The review of the collective monograph *Vitality of Phenomenology: Tradition and Renewal* traces various aspects of an interesting and peculiar design implemented in this publication. Non-thematic unity and community of traditions (philosophical and cultural) are united under the same cover of the authors of this monograph. Following the centripetal tendencies in the development of phenomenology, the authors nevertheless are united by a single task of finding the growth points of the phenomenological tradition and discovering new thematic areas in which phenomenological analysis can be applied. The problems of the life world and the position of phenomenology in modern discussions with representatives of analytical philosophy on the problems of consciousness, the thematic intersections of phenomenology with anthropology, hermeneutical philosophy, biological and linguistic research are becoming the subject of analysis. The authors of the sections not only trace the obvious lines of the development of phenomenology in the concepts of M. Heidegger, M. Merlot-Ponti or O. Fink, but bold parallels with the theory of deconstruction of J. Derrida, with modern ideas of bioethics or traditions of Japanese spiritual culture are discovered and argued.

**Key words:** phenomenology, tradition, consciousness, life world, hermeneutics, being, intentionality, anthropology.
РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ ДЖОВАННИ ЯН ДЖУБИЛАТО (РЕД.)
LEBENDIGKEIT DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE: TRADITION UND ERNEUERUNG / VITALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY: TRADITION AND RENEWAL

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В рецензии на коллективную монографию «Жизненная энергия феноменологии» прослеживаются различные аспекты интересного и своеобразного замысла, осуществленного в данном издании. Не тематическое единство и не общность традиции (философской и культурной) объединяют под одной обложкой авторов данной монографии. Следуя центростремительным тенденциям в развитии феноменологии, авторы тем не менее объединены единой задачей поиска точек роста феноменологической традиции и обнаружения новых тематических областей, в которых может быть применен феноменологический анализ. Проблематика жизненного мира и позиции феноменологии в современных дискуссиях с представителями аналитической философии по проблемам сознания, тематические пересечения феноменологии с антропологией, герменевтикой, биологическими и лингвистическими исследованиями становятся предметом анализа. Авторами разделов прослеживаются не только очевидные линии развития феноменологии в концепциях М. Хайдеггера, М. Мерло-Понти или О. Финка, но обнаруживаются и аргументируются смелые параллели с теорией деконструкции Ж. Деррида, с современными идеями биоэтики или традициями японской духовной культуры.

Ключевые слова: феноменология, традиция, сознание, жизненный мир, герменевтика, бытие, интенциональность, антропология.

If one understands tradition as an opportunity to give something of value “for safe storage,” then one can say that the publishers and drafters of this monograph have tried to show the significance of the phenomenological tradition as such an instrument and space for the preservation and development of phenomenology as an environment, that stimulates the birth of new ideas. This environment goes beyond national schools. This overcoming of borders chooses the logic of “traveling to a new land” and “mapping of its various ‘regions’ ” not only as an elegant metaphor, even if to a certain extent as a guide to action. Noteworthily, within the tradition shared by the authors of this monograph phenomenological philosophy avoids a systemic form and exists as a tension between the depth of studying particular problems and the
breadth of the survey of the successes of phenomenological analysis in studying more global subject areas.

The dynamics of the latest increments of these thematic areas in phenomenology embraces numerous fields from the traditional sphere of humanities—to modern interdisciplinary research in the so-called “naturalized phenomenology” and to the analysis of the successes of empirical research in psychology, psychiatry, medicine, and not least in neurobiology. In the thematic variety of articles included in the monograph, the concept of life, put into the title, is successfully played out. The problems of the life-world and the phenomenological interpretation of new achievements in the life sciences are presented in a productive dialogue.

