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INTRODUCTION:
TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The relationship between the heritage of Kantian transcendental philosophy and phenomenology (Husserlian or post-Husserlian) is undoubtedly manifold. Not only Husserl was not originally moved by a transcendental interrogation in the elaboration of his idea of phenomenology, but his attitude towards Kant's critical philosophy and towards a certain brand of Kantianism has always been polemical. The contributions of this special issue aim to evaluate and to confront Kant’s and Husserl's comprehension of the transcendental in the light of several key questions: the articulation between categoriality and intuition; the architectonic place of imagination among the faculties; the challenge of naturalism; the foundation of the sciences of nature or that of mathematics; the transcendental ground of epistemology in general. The post-Husserlian posterity of the transcendental claims and interrogations within phenomenology is also taken into account by considering their critical developments and transformations in Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Eugen Fink.

Setting a general framework for these various analyses, Rosemary R. P. Lerner’s paper “The Sense of the Transcendental in Kant and in Husserl” revisits the Kantian reform of the transcendental, which removes the term from its initial ontological horizon and inscribes it within an epistemological field pertaining to human knowledge. The author also examines Husserl’s retrieval of the “transcendental”, which broadens its reach far beyond the merely “speculative” or “theoretical” and allows it to encompass the whole field of human lived experiences (theoretical, practical, evaluative) and activities (cultural, scientific or simply rooted in everyday life).

Vedran Grahovac’s contribution “The Tenacity of 'Vicious Circularity' in Kant and Husserl: On Transcendental Deduction and Categorial Intuition” detects and examines a “strategy of circularity” employed by Kant and Husserl in their treatment of categoriality, while focusing on the particular relation between transcendental and metaphysical deductions in Kant’s Critique and on the problem of “epistemic foundationalism” raised by the Fundierung of categorial intuition in sensuous intuition in Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation. Instead of regarding this circularity as a deficient
and damaging occurrence in argumentation, the author highlights its fruitfulness for re-articulating the logic-ontology and founding-founded polarities.

For Azul Katz, the confrontation field between Kant and Husserl is the place that imagination and phantasy hold in their transcendental philosophies. Her paper “The Defiance of the Transcendental by Phantasy and Imagination in Husserl and Kant” recalls the key function of Kantian imagination within reason, both theoretical and practical, while exhibiting its true potential in the aesthetic domain, as productive imagination. It also emphasizes the fact that the crucial methodological function of phantasy for Husserl, in the intuition of essences or in empathy, should not lead to underestimate the specific, more autonomous, regimen of pure phantasy.

With Jean-Daniel Thumser’s paper « Le transcendantal et le naturalisme: Une relecture de Kant et Husserl » the inquiry shifts to epistemological issues, while dealing with the problem of a naturalization of the transcendental. In this perspective, the pathos of a priori knowledge is counterbalanced by the firm orientation towards the empirical, which demands to take into consideration the mundane and embodied condition of subjectivity. If one can undoubtedly find the seeds of a “phenomenological naturalism” in Husserl, the author goes even further and identifies a prefiguration and resource for naturalizing phenomenology in Kant himself.

The horizon of naturalism is also visible in Francesco Pisano’s contribution “The Material Residue. Kant and Husserl on an Aspect of the Transcendental Foundation of the Science of Nature”, which deals with the problems raised by the “facticity of nature” in respect to the particular status of transcendental subjectivity, regarded as temporal. If facticity and ideality come together within the transcendental life of subjectivity and allow resolving the discrepancy between form and matter, the transcendental foundation of the science of nature (as a particular variant of the a priori foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts) encompasses itself a factual, non-formalizable element.

The epistemological ambition of transcendental philosophy is once again at stake in Philipp Berghofer’s paper “New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology: Why Epistemology Must be a Descriptive and Eidetic Study of Consciousness”, which aims to show how current debates in analytic epistemology can unexpectedly help to motivate transcendental phenomenology and even plead for a transcendental grounding of epistemology in general. If, undoubtedly, Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology is intended to reveal and elucidate the ultimate epistemological principles (rather than to provide infallible justification), and mobilizes for this purpose an eidetic, a priori, description structures of consciousness, one has a solid ground to claim that the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic
fashion, for epistemological reasons, can be considered to be a way to transcendental phenomenology.

In “Rethinking Spatiotemporal Extension: Husserl’s Contribution to the Debate on the Continuum Hypothesis”, Claudio Tarditi aims to demonstrate the relevance of Husserl’s phenomenology for the debate around Cantor’s continuum hypothesis, and shows to what extent the mathematicians that consider the continuum conjecture as relevant for a scientific description of reality and for its philosophical foundation have been inspired by Husserl: it is the case of Weyl and Gödel himself, though both progressively abandoned phenomenology. Yet, the author intends to prove that Husserl’s account of the continuum, developed in different ways by Weyl and Gödel, remains “the unique radical attempt to found mathematical formalization on intuition”. Accordingly, transcendental phenomenology can still play a relevant role in current debates about the foundation of mathematics.

The promise of transcendental philosophy finds, as we can see, a valuable field for proving its fertility in epistemology and in respect to the task of the foundation of science. But is its philosophical posterity as favourable to its development and longevity? The case of Merleau-Ponty is a particularly revealing one, and two contributions take up its exploration. Firstly, Sebastjan Vörös and Timotej Prosen, in “Bearing One’s Shadow: The Architecture of the Transcendental from Kant, through Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty”, reactivate the question of a naturalization of phenomenology, while showing that this question is sensibly altered between Kant’s “transcendentalism of faculties”, Husserl’s “transcendentalism of pure consciousness” and Merleau-Ponty’s “transcendentalism of the flesh”. By taking into account these variations, it becomes possible to provide a notion of the transcendental that does not evacuate or exclude the “truth of naturalism”. Secondly, Don Beith’s paper “Nature as Expressive Synthesis: The Sensible Awakening of the Transcendental between Kant, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty” finds its starting point in the tension between activity and passivity within the nature of consciousness, in order to present the passivity of consciousness as a form of synthesis that originates in our expressive bodily nature. The author grounds this claim by confronting the way Kant, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty specifically articulate a synthesis within sensibility and bodily affectivity.

An equally important challenge for transcendental phenomenology, in the immediate continuity of Husserl’s work, has come from his assistant and collaborator Eugen Fink. In “Beyond the Genesis, Toward the Absolute. Eugen Fink’s Architectonic Foundation of a Constructive Phenomenology between a Meta-Critic of Transcendental Experience and his own Project of a Dialectical Meontic”, Giovanni Jan Giubilato examines the way Fink attempted to overcome what appeared to him as the incompleteness of
Husserl’s development of transcendental philosophy, through a solid “critic of the transcendental reason”. But what prepared itself as a complement resulted ultimately in a shift towards a new kind of phenomenology, endowed with a “constructive” method. Furthermore, Fink’s constructive phenomenology set in motion the development of his own *meontic* philosophy, elaborated in his private notes, in which the question of the “enworlding (Verweltlichung)” reveals not only the “ontological opacity of transcendental life”, but also the insuperable difficulty of the task of a world-constitution.

Our choice of book reviews for this issue was also made in strict connection and accordance with this realm of problems related to transcendental philosophy. Firstly, Eric Beauron’s review of the new French translation (due to Arnaud Pelle-tier) of Kant’s *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (Vrin, 2017) allows focusing on the material donation of the objects of experience and interrogating the possibility to relate the empirical properties of the object to the universal principles grounded in the categories. The project of a metaphysics of nature, dealing with mundane, material bodies, can thus appear as the necessary and crucial continuation of the transcendental enterprise deployed in the *Critique*. Secondly, by giving an outline of Béatrice Longuenesse’s book *I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again* (Oxford University Press, 2017), Claudia Serban revisits the Kantian account of the ego and the problem of naturalizing transcendental philosophy. Thirdly, Paul Slama’s review of Chad Englland’s book: *Heidegger’s Shadow. Kant, Husserl, and the Transcendental turn* (Routledge, 2017) looks into the interpretation of Heidegger as a transcendental philosopher and insists on the importance of understanding the role of intuition and that of affectivity when the relationship between phenomenology and Kant is at stake. Last but not least, Iulian Apostolescu’s presentation of the collective volume edited by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo and Timo Miettinen *Phenomenology and the Transcendental* (Routledge, 2014) gives an account of the way recent research has dealt with the question of knowing if, and in what fashion, the project of a transcendental phenomenology can still be defended and promoted as philosophically fertile today. Bringing new light into this challenging interrogation has also been one of the aims of the present issue.

We would like to express our gratitude to all contributing authors for their efforts to produce novel interpretative essays on the theme that has been proposed to them. Special thanks are also due to the editorial team of *Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology* for supporting and encouraging this project from its inception through all the phases of its realization.

*Claudia SERBAN, Iulian APOSTOLESCU*
THE SENSE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IN KANT AND IN HUSSERL

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Unlike Kant's practical philosophy and aesthetics that still enjoy a wide popularity, two Kantian topics that belong to his transcendental philosophy have become favourite targets of manifold attacks as out-dated and archaic, especially during the 20th century: the concept of the “transcendental” and the role of the “I think”. Yet, a century and a half later Husserl salvaged both of these concepts in their essential core, and — against the tide of his time — dealt with them anew, for he considered them revolutionary and unprecedented in history. Husserl's phenomenological method profoundly differed from Kant's constructive methodology — albeit his transcendental turn was also inspired by it — enabling him to overcome many of the controversial aspects of Kant's interpretation. Thanks to Husserl's retrieval, both concepts survived the implacable judgment of history and are currently being seriously reconsidered, in ever increasing measure, as relevant for philosophy. Although both topics are intertwined and should be dealt with jointly, this article is only concerned with some aspects that are central to the “meaning of the transcendental”. First, as it has been introduced by Kant, and second, as it has been retrieved by Husserl in its essential core, broadening its reach far beyond the merely “speculative” or "theoretical" level to which Kant confines it, in order to encompass the whole field of lived human experiences (theoretical, practical, or evaluative), as well as in cultural and scientific endeavours.

Key words: Transcendental, Husserl, Kant, a priori, conditions of possibility, cognition, experience.
СМЫСЛ ПОНЯТИЯ «ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОЕ»
У КАНТА И ГУССЕРЛЯ

РОЗМАРИ Р. П. ЛЕРНЕР

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В противоположность кантовским практической философии и эстетике, до сих пор пользу- 
ящимся широкой популярностью, две принадлежащие трансцендентальной философии Кан- 
та темы стали, в особенности в XX в., излюбленными мишениями для нападок как устаревшие 
и архаичные: понятие «трансцендентальное» и роль «я мыслю». Спустя полтора столетия, 
вопреки общему движению своего времени, Гуссерль вновь восстановил эти революционные 
и не имеющие прецедента понятия в их существенных правах. Несмотря на то, что трансцен- 
дентальный поворот Гуссерля был вдохновлен Кантом, феноменологический метод Гуссерля 
отличался от конструктивной методологии Канта, что позволило ему преодолеть многие спор- 
ные аспекты кантовской интерпретации. Благодаря усилиям Гуссерля, оба понятия выдержали 
суровый суд истории и в настоящее время играют важную роль в философии. Хотя обе темы 
тесно связаны друг с другом и должны рассматриваться исключительно в их единстве, в пред- 
ставленной статье в центре внимания оказываются центральные для «значения трансценден-
тального» аспекты. Во-прервых, речь идет об аспекте, представленном у Канта; во-вторых, об 
аспекте, восстановленном Гуссерлем в его сущностном смысле, что позволило расширить сфе-
ру влияния указанного понятия за пределы «спекулятивного» и «теоретического» уровня, ко-
торым его ограничил Кант, с целью охватить совокупную область жизненного опыта (теорети-
ческого, практического и оценочного) как в повседневной жизни, так и культурных и научных 
устремлениях.

Ключевые слова: Трансцендентальное, Гуссерль, Кант, a priori, условия возможности, познание, 
опыт.

1. CERTAIN UNPOPULAR AND BADGERED KANTIAN CONCEPTS

Those Kantian topics that currently enjoy a wide popularity chiefly concern 
morals, aesthetics, and perhaps even theology. Less popular are those issues related 
to science, scientific knowledge, and transcendental philosophy (or metaphysics “in a 
ew sense”), issues that he deals with in his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1974).

Assuredly, this is wholly justified, for despite the fact that Kant amends and pol-
ishes his Critique of Pure Reason in 1787, he is convinced ever since its first 1781 edi-
tion of having “definitely resolved” the epistemological or speculative problems related 
to science and knowledge. Thus from that moment on he immerses himself in the 
examination of problems that had always been for him much more relevant — those
regarding the “highest ends” and “ultimate interests” of reason, i.e., “the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God” (Kant, 1974, A 798/B 826).

Indeed, towards the end of his Critique of Pure Reason, in a section entitled “The Canon of Pure Reason”, Kant points out that reason’s interest is not merely “speculative” (Kant, 1974, A 797/B 825), but also has a “practical” interest. This can be expressed in “the following three questions: 1) What can I know?, 2) What should I do?, 3) What may I hope?”, whereby the first question is merely speculative, the second is practical (Kant, 1974, A 804–805/B 832–833) — for it concerns “what is to be done if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a future world” (Kant, 1974, A 899/B 828) — and the third is “simultaneously practical and theoretical,” for ultimately “all hope concerns happiness” (Kant, 1974, A 805/B 833). Consequently, during the last twenty years of his life Kant puts most of his philosophical efforts into dealing with the latter two questions concerning practical or moral problems and “eschatological” problems, namely, those related to the ultimate end of human existence. During the past hundred years, these final efforts of Kant’s philosophical thinking have awakened more interest among academics, and square better with what can be qualified as “the current validity” of Kant’s thought.

But let us see what Kant says about what “speculative reason” offers with regard to those highest interests. He acknowledges that what “speculative reason,” in its transcendental use, is able to offer those interests “is very little” (Kant, 1974, A 798/B 826), for both human understanding and existence are essentially finite. He does admit that human beings have a “natural propensity” or yearning to know much more than they can actually cognize; such a propensity is indeed anchored in our nature, but it is a propensity that we cannot fully satisfy by means of our speculative or theoretical knowledge. Yet for Kant, the speculative interest does play a relevant role in spite of these limitations. This is precisely what he attempts to develop, in the most complete and systematic way possible, in his first (1781 and 1787) Critique. The task is then to establish which human faculties intervene in knowledge, how they work correctly (what are the “conditions of possibility” of their use), what are their incorrect uses, and finally, what the “limits” of knowledge are.

Kant is clear that our speculative knowledge is incapable of satisfying, resolving, or giving an answer to reason’s highest questions and ultimate ends. In his view, nothing in experience — to which the speculative or theoretical use of reason is tied — can give us a definite answer regarding these questions.

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1 “If, then, these three cardinal propositions are not at all necessary for our knowing, and yet are insistently recommended to us by our reason, their importance must really concern only the practical” (Kant, 1974, A 799–800/B 827–828).
The reason for this limitation, finitude, or perfection of our “theoretical or speculative reason” is that scientific knowledge or experience is inexorably tied to the condition of time. The introduction of “time” at the center of his reflections on science was, in my view, one of Kant’s greatest contributions to 18th century philosophy, and the introduction of this concept has been of immense and far-reaching relevance in the history of philosophy and culture. Indeed, in spite of the fact that Kant considers “scientific knowledge” — concretely, Isaac Newton’s work in the field of physics — to be the most important intellectual conquest and the most solid scientific product of his time, making use of and grounded upon apodictic, universal, and necessary knowledge, he does not share the conviction of his modern rationalist predecessors whereby science is built from the viewpoint of God, upon a fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum and sub specie aeternitatis. Instead, Kant considers that science is built sub specie temporis, i.e., from the entirely finite viewpoint of human beings moored in time. And since time is a universal and necessary condition bound to our sensibility, science is inexorably tied to, and submits to, what sensible experience may offer. If science attempts to develop itself without any regard to this temporal condition, essential to our sensibility, its discourse remains empty and becomes entangled in dialectical arguments.

The only thing that “speculative reason” is able to offer in this context, according to Kant, is a “regulative use” in psychology, cosmology, and theology, i.e., by bestowing unity on the scientific judgments of those sciences and directing their course towards and around the guiding ideas of soul, world, and God as infinite goals. Indeed, the regulative use of theoretical reason allows the deployment of cognitions drawn from “empirical psychology” (Kant, 1974, A 848/B 876) “as if” beyond the “phenomena of the inner sense” (or psychic phenomena) — phenomena that we apprehend by means of our inner temporal experience — there were something like a soul to which these phenomena adhere or belong, and, furthermore, a soul that is immortal (Kant, 1974, A 683–684/B 711–712). Moreover, such regulative use of theoretical reason also enables the development of physical knowledge “as if” the ensemble of scientific judgments referring to spatiotemporal nature (or to the “phenomena of the outer sense”) were wholly ordered according to “condition-conditioned” relationships, in conformity with the “idea,” principle, or rule of an “unconditioned whole” termed “world,” and, within those “condition-conditioned” relations, “as if” those natural phenomena were wholly governed by the “law of causality” (Kant, 1974, A 684–685/B 712–713). Kant remarks in passing that this regulative idea of “world” under the deterministic law of natural causality does not contradict the possibility that we may simultaneously acknowledge human freedom as a type of “cause” that — at the same time that it acts
in coordination with natural causes and their natural effects — is “not caused” itself, namely, that there may be freedom, which is an “unconditioned” or uncaused cause (not itself determined by other empirical causes). Finally, the regulative use of theoretical reason enables the unfurling of both empirical psychology and physics “as if” every phenomena of the universe in general (psychic and/or physical) were harmoniously governed by a higher, divine, creative, and providential intellect (Kant, 1974, A 685–688 /B 714–716).

Briefly, according to Kant, the “regulative use” of speculative reason should not be interpreted as a “constitutive use”, as if our speculative reason could indeed give us factual information about these “ideas” or “unconditioned wholes” — about the immortality of the soul; about the unity of the world according to its condition-conditioned relations; and about God as “the highest intelligence, [...] the cause of everything according to the wisest aim” (Kant, 1974, A 688/B 716). In sum, for Kant the “ideas of reason” are not objects of knowledge; instead, all three of them — soul, world, and God — are merely “ideas of reason” in accordance with ends.

Thus beyond historical or empirical knowledge and beyond the rational knowledge of mathematics, “philosophy” for Kant — or metaphysics in a “wide” or “future” sense — strives to develop itself as a “system of pure reason”. This system includes a practical part — termed “metaphysics of morals”, focused on the realm of the “ought” (what should be) — and a speculative part (a “metaphysics of nature”), whose central locus is occupied by “transcendental philosophy”². Consequently, transcendental philosophy as part of the “metaphysics of nature” is focused on the study of the a priori (universal and necessary) rational conditions that render possible the scientific knowledge of the objects of nature (psychology and physics), knowledge that is nevertheless organized and oriented according to “hyperphysical ideas” or “ideas of reason” that transcend experience (Kant, 1974, A 845–847/B 873–875). It has been my purpose on other occasions to suggest the current relevance of two Kantian topics that belong to his “transcendental philosophy”, notwithstanding their having scarcely been recognized in general by contemporary philosophers and having instead been favourite targets of manifold attacks and explicit distancing — especially during the 20th century (Lerner, 2012, 2015). Here I am referring to the concept of the “transcendental” and to the role of the “I think”, or in Kant’s terms, of “transcendental apperception”. Manifestly, both topics are intertwined and should be dealt with jointly, precisely because they do not seem to enjoy any relevance in current philosophical reflections and are frequently singled out as out-dated and archaic. All sorts of critical

interpretations and arguments have been woven and devised against “transcendental philosophies” — allegedly idealistic and solipsistic — and against “philosophies of the subject”, many based on misunderstandings that have their origin in modern times, especially regarding the philosophies of Descartes and Kant.

Notwithstanding my belief, on this occasion I will focus on the sense of the “transcendental”. The essential role of the centralized “I” — from the passive, unconscious, instinctive level all the way up to the active, conscious, and responsible stratum of the “life of the subject” (beyond merely the “life of the mind”) — has been the topic of very strong arguments devised by Husserl after his transcendental turn. These arguments are currently being further developed (Zahavi, 2005; Zahavi, 2014; Siderits, Thompson, Zahavi, 2011; Gallagher, Zahavi, 2012).

Now despite Edmund Husserl's admission, a century and a half later, that in Kant's original reflections on the transcendental sphere and the “I think” there remain several problems that have also been addressed by other contemporary philosophers, he did consider that both were revolutionary concepts unprecedented in history and of tremendous scope, so that it was worthwhile to keep probing into their meaning and contents. As a consequence, he did salvage those concepts and dealt with them by means of the “phenomenological method”, modifying Kant's methodology albeit inspired by it. The phenomenological method enabled him to reveal and describe those concepts in their full potential, swimming upstream against innumerable critiques that, curiously, emanated from many of his own disciples or followers, who reproached him for making use of outmoded concepts that it would have been better to consign to oblivion. Thus, thanks to Husserl's retrieval of both Kantian concepts, they survived the implacable judgment of history and today are being seriously considered, in ever increasing measure, as relevant for our times.

My contribution thus only concerns some aspects that are central to the “meaning of the transcendental”: first, as it has been introduced by Kant, and second, as it has been retrieved by Husserl in its essential core. Indeed, Husserl broadens its reach far beyond the merely “speculative” or “theoretical” level to which Kant confines it, in order to encompass the whole field of human lived experiences (theoretical, practical, or evaluative) in daily life, as well as in cultural and scientific endeavours. I will neither dwell further on the synthetic and constitutive role of the “I think” in the construction of scientific knowledge within Kant's transcendental project, nor on its role in the constitution of the sense and validity of every being, value, or norm in general according to Husserl's phenomenology. If these analyses were undertaken, we would also have to focus on the “paradox of subjectivity” that Kant first detects and highlights and that Husserl also revives and explicitly deals with. According to this
paradox, subjectivity may be considered *in the world* as an *empirical* entity alongside other worldly entities, but it can also be considered as a *transcendental* “functioning,” “achieving” subjectivity that is directed at the world and is *responsible* for endowing it with unity, meaning, and validity (Husserl, 1954, 185 ff.; Carr, 1999). As should be clear by now, the fulfilment of the theoretical-practical interests of reason demands that one connect both topics, for the “I think” — as “transcendental” — is the sole subjectivity *responsible* for our theoretical, practical, and evaluative “position-takings” in general.

2. THE SENSE OF THE “TRANSCENDENTAL” IN KANT

Let us start with Kant and examine the global sense that this concept has in his philosophy, as well as some of its limitations.

“Transcendental” has not always had the sense that Kant finally gives it. Formerly, medieval philosophers talked about “transcendental categories” expressed by “divine names” (transcendentalia). This type of “categories” is more original and universal than the categories of “substance” and “accidents” that Aristotle introduces in the first book of his *Organon — The Categories* — to refer to how real natural entities exist and are cognized. For Aristotle, first philosophy must study the principles and causes of “being”, and “being” exists in nature primarily under the form of individual (or primary) substances, bearers of accidents such as quality, quantity, the relative, place, time, position, state, action, or passion (Aristotle, 1973, 1b25–2a10). Medieval philosophers and theologians thus give the name “transcendental” to other higher categories — coextensive and mutually interchangeable — such as *being or thing, unity, something, truth,* and *goodness* (*ens or res, unum, aliquid, verum,* and *bonum,* which are sometimes summarized as the One, the Good, and the True. The transcendentalia — inspired by Plato’s characterization of the Idea of the Good that crowns the τόπος οὐρανός (*beauty, goodness,* and *truth* — καλόν, ἄγαθόν, and ἀληθές) — may be predicated not only of all created entities, but analogically and eminently (as Thomas Aquinas states) of God as “divine attributes” (Aquinas, 1968; Aquinas, 1970–1976, Q. 1 A. 1). Since medieval times, then, these supreme categories that refer to divine attributes are called *transcendentalia* or “transcendentals”. This meaning was still in use in Kant’s lifetime, transmitted by the rationalist school of Wolff and Baumgarten in which Kant was schooled. Kant himself keeps using the term “transcendental” related to “transcendent” — as opposed to the natural “immanent” realm and its finite experience — up to and including various parts of his 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason*.
(possibly the oldest parts), which he began writing around 1772 (Smith, 1984, 73 ff.)³. Thus the first sense of the term “transcendental” that Kant inherits through Martin Knutzen’s school from its ancient, metaphysical use is that which lies “beyond” all possible human experience, namely, that which traditionally pertained instead to an archetypical or divine being.

But Kant also slowly develops a broadened meaning of the term to include properly human activity, although once again it is a matter of a human realm that is situated “beyond” what the sciences (such as physics and mathematics) are able to get hold of, i.e., beyond “possible experience”. This human domain, where the term transcendental does indeed have a use, is precisely the realm of “philosophy”; hence Kant indicates that its statements are “a priori transcendental synthetic propositions” (Kant, 1974, A 722/B 750). But those philosophical “transcendental” propositions are merely “discursive” — namely, in contrast to the statements or judgments of physics and mathematics, they neither inform us about objects nor determine anything regarding them. They are simply statements regarding concepts that concern how the “I think” works with and synthesizes objects. In the 1787 version of his Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant accordingly uses the term “transcendental” to refer to a special type of “knowledge” that deals not “so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori” (Kant, 1974, B 25)⁴. This special type of knowledge is thus that of “transcendental philosophy”. Hence insofar as philosophy is transcendental, it is not a type of knowledge called “experience” — i.e., it is not characterized as being directed to and focused upon objects, but rather as being “reflexively” and “critically” directed towards “our manner of cognizing them” a priori. The latter issue deserves a separate explanation.

Indeed, only transcendental philosophy is able to detect — and later explicate — the conditions of our “manner of cognizing objects”. What it discovers, thanks to its reflexive attitude, is precisely that sciences such as mathematics or physics are only possible thanks to the fact that we possess in our human subjectivity certain a priori (i.e., universal and necessary) structures or formal elements, without which there

³ For example, Kant refers to the “objective use” of the “pure concepts” of reason as being “always transcendent, while that of the pure concepts of understanding must by its nature always be immanent, since it is limited solely to possible experiences”. He then adds: “Thus the pure concepts of reason we have just examined are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason […]. Finally, they are transcendent concepts, and exceed the bounds of all experience, in which no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever occur” (Kant, 1974, A 327/B 383–384 ff.).

⁴ In the 1781 Introduction, the phrasing is not so clear: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy” (Kant, 1974, A 11–12).
would be no scientific *ergo* “objective” knowledge, as in Newton’s science. Transcendental philosophy unveils these *a priori* structures or forms both in human sensibility and in human understanding, faculties that are synthetically articulated by scientific judgments or statements that express this very articulation in various forms. Transcendental philosophy’s task is thus to study these *a priori* structures — to detect them first, and then to indicate how they work. In this sense, the investigation of such structures is not “scientific” — namely, it is not “objective” — but is something more elevated: it is a “discourse about science”. Later, the 19th century’s neo-Kantian tradition characterized this discipline as *theory of knowledge* (*Erkenntnistheorie*), and also as *epistemology* or *theory of science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*).

Now let us see what transcendental philosophy tells us regarding these *a priori* forms according to Kant. Thanks to *sensibility*, we directly encounter empirical and individual objects, so that they are “given” to us or they “affect” us; in this sense, sensibility is *passive, receptive*. Thanks to *understanding*, on the other hand, we think about those objects in general, not individually: we judge about them, for the *function* of understanding is to build *judgments*; in this sense, understanding is *active* or spontaneous. Kant calls the *passive* faculty whereby objects are “given”, are perceived in the sense that they “affect” us, *sensible intuition*. And the objects that are given to us, or that we perceive by means of sensible intuitions, are *phenomena*. In contrast, when understanding judges (and, according to Kant, we only have twelve basic ways to do so), it spontaneously produces certain pure concepts (categories) that function as predicates of those judgments, concepts in which only the twelve synthetic functions of judgments are expressed. These categories are thus purely formal — empty — structures by themselves; they only serve to cognize in a universal manner the sensible and multiple phenomena that we grasp through sensibility. Thus Kant’s well-known assertion that sensibility without understanding is blind, and understanding without sensibility, empty. Both require each other in order that there be knowledge (Kant, 1974, A 50–52/B 74–76).

For Kant, sensibility has *two structures* or *a priori* forms that are the permanent, universal, and necessary modes whereby phenomena appear to us or affect us. Assuredly, phenomena of our “outer sense” or bodily phenomena are perceived by means of changing, random, contingent sensations that originate in our five senses, by reason of which they are called *a posteriori*. But the latter phenomena are always “given” to us, or “affect” us, in a *spatial* mode (one-beside-the-other) and in a temporal mode (one-after-the-other, in successive perceptions). This permanent (necessary and universal) character pertaining to *space* and *time* when we are grasping outer, corporeal objects is what Kant calls *a priori*. In contrast, we always perceive the phenomena of
our “inner sense”, i.e., the psychic or mental events or processes, in a temporal mode (one-after-the-other), in such a way that the a priori condition of their being grasped is time. Briefly, the a priori structures or forms of sensibility are space and time, the wider concept being the latter, for time is the condition of possibility of the perception of “all phenomena in general”.

According to Kant, then, space and time are not transcendent properties that belong to “things-in-themselves”, but permanent a priori structures that belong to human sensibility. And if we are intent on knowing something scientifically, this “something” must first be “given” in a spatiotemporal manner.

The formal a priori structures of understanding, structures spontaneously produced by understanding itself when judging, are pure concepts or categories such as unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, limitation, substance (and accidents), causality, community (or reciprocal action), possibility, existence, and necessity. The aforementioned twelve categories stem from twelve basic types of judgments (synthetic “functions”: universal, particular, singular, affirmative, negative, infinite, categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, problematic, assertoric, and apodictic. Categories are nothing but mere logical predicates that express the unifying function of judgments (Kant, 1974, A 68–69/B 83); i.e., they are empty by themselves, unless they are used as predicates of phenomena provided by sensible intuition. The a priori articulation of phenomena of sensible intuition on the one hand and categories on the other takes place precisely when judging, and such articulation is expressed in the type of judgment that Kant characterizes as “a priori synthetic judgment”, the type of judgment that sciences such as mathematics and physics employ. It is a “synthetic judgment” because its predicates (categories) synthesize the diverse elements that stem from sensibility (the sensible phenomena), unifying them and subsuming their diversity under the twelve universal forms. And this synthesis is precisely the activity of understanding under the supreme unifying function of the “I think”. In contrast to the a priori synthetic judgments of mathematics, Kant uses the term “judgment of experience” to name scientific judgments (namely, synthetic a priori judgments) corresponding to physics. In general, synthetic a priori judgments also differ from “analytic a priori judgments”, for in the case of the latter the ground upon which the relation of their predicates and their subjects is based is purely intellectual (and lies in understanding itself); their predicates are obtained from the concepts stemming from the concept of the subject. Thus these latter judgments are purely logical, abstract, tautological, and formal, built without having either to exit understanding or ever having to appeal to sensibility. Synthetic a priori judgments also differ from “a posteriori synthetic judgments” in that the latter lack necessity and universality due to the fact that their
predicates stem, like their subjects, from the “matter” of sensibility, i.e., from the multiplicity of sensations.

