my own and in temporal awhileness (*Jeweiligkeit*)¹², rather than in a local and spatial sense, one may still infer that by being-involved-with in the unique thisness of its thereness and in the particular awhileness *Dasein eo ipso* objectifies any being (object or state-of-affairs) that encounters in its concerning projection to the world. Perhaps telling to the perplexities in establishing an authentic transcendence in terms of *Dasein*’s open projection to the world is that in the 1930s Heidegger came to believe that his efforts to found transcendence in *Dasein*’s in-being *vis-à-vis* the world ended up in a kind of

¹¹ The analogies one can draw with Sartre’s transcendental character of the *Being-for-itself* are obvious, especially concerning the transcendence of the “out-of-itself” of the *Being-for-itself*. However Sartre’s emphasis is on the present as the foundation of the “being” of the *Being-for-itself* in contrast with Heidegger’s option for the futuralness of *Dasein*.

¹² See: (Heidegger, 1985, 159).

platonism, while the whole language of transcendental philosophy seemed hopeless (Moran, 2014, 493).

In any case if the later Heidegger is considered as seeking to redefine the selfhood of *Dasein* in a direction that departs from the “subjectivism” of the period of *Being and Time*, it is still true that:

The problem remains, however, that Heidegger gives us no new language with which to articulate this new conception of subjectivity that he is supposed to be advocating. In the later Heidegger, as in the earlier, there is a strong sense that language—and not just the language of metaphysics but the language of thinking—has failed him. (Moran, 2014, 509–510)

5. WHY NATURE-WORLD LIMITS THE ACCESSIBILITY TO TRANSCENDENCE?

If there is a way to provide an answer to the question above this should have certainly to take into account the preceding discussion while inquiring further into the constraints posed by the essential attributes of the transcendental character of being-in-the-world. To start with, an interesting account of the ontological and ontic terms under which transcendental reduction may be implemented is McGuirk’s juxtaposition of Fink’s unfolding of transcendental reduction leading to a region of “pre-being” (*Vor-sein*) in which “all human possibilities, including those of knowing and speaking, are ultimately constituted” with Heidegger’s approach to the reduction as disclosing “*Dasein*’s Being-in-the-world as the ground behind which it is impossible to inquire” (McGuirk, 2009, 248). Yet McGuirk’s comparative review of Fink’s presumed rupture between the transcendental and mundane universes and Heidegger’s attempt to make these universes come together in the unique mode of being-in-the-world owned by *Dasein*, has made even more clear the “haziness” in the demarcation line between the transcendental and mundane.

More specifically Fink’s version of constructive phenomenology (or phenomenology of phenomenology) is very much focused on the notion of the ego as a “phenomenologizing onlooker,” whose focus rests on the activity of transcendental constitution and is concerned with “the being together of transcendental subjectivity and world-constitution as a whole.” On the assumption that the transcendental subject cannot be considered “existent,” for being existent is conditioned to being constituted, Fink had claimed that:

Phenomenological experience does not cognize something which is already existent, as what and how it is; it cognizes the sort of thing which is “in itself” not existent, in

cognizing it objectifies it into something that is (transcendentally) “existent,” it lifts the constitutive construction-processes out of the condition of “pre being” (*Vor-sein*) proper to them and for the very first time in a certain sense objectivates them. In other words, the theoretical experience of the phenomenological onlooker ontifies the “pre-existent” life-processes of transcendental subjectivity and is therefore in a sense [...] “productive.” (Fink, 1995, 76)

Fink’s arguments for the concept of a phenomenological onlooker “who” does not constitute but merely “observes” so as to leave no ground for a relapse to an endless regression of reflections, are in fact not radically different from those in Husserl’s *Bernau Manuscripts* concept of the primary process as preceding reflection. This was a part of Husserl’s longstanding and ultimately unattainable goal of reaching an absolutely self-standing description of the absolute ego-origin of temporality, one that would be unfettered from the constraints of any “third-party” reference. Fink is virtually enclosed in the same deadlock insofar as in performing the reduction “the phenomenologizing I is already there and open to itself in the mode of self-consciousness (of being-for-itself)” (Fink, 1995, 13). In an irresistible bent toward the slippery ground of mundane concerns, Fink went on to draw analogies between the structure of the reflection of the transcendental onlooker and that of human self-reflection, the latter in virtue of the human consciousness of the self as being already there before reflection (Fink, 1995, 13–14).