The monograph is opened by an article by Guido Antonio de Almeida, professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), which serves as a kind of methodological introduction to the following sections. In a critical analysis of the phenomenological tools, the author follows E. Tugendhat and L. Wittgenstein and largely joins the arguments of his predecessors, seeing as a peculiarity of his approach the movement not so much from general theoretical approaches to particulars, but rather from the empirical analysis of linguistic analysis to theoretical generalizations. The ultimate level of theoretical generalization in this case is the level of consciousness, and “any theory of consciousness should either explain the phenomenon of intentionality, or eliminate it.” But, turning to the phenomenon of intentionality as a field of discussion of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, we find that there is an aspect of the study of consciousness that inevitably requires access to the macro level. It is an analysis of the “the expressive force of the speech (such as its meaning, its reference, its truth and its demonstrative strength)” (Giubilato, 2018, 18–19). Modern theoretical approaches in linguistics suggest moving in this analysis “…do not derive from the linguistic unities, […] but rather from the person who speaks in the speech, or more precisely, from the way in which the person understands it” (Giubilato, 2018, 19). In the logic of the study of this linguistic understanding the possibility of repeated presentation of the above, the possibility of repetition is important. Even so, repetition in speech has a special character, and the intentional act in this case “…does not designate what is ordinarily understood by a relation, i.e. a relation between two already-given terms which could be determined separately and autonomously.” From the point of view of linguistic empiricism “…this ‘intentional relation’ has the paradoxical property of preceding the related terms” (Giubilato, 2018, 21). It seems that this contradicts Husserl’s original intuitions. “Husserl wants show that the unity of the intentional consciousness is immediate and it is always already given in every intentional act: the unity of the temporal flow of experiences is real-
ized by a ‘fusion’ (Verschmelzung) of the experiences with each other, insofar as every single experience and every intentional act bears a vast horizon of anticipations and retentions” (Giubilato, 2018, 21). But if the intentional act cannot be understood as “…the activity of a ‘subject’ or an ‘ego’ subjacent to the intentional acts, then we can no longer consider the intentional act as accessible to introspection and as in the inner sphere of a subject. How, then, can the intentional act be accessed?” (Giubilato, 2018, 26). As the author of the article sees it, the solution to this difficulty can be a reference to the implementation of an intentional act in a symbolic environment. Similarly, “…the anticipative intentional reference must be mediated by some other presence, by some other element presentially given, whose only task is to refer to the absent object but without capturing or arresting our gaze within itself. This is precisely the function of the linguistic signs…” (Giubilato, 2018, 27). If we interpret thinking as basically a linguistic phenomenon, then the circle in the definition at first glance is overcome.

Since the proposed interpretation of the phenomenological theory and the author himself seem radical and “heretical,” he accepts the need to distinguish between understanding linguistic phenomena in a broad sense and expressiveness as a property of speech. “…when we ask for the meaning of an expression, with ‘expression’ we do not mean the word expressed hic et nunc, but the expression in specie. Using a different terminology, we could also say that it is the word as ‘type’ and not as ‘token’ ”(Giubilato, 2018, 35).This typological character of the word the author brings the concept of noems in phenomenology closer and enters into a polemic in this sense with Tugendhat, who, in a similar context, considers it necessary to distinguish between the ideas of early and late Husserl. Not seeing it possible to agree with Tugendhat’s criticism of the phenomenological interpretation of intentionality as a movement from the fallacies of the “early” Husserl to the fallacies of the “late” Husserl, the author insists on a substantial relationship between the phenomenological approach and the hypotheses of analytical philosophy:

We see that resorting to the notion of noema does not lead to some kind of loss of the ‘universal character’ of meaning. […] Both the phenomenological notion of ‘apprehension-sense’ and the analytical notion of ‘identification-rule’ focus on the same situation: the understanding of an ensemble of determinations which not only enable the anticipation but also the identification of a given object. (Giubilato, 2018, 40)

But the author does not see this intermediate result as final—he considers it possible to go further in interpreting intentionality from the horizon of the language: to show the impossibility to limit oneself only to nominative expressions. This move is defined not only by the definition of a word as a type and by the necessary reference
to other types of expressions, except nominative. The author, according to the logic of movement from linguistic *empireia*, considers it necessary to emphasize:

…What could be the object of a sentence or a predicate, except the object corresponding to their subject? [...] the assimilation of linguistic expressions in general to nominal expressions and consequently the reduction of the expressive function to a function of designation, could be done only if we are willing to accept the existence of a phantasмагoric universe populated by objects such as the ‘no,’ the ‘with,’ the ‘P-factum,’ the ‘being-green,’ etc. as objective correlates of the expressions ‘no,’ ‘with,’ ‘x,’ ‘is green.’ (Giubilato, 2018, 40–41)

In this regard, it seems important to the author to redefine the concept of the synthetic function of consciousness, taking it beyond the boundaries of the usual Kantian constructions. We see, that in language the function of conjunctions consists not only and not so much in obtaining a definition appropriate for the object. Instead, in outlining a possible semantic horizon: synthesis in speech is therefore “…the anticipation of a possible synthesis, in which an object can be identified, or, in other words, in which an object can be given according to the sense referred to” (Giubilato, 2018, 44). Thus, the synthesis realized by “the connective ‘and’ is not a synthesis between objects but a synthesis of determinations, i.e. sentences” (Giubilato, 2018, 54).