We said that the sole interest of transcendental philosophy is to detect, justify the use of, and describe the function of the a priori forms or structures of sensibility and understanding, which are the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge. Due to the fact that critical philosophy’s “type of knowledge” is precisely “transcendental”, the title of the whole first part of the Critique of Pure Reason (which is the propaedeutic discipline of transcendental philosophy) is “Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements” (Kant, 1974, A 12/B 25). Those elements are the a priori forms of sensibility, studied by “transcendental aesthetics”, and the pure a priori concepts of understanding and reason, studied by the “transcendental analytic” as well as by the first chapter on the “transcendental dialectic”, both sections as parts of “Transcendental Logic” (Kant, 1974, A 15/B 29).

But Kant does not limit himself to the aforementioned meaning of the “transcendental”. He also terms the a priori forms themselves “transcendental conditions of possibility” (Smith, 1984, 75 ff.) of scientific knowledge, forms both of sensibility and understanding. Finally, it is not only the a priori forms that are considered “transcendental”, but also the spontaneous activities of understanding, namely, the functions synthesizing the phenomenal multiplicity that stems from sensibility at diverse levels: a first synthesis at the level of apprehension or grasping in sensible intuition; a second synthesis at the level of the imagination’s reproduction; and a third synthesis at the level of recognition under the unity of the concept, whereby all of those levels of syntheses are ultimately ruled by the “I think” or the “transcendental apperception” (Kant, 1974, A 106/B 139).

Briefly put, then, there are up to four meanings of the term “transcendental” that remain side by side in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: first, “transcendental” in the sense of what is “transcendent”, i.e., that which lies beyond possible experience — this is the case, among many examples, for the “ideas of pure reason” (soul, world, and God) that, as “transcendental ideas”, are not objects of a possible experience, although they do fulfil a positive role in the regulative use of reason; second, “transcendental” in the sense of “transcendental philosophy” as a form of discursive knowledge — neither scientific nor objective — “that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori” (Kant, 1974, A 11–12/B 25); third, “transcendental” in the sense of the a priori forms of sensibility and understanding; and, fourth, “transcendental” in the sense of the supreme principle of the “synthesis” carried out by the “transcendental I think” or “transcendental apperception” (Kant, 1974, B 131–143).
3. THE MEANING OF THE “TRANSCENDENTAL” IN HUSSERL

As I have already mentioned, Edmund Husserl retrieves the 19th century Kantian concept of the transcendental, reshaping it and expanding its reach. He studied both Kant and the neo-Kantians, and in his debate with the empiricists and neo-Kantians of his time, he allies himself more on the neo-Kantian side. However, when he publishes his inaugural work, *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901), he does not initially embrace the Kantian notion of the transcendental understood as the “a priori and pure forms of sensibility and understanding”, directing very harsh critiques at this doctrine for several reasons. First, he believes that if Kant considers them a priori, i.e., universal and necessary conditions of possibility of sciences’ objective knowledge, they are indeed “forms” of human sensibility and understanding, and in that sense are still “relative” to our “subjective constitution”. Husserl is concerned with the epistemological and gnoseological “relativism” that this entails, for even if it is not an “individual relativism” like that of the empiricists, it is indeed an extended “specific relativism” — namely, a relativism of the “human species” — and all relativism is in truth a form of “scepticism” (Husserl, 1975, § 17–20, § 36–37). Furthermore, Kant imports the notions of space and time from the physics of his time and assigns them to sensibility, just as he imports the law of causality and other laws dealt with by the physical sciences such as Newton’s, assigning them to human understanding (Husserl, 1970, § 28, § 30, § 56). He also adopts Aristotle’s logical categories, conferring upon them an alleged systematic genesis and incorporating them into understanding as its structural forms. With these instruments in hand he built his “transcendental” philosophy according to an architectonic criterion rather than erecting it on the basis of sheer description founded upon the observation of human experience. In contrast, Husserl wishes to rely instead upon the description of his own experiential observations, characterizing the “method” of his nascent phenomenology as a “descriptive method” from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, those same observations and descriptions lead Husserl to reconsider his critiques of Kant and to become aware of the relevance of the concept of the “transcendental”. Thus around 1908 he begins to use the term, first in referring to a “type” of reflexive knowledge that in Kant’s words “is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects” (Husserl, 1985, 424–430). This is how his “transcendental phenomenology” is born, as the philosophy in charge of describing the conditions of possibility of our experiences of the transcendent or of objectivities in general (Husserl, 1956, 386). But ever since 1903, even before using the term, his phenomenological philosophy is already interested in clarifying the a
priori — i.e., unavoidable — conditions of every possible human experience thanks to which such experiences endow our surrounding world with sense and validity.

In order to reach the conditions of possibility of every possible human experience and describe them, Husserl proposes the “method of ἐποχή and phenomenological reduction” as the method whereby the “natural attitude” concerned with the surrounding world and its objects changes into the “phenomenological attitude” — reflexively oriented to the conditions of possibility of our experience of those surrounding objects and of the world. Distancing himself from Kant, however, Husserl does not understand “experience” solely as “cognitive” experience, let alone as cognitive experience in the strong sense of the objective sciences, whether formal (such as logic, arithmetic, or analysis in general), ideal (such as Euclidian geometry), or empirical-deductive (such as physics). According to Husserl, the cognitive lived experiences of the sciences — which involve a higher degree of rationalization and develop at a predicative level, i.e., by means of judgments using the instrument of language — already begin their development at a pre-predicative level, namely, with simple perception along with a series of lived experiences related to it such as memory, image-consciousness, phantasy, expectation, or empathy. In other words, their development begins before we formulate concepts, enunciate judgments, or reason with the help of language. On the other hand, he claims that different types of science involve different types of cognitive experience and thus have different ways of being verified. The sciences, in his view and in that of several philosophers of his time (such as critics of a neo-Kantian tradition), include not only mathematical and empirical-deductive sciences (such as physics), but also “cultural” or “spiritual” (social or human) sciences, which produce a sui generis type of scientific knowledge that differs from the “hard” sciences, but have their own methods of validation. Finally, the human experiences that are laid bare by transcendental phenomenology after applying the phenomenological method also include non-cognitive experiences such as valuative experiences (pertaining to the field of emotions and feelings) and willing experiences (pertaining to the practical sphere of the will). Each of those experiences — theoretical, valuative, and practical — may be the object of descriptions that must clarify their “essential” or “pure types”, their structures or conditions of possibility, and their different “functions”.

Among the main structures or “conditions of possibility” of all those lived experiences and of consciousness in general, Husserl identifies the “pure I” (equivalent to Kant’s “I think” or “transcendental apperception”), temporality, and intentionality (Husserl, 1977, § 80–84). The latter two permeate and determine every lived experience in general. Regarding the temporality of consciousness, Husserl is also inspired
by Kant, although time is not for Husserl the mere “form” of the apprehension of sensible phenomena, but rather the “form” in which all conscious and unconscious lived experiences necessarily flow, and thus affects in general how we experience absolutely everything that stands as correlate to our cognitive, willing, or emotional lived experiences, whether we are referring to them linguistically or intuitively, or wishing or evaluating, and so forth. Consciousness is described by Husserl as a flux “of lived experiences that not only arise one after the other, but continuously and synthetically flow into one another in such a way that new ones continuously emerge while others “sink”, as it were, into the past and unconsciousness. Here Husserl retrieves the Kantian terms of synthesis and horizon to characterize the temporality of consciousness (Husserl, 1977, § 81–82, 118; Husserl, 1973, § 17–20). But, whereas for Kant all the levels of syntheses (intuitive, imaginative, and conceptual) are ultimately the function of understanding and its “I think” or “transcendental apperception”, for Husserl the temporal syntheses of conscious lived experiences are basically associative, passive, and continuous syntheses that we do not consciously or actively “control”. Only when we judge, predicate, or reason, carrying out higher (conscious, more rational) acts of consciousness, do we consciously synthesize a subject with a predicate in an act of judging. But in the latter case, we are dealing with discrete syntheses that are the product of the intentional, rational lived experiences of an active “I think”, and are thus to be distinguished from the continuous syntheses of the deep temporality of consciousness (Husserl, 1977, § 118).

So far, we have clarified not only the Kantian remnant in Husserl’s concept of the “transcendental”, but also the expansion of its meaning. However, the third structure or condition of possibility of the lived experiences of transcendental consciousness — intentionality, which Husserl retrieves from his teacher Franz Brentano (1838–1917) and amplifies (in a way that does not stem from Kant, but from the Scholastics or even from Aristotle) — gives a new sense to the term “transcendental”. According to the concept in question, all human lived experiences — whether cognitive, emotional, evaluative, volitional, etc. — are characterized by “intentionality”: i.e., in all of them we are conscious of something, we are referred to something (whether persons, animals, things, values, norms, or ideal objects such as numbers or geometric figures, and so forth). Thus for Husserl, intentionality is the pure (i.e., a priori or essential) structure found in the totality of human consciousness in general, as “consciousness of”.

But in Husserl’s view, the “transcendental” character of intentional consciousness reveals itself through an additional element. On the one hand, in every “consciousness of” we are conscious of objectivities, events, norms, people, etc., in different ways. Indeed, we may perceive or remember, value or desire the same objectivity,
and in each one of these diverse lived experiences (perception or memory, valuing or desiring), this same objectivity “appears”, “is given” to us, “we refer to it” in different ways. On the other hand, however, Husserl observes that when one and same objectivity is successively grasped in different lived experiences of the same type (such as in different perceptions, or as referred to in different successive statements), it “appears”, “is given to us”, or is grasped in different ways. For example, we may refer to the planet Venus either as the “morning star” or as the “evening star”; to Napoleon either as the “victor at Jena” or as the “vanquished at Waterloo”; or to the same type of triangle now as “equilateral”, now as “equiangular”. This means that the “mode” in which objectivities are “referred to”, “apprehended”, “judged”, or the way in which they appear or are given to us in perception, remembrance, expectation, fantasy, etc., somehow depends upon the type of experience we have of them. This “mode” of “referring” to them or “seizing” them is, Husserl remarks, the sense (perceptive, evaluative, volitional, and so forth) that we endow them with, or the meaning (conceptual, linguistic) that we predicate of them.

Some of these senses and meanings are merely “empty” or “unfounded”, i.e., “unverified” opinions or beliefs regarding things, people, or events, such as making certain linguistic references to things without having them before us. But other senses and meanings are “validated”, “verified”, “founded”, “demonstrated”, as when diverse experiences of those same objects successively allow us to endow them with senses or meanings that mutually coincide across these diverse experiences in continuous syntheses of identification, consistently maintained through time. Still more evident and more “objective” are senses produced by concordant lived experiences of different subjects through time, senses that are mutually founded in “syntheses of identification”. To obtain “objectivity” in a strong scientific sense, synthetically concordant intersubjective lived experiences are needed. On the other hand, those senses and meanings may lose the validity or evidence through which they acquired their “objective” status if during the course of time other experiences contradict them, as when we perceive a puddle of water when driving along the road, but find on looking back through the window that the puddle has disappeared. The sense of our second perception does not synthetically agree with the first — it cannot be identified with the prior perception of a puddle, and this “contradiction” allows us to understand that we are dealing with a mirage. The former “perceptual sense” reveals itself as “baseless” thanks to the new ones that follow.

Consequently, the intentional correlation between our experiences (some simpler and other higher or more rational), on the one hand, and the objectivities that surround us, on the other, are mediated by those senses and meanings, validated or not.
There are thus three terms in intentional correlation: lived experiences (also called nooses); senses and meanings (also called noemas); and transcendent objectivities. The animate or inanimate, real or ideal objectivities are for us what they are according to the manner in which they appear. They are “transcendences” that are indeed there, in our surrounding world, as real objectivities or ideal objectivities (such as numbers), but we “apprehend” them in lived experiences that endow them with diverse senses and validations. For Husserl, this function of “bestowing senses” and validating them — a function pertaining to our lived experiences and intentional consciousness — is also termed transcendental: these lived experiences are transcendental experiences of a transcendental consciousness. And for him the function of “sense-bestowing” is “constitution”, since we bestow meanings on things and on the world in a temporal succession of experiences. We do not have a divine or instantaneous apprehension of things; we do not perceive or understand things sub specie aeternitatis. The meaning that things acquire by means of our experiences is temporally constituted. And this constitution of the meaning of things takes place when we enter into contact with them. In this sense, consciousness and intentional experiences are both transcendental. But the senses and meanings of transcendent objectivities that we “constitute” the moment we grasp them are also transcendental, for senses and meanings are the result of the way in which what is transcendent is apprehended by our consciousness. Sometimes Husserl names this constituted sense “pure phenomenon” or noema.

We said that for Husserl, transcendental phenomenology claims to be the knowledge of the transcendental character of experiences and of human intentional consciousness insofar as they have the function of “meaning-giving and validation of being” (Husserl, 1952, 139). We have also pointed out that the conditions of possibility of the transcendental character of these experiences are, for Husserl, temporality, intentionality, and the pure I, which are a priori (or “eidetic”) structures that we have the possibility of “intuiting” (grasping) and “describing” after abandoning the natural attitude and directing the phenomenological gaze upon them. Thus Husserl intends to correct the Kantian interpretation of the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience, structures that the philosopher of Königsberg does not directly observe by means of unprejudiced examination, but borrows from Aristotelian logic (the categories) or from Newton’s physics (such as space and time).

4. CONCLUSION

To conclude, and in very general terms, both in Kant and in Husserl the word “transcendental” may have three meanings that refer to three different things. First,
they use it to refer to the reflexive-philosophical knowledge “that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition (or experience) of objects, insofar as this is to be possible a priori”; i.e., it means the knowledge of certain essential conditions that render all human experiences possible. In this sense Kant spoke of “transcendental philosophy” and Husserl of “transcendental phenomenology”. Second, they also use the term “transcendental” to refer to those same conditions of possibility of knowledge or of the experience of objects. According to Kant, these are the a priori forms of sensibility (space and time) and of understanding (categories), crowned by the synthetic activity or synthesis of the “I think”, or “transcendental apperception”, and refer to scientific knowledge. According to Husserl, these conditions of possibility are the pure structures of intentionality, temporality, and the “pure I” that “accompanies all our representations”, as Kant also used to say. Finally, for Kant the sense of the “transcendental” also encompasses the synthetic functions that the “I think” carries out to constitute “scientific judgments” or “synthetic a priori judgments” as the “objects of scientific knowledge,” for the latter are indeed the result of a construction that transcendental subjectivity carries out by subsuming the sensible phenomena under the categories of understanding. For Husserl, the sense of the “transcendental” encompasses the constitutive function of meanings and validations, from the cognitive to the evaluative or volitional, from the simplest sensible meanings to the most rational and scientific.

In this sense, Kant as well as Husserl respectively characterized their transcendental philosophies as “transcendental idealisms”. Such an idealism differs radically, as Kant points out, from Descartes’ problematic idealism”, a “theory that declares the existence of objects in the space outside us to be […] merely doubtful and indemonstrable”, or from Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism”, which also declares that the existence of things in space outside us is “false and impossible”, namely, “merely imaginary” (Kant, 1974, B 274). Husserl too distinguishes his “transcendental idealism” from Berkeley’s “subjective idealism” in his 1913 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Husserl, 1977, § 55), and from Descartes’ prejudiced “scholasticism” and more geometrico ontology, incapable of making “the transcendental turn” (Husserl, 1973, 62 ff.). The claim that intentional consciousness is a “sense-affording consciousness” (Husserl, 1976, 120) is not tantamount to denying “the fully valid being of the world, as the universe of realities” (Husserl, 1976, 120). When speaking of applying phenomenological methods (the ἐποχή and the transcendental reduction) in order to redirect his gaze and bring to light the intentional and transcendental achievements of consciousness, Husserl states the following: “If I do this, as I am completely free to, then I do not negate this ‘world,’ as though I were a sophist;
I do not doubt its existence, as though I were a sceptic” (Husserl, 1976, 65). What the method does is simply to place it within brackets or disconnect our automatic acceptance of it in order to examine the experiences in which this world acquires meaning and ontic validity for us.

As I have indicated, this “transcendental function” of consciousness that Kant introduced into the history of philosophy has not been well understood by certain contemporary philosophers who have interpreted it as a reduction of transcendent reality to the immanence of an autarchic and solipsistic “I think”, and thus as a concept that should not be retrieved as other concepts may be (concepts that allegedly do exhibit some current validity). But thanks to the fact that neo-Kantianism keeps this concept alive until the 20th century, and due to the fact that Husserl fortunately rescues it from oblivion, refining and amplifying it — stripping it of some controversial elements that still remained in its first formulation by Kant — we can affirm its current relevance and interest. Even Heidegger, during his Marburg period, uses the term not only in his readings of Kant and Husserl, but also when elaborating his own fundamental ontology or Dasein’s existential analytics (Crowell, Malpas, 2007), granting it a new ontological reach. And currently there is a renewed interest in the work of Kant and Husserl, thanks to whom a better understanding of the sense and current validity of the concept of the “transcendental” has begun to emerge, both in epistemology, cognitive sciences, mathematics, and the relation of physics with biology (Bitbol, Kerszberg, Petitot, 2009; Zahavi, 2017).

REFERENCES


THE TENACITY OF “VICIOUS CIRCULARITY” IN KANT AND HUSSERL: ON TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AND CATEGORIAL INTUITION

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In this paper, I explore the strategy of circularity employed by Kant and Husserl in their treatment of categoriality. I focus on the relation between transcendental and metaphysical deductions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and on the problem of “epistemic foundationalism” and categoriality in Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation. I propose that the strategy of circularity is manifested through the peculiar self-enclosure of the categories of transcendental deduction vis-à-vis metaphysical deduction (Kant) and categorial intuition vis-à-vis sensuous intuition (Husserl). Although it is usually regarded as a deficient and damaging occurrence in argumentation, circularity appears to be a crucial component in the analysis of both thinkers. The analytical realms recognized by both these thinkers, is acknowledged as continually dependent upon the self-evidential “contingency” of the realms they are supposed to hierarchically overarch. The strict separation between the transcendental and phenomenological realms and their addressees appears to be founded on mutual circularity, where the relation between investigator and investigated extends beyond their separation and reconciliation. Both Kant and Husserl, through the circular relationship with empiricism-rationalism and psychologism radically re-articulated the logic-ontology and founding-founded polarities.

Key words: Kant, Husserl, circularity, categoriality, categorial intuition, metaphysical deduction, transcendental deduction.

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УСТОЙЧИВОСТЬ «ПОРОЧНОЙ ЦИРКУЛЯРНОСТИ» В ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОЙ ДЕДУКЦИИ КАНТА И КАТЕГОРИАЛЬНОЙ ИНТУИЦИИ ГУССЕРЛЯ

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В данной статье исследуется стратегия циркулярности, используемая Кантом и Гуссерлем в их трактовке категориальности. В центре внимания — взаимосвязь между трансцендентальными и метафизическими выводами в Критике чистого разума Канта, а также между проблемой «эпистемического фундаментализма» и категориальностью в Шестом Логическом Исследовании Гуссерля. Я предполагаю, что стратегия цикличности проявляется в своеобразном само-приложении категорий трансцендальной дедукции по отношению к метафизическому выводу (Кант) и категориальной интуиции по отношению к чувственной интуиции (Гуссерль). Несмотря на то, что циркулярность обычно рассматривается как недостаточное и даже разрушительное для аргументации обстоятельство, она, по-видимому, является важным компонентом в анализе обоих мыслителей. Окружающая саму себя «чистота» аналитических сфер, учреждаемая этими мыслителями, понимается как постоянно зависящая от само-очевидной «случайности» этих сфер, над которыми они должны установить иерархическое доминирование. Строгое разделение между трансцендентальной и феноменологической сферами и их адресатами, по нашему мнению, основано на взаимной циркулярности, когда отношения между исследователем и исследуемым выходят за рамки их разделения и согласования. И Кант, и Гуссерль радикально переосмыслили логико-онтологические отношения и основывающиеся на них полярности через круговую (циркулярную) взаимосвязь с эмпиризмом-рационализмом и психологизмом.

Ключевые слова: Кант, Гуссерль, циркулярность, категориальность, категориальная интуиция, метафизическая дедукция, трансцендентальная дедукция.

1. INTRODUCTION

Both Kant and Husserl expand the scope of their philosophical analysis with an eye to the self-regulation of their own concepts. Every newly introduced investigative realm unfolds through the recognition of the results accomplished within its succeeding and preceding analytical level. The newly introduced theme is related to the other components of the analysis through its self-enclosure, while, in a peculiar way, it either enacts or restates the analytical results delivered by these other components. The systematic unity or methodological connection between concepts in Kant and Husserl is established through the constancy of the self-unfolding of these concepts. To show this, I primarily focus on the tables of judgments and categories in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, as well as on the issues of foundationalism and categoriality in the Sixth Investigation of Husserl's Logical Investigations. I suggest a Husserlian reading of Kant by pointing out the dynamics in the excessive circularity of the seemingly static architectonics of Critique. Furthermore, I try to reversely apply a Kantian "static" circularity to the analysis of Husserl's phenomenological dynamism, as it is manifested in the concept of epistemic essence.

My aim is to demonstrate Kant's insistence on both, namely, the "backward reference" of any particular heading and moment within the table of judgments and the "self-referential" specificity of the table of judgments in its mutuality with the table of categories. The third moment and fourth heading do not simply play a mirror-like role, where the preceding two steps can be fully reflected through the undisputable authority of the third, reconciliatory instance. Rather, every particular moment and heading necessitates the completeness of the table of judgments and categories through the process of its backward-reference.

In chapter six of the Sixth Logical Investigation, which is concerned with the categorial intuition, Husserl introduces the notion of epistemic essence, which, constituted in categorial form and sensuous stuff, complicates the structure of intentional essence from the Fifth Investigation. Husserl manages both to further sharpen the analytic specificities of the epistemic and intentional essence and, at the same time, to maintain the possibility of their mutual actualization and re-articulation, but, “this time”, within the realm of a new “epistemic level” — categorial intuition. The difference between categorial and sensuous intuition lies in the fact that categorial intuition obtains what is documented in it, not what is presented in it, thereby securing its ideality through its self-enactment. The intention fulfillment illuminates the specificity of intuited object by exhibiting its own elucidatory role.

2. EXPOSITION AS AN EXHIBITION OF THE LOGICAL FUNCTIONS 
AND THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

In this part of my paper I focus on the First Book of the Transcendental Analytic, particularly on the table of judgments and the table of categories. Kant suggests a peculiar relation or even an argumentative unity between the table of judgments and the table of categories while insisting on the distinction between these two sections. This analysis reveals that the groundwork of the Critique is reflected in its procedural character, which is exhibited as a self-accomplishing of its thematic units. The legitimacy of the position of tables as nexuses and points of overview is confirmed through their self-exhibition. My intention is to illuminate Kant's strategy, as exercised in the
following section of the Transcendental Analytic (more precisely, the Analytic of Concepts), in the Transcendental Aesthetics, and in some passages from *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*:

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. (Kant, 1998, 211, A 79/B 105)

But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible, or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is necessarily its basis and also that of all thinking, cannot be further analyzed or answered because it is of them that we are in need for all of our answers and for all our thinking about objects. (Kant, 1977, § 36, 318–319)

There are many laws of nature that we can only know by means of experience; but conformity to law in the connection of appearances, i.e., nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, because experience itself requires laws which are *a priori* at the basis of its possibility. (Kant, 1977)

I propose the following interpretation of the above-quotations: the strategy of delineation of the realm of purity in the forms of intuition is the same strategy that is employed in the delineation of the pure forms of understanding. This means that the pure forms of intuition and understanding are introduced through their reference to their own regulatory capacity, as indicated in the second quotation. The regulatory role that is assigned to the pure forms of the capacities of reason defines their own composition. The “as if composition” unfolds in the following manner: if there is something that organizes our experience through the peculiar architectonics of its pure forms, then that organizing principle needs to be distinguished as a capacity(ies) of pure reason. In other words, the pure forms of the capacities of reason are distinguished exclusively through their capacity to regulate what is in need of such regulation. Kant, for example, explicitly states that we may “only judge an understanding

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1 Unless otherwise indicated, emphasis in italics is mine throughout the essay.

2 Some emphasis is mine. Cf. Lorenz Krüger (2005, 29). Krüger also quotes the following reflections from Kant’s letter to Herz on May 26th, 1789 (XI 51): “But we are absolutely unable to explain further how it is that a sensible intuition (such as space and time), the form of our sensibility, or such functions of the understanding as those out of which logic develops are possible; nor can we explain why it is that one form agrees with another in forming a possible knowledge. For we should have to have yet another manner of intuition than the one we have and another understanding with which to compare our own and with which everyone could perceive things in themselves. But we can only judge an understanding by means of our own understanding, and to it is, too, with all intuition” (Krüger, 2005, 29).
by means of understanding” (Kant, 1977, 29). The means of understanding become prominent precisely in the application of understanding to what it regulates, so to speak. Further, the impermeable purity of the forms (of intuition and understanding) is always contrasted with the realm of experience these forms are supposed to regulate. In other words, the pure forms of intuition and understanding are necessitated, in their purity, by the density of the experiential contingency. Furthermore, as the pure forms of understanding and intuition are established through the reference to their own regulatory activity these forms are architectonically related to each other through their mutual contrast. We can suggest that the thematic development of the Critique, in its self-enclosing layout, has a chain-like rather than a pyramidal-hierarchical appearance.

The lawfulness of self-grounding makes the field of transcendental logic distinctive in comparison to the jurisdiction of general logic (regardless of whether this logic is pure or applied). Thus, the logic, which does not “abstract from all content of cognition”, would “concern the origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects” (Kant, 1998, 196, A 56/B 80). This peculiar activity of grounding our cognitions of objects is able to determine “the origin, the domain, and the objective validity” (Kant, 1998, 196, A 57/B 81) of the pure cognition of reason, and it is called transcendental logic. We determine that one cognition is 

\textit{a priori} transcendental (the cognition which does not depend on, but which grounds the possibility of experience) not only by stating the apriority of certain cognition, but also by showing “\textit{that} and \textit{how} certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are \textit{applied} entirely \textit{a priori}, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition of its use \textit{a priori})” (Kant, 1998, 196, A 57/B 80)\(^3\). It is important to note that the expressions “\textit{that}” and “\textit{how}” do not refer to the question: “\textit{Why is this \textit{a priori} transcendental cognition possible in reference to some higher argumentative ground?” (or to the goal which needs to be achieved once this \textit{a priori} transcendental cognition is employed). To the contrary, what Kant wants to “achieve” with these terms is to emphasize the unbreakable bond between the definition and the application of \textit{a priori} forms of cognition. This is the reason why Kant mentions \textit{application} of the pure forms of cognition before their possibility, and also the reason why we might define an application of pure cognition as its possibility. What is important for Kant is the activity that “belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not concern their relation to their object” (Kant, 1998).

In the first section of the “Clue Chapter”, Kant suggests that, as much as “sensible intuitions are grounded on sensibility”, so too are concepts “grounded on the

\(^3\) Some emphases are mine.
spontaneity of thinking” (Kant, 1998, A 68/B 93). We can easily read this sentence in the following way: as much as the apriority of intuition has its own power and capacity, so too is the apriority of the understanding grounded in the indisputable activity of its own unfolding. In other words, the pure forms of intuition regulate experience through the perpetual accentuating of their own power to constrain the reason within the context of their jurisdiction. Similarly, the pure forms of understanding ground logical operations and experience that is available through understanding, while limiting the reason itself within the context of their own regulatory capacity. Since concepts rest on the “unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one” their only purpose is to be used by the understanding, which makes “no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them” (Kant, 1998, A 68/B 93). Self-referentiality is also visible in the clarification of the concept, which “is therefore a concept only because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be related to object” (Kant, 1998, A 69/B 94). The concept is defined as a mediator and an organizing thread of the representations since every representation is designed to be subsumed under another one through the guidance of the concept. Conversely, only because the presentations are predestined to be organized under the concept, are they supposed to be subsumed under it. This circularity is clearly stated with regard to the definition of mediate judgments. In other words, the judgment’s lack of immediacy is the main condition of the systematic employment of judgments. We can understand why the definition of understanding must be introduced as its necessary employment of judgments and concepts, which are, themselves, employed in order to illuminate the notion of the power of understanding as such, if we recall the notions of mediacy and the higher representation as an orientating point. Understanding can be delineated not only as the faculty of judging, but also as the faculty of the co-composition between concepts and presentations through judging. This is why Kant states that the “functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments” (Kant, 1998).

Lorenz Krüger, in his essay “Did Kant Want to Prove the Completeness of his Table of Judgments?”, suggests that Kant, in his attempt to oppose the traditional scholastic technique of conceptual analysis, actually developed the strategy of the “‘analysis of the faculty of the understanding itself’ which is supposed to ‘analyze the pure use (sc., of the understanding) in general’”, whereby “only an analysis of the pure use of the understanding could establish something about the completeness of the table of judgments” (Krüger, 2005, 23). The legitimation of this process is possible simply through the listing of the headings and the moments of the table of judgments by
“placing [them] in front of our eyes”, where the completeness of the table of judgments can only appear by referring to the idea of the unity of understanding, which is “a demarcating criterion” (Krüger, 2005, 31) The legitimation of the whole or the unity of the system (in this case, the unity of understanding in the completeness of the table of judgments) is achieved through its demarcating self-exhibition, which culminates in “systemacity and completeness” (Krüger, 2005, 30). Krüger refers here to the following passage from the Critique: “The functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments. The following section will make it evident that this can readily be accomplished” (Krüger, 2005, A 69/B 94). Krüger emphasizes the expression “vor Augen stellen” from the German original, and quotes the previous passage in the following manner: “But that this (sc., exhaustively presenting functions of unity of judgments) can readily be accomplished, the following section will place before our eyes (vor Augen stellen)” (Krüger, 2005, 31, A 69/B 94). Although Guyer’s translation does not closely follow the German original, it is still especially suggestive, because it emphasizes that the exhaustive exhibition of the functions of unity in judgments needs to be accomplished in an evident manner. Guyer uses the word “evidence” and significantly contributes to the clarification of the connection between Kant’s “scientifico-metaphysical” justification and the discourse of pure obviousness and announcement. In this sense, the difference between evidence and self-evidence appears to be crucially blurred, and this is accomplished through the mutuality of limiting and expansive tendencies in the Critique. However, it is important to take a look at the German original, because we realize that the term “accomplishment” or, to use a better word, “execution” (bewerkstelligen) is, in fact, significant for the exhaustive exhibition (vollständig darstellen), whereas one term stands for the other two and vice versa: „Die Funktionen des Verstandes können also insgesamt gefunden werden, wenn man die Funktionen der Einheit in den Urteilen vollständig darstellen kann. Daß dies aber sich ganz wohl bewerkstelligen lasse, wird der folgende Abschnitt vor Augen stellen“ (Kant, 1968, 111, A 69/B 94)4.