Nevertheless as it is utterly meaningless to talk about the possibility of a process or mode of being prior to any reflection for then we would generate by necessity an infinite chain of circularities, it may not come as a surprise McGuirk’s echoing of Fink that

in the phenomenology of phenomenology we must speak of the transcendental subject as though it were existent since the language of being constituted anonymously in the mundane realm before the performance of the reduction is the only language that is available to us. (McGuirk, 2009, 250, emphasis added)

In other words the “as though” hypothetical attribution serves to show *in rem* that natural language is the irreducible intermediary to any sort of transcendental insights, yet natural language knows only the vocabulary of being in objective terms consequently it must be “extraneous” to what Fink characterized as pre-being. In such case, in Fink’s sense, we face the following dichotomy in view of a potential communication between the phenomenologist and the non-phenomenologist: either (1) the phenomenologist expresses his (transcendental) insights in the realm of the mundane knowledge having as a consequence that they radically fail to express what they re-

ally are as transcendental proper or (2) the non-phenomenologist is driven into the performance of phenomenological reduction which, while offering genuine insight, it does so at the cost of making everyday reality deficient.

On the other hand, in spite of the largely shared view that Heidegger's adhesion of *Dasein's* anticipatory resoluteness (as its ownmost possibility of being) to its being-in-the-world in the naïve sense may free himself from any Fink-like "pre-being" preoccupations, it is still true that for both Fink and Heidegger there is an ontic-ontological residuum between the mundane and transcendental spheres that is persistently non-eliminable.

Far from being solely an ontological question this kind of residuum owes by all accounts its non-eliminability to the fact that ontic terms are inalienably only possible within the world. For Fink they are subordinate to the "unfathomable expanse" of the pre-ontic transcendental realm, whereas for Heidegger the ontic priority of the factually existing *Dasein* is "encroached" by *Dasein's* ownmost individuated possibility of being juxtaposed to the insignificance of the world. In this sense one may derive, so to say, a non-mundane stratum situated in the subjective sphere that deprives the mundane or everyday universe of the possibility to be meaningful by itself and yet makes the ontic-ontological residuum ontologically deficient by being addressed in essentially ontic terms, in other words in terms of being-in-the-world *simpliciter*.

In what sense then being-in-the-world with or without qualifications can bar access to pure transcendence? What is more, could nature and world be two distinct concepts if we take, on the one hand, Husserl's validity of the life-world¹³ as derived out of the a priori constituting intentionality of transcendental subjectivity and, on the other, Heidegger's notion of the world as correlate to *Dasein's* existence in the sense that *Dasein* is its world existingly?

N. Keane has looked, in *Dasein and World: Heidegger's Reconceiving of the Transcendental after Husserl*, beyond the separation of *Dasein* as disclosing and "world entering" and the world as always more than *Dasein's* constitutive relationship to it, to the distinct character of nature as the world's other¹⁴ which is still mediated by worldliness (Kean, 2020, 265). In these terms the critique addressed to Husserl's bestowal

¹³ The life-world can be roughly described to a non-phenomenologist as the physical world in its most primeval sense with its ever receding horizon including in an intersubjective sense all knowing subjects in a special kind of presence in the world.

¹⁴ If the "intimation" of the world and *Dasein* may be rendered in the epitomizing Heideggerian phrase *Die Welt weltet* (i.e., the World worlds), nature can be considered the "unworlded world," that is, the entity which is subjected to the invariant laws discovered by physics and yet comprehensible on the basis of worldliness.

of meaning through the noetic-noematic aspects of intentionality is that he does not take account of the inter-relatedness of *Dasein* in its disclosing toward the world and the meaningfulness of the world as exceeding *Dasein*'s disclosure. For Heidegger this sense of world would be referred to the nature as the reality which is not possible to be understood but in terms of worldhood (*Weltlichkeit*).