Thus, according to the author, it is possible to show that the linguistic dimension refers to the intentional act as a pre-emptive perception of the object or, better saying: it is an act of linguistic understanding (Giubilato, 2018, 55). Such assumptions are possible if some hypotheses regarding the nature of consciousness, and if preference is given to the “operational” understanding of the intentional act. According to the author, the idea of representation should be abandoned in favour of the method of carrying out the operation (identification, definition, etc.). An operation, in turn, is determined by a rule that establishes how it is implemented. That is why, as the author believes, the critical confrontation between Tugendhat and Husserl did not take place. The entire argumentation of the criticism proposed by Tugendhat assumed “…that phenomenology, conceived as theory of mental acts guided by representations, is radically opposed to linguistic analysis, as theory of linguistic acts guided by rules” (Giubilato, 2018, 55). The author rightly believes that this is not so. Therefore, summing up his analysis, the author emphasizes that in phenomenology the fundamental role of language remains underestimated. Simulary it boils down to the following dichotomy: “expression (of ideal contents of meaning)—communication (of mental contents).” It is this underestimation “…of the communicative function of language brings phenomenology towards a transcendental subjectivism, which finally leads to
a complete opposition to a conception of language as practice of a collective form of
life” (Giubilato, 2018, 57).

The first article of the monograph opens a virtual discussion between various
phenomenological approaches. James Mensch from Charles University Prague, Czech
Republic, known for his work on a wide range of phenomenological issues in its histo-
rical and modern dimensions, tells in a very personal manner his story of bridging
the gap between the humanitarian and the natural Sciences. This story begins in the
50s and through a romantic fascination with cosmology and the Big Bang theory leads
to conclusions about the duality of coding the world in terms of bodies and causes
and in terms of goals and means,—conclusions, descent with Chalmers’ apologies for
a break in the description.

Against this background, the distinction between real and ideal relations adopt-
ed by Husserl in Logical Investigations contrasts the randomness of our circumstances
of judgment with the necessary content of the judgment. Nevertheless, according to
the author, it does not answer the broader question. “How does a causally determined
mind come to know ideal relations—especially if, as Husserl asserts, its acts of judging
are ‘causally determined’?” (Giubilato, 2018, 63). Paraphrasing De Boer, the author
points out that “Husserl overcomes the ‘naturalization of the ideas’ [in this work] but
not yet the naturalization of consciousness” (Giubilato, 2018, 64). To overcome this
last Husserl uses a “transcendental” phenomenological reduction, and the world loses
the status of description in terms of causality and receives the “status of existence in
this Ego.” According to the author, such a solution is not free from insoluble contra-
dictions. And the Heideggerian interpretation of Dasein does not take into account,
for well-known reasons, all the dimensions of this relationship: “His discussion of
Dasein's being-in-the-world is more or less silent on the embodiment that makes us
part of the world” (Giubilato, 2018, 70). Quoting Merleau-Ponty, the author returns to
the problem of being in the world, but in a new sense: bodily embodiment can be un-
derstood as folds of our flesh, drapery and line our contact with the world. Thus, we
“equalize” the world in its sound, using our ears, or in its tactile qualities through our
sensitive skin and so on. Thus, our corporeality provides measures, by the words of
Merleau-Ponty, “for being, dimensions to which we can refer it” (Giubilato, 2018, 71).
The challenges and reviews found during the analysis are supplemented by questions
that, as the author believes, remained unrealized possibilities of this rout:

Reading it a half a century after its completion, I asked myself about the implications of
his proposed integration of consciousness with the world: How, for example, does this
integration address the 'hard problem of consciousness'? How does it change our under-
standing of objective knowledge? (Giubilato, 2018, 73)
The author’s answer is the development of a metaphor, also found on the pages of Merleau-Ponty’s works—a metaphor for interweaving (the interweaving of the subjective thread into the world and the objective (linguistic, communicative) line into subjectivity. “Thus, whenever scientists, in their theories about what counts as objectively real, undermine the perceptual basis of science, they engage in a version this contradiction” (Giubilato, 2018, 75).

Annette Hilt (Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Deutschland) addresses the problems of the life world and the meaning of Eugen Fink that is imperceptible. Agreeing with E. Fink that the fundamental question of phenomenology is the question of the source (Ursprung) (Giubilato, 2018, 82), Annette Hilt focuses on this aspect of the problematization of the world—the issue of the ultimate horizon in which the world is given—as ordinary and trivial, or, conversely, as transcendental. According to the author, the essential feature of Fink’s interpretation of the world is highlighted in the concept of “invisibility”—the world does not declare itself, but on the borders of what no longer belongs to it, turns out to be non-worldly.