4 We should also recall the following observation by Brandt: “The question as to the systematic coherence of the table of judgments, necessary for acquiring the concepts of the understanding, is answered by the passage that introduces, presents, and explains the table of judgments. Everything is there and requires no hermeneutic question about essences” (Brandt, 1995, 41). I tend to see this statement as a clear delineation of the necessity for circular argumentation in Kant's construction of the language and method of the Critique, although Brandt, overall, attacks the notion of circularity in the argumentation of Kant's interpreters. Here I have in mind especially his attacks on Klaus Reich's tendency to ground and explain the table of judgments through Transcendental Deduction, in reference to which Brandt writes the following: “a 'system' is presupposed of which it was not shown that it was not developed with an eye toward the previously determined result” (Brandt, 1995, 27).
Kant delineates the table of forms of understanding through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments. He isolates four headings or titles, each of which is branched through three moments: quantity (universal, particular, singular), quality (affirmation, negation, infinity), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive) and modality (problematic, assertoric, apodictic). The Kantian novelty regarding the “customary technique of the logicians” (Kant, 1968, A 71/B 96) is in the introduction of the third moment in a heading. Kant differentiates his own project from the one undertaken within the prevailing logical tradition already in the first heading (quantity), by declaring the specific role of the moment of singularity. He even commends the results of the logical tradition according to which singular judgment might have been operationalized as a universal. The fact that singular judgments do not have a domain of their own does not mean that they cannot be arranged in the same way as universal judgments, meaning that the concept in this case would be a “generally valid concept with a domain with the predicate applying to the whole of what is signified” (Kant, 1968). What is important from the point of view of transcendental logic, however, is the status of the singular judgment in comparison to the universal, within the working frame of the heading (Titel)\(^5\) of quantity. Kant’s only way to introduce

Therefore, the ”systematic coherence” of the table of judgments can be delivered only as the specificity, mutuality and purposiveness of (the order of) its elements. The construction of the table of judgments is not made in order to serve, or to stand as, the ordering principle as such; namely the creating of the table of judgments is at the same time their ordering.

\(^5\) Reinhardt Brandt (1995, 82) in *The Table of Judgments: Critique of Pure Reason* A 67–76/B 92–101 directly emphasizes juridical aspects of the terms Titel and Momente, by referring to Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals*. He quotes Kant’s statements that since “we have found the title of acquisition in an original community of the earth (VI 286) […] the moments (attendenda) of original acquisition are thus […] (VI 258)” and also, from the draft to *Metaphysics of Morals*, where he characterizes categories as “the acquisition of right” (XXIII 220). In this context, Brandt even mentions Baumgarten, and his concept of moments as attendenda to which we direct our attention or “attentio”, and concludes that the concept of place in the context of table of judgments “refers to a legalistic context” (Brandt, 1995, 82). A bit earlier in his book, Brandt asks the following: “The table of all functions of the understanding makes it possible to determine ‘the place’ of every pure concept of understanding. Thus, the table of judgments is the topology for the pure functions of the understanding. The question is: How can these topoi be exhaustively acquired?” (Brandt, 1995, 48). Since Brandt notices that Kant uses the terms heading and title as synonyms with that of category in his Reflection 4672 (1773–75), it would be good to take a brief look at some parts of this reflection. Kant here directly connects the notions of place-topoi-ground and rule/process within the same argumentative-operational frame: “First there must be certain titles of thought, under which appearances can be brought in themselves: e.g., whether they are regarded as magnitude or as subject or as ground or as whole or merely as reality(figure is no reality). On this account I will not regard whatever I want in the appearance as either subject or predicate, rather it is determined as subject or respective as ground. […] In order for appearances to belong to or be determined in accordance with certain
the specificity of the singular judgment is through its own instantiation (with regards to cognition in general, on which Kant is focused here), where “with respect to the quantity it has in comparison with other cognitions, then it is surely different from generally valid judgments (judicia communia), and deserves a special place in a complete table of the moments of thinking in general (though obviously not in that logic that is limited only to the use of judgments with respect to each other)” (Kant, 1998, 207). Kant distinguishes between singular and universal judgments by suggesting that the singular judgment has to be special “surely”, and that it is evident and justified in its own capacity to be a distinct and pure form of understanding. The question “Why is it that we have this state of affairs?” is transformed into the question of “How is this particular case of singular judgment exhibited, or how is its regulatory capacity unfolded?”

We notice the same self-exhibiting strategy in the heading of quantity, where Kant declares that the affirmative, infinite and negative judgments have to be differentiated from the point of view of transcendental logic, because these judgments, in principle, are concerned with the value or content of logical judgments instead of their pure form (which is the jurisdiction of general logic). Kant emphasizes that the only difference between transcendental and general-logical aspects of the proposition “The soul is non-mortal” is reflected in a way in which this proposition, as an infinite judgment within the frame of transcendental logic, legitimizes its jurisdiction:

Rules, it is necessary that they be represented as belonging under one or another function of them. Thereby do they become determinate objects of thoughts; otherwise there is nothing in their relations (for sensations are not thoughts) that makes them thinkable for the understanding” (Kant, 2005, 153–154). If we follow Kant in this reflection, is it perhaps possible to conclude that the only way we can accomplish the final acquisition of the ground (or the verdict) is by constantly looking back at the process of this acquisition as such. Therefore, the legal-epistemological place that needs to be reached is the process of its reaching for as such.
It is clear that the immortality of the soul is defined as the inability of the understanding, in this peculiar case, to determine the soul as anything beyond its non-mortal designation. Its immortality is proportional to the amount of the mortal aspects that can be “taken away of it” without violating the legitimate space of its transcendental-logical, quantitatively infinite profile. The sphere of immortality is self-limited with an eye to the realm of mortality, and it gains its transcendental profile through this self-limitation. The transcendental expansion of the moment of infinity is based on its proneness for self-regulation. This self-regulation is the reflection of the capacity of the moment of infinity to remain alert to the contingency it oversees. Conversely, this overseen experiential contingency, through its habitual lack of the capacity to regulate itself, calls for its own purification. The infinity's persistence in perpetual distinction from the realm of mortality, as it regulates this realm, resembles the work of a peculiar kind of self-assurance. The only novelty of the table of categories vis à vis the notion of self-assurance is that, in the case of the above-mentioned moment of quantity, the self-assurance is the exclusive mode of self-establishment.

The same type of self-regulatory approach is applied in the case of the heading of relation where, in the addition to the moments of categorical (relation between subject and predicate) and hypothetic (relation between ground and consequence), the third moment of disjunctive judgment is distinguished. This moment of judgment contains the “relation of logical opposition insofar as the sphere of one judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation of community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition proper” (Kant, 1998, A 73–74/B 99). Kant further writes that “it is therefore a relation of the parts of the sphere of a cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of the others in the sum total of the divided cognition, e.g., “The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause”” (Kant, 1998). The “true cognition in its entirety” is achieved through the application of disjunctive judgment within “a certain community of cognitions, consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each other” (Kant, 1998). In the heading of relation, we witness more clearly that the distinction of each moment does not simply add up to the definition of the heading, but the heading as such is defined through the introduction of a third moment, namely disjunction. The third moment appears to be not a simple mediating instance between the other two moments, but an expression of their relation in isolation from each other (within their respective realms of purity). In the initial description of disjunction, Kant observes that the heading of relation is obtained between “the cognition that is divided and all of the members of the division” (Kant, 1998, A 73/ B 98). If we state that infinity could be portrayed as a peculiarly negative affirmation,
and that the singularity is the universality which is particularized, then we can infer that the disjunction is a categorical hypothesis.

The establishment of headings and moments, whose legitimacy is demonstrated through its own processing culminates in the installment of modality. Kant gives a special status to the heading of modality in comparison to the other three headings, by providing it with the ability to “contribute nothing to the content of the judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing more that constitutes the content of judgment), but rather [to concern] only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general” (Kant, 1998, A 74/B 100). Kant states that the heading of modality is necessary because the jurisdiction of the other three headings (concerning the content of judgment) is exhaustively determined. We can also say that the definition of what is supposed to have a certain jurisdiction is exhausted through the enumeration of the three headings. The space of jurisdiction of modality is secured in a static and “implicit” manner: since the lawful field of content is clearly defined, the only field in need of further arrangement is the field of form. That the modality is not concerned with content is clear from the following example: although the proposition “There is a perfect justice” can obviously be false, that does not concern the realm of modality, according to which this proposition can only have a problematic significance (although the implication is assertoric, this judgment serves exclusively as a problematic, because it is “thought of only as an arbitrary judgment”) (Kant, 1998, B 100/A 75). Just as the problematic proposition is focused only on logical possibility, so too is the assertoric judgment focused on the logical actuality (of truth). Similarly, the apodictic judgment “thinks of the assertoric one as determined through these laws of the understanding itself, and as thus asserting a priori, and in this way expresses logical necessity” (Kant, 1998, A 76/B 101). The third moment, in the case of all headings, is not just purely added from some external source, but it is proposed as a reflection of the relation in difference between the two “preceding” moments. Kant not only acknowledged the findings of traditional logic through the recognition of the first two moments, but also disclosed the self-propelling declarativeness within which these moments were created. The third moment simply re-emphasized the self-enclosure in the instantiation of the first two moments. Once the delineation of the self-sufficiency of each moment in relation to each other is completed, we realize that the division of the categories “transcends mere logic”.

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6 We should recall here the following observation by Brandt (1995): “Common to each of the third moments is the relation of a given individual to the whole in which the individual is located. Located: space clearly serves as a foil for comprehending the specifically logical relation and at the same time the moment in the relation that transcends mere logic. The first two moments can perhaps be taken
If we come back to the Third Section of the “Clue Chapter,” we see that Kant uses the same strategy of “equal” (not only in relation to potential and strength, but also to argumentative structure) profiling regarding the relation between the tables of judgment and categories:

The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori. (Kant, 1998, A 79/B 105)

The same understanding (derselbe Verstand) (Kant, 1968, 118, A 79/B 105), or more precisely, the same strategy involved in bringing the logical form of judgments into concepts, can be traced both in the table of judgments and the table of categories. The power of the careful delineation of main constitutive points is entirely the same in the sections of the Critique concerned with both type of unities. The “only” crucial and important structural difference is in the steps, the first of which, as Lorenz Krüger notes, leads “to the table of judgments, and [which] is simply repeated, in a second step, as it were, only in another light because the same function (Kant, 1968, A 79/B 104) of the understanding is revealed in a new respect with regard to a further given, the manifold of intuition (which transcendental logic has “lying in front of itself a priori” (Kant, 1968, A 76/B 102))” (Krüger, 2005, 28). The peculiarity of transcendental logic is that it teaches us “how to bring under concepts not the representations but the pure synthesis of representations” (Kant, 1968, A 78/B 104). This, of course, stands in complete contrast to general logic, which is concerned only with the transformation of the representations into concepts analytically, regardless of how these representations are given. Kant does not say, unconditionally, that the jurisdiction of one step is “epistemologically” more valuable than the other, but he decisively delineates the strategic importance and the necessity of each of these realms. Kant therefore comes as positions and their merely logical negations or reversals: The negation of ‘All’ leads to ‘Some,’ the negation of affirmation to negation; the reversal of the direction of determination in moving from categorical judgment to hypothetical judgment. In the third moment this internal reference is abandoned, and the judgment is related to a presupposed totality of content” (Brandt, 1995, 78).

Further in the text Krüger states the following: “Transcendental idealism is thus immediately connected to the indispensability of ‘metaphysical’ arguments. Kant’s standpoint requires that the synthetic unity of apperception is indeed the highest point of philosophical reflection on our knowledge, but cannot be a source of speculative proofs” (Krüger, 2005, 42).

Thus, for example, the peculiarity of the table of categories (and the Transcendental Deduction as such) lies in the fact that 1) the manifold of pure intuition needs to be given to us a priori (therefore,
up with the table of categories which hosts “exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured by these functions” (Kant, 1968, A 79–80/ B 105). The organizing principle in which these categories arise is, in fact, the way of their organizing and it bears the operative name of the “faculty of judging” (Kant, 1968, A 81/B 106). This is precisely the main difference between Kant and Aristotle, of whom Kant says that he was exposed to the “haphazard search for pure concepts” and that he “rounded them up as he stumbled on them” (calling them categories) (Kant, 1968, A 81/B 107). This was possible only because Aristotle did not use Kant’s concept of the organizing principle, which not only orders the elements of the system, but is also expressed in the self-regulating distinctiveness of these elements. That the organizing principle has merely the significance of the demarcation of the elements of the system is clear from the following observation:

I deliberately spare myself the definitions of these categories in this treatise, although I should like to be in possession of them. In the sequel I will analyze these concepts to the degree that is sufficient in relation to the doctrine of method that I am working up” (A 82–83/ B 109) […]. For that this table is uncommonly useful, indeed indispensable in the theoretical part of philosophy for completely outlining the plan for the whole of a science insofar as it rests on a priori concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance with determinate principles, is already self-evident from the fact that this table completely contains all the elementary concepts of the understanding, indeed even the form of a system of them in the human understanding, consequently that it gives instruction about all the moments, indeed even of their order, of a planned speculative science, as I have elsewhere given proof (A 83/B 109–110). (Krüger, 2005)

It is indicative that Kant emphasizes the terms “moments”, “dividing”, and “order”, whereby one can conclude that the order as such is nothing but the division of moments. Kant’s observation that this organizing principle already contains “all the
elementary concepts”, that it possesses “even the form of the system of them” and that instructs “about all the moments”; and “even of their order”, directly suggests that its completeness is embodied in the table. We can conclude that the construction of the system (the table of categories in this case), which is simultaneously its self-application, is the most obvious manifestation of the ordering principle as such. The strategy executed here is one of self-assurance and self-sufficiency, and it consists in the achievement of the respect for the unquestionable specificity and the necessarily belonging in difference of the parts of the system — which is, therefore, the same strategy found in the table of judgments.

Giorgio Tonelli suggests that Kant was inspired to pursue an independent and self-grounding discipline of metaphysics by looking at the work of Jacob and Christian Thomasius. He observes that the intention for the establishment of the independent philosophical discipline actually has a ground in the major crisis of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotelianism. This crisis culminated in a debate about which discipline — whether logic or metaphysics — or, perhaps, something “beyond” both of these branches should deal with the issues such as categories and first principles. Tonelli points out that although Kant never aimed at the establishment of the independent theory of knowledge — which was “established only after Kant” (Tonelli, 1994, 168) — he was still influenced (via his teachers in Königsberg) by the attempts for the construction of the discipline, which would be independent, both, from logic and metaphysics. Tonelli is furthermore convinced that this is directly reflected in

10 We can find an important historical overview and background of this problematic in sections 16–23 of the second chapter, and earlier in sections 24–28 of the first chapter of Tonelli’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic. The continual conflict between medieval realism (according to which the categories are concepts expressing an order of being intrinsic to things) and nominalism (where the categories are the “concepts of the mental order which did not correspond to an order of things” (Tonelli, 1994, 165)) is a part of the complex debate concerning the disciplinary place (locus proprius) of discussions concerning supra praedicamenta or transcendentalia, categories, praedicabilia or postpraedicamenta and first principles. Opinions differed and clashed about the question of which discipline suppose to host these discussions, namely whether that is metaphysics (philosophia prima) or logic. Attempt to solve this problem even led to the establishment of two special disciplines: noology (solving the “problems of the proper place for questions like the first principles, the origin of knowledge”(Tonelli, 1994, 167)) and gnoseology (“the study of what can be known (cognoscibile) qua tale, of the notion and possibility of knowledge, of the relationship between concept and thing represented, of abstraction, analogy, etc.” (Tonelli, 1994, 168). Tonelli concludes that these attempts however failed and were not repeated again in the nineteen century.

11 These attempts were “a clear symptom of the instability of the situation, and contributed to the erosion of the borderline between logic and metaphysics” (Tonelli, 1994).
Kant’s separation of (and the confrontation between) transcendental philosophy and critique of pure reason. According to Tonelli, Kant might have found a special inspiration for designing of the Critique in the concept of “an instrumental discipline” (Tonelli, 1994, 173), which can be designated as a dictionary (the same concept which we find in the work of Jacob Thomasius). However, what the term dictionary in this case means “is a list of definition of terms, but not in alphabetical order” (Tonelli, 1994). Tonelli paraphrases Thomasius, and says that metaphysics, once deprived of natural theology, is “nothing but a dictionary which is attached, or subordinated to logic in the same way as a Latin dictionary is attached to grammar” (Tonelli, 1994). Tonelli further writes that “metaphysics is nothing but a dictionary of terms, useful in preventing error rather then in reaching the truth” and therefore it “cannot be separated from logic, in that it belongs to the theory of concepts” (Tonelli, 1994, 174–175). He also notes that Jacob and Christian Thomasius developed this peculiar type of nominalistic ontology, which is supposed to be “nothing more than a list of arbitrary definitions [which] amounts to reducing all general metaphysical concepts to human construction” (Tonelli, 1994, 176). As long as “particular language” provides us the ability to note and investigate certain regularities or just “matter of fact in a way which is adequate for our purposes, the knowledge it provides is valid” (Tonelli, 1994). It goes without saying that anything that might have been of interest to the investigator of ideal regularities, and which might have developed a tendency to go beyond this above-mentioned regularity, is not only unwanted but is also not allowed as such. This directly refers to our ability to see the terms of this language as the “real characters of the matter of fact in question” (Tonelli, 1994). Tonelli, by concluding that this terminological apparatus and instrument is nothing more than “a convention” (Tonelli, 1994), willingly or not, gives enormous strength and importance to the self-exhibiting potentials of the metaphysics. He thus illuminates the significance of the interconnection between the terms: usage, purposiveness, adequacy, and validity within the context of the Critique’s self-demonstration.

12 Tonelli stresses that Kant had to make a clear distinction between “expounding the whole body of transcendental philosophy” and the critique of pure reason which establishes the “area of analytic knowledge which is required in order to found the principles of the synthesis a priori in their entirety”, and whose aim is nothing but that of “correcting human knowledge” and providing “the touchstone for the validity or invalidity of all knowledge a priori” (Tonelli, 1994, 76).

13 Tonelli clarifies this statement, saying that the relationship between dictionary and grammar echoes the historical state of affairs, where the dictionaries (whether Latin or German) were either attached to grammar books, or contained one (Tonelli, 1994, 174).
The carefully developed mechanism of the minute ramification of the parts of the system seems to have, in fact, no other role but to emphasize the tendency for the self-exhibition of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is important to understand that the canonic-organonic self-examination of the critique culminates in the Transcendental Analytic, especially in the section on the concepts of pure understanding. The setting of the ground of Transcendental Analytic, particularly in the Analytic of Concepts, which will provide the placement and operative-structural mutuality between the Transcendental and Metaphysical Deduction, has a dominantly self-exhibiting character and is historically introduced by Tonelli. Tonelli distinguished two traditions that developed in the aftermath of nominalism: one that can be traced from Gassendi to Locke and Hume, and another culminating in the work of Christian Thomasius. After making this distinction, Tonelli remarks that:

In his Transcendental Analytic, Kant produced his own ontological dictionary. Its terms, deprived of intrinsic metaphysical validity, are adequate to the elaboration of a valid metaphysics of nature and of morals, in so far as they correspond to universal and necessary functions of the human mind. As Thomasius and his followers had done, Kant separated this version of ontology from metaphysics. That is, he separated that part of the Critique of Pure Reason, which corresponded to transcendental philosophy, namely Analytic. He transferred it to logic, or more precisely, to the special logic of metaphysics, namely the Critique. Obviously, Kant's position is very distant from the two traditions mentioned above. But I think it is safe to assume that he found in the early Thomasian school a source of inspiration for a more adequate formulation of his own position through the idea of an ontological dictionary. Its terms, albeit not conventional, are not expressive of any absolute truth, but, if properly used, can yield an adequate metaphysical knowledge of the human world. […] we shall see (1) that the Critique as a whole is a methodology in a broad sense […] and (2) that the special logic or organon of a certain science (in accordance with the Wiener Logik, where it is called technical logic) is supposed to contain among other things a list of all technical terms of method […]. Now, Kant indirectly states in the Critique, referring at least to the Analytic of Concepts, that the latter is a vocabulary or dictionary (Wörterbuch), although incomplete (A 83/B 109). According to the Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia (1777–1780?), the whole Analytic of the Critique is a dictionary of pure reason. Therefore, we can conclude once more that (1) the notion of special logic as dictionary plus methodology stricto sensu, is virtually the same thing as

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14 The circular character of the Critique of Pure Reason is visible in the following passage from the Critique: “Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it is to consist in the amplification or the mere limitation of its cognition, can in any case at least some day be exhibited both analytically and synthetically” (Kant, 1968, A11–A12/B 25). Therefore, as long as it is successfully self-processed and efficiently exhibited as such, it is entirely irrelevant for an overall investigation, whether we should ascribe to the critique the character of an organon (ontological) or of a canon (logico-metaphysical).
practical logic; (2) the Critique, being on the whole methodology in a broad sense, is one practical logic. (Tonelli, 1994, 91–92, some emphases are mine)\textsuperscript{15}

In the opening sentence of the above quotation we witness the enacting of the circularity inherent to Kant’s argumentation in the Critique where the validity and adequacy of the new metaphysics is re-confirmed through metaphysics’ reference to its own universality. This self-demonstration is precisely what makes this metaphysics a “separate ontology”, whose character is embodied in the peculiar dynamics of Transcendental Analytic. Therefore the peculiarity and significance of Analytic amplifies the procedural-disciplining character of the Critique, and makes the Critique of Pure Reason a special logic of metaphysics. The reason why the Thomasian school might be an inspiration for Kant lies in its emphasis on the self-regulatory aspect of “logic-as-metaphysics”, whereby the propriety of the overall usage and self-application of the system is clearly countered with the potential for the expression of “any absolute truth”. Precisely because of this, we can call the whole of Critique, being a peculiar exhibition of the self-processing methodology, a methodology “as a whole” and “in a broad sense”. What is in fact practical about the distinctness of the Critique as a practical logic, is its exercise in its own regularity and lawfulness.

3. HUSSERL’S CIRCULAR METHODOLOGY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CATEGORIAL INTUITION IN THE SIXTH LOGICAL INVESTIGATION

Husserl’s transcending of the notion of synthetic unity within the realm of categorial lawfulness is carefully developed in the Sixth Logical Investigation as a radical criticism and further complexification of Brentano’s notion of foundationalism. However, it is important to note that, despite the open criticism of Brentano’s concept of inner consciousness and the clear traces of Bolzanian methodological influences, Husserl still enriches the methodological “pointillism” of the preceding investigations with an emphasis on the problem of self-evidentiality. In chapter six of the Sixth Logical Investigation, which is concerned with the notion of categorial intuition, Husserl focuses on the inner laws of ideal unities. The key question for Husserl in this investigation is not how things are united into one synthetical whole (in the sense of their addition), but rather how this unity is manifested within its categorial context.

\textsuperscript{15} In a sentence immediately following this reflection, Tonelli stresses the fact that “of course, the argument for this second conclusion presupposes the very plausible hypothesis that Kant in 1781 already had in mind what he wrote about technical logic in the Wiener Logik” (Tonelli, 1994).
Husserl introduces the notion of epistemic essence, which, as a further expansion upon the notion of intentional essence (the co-composition of act quality and act matter), is constituted in (categorial) form and (sensuous) stuff. Thus, instead of repeating the dynamics of fulfillment where the “meaning intentions of expressions” correspond to the “mere percepts” (Husserl, 2006, 273). Husserl is interested in the concept of fulfillment as a “parallelism” between meaning intentions and “certain connective or otherwise formational acts”, which are the result of “the epistemic essence of our seeing, in which the apparent object announces itself as self-given” (Husserl, 2006). Husserl crucially portrays fulfillment not as a mere process of intentional correspondence between intending and intended acts, but as a constant tension built into the installation and parallelism between meaning intentions and perceptually founded (thus not perceptual) acts. The word “parallelism” not only emphasizes the phenomenological peculiarity of categorial form, but it furthermore preserves the results accomplished within the frame of intentional essence. Husserl further sharpens the analytic specificities of both phenomenological-descriptive levels: the epistemic and the intentional essence, while emphasizing their mutual actualization. Their mutual re-articulation occurs, “this time”, within the complexity of the new epistemic level — categorial intuition. Thus, intuition in this context has an “essential relation to

16 Husserl avoids using the word matter here, because he does not want to confuse the notions of epistemic and intentional essence.

17 It is important to mention that the German original illuminates the tension built into the establishment of epistemic essence (in contrast to intentional essence) more directly, because Husserl, in the German original, stresses the importance of the realm of the categorial as an “as if” specificity. Therefore, the English translation reads “It may also be the case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in which the apparent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base certain connective or relational or otherwise performative acts and that it is in such acts, performed on a basis of actual perception, that our expression, in respect of such changing forms, finds fulfillment” (Husserl, 2006). However, if we take a look at the German original, we clearly see the importance of the “as if” construct underlying the peculiarity of the categorial and strengthens the tension built into its operational “relation” with the sensuous realm: „Es kann ja auch sein, daß das erkenntnismäßige Wesen des Sehens, in dem sich die erscheinende Gegenständlichkeit als selbst gegebene bekundet, gewisse verknüpfende oder beziehende oder sonstwie formende Akte begründet, und daß diese es sind, denen sich der Ausdruck mit seinen wechselnden Formen anmäßt, und in denen er, hinsichtlich dieser Formen, als auf Grund aktueller Wahrnehmung vollzogen, seine Erfüllung findet“ (Husserl, 1980, 133, emphases in bold are mine). It is clear that the expression finds its fulfillment in the epistemic essence as if (als ob) it was the ground of actual perception. Therefore, the self-unfolding with which Husserl delineates the specificity of the categorial realm is even more emphasized, because the only difference between the categorial and the sensuous realms lies in the fact that the fulfillment within the realm of the categorial is performed with reference to the unfolding of this realm. This reflection implies that the achievement of fulfillment within the categorial is literally the same as within the sensuous, but it has an important modification: it is placed within the categorial context.
expression and to its meaning”; this time, however, not as a “mere togetherness,” but as a “unity of felt belongingness” (Husserl, 2006, 274) between general knowledge and intuition. The objective possibility of the new type of intention fulfillment is reflected in its ability to address the specificity of the intuited object by emphasizing its own elucidatory role. The intuition in the categorial context is characterized as an instance obtaining what is merely documented in it, not what is presented in it. Therefore, it is precisely the self-execution of categorial intuition, its continual emphasis on its own capacity for categorial elucidation, that makes its own universal reality.

Husserl, while dealing with the notion of Being, clearly demonstrates the connection between the strategy of self-enclosure in the delineation of ideal lawfulness and a clear anti-Brentanist attitude, which is manifested in Husserl’s sharp rejection of the psychologistic concept of inner consciousness. This is most obvious in Husserl’s definition of Being as a notion, which is not somehow attached to an object. The Being has “no real (reales) internal feature, so also it has no real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a ‘feature’ at all […]. Being is as little a real constituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a judgment” (Husserl, 2006, 277–278). Husserl leaves the possibility of the thematizing of Being through the process of judging open. He does so, however, only under condition that the judging should not be understood as “merely judging-intentions connected with actual assertions, but [as] the fulfillments that in the end fit them completely” (Husserl, 2006, 279). Husserl does not accept that Being is reached “through reflection’ on certain judgments” (Husserl, 2006), and makes the following statement:

Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but in the judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question. And naturally the appropriate modifications of these acts yield just as good a basis […]. If we are asked what it means to say that categorically structured meanings find fulfillment, confirm themselves in perception, we can but reply: it means only that they relate to

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18 The context of the universality of intuition is clearly delineated in Husserl’s reflection: “Where general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition, certain new acts are built on our percepts and other appearances of like order, acts related quite differently to our appearing object from the intuitions which constitute it. This difference in mode of relation is expressed by the perspicuous turn of phrase employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself the thing meant, but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general meaning. But if expressive acts conform to these differences, their significative intention will not move towards what is to be intuitively presented, but towards what is universal, what is merely documented in intuition. Where this new intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying intuition, it reveals its own objective possibility (or the possibility or ‘reality’ of the universal)” (Husserl, 2006, 275).
the object itself in its categorial structure. The object with these categorial forms is not merely referred to, as in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it is set before our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not merely thought of, but intuited or perceived. (Husserl, 2006, 279–280)

The progression of analytic complexification and subversion of the notion of presentational foundationalism reaches its peak in the circularity of categorial intuition. This time, although fully recognized, the results of the previous investigations (especially the Fifth Investigation) are turned into a matter of operational reference, thus becoming the material illuminated by the epistemic self-sufficiency of the categorial realm. Husserl states that, on this categorial “level”, he is interested neither in the further expansion upon intentional essence nor in reflections upon the complexities of the process of fulfillment of judgments. He is plainly interested in the structural and operational self-reference of the judgments themselves, because this is the only thing that, according to him, can be our focus, especially once we want to understand the “abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question”. Husserl never defines what abstractive basis “in fact” is outside of the need for realizing “the concepts in question”. Even the possibility of defining this basis outside of its self-unfolding would severely miss the core of Husserl’s intention here. Even though the fulfillment of categorial acts is confirmed in perception, the concept of perception here refers to the process where categorially structured meanings relate to “the object itself in its categorial structure” (Husserl, 2006)19. The reason why we cannot suggest the possibility of symbolic signification here (where the concept of meaning intention-meaning fulfillment is achieved on the level of symbolic reference to the object) lies in the fact that only through the categorial forms is the object simply set before our eyes (vor Augen gestellt)20 within the context of categorial synthesis.

19 Formal-structural similarities and operational-contextual differences between sensuous and categorial intuition are given through the example of aggregate: “If ‘being’ is taken to mean predicative being, some state of affairs must be given to us, and this by way of an act which gives it, an analogue of common sensuous intuition. The like holds of all categorial forms (or of all categories). An aggregate e.g., is given, and can only be given, in an actual act of assembly, in an act, that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection A and B and C . . . But the concept of Aggregate does not arise through reflection on this act: instead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we have rather to pay heed to what it presents, to the aggregate, it renders apparent in concreto, and then to lift the universal form of our aggregate to conceptually universal consciousness” (Husserl, 2006, 280, emphases in bold are mine).