Therefore in a kind of a 'dog chasing his tail' game, nature-world exceeds *Dasein*'s being-in-disclosing-itself toward the world, yet nature as material existence cannot by itself provide a sense of worldhood the intelligibility of which is conditioned more and more on "this distinctive presence of what is of concern," in other words the mode of being of *Dasein*. In such view Heidegger conceded that world-existence may not be reducible to *Dasein*'s mode of being yet nature-world has ever been and remains an open horizon of intelligibility by way of *Dasein*'s transcendental mode of being toward the world. By force of these arguments one may have a fortiori, on the one hand, the impossibility of grounding ontologically the transcendence of *Dasein* without being entrapped to the sine qua non ontic terms of the mundanity of nature-world and, on the other, the hindrance posed by nature-world to an absolute accessibility to the transcendence of *Dasein* or to the transcendence of the Husserlian absolute ego for that matter. Perhaps this state-of-affairs cannot be better put succinctly than in Kean's phrase: "Being in the world is thus not reducible to the cognizing activity of an unwordly transcendental 'subject' because only a 'subject' that belongs to the world can make sense of and engage with worldly phenomena" (Kean, 2020, 285).

If nature in the terms discussed above may stand as an impediment to a complete reduction of the question of being to a transcendental "substratum" either in the Husserlian pure ego norms or the Heideggerian norms of *Dasein*'s existence, it is true also that in a reverse sense transcendental subjectivity may stand as an impediment to a universal ontological validity of natural science. In excess of the general methodological problem of phenomenology, that is, the way it may account for its own conditions of possibility if these conditions cannot in principle show up but in the *post* state of constitution, the transcendence of subjectivity itself may explicate the inherent limits of natural science as these latter for both Kant and Heidegger "correspond to a lacuna or blind spot of science with respect to the mode of being of the very subjectivity that makes scientific understanding possible in the first place" (Suarez, 2020, 112). In fact insofar as it is true that for Kant and Heidegger the justificatory methods of physics should be supplemented by the *a priori* capacities of the knowing subject in view of its being in the world, this must be also true for the Husserlian conception of the phenomenological ego in relation to the life-world, as reality in a sense proper to natural sciences cannot adequately describe the mode of being of the transcendental

ego itself. On these grounds one may find himself in a reproducing circularity: the possibility that the question of being is open to intelligibility presupposes the factual existence of *Dasein* (or of the personal Husserlian ego for that matter) which, in turn, presupposes the factual existence of nature and yet what is objectively existent is to be encountered solely in terms of the natural attitude, that is, out of the transcendental sphere. For even on the assumption of suspending the objectivity of the world in virtue of performing the transcendental reduction, there is no way to ‘seal off’ the personal ego as ego-in-act from communicating with the world if it is to be self-evident, conscious of its self-evidence, and therefore possible to be made thematic of and by itself and therefore bring about evidences and judgements relating to itself.

Rather than adopting Fink’s reduction of transcendental-constitutive processes to the vague condition of “pre-being” in trying to find a way out of Husserl’s unattainable goal of acceding to a pure transcendental ego or Heidegger’s quasi *ad hoc* postulation of *Dasein* as not simply itself but as inhering a relation to what is other than itself, one may regard nature in its most primordial sense as first in the order of being. This means that in establishing the ontic terms by which it can be made intelligible, nature founds by the same token the ontological standards by which a transcendental being can determine the mode of being of the world it inhabits and at the same time the mode-of-being of itself within the world as constantly re-affirming its otherness vis-à-vis the world and in being projected to the world. In this state-of-affairs the mundane and the transcendental spheres are not simply ‘osmotically’ interrelated. More than that, they may stand as the mutually irreducible condition of each other’s being ontologically as such.

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