Andriano Fabris (University of Pisa, Italy) refers to a comparative analysis of the concept of phenomenology by Husserl and Heidegger. In search of the ambiguity declared in the title, the author begins by stating that the philosophical problem, which serves as the basis for Heidegger Husserl’s criticism and encourages him to try to “destroy” (deconstruct) the philosophical approach found by Husserl, consists in their different interpretation of subjectivity. This topic has been repeatedly selected as the subject of analysis of the interpreters of phenomenology. In one of Heidegger Husserl’s most radical assessments, he connects his interpretation of subjectivity with the Cartesian perspective of res cogitans (Giubilato, 2018, 94). Tracing the emergence of Dasein’s idea in Heidegger’s lecture courses, the author of the article shows parallels between the rejection of the concept of subject and the rethinking of the concept of intentionality. Heidegger’s Intentio and intentium do not remain poles of a single relationship, since it is not possible to achieve a description of being in the world by not introducing the conceptual framework of Kantian philosophy—the juxtaposition of “things in themselves” and “phenomena,” or by introducing the concept of experience (Erlebnis). “It is precisely this relationship that has to be considered as fundamental. It involves a preliminary, not a derivative, connection between intentio and intentum” (Giubilato, 2018, 96). As a result, phenomenology—and the various ways in which it conducts its analysis—no longer focuses on judgment as an instrument of philosophical analysis. In the new understanding of philosophical objectivity, the goal of its research becomes a prerequisite for the very idea of reflexivity, developed by phenomenology. In this sense, philosophy “…coincides with the ‘science of Being.’
Phenomenology, in its turn, constitutes the way—or, to say it better, the totality of the possible ways—in which this research on Being is carried out” (Giubilato, 2018, 98). Ontological differentiation, which allows us to distinguish between being and being

…allows us to broaden the notion of ‘phenomenology,’ which can thus be applied both to the beings and to the Being itself. It therefore seems that the phenomenological perspective—from which, following his critique of Husserl, he seemed to distance himself—has been reformulated; it reappears in a new guise, its meaning has been transformed, it has a different function and is placed on another level: that of Being in general. (Giubilato, 2018, 101)

Thus, the author of the message finds the ambiguity of criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in an ambiguous understanding of the correlation and relation. Heidegger transforms phenomenology in such a way that he can uniquely focus on the “how” that characterizes being… Being as such, that is, the main task of philosophical research is also a phenomenon. Therefore, it manifests itself in its “how.” Therefore, everything is, so to speak, a “method.” More precisely, this is all the way: even if our destination is unclear; even if—as in Tao, the form of oriental wisdom that Heidegger began to explore after the Second World War—the path itself can be traced while we move along it. That is why it is no coincidence that Heidegger chose the expression: „Wege, nicht Werke“ as his motto for his “Gesamtausgabe” (Giubilato, 2018, 102).

Toru Tani from Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, refers to the medial nature of phenomenology from the horizon of the known challenge to the human being “know yourself!” This slogan in this case means a challenge to the European practice, which is philosophy, from the side of non-European thinking: whether the universal claims of phenomenology turn out to be a kind of blindness in relation to who we are Europeans or residents of other cultural regions. If we take into account the judgment of the Japanese philosopher Sakabe Megumi (1936–2009), that “traditional Japanese thinking and Cartesian philosophy oppose each other diametrically” (Giubilato, 2018, 106). The challenge that his article answers is the opportunity to prove or refute the possibility of instilling the phenomenological philosophy inheriting Descartes to Japanese mental culture. Without turning to the justification of any of these polar oppositions, the author explores the medial component of phenomenology, focusing on the concept of “expression” in Husserl and the concept of mediality (Giubilato, 2018, 106). Instead, not only aspects of mediality associated with the consciousness of time are investigated in this message. In addition to the connotations known to Europeans between the internal and external manifestations of the Self, the author draws attention to the formatting of these relations by the experience of the language. In Japanese, un-
like European, there are not two ways to contact the person you are talking to (“you” and “you”), but much more. This choice of method of expression is determined by the “relationship” (aidagara) between the speakers. In this sense, the aidagara precedes the “person.” The “person” expressed in Japanese is not so much “personal” as “inter-personal” (Giubilato, 2018, 115). The Japanese philosophical tradition does not accept the European concept of “substance” or the accompanying idea of “fulfilment.” In traditional European thinking, the “space” between two substances is “empty.” Japanese terminological language introduces a number of terms that are difficult to find the exact equivalent in European languages. Such is *awai*, which can be very conditionally translated as “between,” *awai* is not an empty space, but a fundament for “producing” and “pairing”—a place where the respective explicit appearances of something and something other are prepared. (Giubilato, 2018, 116). The given example is not the only one in this post, but the author is not interested in the possibility of multiplying the examples, but in the possibility of drawing general conclusions from them. Among other things, the author emphasizes that the archeology of knowledge evokes different connotations in the Japanese mental space than in the logic of movement from surface phenomena to their implicit basis. Therefore, in conclusion, he refers to Spinoza’s statement “extreme arrogance indicates extreme ignorance of oneself” (Ethica, vol.4, Theorem 55) and rings the stated theme: “Instead of ignorance, know thyself in the Between, where phenomenology will lead thee” (Giubilato, 2018, 117).