20 „Der Gegenstand mit diesen kategorialen Formen sei nicht bloß gemeint, wie im Falle einer bloß symbolischen Funktion der Bedeutungen, sondern es sei uns, in eben diesen Formen selbst vor Augen gestellt; mit anderen Worten: er sei nicht bloß gedacht, sondern eben angeschaut, bzw. Wahrgenommen“ (Husserl, 1980, 143). Here we witness again the clear formal and contextual resemblances with the Kan-
Husserl therefore refuses to talk about the synthetical act within the realm of categoriality as “if something had merely been shoved in between unchanged presentations, a bond which combined them in merely external fashion” (Husserl, 2006, 289). The universal self-sufficiency of the new analytic level is manifested precisely in its ability to shape the synthetic components anew, and not in a way that the object could “appear before us with new real (realen) properties” (Husserl, 2006). To the contrary, the object “stands before us as this same object, but in a new manner” (Husserl, 2006). This is why objectifying acts, which exist “purely ‘on their own’”, differ phenomenologically from “the same objectifying acts serving to constitute the terms of some relation or other” (Husserl, 2006).

The self-referring specificity of the categorial realm and its relation to the accomplishments of sensuous intuition is especially visible in moments when categorial intuition is countered with the notions of continuous and straightforward perception:

But the unification of these percepts into a continuous percept is not the performance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness of something objective is set up. We find, instead, that absolutely nothing new is objectively meant in the extended act, but that the same object is continuously meant in it, the very object that the part-percepts, taken singly, were already meaning [...]. The articulating acts and, taken in retrospect, the act we call “straightforward”, are not merely experienced one after the other: overarching unities of act are rather always present, in which, as new objects, the relationship of the parts become constituted. [...] These two acts are not merely performed together, or after one another, in the manner of disjoined experiences; rather are they bound together in a single act in whose synthesis A is first given as containing α in itself. (Husserl, 2006, 285–287)

The concept and the achievement of straightforward perception (the act which grasps A as a whole in one blow) is neither dismissed nor enriched by the dependent moment that belongs constitutively to A, but is re-articulated in an entirely new manner, that is a manner manifested both through the acknowledgment of the straightforward or continuous perception and through the necessity to manifest its own operational self-grounding. We find the same constellation in the context of continual perception, which, once re-contextualized within the categorial act, “does not amount to the mere fact of temporal adjunction” (Husserl, 2006, 284). Thus “the series of...
individual acts rather has the character of a phenomenological unity, in which the
individual acts are fused” (Husserl, 2006).

We clearly see that the founded categorial acts do not deliver a new type of ob-
jectivity, but that they make their contextualization of the relationship between parts
universally objective. Thus, the “processual” self-reference of the categorial acts —
within their own realm of jurisdiction — is in fact the novel manner of synthetical
achievement or of an objectifying act. The complexification of foundationalism and
its accompanying tension(s) is particularly manifest in the following reflections on
identity and categorial form:

Identity itself is now made objective, the moment of coincidence linking our act-char-
acters with one another, serves as representative content for a new percep, founded upon
our articulated individual percepts. This brings to intentional awareness that what we
now see and what we saw before are one and the same. […] Our act of identification is
in sober fact a new awareness of objectivity, which causes a new “object” to appear to us,
an object that can only be apprehended or given in its very selfhood in a founded act of
this sort. […] Just as the object in straightforward perception directly confronts us, so
too does the state of affairs in the act which names it, and so too does any categorically
formed object. The gradual constitution of the object has been completed, as a finished
object it becomes a term in a relation: it keeps, it seems, its constitutive sense quite un-
altered. […] In an act of abstraction which need not necessarily involve the use of an
abstract name, the universal itself is given to us, we do not think of it merely in significa-
tive fashion as when we merely understand general names, but we apprehend it, behold
it. Talk of an intuition and, more precisely, of a perception of the universal is in this case,
therefore, well-justified. (Husserl, 2006, 285, 290, 292)

The obvious self-reference from the first part clearly aims to dismantle any pos-
sible attempts at defining an identifying act within the realm of categoriality as being
a pure abstractive collecting grounded in the peculiar novelty of an abstractive super-
structure. Had the realm of categoriality been conceived in this manner, then the cat-
egorical acts would have been mere transformations and enrichments of the preceding
stages. Husserl sharply opposes this by emphasizing the uniqueness of the new analy-
 tic step of categorial intuition, which, although it clearly acknowledges the results of
the preceding synthetical activity, still radiates with its own operational significance
and uniqueness. Just as the synthetical achievements of the preceding phases refer to
their own initiation and unfolding, so do the categorial acts refer to the specificity
of their own discursive extension. This is precisely why Husserl puts in quotation
marks the term “object” in “new ‘object’”, which appears to us “in its very selfhood in a
founded act”21. He clearly emphasizes the specificity of the notion of objectivity with-

21 It is also important to notice that, in the German original, not only is the term object — „Gegen-
stand“, in quotation marks, but also that the words translated into English as “apprehension” —
in the jurisdiction of newly founded acts, as irrevocably contrasted with the notion of
an object in the process of the “unity of identification” where “the intention of serially
arranged acts coincides continuously, and […] the unity arises” (Husserl, 2006, 285). Husserl even differentiates between the unity of identification and the unity of an act
of identification. However, we must also notice that the usage of the word “object” is
not coincidental. Though it is clearly parenthesized, it is deliberately used so that the
“synthetical work” obtained within the foundationalist frame of sensuous intuition is
acknowledged as a necessary component that will be re-articulated within the realm
of the categorial act. Although we are dealing, within the context of categorial acts,
with “objects which can only show themselves ‘in person’ in such founded acts”, these
new “objects” are “also” “based on the older ones, they are related to what appears
in the basic acts” (Husserl, 2006, 283). The “two-fold” referentiality is reflected (and
“resolved”) in the charge built into the self-evident extension of the realm of the cate-
gorial. This is precisely the reason why Husserl declares that the self-givenness of the
universal can be only apprehended and furthermore, beheld (the German verbs are
erfassen and erschauen). By emphasizing the constant charge and tension of self-ex-
tension as a self-execution, Husserl points out the importance of circular argumenta-
tion in a more resolute way.

As Jay Lampert emphasizes, the only accomplishment of the categorial realm
is embodied in the fact that it needs to “count back” in order “to see how far it has
come” (Lampert, 1995, 186). Lampert even goes so far as to say that “even though
no single experience may be absolutely immediate or complete, both end-point and
starting-point are presupposed as prior” (Lampert, 1995). We can therefore success-
fully avoid talking about “the results of synthesis” only because the absence of this
result “takes the form of being posited in order for individual contents to be named,
placed in context, put in perspective and epistemologically pursued ” (Lampert, 1995,
186–187). Therefore, “it is precisely this absence of results that allows synthesis to
have results” (Lampert, 1995, 187). In the following passage, Lampert captures the
peculiarly tense dynamic that underlies the self-explicatory approach exercised by
Husserl throughout LI:

The ongoing mechanisms of synthesis, then, are cognition’s self-critique. The content of
an act of consciousness cannot be named without being contextualized, cannot be con-

selbst erfaßt and as “givenness” — gegeben. Also the word “apprehension” can be translated here in
the reflexive context as an act of self-grasping performed (as much as its givenness) by the “object”:
„Der Akt der Identifizierung ist in der Tat ein neues Objektivitätsbewuβtsein, das uns einen neuen
‘Gegenstand’ zur Erscheinung bringt, einen Gegenstand, welcher nur in einem fundierten Akt dieser
Art ‚selbst erfaßt’ oder, gegeben’ sein kann” (Husserl, 1980, 151).
textualized without passing through ordered perspectives, cannot be viewed in perspective without referring forwards to a limit-point, and cannot refer forward to a limit point without being a backward referent and in turn referring backwards and then forwards to the processes of its own history. The meaning of each content is in a sense independent of its precedents and successors, but only because the internal demands for self-explication that ground its necessary unity with the whole also set in motion systems of differentiations. […] The system of all the systems of synthetically ordered experience has as its source-point the forward and backward references carried out in every single act of synthesis. (Lampert, 1995, 194)

Just as the inherent necessity of self-explication makes “the meaning of each [analytical] content” unique and independent of precedents and successors. So too the indisputability of self-unfolding underlies the specificity of every analytical unit or step in LI. Only by having in mind the structural obviousness of the underlying strategy of circularity are we able to conclude, with Lampert, that the system of all systems is precisely legitimized and confirmed in the exhibition of the unstoppable self-enclosure of its single points.

We can suggest that Husserl does not simply dismiss the notions such as synthetic unity or epistemological hierarchy, but that he radically rearticulates them apropos their role and constitutive components. The categorial unfolding is delineated as the process of its constant self-articulation, precisely through the re-articulation of how categoriality is conceived within the philosophical traditions Husserl was responding to. Similarly, we notice that Kant’s seeming reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism demonstrates itself as a radical re-articulation of these philosophies rather than their overcoming or mere dismissal. The regulatory capacity of the realm of categorial is achieved through the procedural recognition of the results achieved within its preceding stages, not as the subsumption or the abolishment of these results. The division between the capacities of reason and its pure forms through their architectural mutuality is not only what sets the conditions for the subsequent establishment of transcendental philosophy, but is, in fact, the demonstration of that transcendental philosophy itself. The fact that the system and its correction can be seen through each other and as each other is made clear precisely through Kant’s amplification of the fact that reason’s capacity for regulation needs to be seen through the lens of reason’s self-regulation.
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THE DEFIANCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL BY PHANTASY AND IMAGINATION IN HUSSERL AND KANT

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The present paper explores the place that imagination and phantasy hold in the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl when they are not subordinated to functions that are external to them. The Kantian imagination (Einbildungskraft) has a key function within reason, both theoretical and practical, but it seems to exhibit its true potential in the aesthetic subjective domain, as productive imagination — in addition, this aesthetic domain is defined as the most properly human. In Husserl's work, phantasy (Phantasie) has a relevant methodological function in the intuition of essences and plays other constituting roles, for example in empathy — and therefore in intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, the Husserlian phantasy shows its full potential not when it is bound to a presentation through perception — as it does in its constituting functions, but when it is pure and moves freely in an enlarged eidetic sphere. Husserlian phantasy would not only allow the transit from facts to essences, but it would also allow the reverse path, limiting essences towards facticity. In this framework, a final consideration points to the challenges raised by the exploration of this intermediate sphere of experiences involving productive imagination and pure phantasy, regarding the hierarchy and margins of the transcendental constitution.

Key words: Kant, Husserl, phantasy, imagination, transcendental philosophy, subjectivity, intersubjectivity.

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ВЫЗОВ ФАНТАЗИИ И ВООБРАЖЕНИЯ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОМУ У ГУССЕРЛЯ И КАНТА

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В данной статье исследуется место воображения и фантазии в трансцендентальной философии Канта и Гуссерля, поскольку они не подчинены внешним для них функциям. Воображение в кантовском смысле (Einbildungskraft) исполняет ключевые функции в сфере разума — как теоретического, так и практического. Но, пожалуй, у Канта оно более всего проявляет свой потенциал в субъективной области эстетики в качестве продуктивного воображения. Эта эстетическая сфера характеризуется более других в качестве собственно человеческой. В трудах Гуссерля фантазия (Phantasie) исполняет релевантную методологическую функцию в созерцании сущности и играет другие когнитивные роли. Например, это имеет место в случае эмпатии, а стало быть — интерсубъективность. Впрочем, фантазия в гуссерлевском смысле полностью проявляет свой потенциал не тогда, когда она связана с представлением посредством восприятия, но тогда, когда она является чистой и свободно движется в расширенной эйдетической сфере. Фантазия в гуссерлевской трактовке допускает не только переход от фактов к сущностям, но она допускает также и обратный путь, ограничивающий сущности в направлении фактичности. В этом контексте заключительное рассмотрение делает акцент на том, что проблемы, создаваемые этой опосредующей сферой опыта, включая продуктивное воображение или чистую фантазию в иерархию устройства трансцендентального.

Ключевые слова: Кант, Гуссерль, фантазия, воображение, трансцендентальная философия, субъективность, интерсубъективность.

I. A TRANSCENDENTAL FERNASPEKT

Husserl’s ambivalent relationship to Kant is a fact well established by excellent and well-known works that have identified, both historically and systematically, the points of agreement and disagreement between both thinkers\(^1\), and by the amount of works that have either sustained\(^2\) or denied\(^3\) the affiliation of Husserl’s philosophy to Kant’s. Those who argue that Husserl is at the antipodes of Kant rely, for example, on

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\(^1\) Among the most significant: cf. Kern (1964) and Pradelle (2012).

\(^2\) Ricoeur (1986) has tried to establish (with historical omissions) a Kantian-Hegelian affiliation of Husserl’s Phenomenology.

\(^3\) S. Bachelard, La logique de Husserl, as cited in Kelkel (1966).
the Husserlian rejection of Kant and Neo-Kantianism during the years in which he was Brentano’s disciple, in the consequent privileging of English empiricism, and in the recurrent references to the Cartesian *ego cogito* as the original discovery of transcendental subjectivity. Those who establish a filiation often rely on the relationship between the Husserlian transcendental turn and the Copernican Revolution that gave rise to Critical-Transcendental Philosophy. The present paper does not aim to review Husserl’s reconsideration of Kant’s thought, its true influence on the phenomenological-transcendental turn, or its motivations and limitations. On the contrary, the present paper takes transcendentalism as its starting point, without pretending to dissolve the ambivalent relation between Husserl, on the one hand, and Kant and neo-Kantianism, on the other. As Husserl indicates in his famous conference of May 1, 1924, delivered in Freiburg for the bicentenary of Kant’s birth, *Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie* (Husserl, 1956), taken “a certain distance, as if we were surveying from a distant point a mighty mountain range that we had often wandered through with an indefatigable interest in getting to know it, and now only the general formation, the total type, emerges for us” (Husserl, 1956, 239), “[t]he completely total global form (*Fernaspekt*) of the Kantian philosophy in its distant aspect is the idea of transcendental philosophy” (Husserl, 1956, 239). I believe this to be valid for both authors, that is, at a certain distance Kant and Husserl share certain spirit of transcendentalism.

Husserl considers himself an heir of the Copernican revolution. But to assume the Kantian inheritance does not mean, for Husserl, “to welcome his system as it is, or to improve its details, this is not what is necessary above all else, but rather to understand the ultimate sense of his revolution — and to understand him better than he himself, the trailblazer, but not the perfecter, was capable of doing” (Husserl, 1956, 286). In this sense, Husserl considers that the Copernican revolution, which is “the eternal glory” of Kant, must lead “to an essentially new and, moreover, rigorously scientific interpretation of the meaning of the world” (Husserl, 1956, 240).

Transcendental, therefore, is said in many ways. For Kant, the task of critical-transcendental philosophy is the determination of the limits and possibilities of experience from an investigation into pure reason. Although *transcendental* in Kant’s thought is one of the most difficult terms, in a general sense it is a predicate of necessary and uni-

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4 Husserl argues that Kant’s philosophy is based on the merit of the Cartesian philosophy: “The *ego cogito*, understood in its profound sense, can surely be regarded as the first form of the discovery of transcendental subjectivity” (Husserl, 1956, 241). All translations here and in what follows are mine, unless indicated otherwise, and they are contrasted with English translations when available.

5 “Our ability to cognize from a priori principles may be called pure reason, and the general inquiry into the possibility and bounds of such cognition may be called critique of pure reason” (Kant, 1908, 167).
 universal validity. Thus, for example, the conditions for all objectivity are *transcendental* conditions (the categorical synthesis and the unity of consciousness) because they are necessarily applied to every object. Transcendental cognition is a second-order cognition: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori” (Kant, 1903, 11), that is to say that it is cognition of the necessary conditions of *a priori* cognition. According to Kant, transcendental cognition deals with “the critique of cognitions” (Kant, 1911, 81). Something is said to be transcendental when the possibility of *a priori* cognition is based on that something (Kant, 1911, 132, 151). Transcendental cognition can first be distinguished from the logical-formal structures of thought; second, it is also opposed to transcendent cognition (Kant, 1911, 300, 303, 406, 524); third, since it deals only with pure *a priori* conditions of experience (Kant, 1911, 829), it is independent from experience (Kant, 1911, 829 note) and in this sense it is opposed to empirical cognition; and, finally, not all *a priori* cognition is transcendental, so that it also opposes other *a priori* cognitions, such as, for example, geometry⁶. Transcendental philosophy studies the faculties of *a priori* cognition and its functions, but not all the functions of a faculty are transcendental, since they are not all conditions of the possibility of our experience. For example, imagination is called transcendental not in all its operations, but only in its synthetic operations, that is, those that allow the application of pure concepts to the manifold given in sensibility (Kant, 1903, 118, 123)⁷.

Now, in correspondence with two kinds of concepts, that of nature and that of freedom (Kant, 1908, Introd. I, II), criticism establishes a limit between the theoretical sphere — the knowable (*kennbar*) — and the practical sphere — the thinkable (*denkbar*). “Hence an immense gulf (*eine unübersehbare Kluft*) is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible (*Sinnlichen*), and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible (*Übersinnlichen*), thus obstructing all “possible transit”

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⁶ Since defining transcendental is not my aim, here I have followed Rudolf Eisleir’s *Kant-Lexikon* (Eisleir, 1989) and Mario Caimi’s *Diccionario de la filosofía crítica kantiana* (Caimi, 2016).

⁷ “Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in a cognition. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. […] Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental if, without distinction of the intuitions, it concerns nothing but the connection of the manifold a priori, and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is represented as necessary a priori in relation to the original unity of apperception. Now since this latter is the ground of the possibility of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possible cognition, through which, therefore, all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori” (Kant, 1903, 118).
between both spheres (Kant, 1908, 175). It is this limit to what can be experienced that leads Ricoeur to define Kant’s philosophy as a phenomenology in tension with an impossible ontology. Ricoeur also argues that the Kantian problem of the limit (Grenze) will be replaced in Husserl by the problem of fullness (Fülle), so that, in phenomenological terms, it would be necessary to say that the phenomenal is that what can be fulfilled, while, the noumenal is essentially that what can only be intentioned emptily.

In the case of Husserl, the transcendental is opposed not to the empirical, but to the natural, since to philosophize he considers necessary a shift out of the naïve natural attitude of merely believing in the existence of the world. Therefore, Husserl interprets Kant’s Copernican revolution in terms of an inversion of the natural way of thinking, whose fundamental meaning is “to bring to light the sphere, absolutely hidden until then, of the ‘pure’ subjectivity and the infinite horizon of the transcendental problematic” (Husserl, 1956, 243). Thus, the importance of the transcendental reduction, which allows this shift from a credulous attitude to an attitude in which, through reflection, the true nature of experience as constituted in a transcendental subjectivity appears. But the transcendental reduction is not enough for phenomenology to be constituted as a rigorous science. There must also be a shift from facts to essences, that is, there must also occur an eidetic reduction. So transcendental phenomenology, after phenomenological reduction, is opposed both to the natural and to the factual. A parallel can thus be established between two features of the Kantian critical philosophy, the a priori or non-empirical and the universal or non-particular, and two notes of the Husserlian phenomenology, the transcendental, understood as the non-natural, and the eidetic, understood as the non-factual.

It is necessary to emphasize that both philosophies are also constructed in a spirit of hierarchy. As Deleuze argues, the Kantian system is a system of ends organized hierarchically, in which the transcendental method implies an “immanent criticism, reason as a judge of reason”, which sets out to determine “1. the true nature of the interests or ends of reason; 2. the means to realize those interests” (Deleuze, 1963, 8). With the discovery of principles in pure reason, autonomous areas of interest

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8 According to a well-established research by Oskar Becker the transcendental reduction converts the mundane object into a pure phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon for consciousness, and the eidetic reduction excludes the contingent and leads to the vision of the essence. In this sense, phenomenological reduction requires not only a reduction to the transcendental sphere, but also a reduction to the eidetic one. In addition to the fact that both reductions can be carried out independently, transcendental phenomenology can be reached starting from either of the two reductions. From the real fact, one can first go to capture its essence, and then move on from it to the pure phenomenon. Or one can first go to the pure phenomenon as a singular factum, and then advance to the eidetic dimension to reach the transcendental phenomenon in its essential features (Becker, 1973).
emerge (the theoretical-cognitive interest, the practical-moral interest and, later and relatively, the aesthetic-teleological interest), which are called superior faculties of the mind (Vermögen des Gemüts). Within each interest, the faculties of cognition (Erkenntnis Vermögen) come into concordance and align behind one faculty of cognition that takes the position of legislator in the attainment of one of the interests of reason: the understanding in cognition, reason in morality, and judgment in aesthetic and teleological experience.

This spirit of hierarchy also governs the philosophy of Husserl, mainly in a model of foundation (Fundierung), according to which acts are founded on one another allowing the emergence of increasingly complex experiences. Acts such as feelings of liking and dislike, approval or disapproval, valuation or disvaluation, pane and pleasure, and values of all kinds, are, according to Husserl, intentional acts, since the objectifying act upon which they are founded lend them the intentional directedness to an object9. So here, the spirit of hierarchy may be even stronger than in Kant, not leading to a model of autonomy, since for Husserl the practical sphere of values, latter on the Wertslehre, is founded upon the theoretical sphere (objectifying acts), without which no experience10 would be possible.

The Husserlian model of foundation, for its part, also manifests an intellectualism, in the sense of the priority of the objectifying acts that are the basis of any experience11. All experience remits or returns, ultimately, to a foundational sensible impression12, so it can be argued that in Husserl there is a priority of theoretical reason. While it is true that in the Kantian system practical reason has priority (freedom

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9 Cf. the Fifth Logical Investigation, where Husserl discusses Brentano's concept of foundation (Husserl, 1984).
10 Of course as phenomenology encounters a genetic direction in its analysis, this assertion is not entirely true.
11 “The Husserlian conception of intentionality is of an intellectualist type because it is characterized by a primacy of the theoretical relationship, of the relation of cognition. Reality, as that which is mentioned in every intentional act, that is, the other of consciousness, can only be achieved on the basis of a theoretical consciousness, that is, of an objectification [...]. This does not mean that the acts different of the theoretical ones are not intentional: desire or joy are intentional, that is, they relate to something. But if they lie to an object, they do not give birth to their own object and there is no specific sense of being that would be correlative to them. There is no desired or joy that is not previously knowledge. In short, presence is constituted in an objectifying act, and it is on the basis of this act that other acts can be related to something, to be intentional. [...] This orientation is fundamental and, despite the variations, it will never be truly contested” (Barbaras, 2015, 95).
12 “With the latest Husserl, to found does not mean to raise to the intellectuality, but on the contrary to build on the ground of the primordial, the pre-given. It is precisely the genius of Hume: to regress from signs, symbols and images to impressions” (Ricoeur, 1954–55, 61).
is the only absolute that escapes the contingency of the particular, thus guaranteeing morality), the strength of the critical building depends on the cognitive faculties and the principles that originate in them. In this sense, and considering for example the connecting function that the third Critique tries to accomplish between theoretical reason and practical reason (Kant, 1908), a certain Kantian intellectualism can be postulated. The importance of the cognitive foundation in Kant also manifests itself in the form of idealism it defends, since objectivity is reduced to the categorical synthesis that is imposed on the manifold of sensibility. Not only what is relative to the transcendental subjectivity is knowable, but also the very structures of objectivity are adapted to those of the transcendental subjectivity. Husserlian idealism, one of the most controversial points of his philosophy, lies in his understanding of the world as an intentional correlate of the constituent subjectivity or intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, this idealism does not have the same sense as in Kant, since, as Pradelle argues, Husserl reverses the Copernican revolution: objectivity is irreducible to the structures of transcendental subjectivity and rather determines the way it is apprehended (Pradelle, 2012).

Of course, gradation is inherent to the spirit of hierarchy. At the top lies the certainty, the fixed and indubitable truth, unity. At the bottom we will find the arbitrary, the multiple, the fluctuating, the factual. This gradual hierarchical model affects all spheres of interest of reason or consciousness. Kant also establishes a correlation between degrees and cognitive faculties: to sensibility with its manifold — when not submitted to concepts, can only aspire to a private validity, while objective validity is based on concepts and can result in objective cognition if the concepts originate in the understanding, whereas if they originate in reason they can only be thought without being able to be given and become objective.

Now, can it be asserted that the transcendental foundation is also subject to this spirit of hierarchy? Could there be degrees of transcendentality? How would these

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13 It may also be recalled for example, how Nietzsche accuses Kant of legitimizing aesthetics by lending the values proper to the sphere of cognition: “Intended to pay art a tribute when he singled out from the qualities of beauty those which constitute the glory of cognition: impersonality and universality” (Nietzsche, 2006, 74).

14 See also: Husserl’s fundamental theses overthrow this Copernican revolution, in a precise sense that it does absolutely no imply a return to realism: “Every object in general […] designates a regulatory structure of the transcendental subject; instead of the a priori structures of the object being regulated on the universal structures of the finite subject, on the contrary, the constitutive structures of any subjectivity in general have their foundation in the essence of the possible intentional objects” (Pradelle, 2016, 444).
degrees be reflected in the critical inquiry of reason and in the phenomenological inquiry of consciousness? Or would it be better to think about levels of rationality, instead of levels of transcendentality — which, in fact, would go through all levels of rationality equally? Furthermore, would there be a correlation between the supposed degrees of transcendentality and the cognitive faculties? Or should we keep a mere dualism between the transcendental and the other of the transcendental, for instance, the empirical in Kant and the natural factual in Husserl?

Husserl establishes a distinction, in a Kantian spirit, between three types of truths a community aims to reach and among which the highest are founded on the inferior ones:

Out of subjective and changing acceptances we toil to shape legitimately verified truths and truths that are to be verified at any time subjectively as well as intersubjectively, and finally — under the title of science — “ultimately valid” truths, the existent in the “true”, in the ultimately valid sense. (Husserl, 1956, 260)

In this sense, as noted by Husserl in this excerpt, there is, in addition to the sphere of “subjective and changing” or private validity and, in addition to the “definitive” or scientific validity, a third kind of validity; a validity of intermediate rank, neither entirely private, nor entirely objective, conceptual or categorical, which is the validity of the “intersubjectively verifiable” truths — in Husserlian terms — or subjective validity — in Kantian terms.

Now, how are we to understand this intermediate sphere? What is the place of such a sphere of validity in the architecture of reason, in the life of consciousness? Intermediate between what other spheres according to Kant and according to Husserl? Moreover, what consequences does the recognition of such a sphere have on transcendental philosophy?

II. AESTETICS AND EIDETICS:
BETWEEN THE TRANSCENDENTAL AND THE NATURAL-EMPIRICAL

II.1. THE AESTHEThIC ESSENCE OF KANTIAN IMAGINATION

In Kant, this intermediate sphere coincides with the subjective sphere of feeling, that is, with the superior faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure. It is distinguished, therefore, from the sphere of receptivity, on the one hand, and the sphere of concepts, on the other. As Kant explains in the “Preface” and the “Introduction” of the Critique of Judgment, the sphere of feeling can receive a transcendental foundation only if there
is a principle, different from the principles discovered in the first two Critiques, which also originates in reason, and that determines a certain *a priori* legality for its operation. This principle, which differs from the principle of conformity to law (*Gesetzmäßigkeit*) that originates in the understanding, and from the principle of the final purpose (*Endzweck*) that originates in reason, is the principle of conformity to purpose or purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) and originates in judgment, which is “the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal” (Kant, 1908, 179). However, the principle of the *Zweckmäßigkeit* does not originate in the determinative kind of judgment ([which operates] under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding, [and is thus] only subsumptive” (Kant, 1908, 179), but in the judgment of the *reflective* type, “which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal” (Kant, 1908, 180), because the universal is not given to him by understanding, but it has to “invent” it. In this sense, the scope of the validity of this principle is not *objective* and *universal* (they are not determinative judgments, neither synthetic *a priori* nor *a posteriori*), but *subjective*\(^{15}\). Subjective validity is neither *private* validity, since it is not founded only in sensation, nor *universal*, since it is not founded in concepts. As it does not have objective validity, the principle of the reflective judgment achieves only *heautonomy* — legislation given by the subject to itself — and not *autonomy* — self legislation\(^{16}\). In addition, it must also be remembered that Kant points out that this principle originates only in the *aesthetic* reflective judgment and not in the *teleological* reflective judgment, because the latter has an illegitimate claim to universal validity, while the former does not pretend to add cognition about phenomena but only expresses a state of mind (*Gemüt* of the subject (Kant, 1908, § 12). Thus, in Kant's critical philosophy, *subjective validity*, which is neither entirely universal nor entirely private, corresponds, in a strict sense, to the *aesthetic field*\(^{17}\).

The “Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment” deals with the judgment of the beautiful (which is an equivalent name for the judgement of taste) and the judgment of the

\(^{15}\) “That subjective [feature] of a presentation, which cannot at all become an element of cognition is the pleasure or displeasure connected with that presentation” (Kant, 1908, 189).

\(^{16}\) “So this transcendental principle must be one that reflective judgment gives as a law, but only to itself: it cannot take it from somewhere else (since judgment would then be determinative)” (Kant, 1908, 180).

\(^{17}\) Although we do not refer to “aesthetics” in the sense of the transcendental aesthetics of the *Critique of Pure Reasone* (Kant, 1903, 1911), but to the aesthetics of the *Critique of Judgement*, it must be said that the thetical function of the imagination would allow a possible unification of the two senses of aesthetics that explores Kant in the footnote to § 1 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he establishes the distinction between transcendental aesthetics and aesthetics in the sense of Baumgarten (perspective that he himself will adopt years later with the *Critique of Judgement*).
with a similar consideration of both types of judgments according to four categories, which are cross-related. On the one hand, Kant distinguishes, negatively, the judgment of taste (or judgement of the beautiful) from the volitional judgments (of the sensible appetite, and of the useful good and the good in itself) in the first and third moment of the “Analytic of the Beautiful”: according to the quality, the judgment of taste is disinterested (regarding the existence or non-existence of the object), while, according to purposiveness, it is purposiveness without purpose. On the other hand, Kant also distinguishes the judgment of taste from cognitive judgments in the second and fourth moments of the “Analytic of the Beautiful”: according to the quantity, it has a subjective universality and according to the modality, it has a conditioned necessity. In general terms, subjective universality and conditioned necessity explain how it is possible for an aesthetic judgment to aspire to a higher validity than that of the merely private (in the judgment of taste it is worthless to say “everyone has his own particular taste” (Kant, 1908, § 7, 212)), without falling into an essentialism by postulating an idea of beauty as an objective predicate. But what is it that allows us to assume that others will judge beauty as I do, if it is a feeling and not an objective quality?