Eder Soares Santos from the State University of Londrina, Brazil even more clearly focuses on the human dimension of phenomenology, referring to the science of man, as it is implemented in the Heidegger phenomenological approach. Mentioning the ambiguity of the position of anthropology in Heidegger’s field of thought, the author proposes to consider *Dasein* analytics in the hermeneutics of factuality as a tendency opposing a critical impulse to the human sciences, and at the same time as a kind of therapy that could replace traditional psychoanalysis (Giubilato, 2018, 118).

In the proposed disposition, only the position on the correlation of anthropology and psychoanalysis is not obvious. This last is deduced from the opposition of activity and non-action. “Serenity is the attitude of mind that lets go, that allows itself to flow, as opposed to thinking, which acts (*wirken*). That ‘allowing’ is neither active, nor passive; it takes place by not-doing (*Nicht-handeln*)” (Giubilato, 2018, 122–123). Following Heidegger, the author shows the possibility of reorienting oneself from the horizon of questions that are asked from the perspective of knowledge itself.

…”what is man?”, but much more so to ask ‘how and who is man?’, causing an effect of displacement, deconstruction, and unconcealment of speeches, whose discourses are en-
tangled and hidden by technological language, and thus shocking common language to create a space for the production of new reflections and meanings. (Giubilato, 2018, 125)

The author shows the possibility of avoiding this “technologization,” attachment to purposeful argumentation chains—the possibility of interpretation as therapy.

Robson Ramos dos Reis from the Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil addresses the meanings and limitations of Heidegger’s concept of being to death in *Being and Time*, addressing attention to the need to fundamentally distinguish the death of animals and plants from the meaning that Heidegger puts into the concept of “being to death.” In this way, he examines the modes of existence of Dasein. The author emphasizes the “hermeneutic ontological pluralism of *Being and Time*,” which is realized in such a way that such concepts as “existence,” “determination,” “individuation,” “totality,” “possibility,” “necessity,” and, among other things, a part and the whole, life and death—allow more than one interpretation depending on the class of phenomena to which this concept is related.

One of the outcomes of this analysis is that there is a difference between the dying of living entities (animals and plants) and the dying peculiar to entities that have the way of being of existence. In this context, Heidegger uses the concept of an intermediate phenomenon (Zwischenphänomen) to characterize the physiological death of entities that have the mode of being of existence. (Giubilato, 2018, 135)

Quoting Heidegger, the author emphasizes that a comparison of the biological existence and the existence of Dasein makes it possible to give a clearer definition of the knowledge that sets the boundary for it: “Dasein can be completed without actually dying. [„Dasein aber auch enden kann, ohne daß es eigentlich stirbt.“] As a result of this terminological clarification, it becomes clearer that ‘to die’ means a way of being, not an end” (Giubilato, 2018, 138–139). This distinction reveals a number of consequences. Among other things, “for entities enjoying the mode of being of existence, the foundations of their specific manner of having something lie in the constitution of being-in (In-sein), which means to be structured by understanding (Verstehen), attunement (Befindlichkeit), and speech (Rede)” (Giubilato, 2018, 140). Developing the idea of a productive tension between the two kinds of mortality of creatures, the author sees in this topic a certain increment of hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus, “…the hermeneutic opacity of human existence, which derives from the condition of being thrown into a factual existential situation, would also be determined by the factum of being thrown into a specific setup of intermediate phenomena” (Giubilato, 2018, 143).
César Lambert from the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile), refers to a comparative analysis of the concept of “power” in the concepts of Max Scheler and Edith Stein. In his analysis, the author begins by analyzing Scheler’s *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, reproducing the sequence of stages in the development of life from a life impulse to phenomena of a spiritual nature. Nevertheless, the author is mostly interested in those arguments of the Scheler position that enter into a dispute with Christian-Jewish dogma: it reveals a double dependence of his constructions on the idea of the formation of the world and movement towards the realization of a higher being (an analogue of God, but endowed with a paradoxical characteristic of formation) (Giubilato, 2018, 153). Repeating the Kantian comparison of a human being with angels, Edith Stein points out a special kind of power—the power of the spirit, which presupposes only a movement towards perfect possession of it, but never achievement of this possession. Such a view nevertheless allows for the possibility of accumulation of strength and progressive development. However, from this point of view, the maximum strength is connected with the fact that it grows, being shared with others, which “corresponds to the nature of the divine spirit to emanate and radiate, but without consuming itself [„es entspricht dem Wesen des göttlichen Geistes, von sich auszugehen und auszustrahlen, allerdings ohne sich zu verzehren“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 157).

Spanish researcher Javier San Martín from the National University of Distant Education of Madrid, Spain addresses the interpretation of the causes of tension between anthropology and phenomenology. The author connects the divergence of these theoretical programs with a trend in phenomenology aimed at criticizing “psychologism.” “But psychologism is nothing more than the disciplinary word for a basic theme of our age [„Der Psychologismus ist aber nichts anderes als das disziplinäre Wort für ein Grundthema unseres Zeitalters“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 162). Modern trends in cognitive research do not seek to “more than justify psychology as the main science that explains all human life and its cultural products [„als grundlegende Wissenschaft zu setzen, um die Gesamtheit des menschlichen Lebens und seine kulturellen Produkte zu erklären“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 162), but rather understand it as a science that considers a person and his psyche, as products of evolutionary development. In this sense, the gap between psychology and anthropology is eliminated. It seems that Husserlian objection to considering mathematical truths as the product of a creature accidentally generated by nature should automatically be transferred to anthropology, understood as a science, which is taken to justify the natural and cultural modes of human existence. However, this objection has ceased to be justified since M. Scheler announced a program of substantiation of philosophical anthropology as the first philosophy. The
author of the article believes that from the 20s ethical issues are no longer interpreted by Husserl as the subject of a “second philosophy,” but refers to the first. As a result, “Husserl can reasonably assert that his entire philosophy is a hermeneutics of human life, or a general, absolute spiritual science [„Gerade deshalb kann Husserl sinnvoll behaupten, dass seine ganze Philosophie eine Hermeneutik des menschlichen Lebens sei, oder eine generelle absolute Geisteswissenschaft“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 177). According to the author, anthropological motives, including those drawn from Dilthey's philosophical ideas, are synthesized in it in the concept of the life world.

Cecilia Monteagudo from the Pontifical Catholic University of Lima, Peru addresses the issue of the relevance of the phenomenological concept of the life world in Gadamer hermeneutics. The author questions the conventional wisdom that Gadamer comes to a phenomenological theme, following Heidegger along the path of criticizing the foundations of phenomenology. An analysis of the concept of the life world, as presented in Truth and Method, and a number of other works included in the 10-volume book, show the opposite—phenomenology is an independent line of Gadamer's philosophical evolution and an independent source of hermeneutical ideas.

Among the mentioned parallels, discovered by the author between the phenomenological concept of Husserl's life world and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, the author pays less attention to disputes on the various forms of hermeneutic reflection (hermeneutics of trust, hermeneutics of suspicion, post-hermeneutics, etc.), and he turns with great interest to what constitutes the general conviction of the so-called “continental philosophy.”

The determination of the humanities as practical sciences, which promote solidarity and respect for the plurality of life forms, presupposes their emancipation from the objectivistic claim in which they are still caught. Only after this emancipation can the humanities become a role model and orientation point for human practice according to the goal of a moral foundation for our common future [„Die Bestimmung der Geisteswissenschaften als praktische Wissenschaften, welche die Solidarität und den Respekt gegenüber der Pluralität der Lebensformen fördern, setzt allerdings ihre Emanzipation von dem objektivistischen Anspruch, in dem sie immer noch verfangen sind, voraus. Erst nach dieser Emanzipation können die Geisteswissenschaften zum Vorbild und Orientierungspunkt für die menschliche Praxis gemäß dem Ziel einer moralischen Stiftung unserer gemeinsamen Zukunft werden“]. (Giubilato, 2018, 192)

Alice Serra from the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, draws attention in her article to the influence of the ideas of phenomenology on the theory of deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Quoting Derrida’s confession that “Husserl's phenomenology, by abandoning theoretical and speculative presupposi-
tions, remains an inspiring source for the deconstruction” (Giubilato, 2018, 202). The author traces the main strategies of criticism of phenomenology—clarification of the premises of the “philosophy of presence,” the restrictions that impose on the interpretation of the sign and Husserl’s preferences of the sounding voice over the text (in the criticism of which the well-known concept of “writing” and “trace” is born). This criticism of the “anthropologism” of phenomenology (a tendency that the thoughts of Derrida and some of his associates, phenomenology shares with Hegelianism and Heidegger’s philosophy). A criticism of the “philosophy of presence” is shown by the author as the historically first thematic block on which Derrida works out the main critical arguments—assumes as a hidden motive of the phenomenology’s “an insistence on preserving ideality (Idealität)” (Giubilato, 2018, 195).