The “Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment” does not determine the effective conditions under which empirical judgments are shared; instead, it determines the formal and subjective conditions of possibility for the feeling of pleasure that is expressed in the form of the judgment of beauty (or the sublime): “it does not say that everyone will agree with my judgment, but that they ought to” (er sagt nicht, daß jedermann mit unserm Urteile übereinstimmen werde, sondern damit zusammenstimmen solle) (Kant, 1908, § 22). It is not an obligation (an apodictic necessity, a must: ein Muss), but rather ein Sollen (a should or an ought to). In systematic terms, this subjective universality is based on the universality of the cognitive faculties that intervene in the aesthetic experience: the imagination in free play with the understanding, in the case of the beautiful, and the imagination in free play with reason, in the case of the sublime (hence the intellectualism criticized by Nietzsche). That is why Kant argues, in relation to modality, that “as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be

\[18\] The Critique of Judgement is divided into the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement” and the “Critique of Teleological Judgement”; the first part is divided into “Analytic” and “Dialectic” of the Aesthetic Judgement. The “Analytic of the Aesthetic Judgement” is also divided in two: the “Analytic of the Judgement of Taste”, which is the same as the judgement of the beautiful, and the “Analytic of the Judgement of the Sublime”.

\[19\] This is a kind of “aesthetic Copernican revolution”, analogous to the transcendental turn in cognition. As well as the reading of Hume awoke Kant from his dogmatic dream concerning cognition, the reading of Burke awakens him from his aesthetic dogmatism (Kant, 1908, 277).
called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state” (Kant, 1908, § 18).

But what is Kant referring to with this conditional agreement from everyone? That it is essential for aesthetic judgments to make a claim of validity for each one, that is, that in an aesthetic judgment I take into account the other subjects of the community to which I belong, or, rather, other transcendental subjects (let us add, with Husserl, also those who are no longer and those who are not yet): “although it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the object, considered in its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the entire sphere of judging persons” (über die ganze Sphäre der Urteilenden) (Kant, 1908, § 8). Kant calls that inclusion of others in my judgment — a consideration that saves the judgment from being limited to a particular subject and raises it to a certain range of universality — common sense:

So they must have a subjective principle, which determines […] what is liked or disliked. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a common sense […] (sensus communis). […] Only under the presupposition, therefore, that there is a common sense (by which, however, we also do not mean an outer sense, but mean the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers) — only under the presupposition of such a common sense, I maintain, can judgments of taste be made. (Kant, 1908, § 20)

Now, what place does the sphere of subjectivity (which seems to anticipate Husserlian intersubjectivity) occupy in the hierarchy of the cognitive faculties? Should we simply consider that it coincides with the domain of judgment in its reflective function? On the contrary, I believe that its intermediate place corresponds to the “ladder” of the imagination (Einbildungskraft). While it is true that reflective judgment is responsible for the transition from the phenomenal to the noumenal, to connect the sensible with the supersensible, the imagination connects the particular and the universal in many places of the critical system (especially through the synthesis of the reproduction of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and through the Schematism, which is the place of a “suture” between sensibility and the faculty of concepts).

Unlike Heidegger, who stresses in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics the pivotal role of Schematism (Heidegger, 1991, § 19–23), Husserl is interested in synthesis as a constituting Leistung of consciousness (Husserl, 1966, 275 ff.). He is particularly

20 “The time of Schematism sutures receptivity and spontaneity, diversity and unity; it is my power to order and the threat of ever escaping and of undoing me; it is indivisibly the possible rationality of order and the ever-renewing irrationality of lived experience; he looks towards affection, in which it is the pure flow, and towards intellectuality, since schemas appear as the possible structuring for ‘series’, ‘content’, ‘order’ (A 145)” (Ricoeur, 1954–55, 52).
interested by the synthesis of the reproductive imagination that appears in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he finds an intentional analysis *avant la lettre*\(^\text{21}\), even though Kant himself did not “recognize” it\(^\text{22}\). Although Husserl compares it with his own *passive syntheses*, perhaps it should be rather compared with *retention*, as Kern suggests (Kern, 1964). In this case, it would be a *positing* function of consciousness; and, therefore, it would not belong, in the strict sense, to the domain of the non-positing presentification, which is phantasy (*Phantasie*). In a certain sense, the transcendental *Einbildungskraf* fulfills a positing function. Schemes, which give the rules of temporal determination (*Zeitbestimmung*) for the concepts, would be rules of “positing” (*Setzbarkeit*) in the sense that they give the conditions under which something can be inscribed in a *temporal* order—and it may be even possible to think of a *spatial* positing as well\(^\text{23}\). In fact, I believe that the well-known reduction of this function of the imagination to that of understanding in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be explained in terms of a reduction of the synthetic role of the imagination to a merely *thetic* role. Alexis Philonenko points out the thetic and original element of the transcendental imagination (Philonenko, 1988), and Iso Kern argues that while Kant emphasizes the relational moment, the “*syn*” of the *syn*-thetic, Husserl emphasizes the *thetic* moment of consciousness (Kern, 1964)\(^\text{24}\).

\(^{21}\) “It is of historical interest to recall here Kant’s brilliant insights that are expressed in his profound but obscure doctrine of the synthesis of productive imagination, above all in his transcendental deduction from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*” (Husserl, 1966, 275, 410).

\(^{22}\) “When Kant in his great work speaks of an analytic synthesis, he means cognition deployed there in explicit forms of concepts and judgments, and this points back, for him, to a productive synthesis. But, in our view, that is nothing other than what we call passive constitution. […] Since Kant was not in the position to recognize the essence of passive production as intentional constitution, and could not yet see the actual task of making systematically intelligible the essential necessities of the constitution of all objective formations and the path of their order of foundation, he also understandably missed the problem of evidence” (Husserl, 1966, 276, 410).

\(^{23}\) Although the distinction between the temporality of the internal sense and the spatiality of the external sense cannot be annulled, it could be considered an extension of this “positional function” of the schemes also to space. See for example the work of Gregg E. Franzwa, “Space and Schematism”, where he considers the possibility of spatial schemes in addition to temporal ones (Franzwa, 1978).

\(^{24}\) “According to Husserl, because Kant defined experience as synthesis, he had already grasped the basic structure of subjectivity in general (the peculiarity of intentional connections). That Husserl’s concept of synthesis, which already plays a decisive role in the *Logical Investigations*, can be directly or indirectly attributed to Kant, can be regarded as certain. However, it should be noted that Husserl emphasizes the moment of ‘thesis’ or ‘setting’ (the ‘Doxa’) of the Synthesis, whereas in Kant the accent is solely on the ‘syn’, on the connecting. Correlatively, a corresponding difference in the concept of being would be recorded” (Kern, 1964, 249).
Now, can it be claimed that the characterized subjective validity, intermediate between the contingency of particular experience and the universality of the concepts, corresponds to the synthetic and transcendental function of imagination? Is there not a non-cognitive function more essential to imagination taking place in the sensus communis?

Imagination in Kant fulfills different functions, according to the domain of reason in which it is circumscribed. The imagination synthesizes (a function that later becomes that of understanding); it gives schemas, as pure transcendental imagination, or images, as empirical transcendental imagination; it gives types [Typus] in practical reason; and it gives examples in the aesthetic-teleological sphere. As it is defined in the Anthropology in Pragmatic Sense (Kant, 1907, 167), imagination belongs to sensibility and differs from sense as it allows the intuition not only in presence, but also in absence of the object (Caimi, 2011). There are three types of imagination defined in the Anthropology. Firstly, phantasy, which is “the power of the imagination, insofar as it produces images involuntarily” (Kant, 1907, 167) and resembles the dream. Then the productive or poetic imagination, which, though it is productive, is not creative because “it is not capable of producing a sense representation that was never given to our faculty of sense; one can always furnish evidence of the material of its ideas” (Kant, 1907, 167). And finally, the reproductive or evocative imagination.

The subjective validity of common sense does not seem to be connected to the transcendental imagination, that is, to the reproductive imagination that fulfills its function under the legislation of understanding in pursuit of a cognitive interest, precisely because it is the principle of the Gesetzmässigkeit that governs it and that imagination adjusts to the legality of experience in general (Jáuregui, 2011).

As Kant argues in the Critique of Judgment, subjective validity is subscribed to the framework of productive imagination that enters into free play with the under-

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25 Kant continues by saying: "so no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the material for its images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories formed of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding" (Kant, 1907, 168).

26 In a not yet published conference given by Heiner Klemme in Buenos Aires the 19th September 2016, he stated that if we ask ourselves why Kant distinguishes between understanding and imagination, two answers arise: First, imagination describes the ability to imagine something that is not given in sensibility. Secondly, there must be some form of the connection (Verknüpfung) of representations that does not express an objective unity of our representations. This must be possible because otherwise there would be no mistake and no phantasy. Every judgment would be true. If there were no difference between understanding and imagination, every judgment would be a judgment of experience (Erfahrungsurteil).
standing or with reason: “in a judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom. This implies, first of all, that this power is here not taken as reproductive, where it is subject to the laws of association, but as productive and spontaneous (as the originator of chosen forms of possible intuitions)” (als productiv und selbstthätig (als Urheberin willkürlicher Formen möglicher Anschauungen)) (Kant, 1908, 240; Kant, 1907, 169). It is an imagination that only fits the quasi-legality of reflectiveness, of the examples that are examples of a rule that we are not able to state (einer allgemeinen Regel, die man nicht angeben kann) (Kant, 1908, § 18). Subjective or exemplary validity is, then, that of the judgments of the particular (this is beautiful, this is ugly, etc.); those that, however, see “in the particular that which is valid for more than one case” (Arendt, 2003b, 153). This is the reason why Hannah Arendt was more interested in the third Critic than in the second one: the Critique of Judgment deals with the particular, with the faculty of judging as a capacity for the particular, and with “sociability as a condition for exercising that capacity” (Arendt, 2003a, 35). This common sense, this consideration of others in my judgments of evaluation of the particular has a practical-political meaning, because “without other people, it would be meaningless to regulate one’s own behaviour” (Arendt, 2003a, 45), and this refers to the legality that Husserl thematizes as intersubjectivity. Reflective judgments make it possible to evaluate (beurteilen) and not only to judge (urteilen), that is, they allow a reflection pertaining to the particular. But it is imagination that provides the “matter” for such reflection, which allows one to intuit that for which no concept is adequate. Thus, it may be said that the place of the true Kantian imagination is between the empirical and the transcendental.

II.2. HUSSERLIAN FREE PHANTASY

The Husserlian phantasy (Phantasie) also has cognitive functions that, in analogy with the Kantian system, can be understood as operating in a legal framework that is external to it and that also involves exemplarity. However, the role of the Phantasie in Husserl’s phenomenology is considerably more relevant than that of the Einbildungskraft in the Kantian critical system. I am of course referring to the imaginative variation that allows the intuition of essences (Wesensschau), that is, the liberation

27 “The decisive difference between the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment is that the moral norms of the first of them are valid for all intelligible beings, while the rules of the latter limit their validity strictly to human beings. The second link is that the faculty of judging deals with individuals, who ‘as such, in consideration of the universal, contain something of contingent’ [Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 76]” (Arendt, 2003a, 33).
of contingency through an operation of intuitive capture of a pure, necessary, and *a priori* generality. This operation consists of taking as a starting point a particular given within an experience or something imagined, for example “red” or “home” (Husserl, 1976, 41), and varying that guide model with similar images to find, through an infinite multiplicity arbitrarily produced, what is common to the examples. Thus, through variation, the singular cases must be considered as examples of a rule that, in this case, will have to be reached: “It is of the universal essence of the immediately intuitive seizing upon essences that […] it can be effected on the ground of mere presentation of exemplificative single particulars” (Husserl, 1976, 129). The result of this operation, the invariant that endures through the different modifications of the model used as a starting point, is the essence, *eidos*, or idea.

If, as I have anticipated above, phenomenology depends as much on the reduction of the natural to the transcendental, as on the reduction of facts to essences, then the fact that the possibility of intuiting essences depends on the phantasy explains why Husserl, in the § 70 of *Ideas I*, assigns to phantasy the place of the “touchstone of the phenomenological method” (Embree, 1997, 341):

Thus if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually say, and if one is means the ambiguous phrase in the right sense, one can say in strict truth, that “feigning” (*Fiktion*) makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science, that feigning is the source (*Quelle*) from which the cognition of “eternal truths” is fed. (Husserl, 1976, 222)

Among the objections that have been raised against the method of the *Wesensschau*, one should recall Merleau-Ponty’s in *The Visible and the Invisible*, who aims to point out that “the error of Husserl is to move from the ‘without which’ to ‘that because of which’” (Barbaras, 2015, 66), that is, Merleau-Ponty considers that by relying on the facts, the eidetic reduction depends on the empirical without truly transcending the world. In short, Barbaras will say,

What is finally at stake here is the status of phantasy, in its double dimension: of freedom in relation to the given, which Husserl accuses, and of dependence in relation to the given, which Merleau-Ponty emphasizes. Can imagination transcend the world in which it is not necessarily inscribed? (Barbaras, 2015, 67)

This “double dimension of phantasy” is well established in the fact that it not only allows, as it has been shown, to go from the facts to the essences, to free facts from the limitation of their facticity, but also allows the reverse path, that goes from the essences to their factual possibilities.
In a text in which Husserl explores the relationship between pure possibilities and phantasy, it is argued that the phantasy of something, insofar as it does not imply putting the phantasized in relation to the existing, is, in an ontological sense, “previous” to pure possibility. “To phantasize” an essence means *posing* (setzen) the phantasy of an essence, or better yet, *supposing* (versetzen) the spatio-temporal conditions of the possibility of an essence. In this sense, the phantasy would produce a sort of limitation or first “particularization” (Husserl, 1980, 562) of the essence in direction to the facts:

We must therefore distinguish what is phantasied from the pure ideal possibility […] What is possible is possibly existent. […] Hence what is phantasied is absolutely subjective and not something in itself; possibilities however, do exist in themselves. Suppositions are not phantasies but “impressions” brought about on the basis of phantasies. […] All phantasies that are alike, that is, all like phantasy intuitions, phantasy experiences that become quasi-fulfilled in phantasy, give me the same essence; specifically, the same concrete essence. Each such essence has a range of “individual possibilities”. That means that the closest individuation of an essence is a phantasy of something individual; that is, of something hovering before me *hic et nunc* that I can identify in the phantasy attitude only in repetition. […] But then I can suppose that what hovers before me exists — in the nexus of my real factual existence, of course — and in that case I have a possibility. (Husserl, 1980, 569)

Now, the phantasy that *intuits* and the phantasy that *limits* essences is a motivated and guided phantasy, but not completely free, that is, drawn at its own discretion, to its own fluctuation. In its constitutive functions, phantasy is bound (*verbunden* or *gebunden*) to a presentation, to something real, to a presence in flesh and blood. It can be the individual that serves as the starting point of the variation, or the body of others in empathy (Husserl, 1973, 499), or the cultural object or the monument or the historical document that serves as a basis for the presentation of a bygone era. In all of those cases phantasy operates on and from those presentations.

But there are also in Husserl different kinds of imagination or phantasy. Literature on the subject has debated between accepting a unitary concept of imagination (*Imagination*) that contains different species of consciousness (basically image consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*) and phantasy (*Phantasie*)) and considering these two species as types of experiences irreducible to one another28. In the lectures and re-

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28 With the publication of the lectures of the winter semester 1904/05 in *Husserliana XXIII* as text N°1, the dispute comes to an end, since in them Husserl concludes that phantasy and image consciousness are irreducibility to one another. Prior to the publication of *Husserliana XXIII* (Husserl, 1980), the most representative view in favour of the unitary vision is that of Saraiva (1970). More recently Dubosson (2004) expresses the opposite and more accurate view.
search manuscripts in which Husserl has dealt with these subjects, it is said that the concept of image consciousness must be reserved for what in the strict sense should be called imagination (imaginatio), that is, the types of consciousness that involve or represent by means of an image (imago) (Husserl, 1980). The term Phantasie, on the other hand, is a more general term to which, in addition to different types of phantasy, experiences that involve images can be referred; this is due to the fact that image consciousness is a complex type of consciousness in which there are two intertwined apprehensions, a perceptive one (that will be neutralized but will lend its sensible matter) and a phantasy one29. In addition to the complex image consciousness, phantasy must “include perceptual and reproductive” (Husserl, 1980, 591). Similarly to the Kantian division of imagination between free phantasy, productive imagination and reproductive imagination, in Husserl, in addition to a “mere” (bloss), “free” (freie) or “pure” (reine or pure) phantasy, and a perceptive phantasy (which takes place when watching a play30), there is also a completely free phantasy31.

As in Kant, the true potency of the Husserlian phantasy may not be shown in its constitutive function, when it is bound to a presentation, but only when it is free. But is a completely free phantasy the most characteristic function of this kind of consciousness? Actually not, because Husserl repeatedly questions the bare possibility of these kinds of totally free or totally unchained phantasies that would correspond to a passive phantasizing, to a surrender to the free configuration of images (Husserl, 1980, 236). And this for, at least, two reasons. On the one hand, every phantasy is an Ichakt, that is, it is the experience of a connected and unitary self. On the other hand, as Kant warned about the productive imagination, phantasy does not create ex nihilo, but rather every phantasy could be decomposed into its impressions. Completely free phantasies would be hallucination but not phantasy. In this sense, the essence of phantasy is exhibited when it is pure or mere phantasy. It is also necessary to ask whether, as in Kant, its “legitimate” place is the aesthetic sphere. Although there are significant excerpts that point in this direction32, I believe that it is not possible, at least in Husserl,  

29 For an abbreviated version of this research see Katz (2016).
30 The work is constituted as a total image-object that represents an imaginary world; the work is annulled intrinsically but not by the conflict with the surroundings, that is, not as it happens in the contemplation of an image, but annulled in itself: “the image figment is a nullity of a unique type” (Husserl, 1980, 491). Cf. Husserl (1980, 585).
31 We leave aside the types of phantasy that arise by modifying their modes of giving according to fullness, clarity or darkness, etc. And we also put aside the two possible attitudes to a phantasy: the living in it (Hineinphantasieren) and the mere floating (Vroschweben) of phantasy.
32 “Extraordinary profit can be drawn from the offerings of history, in even more abundant measure from those of art, and especially from poetry, which are, to be sure, imaginary but which, in the
to restrict the domain of pure phantasy to its aesthetic function. The place of phantasy in Husserlian phenomenology is in fact that of the *eidetic sphere*. According to this, phantasy would command the border between aesthetics and logic, but its original place is between the merely natural and the pure transcendental\(^{33}\).

**III. BEYOND AND BELOW TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY**

Up to this point, I have suggested that there is a common transcendental aspect in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl. Also common to both is a *spirit of hierarchy*, which crosses all the dimensions of the architectonic of reason and the phenomenological research. It has then been asked whether this spirit of hierarchy can also affect the transcendental foundation, subjecting it to a certain gradation. A dualist perspective (in which the transcendental is opposed to the empirical and the particular in Kantian Critical philosophy, and the factual and natural in Husserlian Phenomenology) would lead to a mere reversal of the order of foundation, that is, it would lead to a return to a naïve kind of empiricism or psychologism. But both authors find an intermediate sphere of foundation and validity that allows a triadic reading of their philosophies. This intermediate sphere between the empirical and the transcendental, between the particular and the universal, between the knowable and the supersensible depends on the possibility of *intuiting something not present* in the strict sense. This possibility is primarily a possibility of the Kantian *Einbildungskraft* or the Husserlian *Phantasie*.

Sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, both the Kantian *Einbildungskraft* and the Husserlian *Phantasie* are present in multiple dimensions of their analysis. Assuming key functions in the theoretical reason and in the practical reason, the Kantian imagination overflows the territory of experience: *Below* objectifying experience, in the case of the beautiful, *beyond* objectifying experience in the case of the sublime, or as intuition of aesthetic ideas in the case of genius. But although Kant restricts the arbitrariness and freedom of imagination to aesthetics, we can see a wider presence of this “art hidden in the depths of the human soul” (*verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen* originality of their invention of forms (*Neugestaltungen*), the abundance of their single features and the unbrokenness of their motivation, tower high above the products of our own phantasy and, in addition, when they are apprehended understandingly, become converted into perfectly clear fantasies with particular ease owing to the suggestive power exerted by artistic means of presentation” (Husserl, 1976, 132; 160 E).

\(^{33}\) For the passage from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology through an eidetic period circa 1903, see Lavigne (2005).
der menschlichen Seele) (Kant, 1903, 141). As Ricoeur points out, with respect to the imagination, and in particular in the Schematism, “Never has Kant been more free in regard to his epistemological concerns” (Ricoeur, 1954–1955, 52). In some places Kant has even pointed out the impossibility of thinking without images. Moreover, the place that Kant assigns to the imagination is a preponderantly anthropological place. As argued in the Critique of Judgment, aesthetic experience, for which imagination occupies an almost legislative role, delineates what is exclusively human:

Agreeableness [satisfaction of the senses] holds for nonrational animals too; beauty [taste of the imagination] only for human beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal as well; the good, however, holds for every rational being as such. (Kant, 1908, § 5)

In Husserl’s phenomenology, phantasy occupies a privileged position. And this is not only because it allows the intuition of essences. Husserlian phantasy allows, as I have pointed out, also the limitation of essences with the conditions of facticity, that is, it particularizes essences into possibilities as well. And furthermore, I believe there can be also pointed out an harmonizing function in experience, as it does in Hume’s thought, where phantasy comes to the salvation in the face of the objection of the impossibility of recognizing a tone of blue that has never been experienced. Also in Husserl, I believe, phantasy collaborates in the concordance (Einstimmung) of experience by providing intuitions of the inactual. Phantasy brings about the “completion” or “harmonization” of what can never be given to us in flesh and blood. This is the paradigmatic case of the experience of the alter ego. Firstly, phantasy modifies the here of the one’s own body (Leib) into its there, which is a condition for the possibility of the analogizing transference of the sense “own body” to the foreign “own body”. Secondly, phantasy also allows the appresentations of increasingly complex degrees of subjective life that are mounted on the experience of one’s own body (Husserl, 1976; Husserl, 1950, § 51–52). Moreover, to the extent that intersubjectivity is based on the possibility of the experience of the alter ego, which depends radically on functions of phantasy, the latter appears again as central with respect to the intermediate sphere of foundation: that of the “subjective and intersubjectively verifiable at all times” truths, quoted above.

34 “Rather, we must prove only that the contrast I between such an intellect and lour discursive understanding — an understanding which requires images (unseres diskursiven, der Bilder bedürftigen, Verstandes) (it is an intellectus ectypus) — and the contingency of its having this character lead us to that idea (of an intellectus archetypus), and we must prove that this idea does not involve a contradiction” (Kant, 1908, § 77).
Now, the sphere of Husserlian intersubjectivity and the subjective sphere of Kantian common sense share the representation of the domain of what is *most properly human*. And if both, imagination in common sense and phantasy in intersubjectivity, play a fundamental anthropological role, can it be thought that the hierarchy of the critical and phenomenological transcendental building is thus threatened? Isn’t the hierarchical order of foundation at least convulsed in the light of the importance of imagination and phantasy in the most basic and extended levels of constitution of the experience and consciousness? And would this be due — as a certain branch of contemporary phenomenology states — to the exacerbated possibility of claiming an intuitive access to the absolute, to the supersensible, to the inactual, or, on the contrary, because of the place from which the ontological question can be raised? Of course, it can be argued that the sphere of the human departs from the sphere of the transcendental subject and that, moreover, the anthropological question is an empirical question, which in no way affects transcendentalism. And yet, are not all spheres of reason subordinated to the anthropological question, including the question of freedom, as Kant has stated more than once?35 Imagination and phantasy become in the critical-phenomenological legitimation, the Quelle from which the intuition of infinite possibilities is fed — possibilities that go *beyond and below* the infinite horizons of reality.

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35 “Philosophy, in the cosmopolitan sense of the word is directed to the following questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope for? What is a human being? The first question is answered in metaphysics, the second in morals, the third in religion, and the fourth in anthropology. But deep down we could lead everything to anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last one” (Kant, 1966, 25).


This paper aims to highlight the fact that Kantian philosophy and phenomenology do not only tend to disclose the structures of a priori knowledge. Contrariwise, we suggest that the transcendental may also be understood by a detour towards the empirical. Our first example concerns Kant as he developed a certain prefiguration of the phenomenological considerations and described a way to consider the subject in a naturalistic way by introducing the notion of Selbstsetzung in his latest work. By comparing the way Kant and Husserl thought the need to consider that the subject is embodied in the world, we also point out that Husserl improved the Kantian problematic of the Selbstsetzung as he described a transcendental and scientific method to apprehend the life of the subject. Nevertheless, this method may also be defined as a “phenomenological naturalism” in so far as the questions Husserl brings to light can be seen as the seeds of the current attempt to naturalize phenomenology. In this context, we aim to demonstrate that Kant’s first comprehension of the Selbstsetzung prefigures the development of the phenomenological turning point from a static to a genetic method. Furthermore, this genetic method may be conceived as an original form of naturalism which is able to illuminate the current cognitive sciences by focusing on the first-person perspective and on crucial themes like the flesh, consciousness, etc. Eventually, we conclude that this turning point may have been an inspiration for the naturalization of phenomenology.

Key words: Phenomenology, naturalism, Kant, Husserl, transcendental, practical philosophy, epistemology.
Цель этой статьи — продемонстрировать, что кантовская философия и феноменология не только направлены на раскрытие структур априорного знания. Напротив, мы полагаем, что трансцендентальное может быть понято окольным путем через эмпирическое. Наш первый пример связан с Кантом, поскольку он создал известный прообраз феноменологических исследований и описал натуралитический способ рассмотрения субъекта, введя понятие Selbstsetzung в своем позднейшем труде. Сравнивая способ, которым Кант и Гуссерль продумывали необходимость рассматривать субъекта с точки зрения его телесного бытия в мире, мы также обращаем внимание на то, что Гуссерль усовершенствовал кантовскую проблематику Selbstsetzung, описав трансцендентальный и научный метод понимания жизни субъекта. Тем не менее, этот метод может быть также определен как «феноменологический натурализм» в той мере, в какой поднимаемые Гуссерлем вопросы могут рассматриваться как исходные пункты современной попытки натурализации феноменологии. В этой связи мы намерены показать, что исходное кантовское понимание Selbstsetzung предвосхищает феноменологический поворот от статического к генетическому методу. Более того, этот генетический метод может быть понят как оригинальная форма натурализма, которая способна прояснить современные когнитивные науки, фокусируясь на перспективе первого лица и таких ключевых темах, как тело, сознание etc. В конце статьи делается вывод о том, что этот поворотный пункт может служить стимулом для натурализации феноменологии.

Ключевые слова: Феноменология, натурализм, Кант, Гуссерль, трансцендентальное, практическая философия, эпистемология.

INTRODUCTION

Kant et Husserl ont tous deux développé une philosophie dite transcendantale. L’apport de tels projets est conséquent, car il permet de saisir à la fois les cadres a priori à l’origine de la formation du savoir et, dans le cas de Husserl, la portée d’une reconquête du sens à partir d’un retour vers l’ego meditans. Or, dans cette optique épistémologique de fondation ultime de toute forme de connaissance, ces auteurs ont tous deux opéré un revirement conséquent dans leur philosophie qui a mené à considérer le sujet, non plus comme une forme logique et impersonnelle, mais comme un être situé et incarné. Kant, le premier, a mis au point une philosophie critique qui avait pour fin de décrire de quelle façon le sujet transcendantal accorde du sens au monde,
tout en mettant en avant la frontière infranchissable qu’il y a entre lui et le domaine du phénoménal. Pourtant, cette forme de transcendantalisation trouve ses limites dans l’élaboration des notions d’autoposition (Selbstsetzung) et d’autoaffection lesquelles suggèrent que le sujet est un être situé dans le monde, un être qui s’auto-positionne en son sein. Il s’agit là d’une forme embryonnaire de naturalisme qui vise à comprendre le sujet comme un être au monde, c’est-à-dire à reconnaître le sujet dans sa mondanéité. Ce revirement, nous le voyons également dans la phénoménologie développée par Husserl, en particulier après la publication du premier volume des Ideen, lequel demeure essentiellement statique et kantien. Le tournant dit « génétique » de la phénoménologie est crucial, car il perpétue ce même besoin de recourir à une analyse qui ne soit pas strictement transcendantale, mais qui promeut également la vie du sujet en ses dimensions concrètes. Ce faisant, la phénoménologie opère un mouvement pareil à celui de la philosophie kantienne, mais demeure néanmoins problématique, car elle ne prend que peu en compte la dimension strictement naturelle du sujet. Est-ce ainsi possible de décrire de tels revirements comme des preuves d’une naturalisation embryonnaire ? Rappelons que la thèse de la naturalisation est que « le domaine entier de la nature, y compris la nature humaine, ne comprend que des entités et processus susceptibles d’une […] analyse quantitative » (Cobb-Stevens, 1998, 217). Or ce type de naturalisation est largement remis en question par Kant et Husserl, ce qui contredit à première vue toute tentative d’établir un lien entre leur philosophie et toute entreprise naturaliste. Pourtant, en ayant pour objectif de décrire ce besoin de développer une philosophie qui ne pratique pas une transcendantalisation exacerbée de la vie du sujet, nous souhaitons montrer que Kant et Husserl ont tous deux posé les jalons de l’actuelle naturalisation de la phénoménologie. En particulier, nous suggérons que les textes tardifs de Husserl sont empreints d’un certain « naturalisme phénoménologique » en ce qu’ils portent sur le problème de la nature entendu non pas en des termes scientifiques, mais en un sens phénoménologique, du fait qu’il nous procure une lecture renouvelée de la notion de vie. Nous tenterons dès lors de mettre en lumière l’apport de ces deux philosophies en ce qui concerne la proposition d’une naturalisation de la phénoménologie qui soit pleinement phénoménologique. Nous aurons ainsi l’occasion de revenir sur certains points ambivalement de la pensée kantienne et de la phénoménologie, pour mettre en avant le fait que ces pensées ne portent pas atteinte aux entreprises visant une naturalisation de même qu’une science globale de la vie subjective, mais viennent les compléter. Nous espérons ainsi démontrer que la question du transcendantal va de pair avec la question du naturalisme dans le cadre de la philosophie kantienne et de la phénoménologie husserlienne en ce qu’elles rendent possible une étude cogénérative.
UN REVIREMENT PHENOMENOLOGIQUE ET NATURALISTE DANS L'OPUS POSTUMUM DE KANT ?

En ayant pour fin d'attribuer une primauté au sujet épistémique, Kant s'applique à décrire les cadres *a priori* permettant à celui-ci d’apprécier et de concevoir une chose. Il fait pour cela appel aux formes pures de l’intuition que sont l’espace et le temps, de même qu’aux catégories de l’entendement qui sont des fonctions logiques et des représentations des choses. C’est au travers de ces formes pures et de ces catégories, pures ou en lien avec le sensible, que le sujet est capable de distinguer les divers éléments qui se présentent à lui et d’acquérir une connaissance de la chose visée sous une forme unifiée. Néanmoins un tel examen des cadres *a priori*, loin d’être un exercice psychologique d’introspection, requiert de ne situer le fondement de la connaissance ni en dehors du sujet transcendantal ni à partir des qualités physiques du sujet, sous peine de perpétuer tantôt un cartésianisme suranné, tantôt un empirisme réductionniste qui réduirait chacun des vécus à des faits. L’impératif épistémologique du criticiisme kantien est de trouver le fondement apodictique d’une connaissance pour garantir une science qui prenne appui sur un fondement indubitable. Or ce fondement doit puiser sa source dans le sujet qui se définit dès lors comme *denkendes Ich*, sujet pensant, dont la particularité est de ne pas être uniquement considéré comme moi empirique, dont on peut attester l’existence durant l’expérience sensible quotidienne à la manière de tout autre objet intramondain, mais aussi d’inclure en soi une sphère primitive qualifiée de moi pur (*reine Ich*) appréhendé par déduction: « Kant soutient qu’on ne saurait faire l’économie d’un sujet de l’expérience potentiellement conscient de soi-même. Il qualifie ce sujet de “transcendantal”, car il ne saurait être appréhendé par la conscience empirique ni étudié par les sciences empiriques. En outre, l’accès à la dimension transcendantale s’avère toujours d’ordre déductif, plutôt qu’intuitif, puisqu’il n’y a pas d’intuitions non sensibles » (Cobb-Stevens, 1998, 197). Cette instance originale est le principe premier dont rien ne peut être dit, sinon qu’il « doit nécessairement pouvoir accompagner toutes mes représentations » (Kant, 2006, 198). Non hypostasié, le Je kantien n’est ni une substance ni un élément réal. Contrairement à Descartes, Kant reprend ainsi l’*ego cogito* afin d’y déceler une unité première et synthétique, qui, dépossédée de tout ancrage mondain, est présente sans pour autant être une chose empirique. Il s’agit là d’un principe originaire et synthétique que Kant nomme l’aperception pure, c’est-à-dire l’unité transcendantale ou la conscience de soi pure à partir de laquelle toute connaissance est possible. En ce sens, Kant se distingue de Descartes et nous trouvons dans les *Paralogismes*, en l’occurrence lorsqu’il traite de l’argument de la psychologie rationnelle, l’expression de son opposition radicale avec
la position cartésienne. Il y souligne l’illusion qui a poussé la tradition néo-cartésienne à hypostasier à tort l’ego :

La proposition : Je suis simple doit être considérée comme une expression immédiate de l’aperception, tout comme le prétendu raisonnement de Descartes : cogito, ergo sum, est en fait tautologique, dans la mesure où le cogito (sum cogitans) énonce immédiatement l’effectivité. […] Mais c'est manifeste que le sujet de l’inhibition est indiqué […] sans qu'en soit remarquée la moindre propriété […] Il signifie un quelque chose en général (sujet transcendantal) dont la représentation doit être absolument simple précisément parce que l'on n'y détermine rigoureusement rien. (Kant, 2006, 368)

Kant reprend ainsi le raisonnement de Descartes afin de montrer le caractère tautologique, mais surtout perlocutoire de son énoncé: « le cogito énonce immédiatement l'effectivité ». Il affirme en conséquence et sans détour que la présence du Je n'est pas seulement nécessaire, mais permanente, et avant tout qu’il n'y a aucune connaissance possible du Je en-dehors de la simple énonciation de cette effectivité. Si connaissance il y avait du moi, « des jugements synthétiques a priori seraient possibles en dehors de toute expérience » (Philonenko, 1969, 240), or cela n'est pas le cas. Le Je ne doit pas seulement pouvoir accompagner chacune des représentations, il les accompagne toutes comme point-origine, mais n'est pas une représentation comme les autres ni même l'objet d'une quelconque connaissance. Inconnu à lui-même, le Je kantien n'est qu'un principe. Mais ce qui est certainement le plus notable dans cette optique est l'opacité du Je qui s'illustre le mieux lorsqu'il est question de l'« inconscient » — thème similaire à la synthèse passive dont fait état Husserl. En effet, l'une des principales difficultés relatives à la thèse kantienne du Je tient en cela que les représentations accompagnées nécessairement par le Je ne peuvent toutes être limpides. Victime d'illusions, de représentations pour le moins confuses et de pulsions, l'expérience du sujet épistémique est soumise à un enchaînement d'événements disparates. Kant va jusqu'à affirmer, non sans esprit de paradoxe, que c'est « le champ des représentations obscures qui, en l'homme, est le plus vaste » (Kant, 1993, 63), mais cela n'empêche nullement que ce même champ ne puisse être éclairci par la suite. Lors de telles représentations le Je n'est ni tout à fait absent ni tout à fait présent. Il serait plus adéquat de dire qu'il s'agit d'une « conscience médiate d'une représentation, sans que nous en soyons immédiatement conscients » (Kant, 1993, 62). Ainsi le Je, en tant qu'unité logique permettant la synthèse du divers de l'intuition, accompagne nécessairement toutes mes représentations. À la manière d'un éveil, chaque expérience peut par la suite être recouverte. En effet, l'inconscient kantien est une absence d'attention qui peut être recouverte par une conversion attentionnelle, en un sens similaire à l'activité de la synthèse passive mise en lumière par Husserl, laquelle nous permet
d'être toujours confrontés à des objets sans pour autant que nous soyons attentifs à tel ou tel objet. L’aperception pure (apperceptio) ou transcendante du moi, distincte de l’aperception empirique, s’illustre ainsi comme principe formel qui, par-delà toute expérience distincte ou obscure, prospère et persiste. Le Je, quoique non substantiel, subsiste quel que soit le rapport conscientiel. En somme, le moi n’est pour Kant « rien de plus que le sentiment d’une existence sans le moindre concept et il est seulement la représentation de ce à quoi se rapporte toute pensée (relatione accidentis) » (Kant, 2012, 136), un moi sans qualités.

Présent et nécessaire afin de maintenir et de garantir l’unité du divers des représentations, le moi pur kantien se révèle pas être un objet de l’expérience, bien qu’il en soit le principe unificateur. Si nous pouvons en avoir un sentiment d’existence, il n’en résulte aucun prédicat. Le moi est l’instance prédicative dont nulle chose ne peut être prédiquée. « Il signifie un quelque chose en général (sujet transcendental) dont la représentation doit être absolument simple précisément parce que l’on n’y détermine rigoureusement rien, puisque, de fait, rien ne peut assurément être représenté avec davantage de simplicité qu’à travers le concept d’un pur quelque chose » (Kant, 2006, 368). Ainsi en arrivons-nous à une compréhension pour le moins singulière du sujet. Déchiré entre une approche transcendante et une approche psycho-physiologique, le moi ne saurait être défini sans ambiguïté, mais il trouve une ultime définition dans les écrits tardifs de Kant, en particulier dans l’Opus Postumum où, plus encore que dans la Critique de la raison pure et les Prolégomènes, l’auteur opère un revirement dans sa pensée initiale et affirme que le sujet, lors de l’aperception transcendante se perçoit tel un Object, c’est-à-dire comme chose en soi, et non comme un objet à portée de main, un vis-à-vis (Gegenstand) :

La conscience de soi-même (apperceptio) est un acte par lequel le sujet se fait de façon générale objet (Object). Ce n’est pas encore une perception (apprehensio simplex), c’est-à-dire pas une représentation sensible […], mais une pure intuition, qui, sous l’appellation d’espace et de temps, contient simplement le côté formel de la composition (coordinatio et subordinatio) du divers de l’intuition et qui contient par là un principe a priori de la connaissance synthétique de celui-ci, mais qui précisément pour cela représente l’objet dans le phénomène. (Kant, 1986, 287)

Comme nous pouvons le noter, cette nouvelle caractérisation de Je ne signifie pas pour autant que le Je soit saisi sur le mode d’un objet mondain. La définition du terme Object peut éclaircir ce dernier point : « […] le terme catégorial latin Object est employé pour désigner la chose en elle-même, tandis que le terme Gegenstand est employé pour la relation phénoménale, laquelle est un rapport au sujet, Subject » (Kant, 1986, 330). Cela nous laisse penser que la saisie du Je à travers une pure intuition nous
permet d’appréhender le Je en sa dimension d’entité non mondaine, ce qui signifie de
la même façon que le Je n’est plus alors un simple X logique, mais un quelque chose
tant qu’instance formelle, le Je n’est autre chose qu’un principe synthétique, logique et fonctionnel — conditio sine qua non de toute compréhension de la nature et plus généralement de tout jugement. Voilà l’objectif principal de Kant : mettre au jour les cadres a priori de la connaissance, ce qui laisse en suspens la question d’une définition du moi, de ses caractéristiques ontiques et, par conséquent de la vie du sujet. Le transcendantal semble ainsi être une impasse à une philosophie de la vie. Mais, comme le souligne pertinemment Jocelyn Benoist, l’entreprise kantienne ne consiste pas à nier qu’il puisse y avoir un moi, puisqu’il est partout en tant que forme logique principielle : « Le moi n’est en un sens rien pour moi, mais en un autre sens il est partout, car il n’est rien qui puisse être pour moi sans avoir un rapport nécessaire a priori à ce moi, contenu dans le “Je pense” » (Benoist, 1994, 53). Il en ressort que Je n’est pas tant un sujet ou un agent qu’un principe synthétique. Il ne serait donc pas un corps parmi les autres, mais le principe des principes ; autrement dit, un pôle vide ou, tout au plus, un point de fuite. L’entreprise kantienne serait dès lors archéologique en ce qu’elle met en lumière le principe logique originel. Aussi, en nous fiant à l’analyse qu’en donne Gaston Berger, le Je n’est pas tant un sujet ou un agent qu’un principe synthétique. Il ne serait donc pas un corps parmi les autres, mais le principe des principes ; autrement dit, un pôle vide ou, tout au plus, un point de fuite. L’entreprise kantienne serait dès lors archéologique en ce qu’elle met en lumière le principe logique originel. Aussi, en nous fiant à l’analyse qu’en donne Gaston Berger, le Je ne peut être compris autrement qu’en tant qu’« acte logique », y compris dans l’Opus postumum :

Ainsi le sujet n’est pas éprouvé ; il est admis. Il n’est qu’une condition formelle. L’Opus postumum lui-même, dont les tendances idéalistes sont incontestables (soit qu’elles tra-
duisent une intention profonde du système, soit qu’elles manifestent un déplacement de
point de vue sous l’influence des critiques), conserve au Je son caractère logique. Le « Je pense », forme universelle, a seulement perdu l’allure d’une donnée statique qu’il avait dans la Critique, pour prendre celle « d’un acte et d’un devenir », mais c’est encore un acte logique. (Berger, 1941, 127–128)

Or, si Gaston Berger soutient que le Je conserve son caractère logique, d’autres lectures sont toutefois possibles. L’on pourrait considérer en effet que, contrairement à ce que ce passage laisse suggérer, Kant ait entrepris une véritable refondation de la philosophie critique dans l’Opus Postumum en voulant incarner le sujet dans le monde — aspect qui était négligé jusqu’alors comme le relève justement Michaël Foessel : « Ignorant de la réduction phénoménologique, le criticisme l’est donc aussi de la conscience absolue comme origine du monde et le “Je pense” se voit réduit à n’être qu’une fonction d’accompagnement des actes cognitifs de l’entendement »
Ce revirement préfigure une nouvelle façon de concevoir l'idéalisme transcendantal en insérant le sujet dans le monde comme agent, comme sujet d'une expérience possible, en tant que le sujet se pose lui-même et est auto-affecté. Kant, en effet, met alors l'accent sur l'expérience du sujet et va même jusqu'à définir la philosophie transcendantale comme une possibilité pour le sujet d'être l'auteur de soi-même : « La philosophie transcendantale contient les principes synthétiques de l'intuition des choses et du penser ; espace et temps comme phénomènes, non comme agrégats, mais comme principes formels de l'unité des principes du sujet, d'être auteur de soi-même » (Kant, 1986, 235)! Plus encore, il va jusqu'à caractériser la philosophie transcendantale comme « la doctrine de la sagesse qui s'oriente toute à ce qui est pratique dans le sujet » (Kant, 1986, 234). Plusieurs philosophes, comme Patočka ou Petit, ont également souligné cette avancée cruciale dans le développement de la pensée kantienne. Il s'agit ni plus ni moins d'une première caractérisation de la corporéité au sein de l'idéalisme transcendantal. Patočka notait à ce propos qu'il y a dans l'Opus Postumum une « aspiration à faire accorder à la corporéité le statut d'une condition a priori de la conscience pensante ». Malheureusement, ce revirement n'a pas été mené à son terme : « Cette idée, extrêmement importante et qui anticipe certains motifs les plus modernes de la phénoménologie actuelle, n'est pas, chez Kant, menée à sa conclusion » (Patočka, 2016, 188). Mais, bien que cette entreprise demeure sous une forme embryonnaire, nous pouvons noter avec Jean-Luc Petit qu'une certaine préfiguration d'une naturalisation au sens d'une inscription corporelle et mondaine du sujet transcendantal viendrait répondre à la position statique adoptée dans la Critique de la raison pure dans laquelle seules les facultés du sujet sont prises en compte. En effet, la prise en compte de l'autoaffection et de l'autodétermination du sujet revient à comprendre que celui-ci n'est pas uniquement une forme logique, mais un être situé dans le monde en interaction avec l'ensemble de l'environnement dans lequel il se trouve. Cela importe d'autant plus que Kant met l'accent sur les principes moteurs des corps dans divers passages ; le sujet, plus qu'un X logique, est un Object qui s'affecte lui-même et se représente pour apparaître (Kant, 1986, 103). Voilà en quoi Petit peut affirmer sans difficulté la chose suivante :  

En revanche, dans l’Opus postumum est esquissée une théorie de l’ « autoposition » (Selbstsetzung) du sujet comme objet d’expérience […]. On peut […] y discerner un premier essai de « naturalisation du transcendantal », ou au moins la preuve de ce que la philosophie transcendantale a rencontré dès l’origine l’exigence de sa naturalisation. Toute connaissance et en général toute expérience s’accompagnent d’un « je pense » qui est l’acte unifiant le divers de cette expérience en l’unité d’un objet. Mais quelle expérience pouvons-nous donc avoir d’une pure fonction d’unité logique, formelle, ou analytique, l’unité d’une diversité sensorielle quelconque ? (Berthoz & Petit, 2006, 100)
Ces commentateurs renversent ainsi la problématique précédente en avançant que la place du sujet transcendental doit comprendre une dimension ontique, sinon des possibilités d’effectuations (Leistungen) au sein du monde. En d’autres termes, l’idéalisme transcendental kantien porterait en soi le germe d’une certaine naturalisation qui, étrangère à tout réductionnisme naturaliste, postule toutefois la nécessité d’un ancrage corporel et par conséquent mondain du sujet au sein même de son environnement (Umwelt). « La philosophie transcendante est la faculté du sujet s’auto-déterminant par le complexe systématique des idées qui font un problème de la détermination complète de celui-ci comme objet (Object) (l’existence de celui-ci) pour le constituer lui-même comme donné dans l’intuition. Tout comme se faire soi-même » (Kant, 1986, 232–233). En ce sens, la philosophie kantienne tardive est notamment une anticipation des problématiques relatives à la phénoménologie husserlienne tant elle se préoccupe de l’inscription corporelle du sujet dans un monde au sein duquel il se tient et auquel il attribue du sens. Perdre de vue la dimension corporelle c’est, en effet, non seulement nier l’origine de la pensée comme pensée d’un sujet toujours déjà incarné dans le monde, mais c’est aussi mettre sous silence le caractère fondamentalement phénoménologique du corps comme lieu irréductible (Nullpunkt) au sein duquel la vie jaillit et prend forme: « Un corps organique (articulé) est celui dans lequel chaque partie avec sa force motrice se rapporte nécessairement au tout, à chaque partie de sa composition. La force productive de cette unité est la vie » (Kant, 1986, 48). Nous retrouvons cette interrogation sous une forme similaire dans le corpus phénoménologique lorsque Husserl se défait d’une approche strictement statique inspirée de l’entreprise kantienne pour développer une phénoménologie dite génétique qui met en avant la dimension expérientielle du vécu. Or, tel que nous le verrons, le tournant génétique de la phénoménologie, qui est pour ainsi dire une perpétuation du dessein kantien tardif d’une autoposition et d’une inscription corporelle du sujet au sein du monde, dépasse le cadre d’une recherche des invariants eidétiques et préfigure de la sorte ce que nous nommerons un « naturalisme phénoménologique » qui peut, selon nous, répondre à l’exigence d’une véritable philosophie scientifique appliquée à la vie consciente.

HUSSERL ET LE RISQUE D’UNE TRANSCENDANTALISATION EXACERBEE DE LA VIE

La particularité de l’entreprise husserlienne est de développer une phénoménologie de la vie du sujet qui ne porte pas exclusivement sur la sphère transcendante. Husserl se devait de dépasser la position statique qui était la sienne jusqu’aux Ideen I
afin que la phénoménologie puisse devenir une philosophie de la vie concrète. Ce faisant, la phénoménologie propose une analyse fine du rapport entre le Je pur, la chair et le corps matériel qui sont autant d'hypostases d'une même réalité, l'ego. Mais, plus que cela, la phénoménologie est porteuse d'un certain naturalisme phénoménologique qui s'est développé depuis son tournant génétique aux environs des années 1920 et elle peut, dans une certaine mesure, venir en aide aux sciences de la nature en ce qu'elle permet d'outrepasser le fossé explicatif constaté entre les vécus intimes et l'étude de la conscience d'un point de vue neurophysiologique. En effet, l'analyse du vécu développée par Husserl dès son tournant génétique représente à notre sens une modalité essentielle dans le cadre d'une naturalisation de la phénoménologie, car elle représente une limite à une entreprise de transcendantalisation exacerbée de la vie et parce qu'elle justifie une interprétation nouvelle de la vie dans un cadre bivalent. La phénoménologie instruit ainsi les sciences cognitives en ce qu'elle met en lumière l'importance de la vie subjective analysée dans une perspective à la première personne. Le transcendantal se lie dès lors à l'ontique pour donner à une approche cogénérative. Il ne s'agit donc pas de faire de la phénoménologie une science axielle des neurosciences, au contraire. Néanmoins, une approche strictement transcendantale est limitative pour plusieurs raisons.

D'abord, selon les termes de Natalie Depraz, « décrire l'ego à partir de sa dimension d'essence invariante, c'est pour Husserl mettre hors-jeu toute conception du sujet en termes de “je” particulier caractérisé par ses états internes provisoires » (Depraz, 2015, 121). En ce sens, la recherche d'invariants universels mène à une dépersonnalisation de l'ego et empêche de saisir sa vie singulière. À ce stade, la phénoménologie demeure essentiellement une méthode à la troisième personne. « L'ego en troisième personne est un Je objectivé, structurellement invariant et anonyme (un Je générique). Il est tout le monde et personne, partout et nulle part » (Depraz, 2015, 127). L'aspect expérientiel et singulier de la vie du sujet semble alors être mis sous silence, tout comme il l'était dans la philosophie kantienne. Or, Natalie Depraz nous fournit quant à cette problématique de précieux outils pour appréhender l'usage du Je en phénoménologie. En effet, elle propose dans *Première, deuxième, troisième personne* de comprendre en quoi « la première personne pourra se manifester à plein à travers une situation, un cadre spatio-temporel concret où le “je” en tant que pronom personnel peut être absent, mais l’incarnation en acte maximale » (Depraz, 2015, 135). Sa visée est une pratique phénoménologique qui met l’accent sur la part expérientielle du sujet, cette part pouvant être illustrée sans faire usage du pronom personnel « Je ». Elle retrouve une telle pratique dans le premier volume des *Ideen*, en particulier lorsque Husserl donne des exemples concrets, entre autres la galerie d’art à Dresden. Le « Je » y
est fréquemment absent, mais l’incarnation et la description de l’expérience sont bien présentes. « Au fond, ajoute-t-elle, les différentes composantes d’une phénoménologie en/de la première personne (pronom personnel “je”, présence du corps, inscription dans une situation spatio-temporelle concrète) deviennent actives et opératoires dès lors qu’elles sont mises au service d’une épreuve pratique » (Depraz, 2015, 136). Le « Je » acquiert donc du sens à partir du moment où il implique une expérience et une situation données. Nous pouvons ainsi voir dans la phénoménologie une pratique à la première personne dans une écriture qui laisse suggérer un Je générique et, donc, une perspective à la troisième personne. La lecture que nous avons désormais des textes du corpus husserlien prend pleinement son sens, et Natalie Depraz ajoute à cela qu’une lecture expérientielle des textes, qui suit une lecture plus traditionnelle, disons « conceptuelle » ou « herméneutique », laisse entrevoir cette autre dimension de l’écriture phénoménologique à partir des exemples qui y sont donnés. Prévaut toujours l’idée d’une phénoménologie à/de la première personne qui, malgré son usage diversifié du pronom personnel « Je », situe son propos et l’incarne dans une situation donnée. Si, quand bien même elle échouait par moments à réaliser un tel besoin épistémologique, elle permet malgré tout au lecteur de s’interroger sur son rôle de donateur de sens. Il faut par conséquent distinguer deux types d’usage du « Je » comme indexical : 1) le premier, rhétorique, qui ne renvoie à aucune expérience située et à aucun sujet précis et incarné. Il servirait à parler de tout et de rien, dans une indistinction spatio-temporelle totale. 2) Le second usage est quant à lui la description d’une situation, d’un vécu d’une subjectivité incarnée, d’un « processus expérientiel ». Comme le mentionne Depraz en guise de conclusion à son article, « l’enjeu d’une phénoménologie authentiquement en première personne est profondément (auto-) éthique », « une “éthique pratique” qui tient en cinq traits : 1) la fidélité au donné et à l’expression ; 2) la précarité provisoire de la description ; 3) la confiance dans ce qui est obtenu ; 4) la dynamique du perfectionnement par l’exercice ; 5) la liberté intérieure grâce à la vigilance » (Depraz, 2015, 145–146). En quelques mots, il est nécessaire de prendre conscience du rôle de l’indexical « Je » afin de saisir en quoi la philosophie phénoménologique transcendantale peut nous égarer quant à l’expression même de l’expérience.

Mais plus que cela, nous pouvons nous interroger quant à la portée de la réduction transcendantale en tant qu’elle nous empêche de saisir la dimension expérientielle et vivante du sujet. Comme le note Renaud Barbaras, la réduction transcendantale et toute forme de retour aux fondements transcendantaux de la vie prennent précisément appui sur ce qui manque la vie : un « mouvement, engagé par Husserl, d’une “transcendantalisation” de la vie. Mais cette vie purement transcendantale,
étrangère au monde, est une vie exténuée, une vie désertée par le vivant» (Barbaras, 2008, 9–10). A cela, nous pourrions répondre que Husserl, dans les Méditations cartésiennes, affirmait qu’une expérience transcendantale existe bel et bien (Hua I, II). Or, cette expérience se limite à l’examen du cogito transcendantalement réduit. En ce sens, il n’est pas question d’une expérience mondaine ou psychologique, c’est-à-dire d’une expérience située pour un sujet singulier. Il s’agit précisément d’une expérience impersonnelle à la troisième personne. Et, si l’on se réfère une fois de plus aux propos de Natalie Depraz, nous pourrions nous demander si la voie de la psychologie ne serait pas davantage adéquate dans la caractérisation de la vie subjective que la voie cartésienne qui ne nous permet, finalement, que de découvrir l’antichambre de la subjectivité qu’est la sphère transcendantale : « Contrairement à la seule voie cartésienne dont la radicalité du point de départ, apodictiquement fondateur, est à la mesure de son étroitesse, de sa pauvreté voire de sa stérilité phénoménologique, [...] la voie de la psychologie permet de fonder la pertinence de l’intersubjectivité husserlienne, laquelle se soutient elle-même dans la configuration des trois voies » (Depraz, 1995, 25). Contrairement à la voie cartésienne de la réduction ou la voie du monde de la vie, la voie de la psychologie décrite par Husserl dans ses écrits relatifs à la Psychologie phénoménologique met en avant le caractère incarné du sujet, son vécu singulier. La voie de la psychologie situe le sujet de même que son expérience. Elle rend compte du caractère expérientiel de la vie subjective. Ce faisant, le risque de la réduction consiste en une transcendantalisation extrême qui surdétermine ce qu’elle s’efforce de nous faire voir, tandis que la voie de la psychologie rend possible une réduction qui nous permette de saisir à la fois la dimension intersubjective de la vie et les objectités sans recours à une surdetermination stérile. Par conséquent, le revirement génétique de la phénoménologie nous permet d’appréhender plus justement le domaine de la vie subjective en ce qu’il nous ouvre un horizon qui s’inscrit directement dans le domaine du concret. D’une phénoménologie statique encore trop proche de l’entreprise kantienne, Husserl s’est donc attelé à développer une phénoménologie de la vie qui va de pair avec un naturalisme phénoménologique.

DU « NATURALISME PHENOMENOLOGIQUE »
A LA NATURALISATION DE LA PHENOMENOLOGIE

Parler de « naturalisme phénoménologique » peut étonner. En effet, n’est-ce pas là une transgression à l’égard de l’idéal de Husserl ? Cette expression a priori omymorique nous sensibilise toutefois sur l’ambivalence des propos que tient Husserl au terme de son œuvre, en particulier dans le volume consacré aux Grenzprobleme relatifs
aux questions portant sur la naissance, la mort et l’inconscient. Le naturalisme phénoménologique naît d’une lecture du corpus husserlien qui se veut pour le moins radicale, en ce que nous prenons Husserl aux mots, lorsque celui-ci traite de la naissance, de la vie, et de la mort du sujet transcendantal, etc., en d’autres termes de la nature du sujet. Davantage, cette lecture nous permet plus aisément de faire le lien entre son œuvre et les recherches actuelles qui consistent à naturaliser la phénoménologie. En nous inspirant des propos de Merleau-Ponty, nous pouvons concevoir l’ambivalence de la phénoménologie à partir du terme de nature : « La phénoménologie dénonce l’attitude naturelle et, en même temps, fait plus qu’aucune autre philosophie pour la réhabiliter » (Merleau-Ponty, 1995, 104). En soulignant cette difficulté interprétative inhérente à toute l’œuvre de Husserl, Merleau-Ponty met le doigt sur un aspect bien souvent mis sous silence : la phénoménologie en vient toujours, en dernière instance, à comprendre quelle est la vie du sujet — qu’il s’agisse de la vie mondaine ou de la vie transcendante. Toutefois, si le sujet est capable de comprendre grâce à la réduction ce qu’est une vie qui n’est plus anonyme, il n’est pas, à vrai dire, de sujet qui pratique à temps complet la réduction. C’est pourquoi la vie doit être étudiée non seulement dans sa composante constitutive, c’est-à-dire à partir des modes de donation de sens propres au sujet méditant, mais aussi à partir de cette « activité passive » de la vie dans laquelle l’ego transcendantal n’est engagé que de façon latente. Dans cette optique, Merleau-Ponty a raison d’affirmer que la phénoménologie virevolte constamment entre deux attitudes, entre deux formes de vie, car sa visée d’une science idéale, dont le fondement est l’ego meditans, ne peut se passer d’un examen des modalités doxiques qui sont à l’origine d’un savoir toujours à disposition dont il faut actualiser le sens par la réduction. Une telle attitude suscite un questionnement de taille pour Merleau-Ponty qui aura certainement été l’un des premiers à mettre en lumière cette part méconnue de la phénoménologie : « Doit-on passer de la doxa à l’épistémè, ou de la doxa à l’Urdoxa, à la doxa primordiale ? Si la philosophie commence par l’attitude naturelle, en sortira-t-elle jamais et, si elle en sort, pourquoi sort-elle ? » (Merleau-Ponty, 1995, 112–113). Nous répondrons à cette interrogation en avançant que celle-ci ne peut se passer de ces deux dimensions de la vie, qu’elles vont de pair lorsqu’il est question d’établir une science dont le fondement est la vie du sujet : naturelle et transcendante. La phénoménologie est ainsi une science fondateur pour laquelle l’établissement d’une véritable épistémè dépend autant de l’Urdoxa que celle-ci de l’épistémè. Néanmoins l’Urdoxa n’est pas sans poser problème en ce que le phénoménologue est sans cesse dans l’obligation de rediriger son regard sur des formes de la vie qui dépassent la visée initiale de la phénoménologie, c’est-à-dire qui reposent sur une entente quasi mondaine de la vie. Voici la raison pour laquelle la notion de nature importe tant pour
Husserl, en particulier dans ses leçons au sujet de la nature et de l’esprit ou dans le volume XLII des Husserliana. C’est notamment pour cela que cette même notion n’est jamais tout à fait la même dans son corpus, car elle dépasse la binarité idéalisme-réalisme, elle suppose un naturalisme phénoménologique qui puisse devenir une science globale de la vie de la conscience. Entendons par là que Husserl ne cesse de caractériser la nature tantôt comme ce qui est relatif au « temps et l’espace, les corps matériels, la forme, la position, le mouvement et la direction du mouvement, le changement, aussi l’action, la force, etc. » (Husserl, 2001, 10), tantôt comme ce qui est relatif à la dimension corporelle et mondaine du sujet. Cette nécessité d’une compréhension globale de la vie subjective peut se comprendre avec les propos de Merleau-Ponty : « Tout ce qui se passe ne s’explique pas par l’intériorité, ni par l’extériorité, mais par une chance, qui est la concordance entre ces deux données, et qui est assurée par la Nature » (Merleau-Ponty, 1995, 111). Il importe par conséquent de lier les termes de vie et de nature afin de comprendre de quelle manière la méthode pratiquée tardivement par Husserl peut être désignée comme un naturalisme phénoménologique.