Moving from earlier works on Husserl to later works, the author believes that the common denominator of the analysis undertaken by Derrida is the fact that “Deconstruction can be interpreted as a sort of ‘super-phenomenological critique’ (über-phänomenologische Kritik) which absorbs the phenomenological critique of dogmatic metaphysics and turns it against phenomenology itself” (Giubilato, 2018, 202). The author pays special attention to criticism of limitrophy (neologism derived from the word limit)—the boundary of the boundaries, according to Derrida, who, behind the tendency of phenomenology to limit phenomena and the restriction of regions and reflection on boundaries. He reveals the presence of boundaries in the third sense overcoming borders as a passage through and through, entry, exit, return, slip, dislocation, diffraction (through a door or window sill). Bringing to the surface the fact that such “analogues” are not external to phenomenology, but, rather, are implied in its very core, deconstruction unfolds the way phenomenology is self-deconstructed due to a continual necessity of revising its margins of certainty and restating its own boundaries. (Giubilato, 2018, 207)

Luis Niel from National University of Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina (CONICET / Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina) in the article “Intentionality and its Objects. Tim Crane’s philosophical project and phenomenology” refers to one of the concepts that continue and develop Husserl’s phenomenological project, or, more precisely, in the debate of phenomenology and analytical philosophy that has lasted more than a decade, about the limits and boundaries of the substantiation of a phenomenological project. Intentionality in these disputes has always occupied a place of honor, and for the concept being analyzed it turns out to be a tool of a dispute with representatives of the analytical tradition and with the supporters of phenomenology. Tim Crane connects intentionality with the problem of representing non-existent ob-
jects, and introducing a subtle differentiation between the positions of the philosophy of consciousness, criticizing the philosophy of consciousness with phenomenology and criticizing phenomenology with the analytical philosophy. Crane discovers a way of interpreting intentionality, which rehabilitates psychologism in a new sense: “...conclusion about the problem of non-existent objects is that the solution shall not rely on logic or on semantics, but rather on psychologism, namely, on the psychological nature of representation” (Giubilato, 2018, 220). Recognition of psychological reality is the only solution for such an eternal philosophical problem as non-existence.

Gustavo Gómez Pérez from the Javeriana Pontifical University, Bogotá (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia) focuses on the interpretation of the gesture that we can find in M. Merleau-Ponty. In the author’s interpretation it is not the language that turns out to be a paraphenomenon for explaining the expressive capabilities of the body, but, on the contrary, it is the gesture that turns out to be the prototype for interpreting the language. It is proposed to understand the language on a basis of the hypothesis of “gesture syntax” (Giubilato, 2018, 222) without contrasting conceptualization and the lived intention of speech, without cooling off in a fixed contrast between subject and object. Turning to the “gestural syntax” allows Merleau-Ponty to present in a new light the contrast between language and speech proposed by F. de Saussure: paying particular attention to the analogs of gestures in the language—diacritics, the French thinker emphasizes the importance of differentiation, function of these signs is the opposite of the definition. In this context, silence comes to the fore as a communicative element, delaying the completion of a phrase and the final definition of meaning. This delay does not so much function as an obstacle to the understanding of what has been said, but rather as a mechanism that incites the listener to design horizons of meaning, the possibilities of its implementation, “a sort of invitation to action” (Giubilato, 2018, 229).

R. S. Oliveira (State University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil) studies W. Flusser’s phenomenological ideas of—the theme of “outsiders” and marginal trends in evolution of phenomenological philosophy. “Bodenlos” as a metaphor and as a research program opens the analysis proposed in the article. The critical impulse of Flusser’s interpretation of phenomenology marks the very heart of the phenomenological approach—it turns to the inside of the rational interpretation of the world, explores “efforts to combat thought” (Giubilato, 2018, 238). In criticizing phenomenological reduction, Flusser comprehends the necessary steps in further movement along this path—the rejection of the judgments of common sense and mental habits cannot be stopped when the clarification of their foundations is reached. “After questioning an established belief, the belief itself is forever modified” (Giubilato, 2018,
Therefore, the change of point of view on the data of experience should be opposed to the experience of groundlessness, *Bodenlosigkeit*. Flusser draws his criticism to the apparent omnipotence of doubt, chosen by philosophy since the time of Descartes as the main methodological tool. Following Flusser’s Nietzschean logic of revaluing values, the author upholds the positive meaning of *Bodenlosigkeit*.

Dai Takeuchi from Jichi Medical University, Tochigi, Japan, refers to Eugen Fink’s phenomenology, intending to discover a new metaphysics of the world in his ideas of the meontic that disputes the influence on the phenomenology of German idealism and the idea of a unified understanding of life.

Eugen Fink, according to Dai Takeuchi, did not publish his research on the topic of nothingness, so the reconstruction of his position on this issue needs to be addressed to his archive. He is inspired by the ideas of the Neoplatonists on the one hand and his thinking about the source (*Ursprungsdenken*) in the Neo-Kantian tradition (first of all, the ideas of Herman Cohen). On the other hand, such a source can be understood as the world (Giubilato, 2018, 250). Therefore, the phenomenon of the world is not removed by the negation of denial, it appears on the other side of this work of negation. Born in the same decade that Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, the meontic concept of O. Fink, according to the author, combined not only the ideas of the Husserlian study of time in terms of retention and tension, but also some of the mental moves worked out by Heidegger. This concept of time fluctuation introduced by Fink allows us to come back to the problems of the world:

> the world is not a mere continuation of the horizon. The horizon is potentially infinite which can be gradually actualized by the practical ability ‘I can.’ In contrast, the totality of the world is not accessible by the same way. (Giubilato, 2018, 256)

As applied to the world, the concept of the game can and should be used, since “…Fink saw the world as bottomless ‘play’ and, as such argued that the world was not necessary. The world exists in a proto-accidental sense beyond the horizon of the necessity and accidentence” (Giubilato, 2018, 257).