Pourtant, dans l’optique dans une naturalisation de la phénoménologie, le terme de nature demeure problématique. En effet, si l’œuvre tardive de Husserl regorge de fines d’analyses permettant de conjointre la phénoménologie aux sciences de la nature grâce au naturalisme phénoménologique, il n’entendait pas unifier de manière si significative sa méthode avec celle des sciences de la nature. Au contraire, n’a-t-il pas écrit une quantité non négligeable de papiers relatifs à ce refus ? Pour preuve, cette lettre adressée à Rickert en 1915: « Donc, je me sens, depuis une décennie, étroitement lié avec les responsables des écoles idéalistes allemandes, nous combattons comme des alliés contre le naturalisme de notre temps en tant qu’il est notre ennemi commun » (Husserl, 1994, 178). Plus largement, suite au tournant génétique de sa philosophie, ses écrits sur la psychologie phénoménologique récusent strictement toute entreprise naturaliste :

L’attitude thématique portant sur le monde et l’univers comme nature opère d’une certaine manière une césure avec toutes les attitudes dirigées sur ce qui est concret. […] La pure considération du monde prive ainsi le monde d’esprit (entgeistigt), son intérêt est pareillement aveugle pour tout ce qui concerne le monde des hommes, pour ce qui a une signification pour quelque subjectivité que ce soit, et, alors, elle est naturellement aussi aveugle pour ce qui est subjectif, spécialement pour ce qui est humain, en général pour la vie de l’esprit, pour les personnes et les communautés personnelles, les valeurs, pour les beautés, le bon, etc. (Husserl, 1968, 382–383)

De telles considérations ne peuvent que renforcer le refus de toute naturalisation en ce qu’elles récusent l’attitude naturelle réductrice. Husserl a bel et bien traité de
la nature à partir de thèmes aussi divers que la conscience, la vie, la naissance, la mort, en particulier dans les textes publiés dans le tome XLII des Husserliana consacré aux Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, mais le terme de nature demeure problématique dans le cadre d’un réductionnisme naturaliste. De la nature il y a deux ententes différentes dans le corpus phénoménologique, d’abord la nature comme ensemble de l’étantité matérielle dans laquelle nous nous mouvons et que nous étudions scientifiquement dans une perspective à la troisième personne, et comme nature du sujet, autrement dit, une nature constituée et constituante. Comprendons dès lors qu’il ne peut y avoir de naturalisation qui prenne appui sur la première entente de la nature — la nature comme matière, comme objet de science. La nature dans un sens strictement phénoménologique est relative à la vie du sujet constituant. En ce sens, la naturalisation est phénoménologique si elle n’a affaire qu’à la question de la constitution du sens. Qu’il s’agisse de données phénoménologiques ou de données scientifiques, il est nécessaire qu’elles convergent vers ce même objectif qui est de définir les qualités constitutives de la vie du sujet.

Le tournant génétique de la phénoménologie, c’est-à-dire l’avènement d’un questionnement tourné sur la vie du sujet en sa dimension concrète, mondaine et psychologique, permet de dépasser le dualisme que l’on pouvait imputer à la première forme de phénoménologie esquissée par Husserl. Il s’agit précisément de ce que nous nommons ici un naturalisme phénoménologique, pour ne pas dire une phénoménologie générative ou un empirisme transcendantal, comme le proposent Anthony Steinbock ou Natalie Depraz. Nous proposons de prendre Husserl au mot, et de reprendre le terme de nature tel qu’il l’a employé lorsqu’il s’est interrogé sur la vie, la vocation, le monde de la vie, l’être psycho-physique, etc. C’est grâce à ce type particulier d’analyse que ces thèmes trouvent une véritable explicitation phénoménologique, mais aussi un ancrage davantage mondain. En effet, Husserl s’applique à situer son propos dans son époque, en particulier lorsqu’il est question de l’anomalité, de la crise des sciences européennes, ou de l’attention singulière qu’il faut accorder aux phénomènes alors croisants de xénophobie et d’exclusion. La mise entre parenthèses de la thèse du monde nécessaire lors de la pratique de la réduction ne signifie nullement un oubli du monde dans lequel nous nous trouvons en tant que sujets incarnés liés dans une communauté intersubjective. Au contraire, les derniers textes nous indiquent qu’il y a un télos pratique de la phénoménologie qui ne se réduit pas à la dimension strictement transcendantale et immanente. En l’occurrence, la Lebenswelt, contrairement à la sphère transcendantale fermée sur elle-même, constitue le lieu d’un ὕλη pour la raison en quête perpétuelle de sens. Tel que nous pouvons le lire dans le volume consacré à la Lebenswelt: « dans l’immanence il n’y a pas de télos pour la vie du Je » (Husserl, 2008,
21). Par conséquent, il est important de noter que la phénoménologie husserlienne connaissait un véritable revirement au terme de son élaboration. Pourtant, l’apport de la réduction phénoménologique et le recours à la dimension transcendantale du sujet, comme pierre angulaire de toute connaissance, ne doivent pas être négligés et Husserl n’entend aucunement y renoncer. Seule la pratique de la réduction permet de rendre compte du rôle déterminant de la subjectivité dans le domaine de la science entendue en un sens large. Peut-être est-ce une façon de revoir ce que Husserl affirmait dans les derniers passages des Méditations cartésiennes: « toute analyse et toute théorie phénoménologique transcendante — y compris la théorie de la constitution transcendantale du monde objectif […] — peut être développée au niveau naturel dans l’abandon de l’attitude transcendantale » (Husserl, 1947, 212). Mais nous ne devons pas oublier que seule une naturalisation phénoménologique mérite le titre de « naturalisation de la phénoménologie », car elle s’appuie sur des méthodes entièrement nouvelles que Husserl a mises en lumière. « D’ailleurs, la partie de beaucoup la plus importante des recherches phénoménologiques appartient à une psychologie intentionnelle apriorique et pure (c’est-à-dire libérée de tout ce qui touche à la psycho-physiologie) » (Husserl, 1947, 231). Il faut à ce sujet se souvenir que Husserl, dès les leçons de 1923/24 et le tournant génétique de sa philosophie, s’est attelé à décrire une réduction qui n’est plus uniquement cartésienne et solipsiste, mais qui prend en compte la situation incarnée du sujet. Phénoménologique, une telle réduction concerne la vie du sujet et respecte l’esthétique transcendante développée par Husserl. Comme le dit Natalie Depraz,

on a là une structure, quelque chose qui respecte la consigne que donnait Husserl, lorsqu’il proposait la réduction et qui se situe sur le terrain de ce qui est formellement nommé le transcendental. Cette voie permet aussi d’éviter l’opposition entre ce qui est de l’ordre du transcendental, le structurel, et ce qui est de l’ordre du psychologisme. La voie de la psychologie respecte l’esthétique transcendante de Husserl. La seule différence, c’est qu’il l’applique au domaine de la vie du sujet. (Thumser, 2017)

C’est dire si les liens de parenté entre la psychologie et la phénoménologie, les sciences naturelles de la subjectivité et la phénoménologie, sont étroits. Elles portent chacune sur le même objet, mais gagnent à pratiquer la réduction. Seulement, quoi que pût défendre Husserl à son époque, les paradigmes scientifiques qu’il niait alors n’en étaient qu’à leurs balbutiements. Aussi, faut-il nuancer son propos pour comprendre deux choses : d’abord que la science, en particulier ces nouvelles humanités appelées les sciences cognitives, connaît un renouveau sans commune mesure depuis une quarantaine d’années. De l’étude rudimentaire du système nerveux ou du comportement, les sciences de la subjectivité ont connu un revirement important lors-
qu'elles ont pris en compte le domaine de la conscience humaine. Plus spécifiquement, la question de l'objectivité de la conscience peut être revisitée, car les sciences de la subjectivité tendent progressivement à dépasser le stade d'une dualité insurmontable en ce qui concerne la conscience comme objet de science, car elles l'étudient sans pour autant classifier la conscience comme un objet (Gegenstand). Du fait de ce renouveau épistémologique, il peut dorénavant advenir un nouveau commencement en phénoménologie, en ce qu'elle peut se joindre aux sciences cognitives dans un éclaircissement réciproque, pour aborder la question cardinale de la constitution du sens. Cela nous permettra sans nul doute de comprendre comment « on peut accepter les faits évidents de la physique — que le monde est entièrement constitué de particules physiques dans des champs de force — sans nier l'existence, au sein des caractéristiques physiques du monde, de phénomènes biologiques tels que des états de conscience qualitatifs internes et une intentionnalité intrinsèque » (Searle, 1995, 14). Il importe pour nous de conquérir ce nouveau continent scientifique pour pleinement appréhender de quelle façon la naturalisation de la phénoménologie entend atteindre une vue d'ensemble de cette constellation si bariolée que sont les vécus-de-conscience et leurs soubassements neurophysiologiques. Si la conscience peut bien entendu être étudiée à partir d'un examen de type neuroscientifique, nous pourrions néanmoins être étonnés de l'importance que peuvent avoir d'autres dimensions du vivant et du corps pour ce qui relève de la naturalisation, comme le cœur, le système nerveux entérique, etc.

**CONCLUSION**

Nous constatons, en fin de compte, que l'idéalisme transcendantal dont se parent la philosophie kantienne et la philosophie phénoménologique n'est en rien limitatif. D'une part, parce qu'une approche statique va de pair avec une approche génétique, voire naturalisante, en ce que la mise en lumière des cadres a priori et universels à l'origine de toute forme de connaissance ne peut se passer d'une étude de l'inscription corporelle du sujet dans le monde intersubjectif. Sans cela, la philosophie demeurerait empêtrée dans une vision similaire à celle développée dans la Critique de la raison pure, c'est-à-dire dans une transcendantalisation exacerbée de la vie qui mène à une césure entre le phénoménal et le transcendantal, et qui nierait par la même occasion la vie en sa dimension globale empirico-transcendantale. D'autre part, l'étude de la phénoménologie husserlienne peut servir le chercheur en sciences cognitives en ce qu'il sera en mesure de comprendre la portée d'un retour à la sphère subjective. Ce faisant, toute forme d'entreprise scientifique pourra devenir pleinement phénoménologique. Plus encore, nous avons souhaité mettre l'accent sur l'ambivalence et la portée des textes.
tardifs de Husserl afin de montrer en quoi ces derniers sont en mesure d'apporter un éclaircissement aux sciences cognitives. Le naturalisme phénoménologique dont nous évoquions l'existence n'est pas une naturalisation au sens strict, c'est-à-dire une entreprise visant à formaliser le vivant d'un point de vue facto-logique, mais une première élaboration de type phénoménologique d'un questionnement plus vaste. En ce sens, les développements relatifs aux thèmes de l'empathie, de la naissance, de l'inconscient, de la conscience préréflexive ou de la mort sont des exemples qui peuvent contribuer à la réalisation d'une science globale de la vie subjective du fait qu'ils apportent un éclairage nouveau sur les modalités transcendantales et ontiques de la vie du sujet. Ce faisant, les sciences cognitives ont tout à gagner en s'inspirant de la phénoménologie husserlienne, mais il ne faut pas négliger la part transcendantale et expérientielle de la vie de sorte qu'une naturalisation pleinement phénoménologique puisse voir le jour et ne pas perpétuer une approche uniquement à la troisième personne. Il faut en effet que la vie du sujet soit interrogée non seulement à partir des cadres transcendantaux ou ontiques via ce que Jean-Luc Petit nomme également « une régression contre-transcendantale » (Petit, 2015, 265) vers les constituants du sens que sont les organes, mais qu'elle prenne avant tout en compte la dimension individuelle, psychologique et expérientielle de la vie.

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Husserl’s late claim of that transcendental logic is self-founded stands in a puzzling relation with the facticity of nature. This relation concerns issues such as the traceableness of a “living present” in the immanence of living consciousness. The article considers this matter through a specific perspective, gained by reference to the project of a transcendental foundation of the science of nature. This project requires the problematic possibility of a formal determination of facticity. One could characterize the phenomenological finding of a “living present” as Husserl’s attempt to resolve the discrepancy between fact and form in a “living being” which consists of both actual materiality and transcendental ideality. This conciliatory solution remains questionable, given the impossibility to provide an \textit{a priori} foundation of this synthetic moment through the self-reflexive movement of transcendental logic. However, the systematic project of transcendental phenomenology as such entails the question concerning the \textit{a priori} foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts. It seems, then, to require a solution of this sort. The problem of grounding the scientific knowledge of natural facts dates back at least to Aristotle’s \textit{Posterior Analytics}. So does the need for the definition of an empirical moment of this grounding. A discussion of Kant’s \textit{Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft} presents an aporetic facet of the way in which transcendental philosophy responds to this need. An analogous \textit{impasse} occurs in Husserl’s mature work. The concept of “living present” holds a central role in defining Husserl’s stance towards this stalemate. The analysis of this role aims to clarify both Husserl’s specific position in the broader context of transcendental philosophy, and an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature. I conclude that this foundation must encompass a factual, non-formalizable element: a material residue, required in order to complete its reflexive movement.

\textbf{Key words:} Phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, philosophy of science, science of nature, \textit{a priori}, living present, Kant, Husserl.

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МАТЕРИАЛЬНЫЙ ОСТАТОК. КАНТ И ГУССЕРЛЬ О ПРИНЦИПАХ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОГО ОСНОВАНИЯ НАУКИ О ПРИРОДЕ

ФРАНЧЕСКО ПИЗАНО

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Попытки позднего Гуссерля осуществить само-обоснование трансцендентальной логики сами оказались в запутанном отношении с фактичностью природы. Это относится к таким аспектам, как «живое настоящее» в имманентности живого сознания. В статье этот вопрос рассматривается через специфическую перспективу с отсылкой к проекту трансцендентального основания науки о природе, для которого необходимо проблематизировать возможность формального определения фактичности. Введение феноменологического понятия «живого настоящего» можно трактовать как попытку Гуссерля разрешить несоответствие между фактом и формой в «жизни», которое заключается в актуальной материальности и трансцендентальной идеальности. Такой способ примиряющего решения остается под вопросом, поскольку невозможно гарантировать априорное обоснование синтетического момента через само-рефлексивную направленность трансцендентальной логики. В тоже время систематический проект трансцендентальной феноменологии как таковой заключает в себе вопрос об априорном основании нашего обыденного знания фактов. По всей видимости, все же возникает необходимость искать решение для проблемы такого рода. Проблема обоснования научного знания природных фактов отсылает нас к тексту Аристотеля Вторая аналитика. Тем самым указывается на необходимость определения эмпирической составляющей такого обоснования. Рассмотрение работы Metafizicheskie начала естествознания демонстрирует апоретичность способа, которым трансцендентальная философия может обосновать такую необходимость. Схожее impasse появляется в последней работе Гуссерля. Понятие «живого настоящего» играет центральную роль при обосновании позиции Гуссерля в отношении этой безвыходной ситуации. Осуществленный анализ этой роли позволяет прояснить как специфическую позицию Гуссерля по отношению к более широкому контексту трансцендентальной философии, так и аспект трансцендентального обоснования науки о природе. Я прихожу к выводу, что такое обоснование должно включать фактичный, неформальный элемент: материальный остаток, необходимый для завершения рефлексивного движения.

Ключевые слова: Феноменология, трансцендентальная философия, философия науки, наука о природе, живое настоящее, Кант, Гуссерль.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The penultimate chapter of Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Kant, 1904) is, as it is well known, dedicated to the draft of an architectonic of pure reason as the system of philosophy. Such a system would have to subsume the manifold of knowledge derivable from pure reason under a single idea (Kant, 1904, 538): the idea of pure philosophy — that is, philosophy of pure reason. According to Kant, pure philosophy should include two aspects: a propaedeutic one (critical philosophy) and an expository one (metaphysics). The latter should exhibit the entirety of possible a priori knowledge as a system. This system should encompass both a priori knowledge of everything that is, and a priori knowledge of everything that must be. Namely, with respect to the former, this complex of a priori knowledge should consist of both a priori knowledge of the disposition of reason towards possible objects in general and a priori knowledge of given objects as a whole (as long as it is obtainable). Kant defines this whole as “nature”, and the network that links together these two domains of a priori knowledge as “metaphysics of nature” (Kant, 1904, 546). This knowledge pertains then both to *de jure* possible objects and to *de facto* given objects, and thus constitutes the horizon of all theoretical a priori knowledge.

This architectonic outline, which remains substantially unaltered in the two editions of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Kant, 1781, 832–851; Kant 1904, 538–549), entails a specific relation between transcendental philosophy and the concept of nature as the whole of given facts. Therefore, it is a possible starting point for an attempt at clarifying an issue concerning the idea of a transcendental foundation of our positive knowledge of nature.

Let us examine this relation. Usually, positive knowledge is defined as the knowledge of an object as actually existing, i.e. as the knowledge of a fact. This definition embraces both our ordinary actual perceptive cognition and the wide variety of sciences that are in any way based on it. This complex of experiences — namely, the complex of positive knowledge — finds its formal unity in the positivity of its objects. Vice versa, one could delimit nature as the field of the objects of positive knowledge. Positive knowledge depends, then, on the actual occurrence of a perception. It is therefore contingent, just as its objects. It follows that nature could also be defined as the general ambit of contingent objects. On the other hand, the system of pure philosophy should consist only of necessary relations. More specifically, from the point of view of transcendental philosophy, these relations should systematically define the a priori principles of theoretical and practical reason. As a system, transcendental philosophy should then include “the laws of nature” (Kant, 1942, 202). Given the discrep-
ancy between the contingency of facts and the necessity of a priori laws, this inclusion proves evidently problematic. Ultimately, it calls into play the enigma of the relation between form and matter within the transcendental constitution of the natural object.

This recapitulation of well-known issues, albeit schematic, presents the way in which transcendental philosophy poses the traditional problem of the relation between facts and ideas. The main aim of this article is to clarify a common aspect of Kant and Husserl’s approach to this problem, in order to highlight a characteristic limitation of transcendental reflection in this regard. This clarification could contribute to offer a theoretical justification of the usual ascription of both thinkers to the same tradition of thought. Moreover, it could provide a clearer understanding of the tradition of transcendental philosophy as a whole. We will find that both Kant and Husserl's propositions concerning the foundation of positive science need to imply a moment in which the discrepancy between matter and form is reconciled; and that this reconciliation cannot be justified by transcendental reflection. In light of these remarks, the possibilities of transcendental philosophy should be at least partially redefined by the impossibility to absorb matter into form and vice versa.

Kant defines transcendental reflection as the act of connecting a synthesis of representations with the corresponding cognitive faculty, and thus as the act of distinguishing different syntheses based on the faculty that made them possible (Kant, 1904, 215). A transcendental reflection on a natural object should then be able to discriminate between “the determinable in general” and “its determination” (Kant, 1904, 218) — i.e., between matter and form, based on the corresponding cognitive source. The claim to a transcendental foundation of the science of nature must be fulfilled through such a reflection. This foundation should consist in a knowledge of a priori, non-factual determinations that nevertheless constitute facts as objects of positive knowledge. These determinations are then to be found only on the basis of the preliminary distinction between form and matter: they are a priori rules defining the respective synthetic faculties. It follows that a transcendental foundation of the science of nature should consist in the definition of certain conditions of legitimacy concerning the syntheses that constitute its objects.

The connection between the two aforementioned facets of metaphysics of nature is indeed hierarchic: transcendental philosophy (Kant, 1904, 547) guarantees the possibility of rational physiology. The latter, in turn, defines the conditions under which the scientific knowledge of a natural object is legitimate as such. The equivalence between foundation and definition of the conditions of legitimacy is indeed an aspect of the specific relevance of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ in the history of the problem regarding the knowledge of nature.
The exposition of Kant’s perspective on this problem should serve exactly the purpose of outlining this specificity — viz., the specific position of transcendental reflection in the general framework of the problem. This position is characterized by the structural connection of every formal determination to a determinable (matter), which can never be positively determined per se. Thus, a “material residue” should be defined as a residue of that, which is determinable. Matter is, by definition, the contingent aspect of the object of actual knowledge. It follows that the claim to a universal determination of contingency can be fulfilled only through the absorption of the determinable in the determination, and thus only through the dissolution of the difference (between matter and form) that opens up the space of transcendental reflection. Both Kant’s concept of the essential mobility of matter and Husserl’s concept of living present will be presented as ways to dissolve this difference.

This analogy should highlight that both proposals develop within the possibilities (and the limits) of transcendental reflection. Nevertheless, it should also underline the differences between Kant and Husserl’s conceptions of this reflection. The notions of mobile matter and living present mean, respectively, a static determination and an active intuition. This dissimilarity mirrors the divergence between Kant’s definition of transcendental reflection as the act of connecting representation to a static articulation of cognitive faculties, and Husserl’s idea of the same act as the exploration of the structural field of possibilities that specifically defines each constitution of an intentional object.

We have outlined the argument and its aims. Let us now proceed to the actual examination of the issues we brought into play.

2. THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING THE SCIENCE OF NATURE

The characterization of transcendental philosophy’s specific perspective on the problem of the foundation of the science of nature requires, at least, a general understanding of the history of the problem. It is evident that, at least since Aristotle’s exposition of the issue in the Posterior Analytics (Aristotle, 1831, 71–72), the scientific value of empirical knowledge of facts must rely on a non-empirical aspect: a principle, the truth of which is assured through immediate self-evidence rather than through empirical verification. Only by way of a relation with such universal and evidently true knowledge, one can recognize empirical statements as belonging to a stable network of propositions, and thus to the tissue of deductive inferences this network consists of. Such is the structure of the domain of scientific knowledge. Vice versa, the claim of acquiring a stable theoretical grasp of nature (i.e. of what there factually
is) through such formal, non-empirical articulation of its inordinate factual variety, while on the one hand refers to the self-evident truth of a unity principle, on the other must somewhat require a certain “disposition” of form towards the facticity of nature. This notion of disposition is obviously vague. Nevertheless, just as such, it indirectly means a plexus of issues that remains constant into a well-defined history.

One could summarise the first of these issues in what follows: a principle, even if not empirically demonstrable (in other words, even if not observable as a derivation from another fact), should ideally share a common horizon with every particular empirical statement, as long as it provides the foundation — and thus, the scientific truth — of that particular statement. Aristotle's work responds to this need by the definition of this horizon as causality. Facts consist of a series of causal relations, and principles of each positive science should express the first of these causes for each thematic series of causally intertwined phenomena. Aristotle's *Physics* attempts indeed to give, through the study of the first causes of nature and of change in general, the explanatory resources required for an empirical and scientific investigation of the world of facts (Falcon, 2005, 1–16). This common ground should define the way in which one could bring the variety of facts back to scientific unity. Such a ground is required in order to ensure the intelligibility of the relation between particular facts and universal principles. Therefore, every attempt at a foundation of natural science demands a certain amount of abstraction: in each case, the variety of facts has to be unified by virtue of a distinction between essential and non-essential properties (Bunge, 1967, 51–72).

It seems that the traditional notion of natural science (empirical content in a non-empirical, formal order) implies that the essentially non-empirical principles, which superintend this order, must exhibit an empirical moment. One could define such a moment as a trait that pertains to facts in general and that, abstracted from them, gives us access to a knowledge of the form, of the unity of our thematic object — because, in fact, our scientific knowledge begins with experience. From a theo-

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1 Falcon underlines how carefully structured Aristotle's inquiry on nature is. It begins with *Physics*, then proceeds through the study of celestial phenomena, and ends with an examination of the sublunary world. The unity of this investigation depends on the internal causal unity of its complex object (Falcon, 2005, 16). We said that *Physics* describes the first causes. This means that it describes the *universal* causal determinations pertaining to the domain of nature. As long as these determinations define nature as a whole, they cannot be justified, in their turn, by physics alone — being that physics presupposes the definition of its object. Falcon's study focuses on the internal coherency of Aristotle's conception of nature. We will instead aim attention at the need for a definition of nature that does not rely on positive knowledge alone. This need emerges within every attempt at establishing a system of scientific knowledge, as Aristotle's example is intended to show.
retical point of view, even knowledge of the non-empirical must be obtained through a process that springs from the fact of experience.

These considerations are purposely generic: what is relevant for our argument is not the specific way in which Aristotle deals with the problem, but the fact that the very first theoretical outline of science as a systematically articulated unity seems to imply such an issue. As long as the idea of \textit{prima philosophia} is relevant, the question arises of how a knowledge can be stable and related to facts at the same time. The puzzling connection between empirical and non-empirical aspects of the founding principles of positive science appears, in this context, as the \textit{explanandum}. The relevance of the \textit{Architectonic of pure reason} and, more generally, of every transcendental take on the issue, therefore follows from the way transcendental reflection intends the role of \textit{Grundsätze}. In short: inasmuch as form is no more a real property, but rather the field of legitimacy of a possible \textit{Sinngebung}, the common ground between facts (as objects of experience) and forms (as structures of the transcendental synthetic operativity from which the experience emerges) is the possibility of being thought as such (i.e., intelligibility in general).

A historical take on this matter would have to deal with the certainly relevant modifications of concepts such as causality and knowledge between Aristotle, Kant and Husserl. However, the following considerations will only concern a theoretical hypothesis. One can perhaps sum up this hypothesis as follows: if the consideration of nature within non-transcendental perspectives requires an abstraction from other real properties, in the context of transcendental philosophy the residue of this abstraction is instead the facticity of things as such. This facticity is to be understood as opposed to the results of the constitution of logical elements (or objects) that is implied in the operations of a priori transcendental consciousness.

3. MATTER AND MOVEMENT

Kant’s philosophy of nature embodies the first and perhaps most emblematic example of the way in which transcendental philosophy deals with the matter at hand. Let us examine an aspect of how the project outlined in the \textit{Architektonik der reinen Vernunft} unfolds. Kant’s \textit{Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft} (Kant, 1911, 465–565) should have contained, according to that draft, rational immanent physiology: i.e. the metaphysics of empirical knowledge. Actually, in that work (published in 1786), Kant radically revises the structure and the position of this part of metaphysics in relation to the system. In fact, this remains the only part of metaphysics of nature that Kant realizes.
Clearly, Kant's philosophy of nature crosses, in its long development, nearly all of its major philosophical writings, from *Monadologia physica* (Kant, 1902, 473–488) to *Opus postumum* (Kant, 1936; Kant, 1938). The dialogue with the historical development of physics is, in these writings, constantly open — the Vorrede to the second edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* being the most prominent example of a way of connecting physics and metaphysics that remains as a stable feature of Kant's philosophy. In general: if physics, as a science, presupposes metaphysical principles, then metaphysics, reformed in a critical sense, has to draw its observations first and foremost from the facts that physics exposes (Pecere, 2009, 3–33)².

However, perhaps it is in the work of 1786 that this mutual implication becomes most clear: the claim to develop a traditional, Wolffian system of philosophy begins here to dissolve, giving way to a more complex movement of rebound between principles and facts. Immanent physiology reduces itself to rational physics. For its part, rational physics becomes profoundly intertwined with mathematics (i.e. to the science of constructing objects in the field of pure intuition, such as to allow us to anticipate, so to say, what is essentially given through sensibility), as long as it consists in an attempt to define an a priori knowledge pertaining determinate given facts. Such anticipation is impossible solely through concepts: the property one needs to anticipate while attempting at an a priori consideration of certain natural determinations is a property defined in the horizon of intuition. Concepts can only illustrate the formal possibility of an object, its mere intelligibility, whereas one can demonstrate the possibility of its existence (as long as it implies factual givenness) only through the presentation of an intuition corresponding to the concept — that is, through the construction of the concept in the horizon of pure intuition (Kant, 1911, 470).

It follows that a pure science pertaining to a determinate natural object can be defined as “pure” only insofar as it contains mathematics. Thus, rational (i.e. pure) physics is possible only as far as physical objects are mathematizable. Kant's constructivist take on mathematics (Hintikka, 1992, 21–23) allows the intelligibility of every mathematical object in the context of pure a priori intuition. On the other hand, Kant defines the object of physics in general as “matter” or “corporeal nature” (Kant, 1911, 470).

² The critical metaphysics of corporeal nature developed in Kant's *MAdN* explicitly occupies a sort of midpoint between positive physics and the metaphysical part of the philosophy of pure reason. Pecere details various aspects of its specific role in the system of transcendental philosophy. This role already takes into account a certain concession to the empirical concept of matter (Pecere, 2009, 393–411). From the point of view of transcendental philosophy, this concession is not a problem in itself, as long as the claim to an a priori foundation of nature is correspondently limited. A problem perhaps arises if the limited object of such an examination — movement, in the present case — is redefined as its essence, i.e. as a formal determination of the whole of factual nature.
Therefore, rational physics would have to deal specifically with the mathematizable aspect of matter. The mathematizability of a determinate natural fact should indeed imply the possibility of an a priori definition of its existence.

Let us consider the text. The first definition of *Phoronomie* states that:

> Matter is the movable in space. That space which in itself its movable is called material, or also relative space; that in which all motion must finally be thought (and which is therefore absolutely immovable) is called pure, or also absolute space. (Kant, 2004, 15; Kant, 1911, 480)

Matter is, essentially, what is mobile in space. Pure space is the horizon of every possible movement: it is not mobile, and thus not material. This dual definition already entails the operation of abstraction required to gain a pure knowledge of nature. In fact, reducing materiality to mobility means qualifying the essence of matter as measurable and thus quantizable. By Kant’s perspective, quantities are both objects of philosophy and mathematics, while qualities can be examined a priori only through concepts, i.e., philosophically (Kant, 1904, A 714). This is because, while qualities are *de facto* given only through empirical intuition (to say, through an intuition that effectively applies to a sensation), determinate quantities, both continuous and discrete, can be constructed a priori, as long as one can associate a pure intuition to their concept. By means of pure intuition, individuals become possible objects of thought without compromising themselves with the contingency of facts: as long as an examination through concepts alone can only take into account more or less extensive generalities, such individual objects can only be mathematical ones.

In the first note to the definition, Kant seems to refer to the reduction of matter to movement as a characteristic feature of *Phoronomie*, which indeed focuses on movement (Kant, 1911, 480). He recognizes that this abstraction implies an a priori consideration of matter as if it were only a mobile point in space, mathematically defined by its movement. However, such abstraction remains indeed as a premise of rational physics as a whole, being that all three other definitions of matter in the work of 1786 presuppose mobility. *Dynamik* defines matter as the mobile, insofar as it fills space (Kant, 1911, 496). *Mechanik* defines it as the mobile, insofar as it has motive power (Kant, 1911, 536). Finally, *Phänomenologie* defines matter as the mobile, insofar as it is an object of experience (Kant, 1911, 554). They all start indeed from a specification of the first definition of *Phoronomie*, thus presupposing that definition. Therefore, the attempt at a definition of an a priori knowledge regarding matter results, actually, in the definition of a priori truths regarding movement. However, the claim that movement is the essence of the empirical concept of matter remains
unjustified. So does, consequently, the attribution of the findings of rational physics to factual matter as a whole.