Panos Theodorou from the University of Crete, Greece (University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece) refers to the idea of a “natural state” in the light of the human rights problem of Hannah Arendt. In this message, the emphasis is on the border between natural and cultural creatures. Quoting H. Arend, the author connects human rights with the political state: “…humans can only be considered beings with indisputable dignity and rights when they are political agents, when they speak and act within the public sphere of a politically organized society with positive law” (Giubilato, 2018, 260). In this context, all other meanings of the “naturalness” of a person are beyond
these supposed phenomenon political limits. The author proposes to test H. Arendt’s idea for strength and compare a political person with the pre-political and prehistoric “states” of the human tribe. The key point is the idea of multiplicity, overcoming the abstractness of “social atomism.” The author shows that even if we do not agree with the definition of a person as a cultural being, overcoming his natural predestination and setting supernatural goals. If we believe that a person and human tribes simply exist, and do not realize the divine purpose in achieving eternal peace or reasonable perfection—and in this case, the idea of plurality is important to substantiate this antimetaphysical hypothesis. Just as H. Arendt, the author understands the multiplicity of points of view as a condition for coexistence, however disagreeing with H. Arend in assessing the role of the political space, comes to the same need to reckon “…with a multiplicity of multifarious systems of values. This is, in the end, what defines and determines the reality around us and organizes it into a cosmos” (Giubilato, 2018, 273).

The monograph ends with an article by Hans Rainer Sepp from the Prague Charles University, entitled “Phenomenology as an ecology.” In this article, he refers to mutually opposite approaches. It seems, to derive human features from laws the policy to which all other social institutions (primarily the family) are subordinated and adjusted; or, on the contrary, to interpret the family, household (oikos) as the elementary particle, which the policy is made from. But, if we understand the product of the policy or oikos—the human individuality—as a more complex formation than the function of one or another type of community, as

…self-being in the sense that the individual human existence lives by experiencing, i.e. only lives in such a way that it exists within itself from within. This insistence is so rudimentary that it does not come about as a result of behavior […Selbstsein in dem Sinn, dass die einzelne menschliche Existenz lebt, indem sie erlebt, d. h. nur so lebt, dass sie aus einem Innestehen in sich selbst heraus existiert. Dieses Innestehen ist so rudimentär, dass es nicht erst als Resultat eines Verhaltens zustande kommt”]. (Giubilato, 2018, 278)

In the same way as belonging to the oikos and the status of a stranger in a polis (metoikos) can be considered as two opposite poles in determining the individual’s strategy in relation to society, in the same way we find in the individual a peculiar eccentricity. As rooted in the polis or the stranger, the individual discovers in his existence “a center that is, however, in tension with its edges […eine Mitte, die jedoch in der Spannung zu ihren Rändern steht…“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 279) which makes a person’s life an eternal journey in a futile attempt to find oneself. As persuasive as this parallel between the external and internal modes of existence may be, the human individuality is distinguished by topos—the place of being. In this sense, oikos has a preference
over all other forms of social existence: “a house is a medium of rudimentary reflection, through which human existence reflects its place [„Das Haus ist damit Medium einer rudimentären Reflexion, durch die menschliche Existenz ihren Ort spiegelt“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 281). In various forms of housekeeping, the form of the transition from individuality in its independence to individuality in its social communication is honed or eliminated: “the name for this interaction is a habit: it indicates equally the social schematism of the ‘habitual’ and the bodily actions of the individual existences expressing a tendency toward self-organization… [„Ein Name für diese Interaktion ist das Wort Gewohnheit: Es verweist ebenso auf soziale Schemata des ‘Gewohnten’ als auch auf leibliche Verhaltungen der einzelnen Existenz, welche die Tendenz zum Ausdruck bringen, sich einzurichten…“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 283). This kind of habit is the feeling of being in a familiar place—for example, understanding oneself in terms of “above”—“below”—and transferring these high-quality forms of self-orientation on social hierarchies. Eccentricity can be also understood as more radically—as egocentrism in its more radical and less wild modifications. Demonstrating the wide thematic range of the idea of oikology, at the end of the article the author focuses on philosophical oikology, which he understands as the radicalization of the oikological approach that controls behavior—an explanation of the conditions and structures of reflective modes of behavior (especially high-level ones—religion, art, philosophy, science) (Giubilato, 2018, 289).

REFERENCES