This movement of abstraction constitutes the first concrete attempt at a transcendental foundation of natural science, beyond the mere draft that is the Architektonik der reinen Vernunft. The relation with that systematic outline gives to the first definition of Phoronomie a peculiar problematic character. In itself, the modern idea of physics does not necessarily imply an a priori foundation in the traditional sense: positive research can efficiently proceed by means of operative, circular definitions (Toraldo di Francia, 1981, 51–52). It follows that the idea of a model-based physics is not taken as per se problematic: the abstraction of certain aspects of reality could be sufficiently justified by its functionality — that is, by its actual effectiveness in relation to the explanatory and predictive aims of positive science. For its part, transcendental philosophy’s a priori definition of matter in relation to objects in general (i.e., as the determinable) does not seem inherently puzzling, at least from an epistemological point of view. However, a problem arises when attempting to conform actual physics to the claims of a systematic development of such kind of philosophy. Such an attempt would indeed require the grounding of an abstract notion of matter within an a priori theory, thus assigning to the chosen model an essential primacy, rather than a functional one.

In the second note at the first definition of Phoronomie, Kant writes:

If I am to explicate the concept of matter, not through a predicate that belongs to it itself as object, but only by relation to that cognitive faculty in which the representation can first of all be given to me, then every object of the outer sense is matter, and this would be the merely metaphysical explication thereof. [...] Matter, as opposed to form, would be that, in the outer intuition, which is an object of sensation, and thus the properly empirical element of sensible and outer intuition, because it can in no way be given a priori. [...] Finally, I further remark that, since the movability of an object in space cannot be cognized a priori, and without instruction from through experience, I could not, for precisely this reason, enumerate it under the pure concepts of the understanding in the Critique of the Pure Reason; and that this concept, as empirical, could only find a place in a natural science, as applied metaphysics, which concerns itself with a concept given through experience, although in accordance with a priori principles. (Kant, 2004, 16–17; Kant, 1911, 481–482)

Considering the Architektonik der reinen Vernunft, one easily notices that Kant’s idea of a system of philosophy shows a certain ambiguity, being that critical philosophy is characterized as propaedeutic to metaphysics, while transcendental philosophy is determined as a part of it. In this passage, we see an analogous uncertainty. The metaphysical definition of matter as the determinable — i.e. matter defined by its role in the transcendental constitution of an object in general — pertains to a priori
knowledge only by a negative determination. Matter is the aspect of the object of knowledge that (unlike form) cannot be given a priori. Therefore, the legitimacy of an a priori positive determination the essence of matter (i.e., of matter in general), such as the one implied in the first definition of Phoronomie, remains unjustified. Indeed, it requires a certain concession to experience. The question is if such partiality towards experience — which mirrors the aforementioned abstraction of some features from the physical fact, in order to make an object of stable knowledge out of it — is, in general, a priori justifiable in its turn. This a priori justification would in fact mean that mobility would have to assume towards the rest of facticity a sort of formal role. No matter what the contingent impact of sensation could bring to intuition, matter would always be determined as mobile, and thus unified under this determination.

The notion of matter required by rational physics seems to dissolve the bounds fixed by metaphysics. While the hierarchic structure of the system should imply the comprehension of matter as facticity of nature under the a priori definition of matter pertaining to objects in general, thus defining facticity only through a negative relation with the formal structure of knowledge, the claim to a pure physics must admit an exuberance of matter from this negative relation. It must admit a universal positive determination of facticity as a whole. The point of the system in which the critical exam of the possible a priori knowledge should connect to the knowledge of determined natural objects seems indeed to imply a divergence between transcendental philosophy and the critical distinction between matter and form.

However, if the same act of transcendental reflection is tied together with this critical distinction, it follows that every transcendental approach to the foundation of the science of nature has to accept that its claim to an a priori knowledge of nature has to be limited by a certain partiality. This partiality is implied by the fact that every determination of the experience of a natural object remains in a certain relation with the factual aspect that defines this object as natural (given that its contingency cannot be resolved in any way into an a priori determination). Thus, a universal a priori determination of nature can be found only outside of the domain of what is justifiable through transcendental reflection. That is, if the issue concerning the transcendental definition of mobility as the essence of matter has its roots not in a specific feature of Kant’s conception of transcendental reflection, but rather in the general structure

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3 In this context, the notion of facticity should be intended as a phenomenological tool of analysis. Its function would be to indicate the field of that knowledge of contingent determinations that can only be acquired a posteriori, or the field of knowledge of what could be otherwise (in accordance with the use of the word “faktisch” in (Husserl, 1976, 12)).
of transcendental reflection as such. Let us try to understand if this is the case by considering the same problem within the context of another instance of transcendental philosophy — the instance embodied by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

4. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTUITION OF LIFE-WORLD AS FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE

Much has been said about the relationship between Kant and Husserl, and thus about the role of Husserl as a transcendental philosopher in the traditional sense (Kern, 1964, 276–303). We initially accepted the traditional interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology as one of the most relevant and elaborated examples of transcendental idealism, in order to explore its meaning. We will now try to determine if even within the context of a phenomenological transcendental reflection an a priori determination of facticity should imply the dissolution of the critical distinction between form and matter. If so, the inclusion of Kant and Husserl under the same tradition should result clarified as the sharing of a common limit of their theoretical gestures. An examination of the phenomenological investigation of the founding conditions of the science of nature could indirectly shed more light not only on the relationship on Husserl’s reception of Kant, but also on an aspect of transcendental reflection as such.

Husserl’s work has provided a certain philosophical framework for positive research, especially concerning mathematics and physics (Ryckman, 2005, 108–145). Amongst other Husserl’s writings, one often intends Die Krisis der europäischen Wis-

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4 This initial inclusion of Husserl’s work in the domain of transcendental idealism can be justified by a quote from the Cartesianische Meditationen (Husserl, 1973). There, Husserl explicitly defines for the first time his phenomenology as a “transcendental idealism, though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense” (Husserl, 1973, 118). Our starting hypothesis was exactly that Kant and Husserl’s philosophies can be understood as two specific instances within the common framework of transcendental idealism. However, such a connection between Husserl’s philosophy and transcendental idealism remains only nominal, as long as it is not validated by a clarification of the structure of Kant and Husserl’s theoretical operations. The historical examination of Husserl’s reception of Kant cannot possibly suffice to present such a clarification, given that this reception is already part of Husserl’s theoretical project. In view of this aim, a systematic approach to the issues discussed by both thinkers would be required. The second part of Kern’s Husserl and Kant (Kern, 1964, 51–320) can be seen as a paradigm of this systematic approach.

5 Being especially concerned by Weyl and Becker’s contribution to the philosophical elaboration of Einstein’s theory of relativity, Ryckman’s book centers on Husserl’s Ideen I. One could argue that the aporetic outcome of the founding problem of the science of nature from a transcendental point is
senschaften und die transzendentalen Phänomenologie (Husserl, 1954) as a major reference, concerning this topic. However, the general terms of Husserl’s later contribution towards a philosophical theory of positive science trace back right to the first attempts at a genetic phenomenological analysis. In fact, his later works present what one could summarize as a constructivistic take on the crisis of modern rationalism.

This attempt intertwines itself profoundly with the aim of genetic phenomenological analysis, insofar as it is an effort at defining a new scientific praxis oriented by the idea of a transcendental clarification of the life-world, from which every complex intentional objective constitution emerges. Such praxis is, primarily, a scientific one; and, as a central nucleus, it entails a new comprehension of the science of nature, as far as the clarification of life-world is ultimately a transcendental clarification of facticity as such (Heelan, 1987, 380–388).

Husserl’s appeal to a new praxis is justifiable from a transcendental point of view only if the concept of life-world entails a formal knowledge of facticity — a knowledge that could guarantee an a priori foundation of science of nature. A meaningful passage from the Krisis reads:

> It is not the life-world as such what we know best, what is always taken for granted in all human life, always familiar to us in its typology through experience? Are not all its horizons of the unknown simply horizons of what is just incompletely known, i.e., known in advance in respect of its most general typology? [...] And perhaps the scientificity (Wissenschaftlichkeit), which this life-world as such, in its universality, requires, is a peculiar one, one which is precisely not objective and logical but which, as the ultimately grounding one, is not inferior but superior in value. But how is this completely different sort of scientific discipline, for which the objective sort has always been substituted up to now, to be realized? The idea of objective truth is predetermined in its whole meaning by the contrast with the idea of the truth in pre- and extra-scientific life. This latter truth has its ultimate and deepest source of verification in an experience, which is "pure" in the sense designated above, in all its modes of perception, memory etc. [...] What is actually first is the "merely subjective-relative" intuition of prescientific world-life. (Husserl 1970, 124–125; Husserl, 1954, 127–128)

Beyond the traditional requirements of scientific objectivity, this intuition encompasses a knowledge that gives sense to natural, historical praxis — and does so as a firm and definite knowledge. In other word, this intuition defines a "Typik", a formal unity for facts, as long as they present themselves into the horizon of praxis. It

already implicitly present in the work of 1913. However, in order to highlight the decisive character of this issue for the phenomenological project as a whole, we need to focus on the genetic issue of the origin of intentional life. Sure enough, it is especially within this issue that phenomenology has to deal with the question of what is given “before” the intentional determination as such (i.e., before the form).
follows that this intuition consists in a formal, but dynamic background of living consciousness. As long as it remains a constitutively implicit intention, such background is indeed a foundation. It is an aspect of living consciousness, whose intentional content cannot be determined through its articulated relations with other acts (namely, founding acts of sensible perception), but only progressively clarified in the explanation of the unending task of transcendental self-reflection.

We have already defined, at least provisionally, the relation of foundation from a transcendental point of view: foundation is what determines the possibility of that, which is founded, as an objective constitution of transcendental consciousness. Clearly, this is not the phenomenological concept of Fundierung, which has a distinct mereological character. The issue at hand concerns specifically the effort for a transcendental Begründung (Husserl, 1974, 230–238) of knowledge in a phenomenological context, rather than the idea of a phenomenological description as such. Therefore, we will not take into account, here, the descriptive formal ontology of nature outlined in the Logische Untersuchungen (Husserl, 1984, 296–300). Based on the quoted excerpt from the Krisis, one could indeed attribute to the subjective-relative intuition of life-world the role of a Begründung.

This intuition is what constitutes everyday praxis as such. It is not reducible to other intuitions, as all of them are moments of the practical-historical life that unfolds in its horizon. It appears as formal and thus stable, by considering that every intentional constitution, from the simplest to the most complex, is ultimately a moment of this unfolding. It is, then, the stable, formal field of every possible knowledge. It is the field that the phenomenological transcendental self-reflection attempts at bringing to light. It is worth noting that such an attempt can be phenomenologically justified only through a reference to facticity. Indeed, phenomenological reflection is a self-reflection exactly because reflection in itself is a fact, taking place in the actual (albeit infinitely clarifiable) horizon of the life-world. Still, its clarification would demand a sort of detachment from everyday cognitive experience, given that ordinary knowledge (i. e., ordinary cognitive praxis) already implicitly presupposes this intuition.

The fulfillment of such a clarification would imply a complete reintegration of concrete experience into the reflexive abstraction. It would then mean the nullification of that separation between the fact and the knowledge of the fact that made transcendental reflection possible in the first place. Actually, facticity seems to be just what transcendental reflection leaves behind in order to abstract an a priori knowledge from the fact of experience. If that is the case, then transcendental reflection has to pursue indefinitely an aim that cannot be fulfilled within its domain. One could
also say that the ultimate completion of transcendental philosophy would mean its
dissolution as a theory.

Husserl and Kant’s conceptions of transcendental reflection seem to share this
sort of tragic aspect. Walter Benjamin refers exactly to this feature in order to define
transcendental philosophy as a whole (Benjamin, 1985, 34–38). Benjamin’s sugges-
tion gives us a theoretical criterion for distinguishing transcendental philosophy from
other possible theories. The issue concerning the foundation of the science of nature
gave us the possibility to test the relevance of this criterion. Sure enough, it should be
relevant as long as it allows us to decide the soundness of Kant and Husserl’s proposals
from a transcendental point of view.

However, it also appears to hint at a clearer (negative) determination of the
claim to a non-transcendental, universal knowledge. In phenomenological terms, this
would be the claim to a universal knowledge about what does not constitutes itself
within the field of experience: the claim to a universal knowledge about the *Faktum*.
Husserl defines such a knowledge as *metaphysical* (Husserl, 1973, 181–182)\(^6\). The in-
tegration of facticity into the a priori knowledge of experience should then result ei-
ther in silence (that is, in the muteness of mere facts) or in a metaphysical knowledge.
It follows that the idea of a complete theoretical clarification of life-world should be
characterized as metaphysical.

Here we will not discuss extensively if the notion of an infinite progress towards
the exhaustion of the phenomenological *explanandum* — which remains, even ac-
cording to Husserl, *de facto* impossible — is inherently metaphysical in its turn, as it is
a fairly common topic of critical literature (Tengelyi, 2005, 487–498)\(^7\). We will instead
focus on the metaphysical character of the notion of “living present” as a mean to fill
the gap between the fact of living consciousness and the founding formal intuition of
life-world, in order to make this intuition at least *de jure* possible.

\(^6\) According to Husserl, the “total science of the a priori” must entail metaphysics as the theory con-
cerning “all the problems of accidental factualness, of death, of fate” (Husserl, 1973, 181–182). One
could argue that the problems posed by death, fate, or in general by the contingency of facts, are
already included under “the problems of accidental factualness”.

\(^7\) Both in Kant and Husserl’s work, the ultimate completion of the task of reason, albeit *de facto* im-
possible, is formally defined by infinitely determinable ideas. In other words, even if we cannot ac-
tually connect (or display) the infinite variety of actual representations (or intentional objectivities)
in an actual representation (or vision) of the totality of possible objects, we ideally know how to
move towards this goal. However, it is worth noting — as Tengelyi does — that Husserl’s conception
of the infinity is different from Kant’s in a very relevant way. Kant’s infinity is potential; Husserl’s
5. LIVING PRESENT AND FACTICITY

Kant and Husserl's attempts at defining a junction between our knowledge of facts and the system of transcendental philosophy show, as we have seen, a common impasse. Despite relevant differences between the two conceptions of the relation between form and matter, the shared pursuit of a transcendental a priori foundation of our knowledge of facts seems to incur in an unjustified “apriorification” of a posteriori determinations. Let us further elucidate this point.

Kant's idea of physical matter resulted in a cardinal example of an aporia concerning the hylomorphic structure of the object of knowledge within transcendental reflection. The non-empirical determination of matter as a whole implied in Kant's rational physics should consist of an unjustified separation between a certain formal (universal) essence of matter and a non-formalizable factual residue. The former term is metaphysical insofar as it implies an unjustified fusion between form and matter. This fusion should serve to guarantee a continuous passage between the two, thus bypassing the discrepancy between necessity and contingency. It is a metaphysical operation, as long as it consists in an arbitrary assumption of a determinate aspect of this contingency as its universal essence.

Husserl's concept of living matter implies this same operation. First, let us remember (albeit only vaguely) the role and development of the notion in Husserl's work. Living present (lebendige Gegenwart): this expression refers to an aspect of the temporality of living consciousness — an aspect that emerges from the genetic analysis of the passive syntheses from which temporality emerges. The first relevant use of the concept dates back to the Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstseins (Husserl, 2001, 140–141), within a context defined by Husserl's first attempts at a genetic analysis of intentional constitutions. However, the search for a foundation of time-syntheses implied a genetic aspect even in the previous phenomenological researches about inner time-consciousness (Husserl, 1969, 99–134). The specificity of infinity is actual. Kant's infinity is the infinity of an infinite series of connected representations of the same object; Husserl's infinity is the infinity of an omnilateral perspective on the same object. In a certain sense, the claim to an a priori determination of facticity implicitly gives access to this completion, as the universal determination of what is determinable (should the transcendental philosopher give in to the metaphysical aspect of Kant and Husserl's solutions). Therefore, these two different conceptions of infinity should define the two different tasks that are implicitly delegated to the mobile matter and to the living present. As we have seen, the mobility of matter makes facticity into something that can be constructed through a synthesis of representations. We will see that the living present makes facticity into something that is always already exposed into an intuitable horizon of intentional relations (i.e., into a horizon of potential phenomenological perspectives).
the notion of living present in comparison with the concepts of\textit{ Urimpression} and \textit{Strom} relies in its peculiar link with transcendental subjectivity. This link remains only outlined in the earlier concepts of this original level of temporality. Then, at a later stage, living present is defined as the time of transcendental, original presence, which determines consciousness as constitutively intentional, i. e. open towards an irreducible transcendence — being nevertheless somewhat extended and streaming, fluently stretching itself in a self-grasping movement from which the ego emerges as an originally factual whole.

It is not the case, here, to proceed to a more thorough explanation of the concept as such, being that critical literature already exhaustively examined this matter too (Held, 1966, 61–137). However, it is interesting to note that, while on the one hand the living present has been intended as the time of absolute subjectivity, ideally (necessarily) self-present as intentional operativity (Derrida, 1993, 4–5), on the other the whole of this subjectivity seems to exhibit only a factual (contingent) unity. Husserl recognizes that the wholeness of the intentional ego — the unity that, in \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen}, he calls "monadisch konkrete ego" (Husserl, 1973, 102) — is indeed factual, as far as it implies that the hyletic aspect of intentional constitutions should be already included in this conclusive synthesis.

There are two main points to be clarified: if this intertwining between ideality and factuality implies a metaphysical continuity, rather than a mere contiguity; and how this supposedly transcendentally unjustifiable continuity is connected to the founding intuition of life-world. It is perhaps useful, in this regard, to explore Husserl’s unpublished works (which, as it is known, constitute the larger part of his written production).

Here, we will briefly consider parts of a currently unedited manuscript, dated back at the last part of 1932 and titled \textit{Urassoziation und Zeitigung: Konstitution des realen, Raum, Zeit, Kausalität}\textsuperscript{8}. According to the incipit of the manuscript (p. 2):

\begin{quote}
Zu der schwierigen Klärung der offenen Horizonte, die sich in Gang des monadischen Lebens immerzu konstituieren, und die zugehörigen Schwierigkeiten „möglicher Erfahrung“ ist folgende zu bedenken. Die ursprünglich zeitigende Assoziation (die Retention
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{8} Edmund Husserl’s manuscripts have been consulted at the \textit{Husserl-Archiv} of Freiburg im Breisgau, during the winter semester 2016/17 (from October 2016 to February 2017), with prior authorisation from the Director Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmuth Gander. The manuscript we will here quote has been classified under the signature D 15, and has been transcribed in a typescript by M. Biemel. It was delivered to the \textit{Archiv} on 8 December 1951. The transcribed manuscript consists of 45 pages. Page 7, 24, 33 present respectively the dates of 1, 2 and 3 November 1932. The dating of pages 1–6 remains uncertain. One could translate the title of the manuscript (attributed to it by Biemel) as follows: \textit{Original association and temporalization: constitution of reality, space, time and causality}. 114
The intentional life of the concrete ego displays a founding synthesis. The clarification of this original, operative unity is the final aim of phenomenological reflection. The beginning of such reflection consisted in a critical movement. This movement consists of a suspension of the unjustified belief in the positivity of facts and in a reduction to a self-evident knowledge, starting from which the phenomenologist should progressively bring out in clarity the intentional operativity that structures living experience in the way it de facto is.

Husserl describes the supposedly original synthesis as a temporal one. Every possible experience is defined by the unity of a primordial presence with the retentional continuity of consciousness. In the context of this synthesis, one can still distinguish a determinans (the serial structure of time) and a determinandum (the Ur-impression). However, the justification of the supposedly original, founding aspect of this synthesis implies a relevant addiction to this distinction. This addiction consists in a character of continuity, not only (as it is for other constituted temporal syntheses) for what pertains to the formal aspect (i.e. between the “now” and the retentional “no more”), but also for what concerns the Ur-impression. The material presentation of the Ur-impression to consciousness in the “now” (Jetzt), deemed as contingent in relation to the temporal constitution of determinate intentional objectivities, is, at this original level, necessarily required in order to prevent the collapse of the entirety of experience as an intentional structure. The rise of the totality of experience as a transcendental logical structure demands a certain a priori unification of the absolute hyletic multiplicity that is facticity. On the other hand, transcendental reflection should be able to grasp this absolute sense of facticity only via negationis, as a difference from form (and thus from unity as such).

9 “For the difficult clarification of the open horizons, which always constitute themselves in the course of the monadic life, and the associated difficulties of ‘possible experience’, the following is to be considered. The original temporal association (retention and pre-temporalization) takes place in respect of each datum as unity of a separation. […] What emerged from the original impression has only for me ‘being’ as the respective ‘momentary’ retention, [while] in the constitution of duration I have an impressional point […] and a transversal series, the continuously modified retention of the earlier original impressions. The self in streams and in self-concealment. The whole sinks, if the continuity of the original impression is interrupted […]”. Translation is mine.
The peculiar “streaming punctuality” of the living present, apparently an elaboration of the psychological concept of “extended present” (Husserl, 1969, 19–23), is in fact a necessary work hypothesis, given Husserl’s attempt at a phenomenological investigation regarding the absolute transcendental origin of experience. This is because the required continuity of the Ur-impression cannot be made discreet by the dimensionless punctuality of the Jetzt-form, and yet it needs to partake in a certain synthetic relation with consciousness, in order to be able to define in a formal sense the field of possibility of every possible experience. The manuscript continues (p. 7–8):

Natur als Universum der Realitäten hat universalen Formen der Zeitlichkeit nach Simultanität und Sukzession, in der die Realitäten, die seiernden Körper, sind. […] Genauer besehen hat die Welt und zunächst in unserer abstraktiven Beschränkung die universale körperliche Natur eine konkrete Form, die sich abstraktiv in folgender Weise schichtet. In äußerster Abstraktion ist die Natur eine Allheit zeitlich Seiender, und zwar eine Allheit im zeitlichen nacheinander Verharrender, d. i. in der sukzessiven Zeit Fortdauernder.10

This is an instance of transcendental philosophy’s attempt at a priori foundation of the science of nature via an abstract, supposedly essential determination. In a phenomenological perspective, the enigmatic relation between ideality and factuality can be read indeed as the relation between truth and time (Paci, 1961, 3–22)11, with the phenomenological task being to describe and clarify the articulation of the former into the horizon of the latter. Therefore, the assumption of time as the original field of every possible truth means the exclusion of any eventual non-temporal truth that should supposedly partake in temporal experience (implying that forms are properly omni-temporal, rather than atemporal). If the equivalence between foundation and condition of intelligibility is a general character of such attempt, then the position of a temporal synthesis as a condition of intelligibility of every possible experience is

10 “Nature as the universe of realities has universal forms of temporality in accordance with simultaneity and succession, in which the realities, the existing bodies, are. […] More exactly, the world and, first of all, in our abstract limitation, the universal physical nature has a concrete form, which layers itself abstractly in the following way. In the utmost abstraction, nature is a totality of temporal beings, and indeed a totality in a temporal succession, i.e. in the successive continuous time”. Italics added, translation is mine.

11 Paci’s dialectical conception of phenomenology is based exactly on the irreducibility of time into truth (and vice versa) — that is, on the irreducibility of the contingency of actual facts into a certain logical determination (and vice versa). Each one of these terms implies the other, as facts cannot be given outside a determined experience, and an experience is the fact of a living consciousness in itself. Thus, it is possible to interpret phenomenology — i.e., transcendental philosophy in its most radical instance — as an infinitely unresolved dialectic movement of reflection between “truth” and “time” within the intentional object. The arguments developed here hint at this possibility.
in fact a testimony of the radicalism of Husserl’s phenomenology as transcendental philosophy.

However, the justification of time-synthesis as the form of nature as such implies once again an ambiguous duality. This synthesis defines the “concrete form” of life-world — that is, life-world as clarified in its essential structure. This concrete form should fill the gap between reflection and complete experience. It is metaphysical as far as there is no possible experience (i.e., no possible intentional constitution) of a concrete form of nature, since the reflexive determination of a form presupposes a certain abstraction from facts.

The admission of a de jure possible intuition of the totality of nature, albeit only as a formal temporal horizon, remains unaltered in its metaphysical character even admitting that such intuition is never de facto actual. The infinity that this intuition entails, as far as it is a priori founded in the metaphysical indistinction between form and matter that is the living present, defines the founding character of this intuition. In other words, this intuition defines the origin of possible experience specifically by virtue of its non-actual aspect. This clearly results from the manuscript itself (p. 21–23):

Nicht Erfahrung, sondern „Anschauung“ ist notwendig, damit den zweifellosen Boden zu gewinnen, auf den alle rechtmäßigen Begriffe und Urteilsbildungen über Welt und Natur angewiesen sein. […] Diese Vollkommenheit der wirklichen Erfahrung, die in allem wirklichen synthetischen Fortgang immerfort endlich bleibt, ist in eben dieser Endlichkeit nie zu gewinnen und a priori. Was aber zu gewinnen ist oder sein muß (wenn ja ein Axiom der Natur aussprechbar sein soll) ist die Vollkommenheit einer „Anschauung“, welche die endliche Ausgangserfahrung in die Totalität ihrer Möglichkeiten verfolgt und das Erfahrene als möglicherweise Seiendes in der Einstimmigkeit eines möglichen Fortganges des Erfahrens konstruiert12.

In this perspective, the actuality of experience implies its contingency, i.e., its specific placement in the articulated totality of possible experience. It follows that the intuition of the living present can define the formal a priori dimension of this totality only insofar as it does not, in its turn, take place into this same dimension — that is, only as long as it is (at least partially) not actual.

12 “Not experience, but ‘intuition’ is necessary in order to gain the indubitable ground which all legitimate concepts and judgments about world and nature depend upon […] . This perfection of actual experience, which remains always finite in all actual synthetic progress, can indeed never be attained in this finitude and is a priori. But what is or has to be gained (if an axiom is to be pronounceable with regard to nature) is the perfection of an ‘intuition,’ which pursues the finite initial experience into the totality of its possibilities and constitutes the experienced as possibly existing in the concordance of a possible continuation of the [already] experienced”. Italics added, translation is mine.
6. CONCLUSION

I presented two examples in favour of two specific points. The first point is that an a priori knowledge of nature (i.e. of what there factually is) implies a foundation only achievable through the dissolution of the distinction between matter and form. The second point is that such an indistinction cannot be dealt with within the domain of transcendental philosophy — that is, within the domain of the reflexive analysis of experience. On other aspects, even deeply linked to this points (such as the question about if and how the idea of an infinite progression towards the end of phenomenology already involves such metaphysical completion, or if its heuristic value could be somewhat considered independently from it), I do not express myself here.

It is worth noting, once again, the subtlety of Kant and Husserl's theoretical operations. The metaphysical aspect of these operations does not consist in the abstraction of a simplified model of nature as such, but rather of the claim to essentiality that the abstracted determination holds towards what remains of facticity. From transcendental philosophy's point of view, such a claim results in an attempt at an a priori (i.e. universal, formal, necessary and ideal) foundation of the intelligibility of nature by this determination.

In Husserl's case, actual life is already conceived as essentially convergent towards the intuition of life-world, while the same intuition seems to emerge spontaneously from the actuality of life itself. This problematic correspondence should serve to define factuality as a totality, unified within this a priori intuition.

If we assume phenomenology as the most radical and elaborated instance of transcendental philosophy, the acknowledgement of the metaphysical nature of its take on the foundation of the science of nature requires one last consideration. We have seen that a transcendental attempt at an a priori foundation of our knowledge of facts implies, as long as it remains within the context of transcendental reflection, a non-formalizable — non reducible to an essential form, or non-convergent towards it, so to say — aspect. This does not exclude the possibility of an a priori foundation of facticity, in the eventuality of a proper redefinition of the notion of “a priori knowledge”. Such a redefinition would have to dissolve the connection between a priori knowledge, universality, formality and necessity. It would be based on a contingent abstraction from the absolute multiplicity of actual facticity — the multiplicity that, from the point of view of formalizing reflection, remains each time as a material residue.
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NEW WAYS TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY:
WHY EPISTEMOLOGY MUST BE A DESCRIPTIVE AND EIDETIC STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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Husserl has spilled much ink motivating the transcendental reduction that is supposed to pave the way for the ultimate, subjective science, i.e., transcendental phenomenology. However, Husserl’s original ways to the transcendental reduction are problematic. One such issue concerns the (in)fallibility of apodictic evidence. If apodictic evidence must be infallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology seems to be unattainable. However, if apodictic evidence is fallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology is not as well-motivated as seemingly implied by Husserl’s Cartesian way. In the present paper, I put forward new ways to transcendental phenomenology that are based on arguments in current analytic epistemology. I show that the new evil demon problem, Laurence BonJour’s example of clairvoyance, and the phenomenon of blindsight can not only be used to make a case against reliabilism, but also to motivate the core ideas of transcendental phenomenology. The underlying conviction of this paper is that any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology. The thesis of this paper is that one such way to transcendental phenomenology can be found by engaging in current epistemological debates. I exemplify this new way to the reduction by discussing concrete problems, putting particular emphasis on the new evil demon problem as it allows us to motivate a phenomenological version of epistemic internalism, according to which two experiences that are phenomenologically identical are also justificationally identical, which means that they justify the same beliefs to the same degree.

Key words: Transcendental phenomenology, epistemology, Husserl, transcendental reduction, phenomenological epistemology.

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НОВЫЕ ПУТИ К ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОЙ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИИ: ПОЧЕМУ ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ ДОЛЖНА БЫТЬ ОПИСАТЕЛЬНЫМ И ЭЙДЕТИЧЕСКИМ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕМ СОЗНАНИЯ

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Гуссерлем было много написано о мотивации трансцендентальной редукции, призванной проложить путь к наивысшей субъективной науке, т.е. трансцендентальной феноменологии. Однако собственные пути Гуссерля к трансцендентальной редукции являются проблематичными. Одной из таких проблем является (не)pогрешимость аподиктической очевидности. Если аподик-тическая очевидность должна быть непогрешимой, то проект трансцендентальной феноменологии кажется неосуществимым. Но если аподиктическая очевидность может быть ошибочной, проект трансцендентальной феноменологии не столь хорошо мотивирован, как это, по-види-мому, предполагает картезианский путь к редукции у Гуссерля. В данной статье мы предложим новые пути к трансцендентальной феноменологии, которые исходят из дебатов в современной аналитической эпистемологии. Я покажу, что новая проблема злого демона, пример с ясновидящим у Л. Бонжура и феномен слепозрения, не только могут быть использованы как аргументы против релиабилизма, но и для того, чтобы мотивировать ключевые идеи трансцендентальной феноменологии. Основополагающее убеждение автора этой статьи заключается в том, что любой аргумент или линия рассуждений, которые по эпистемологическим соображениям моти-вируют исследование сознания посредством неэмпирического дескриптивного и эйдетического метода могут рассматриваться в качестве пути к трансцендентальной феноменологии. Тезис этой статьи заключается в том, что один из таких путей к трансцендентальной феноменологии может быть найден в рамках современных эпистемологических дебатов. Мы проиллюстрируем этот новый путь к редукции посредством обсуждения конкретных проблем, делая основной ак-цент на новой проблеме злого демона, так как последняя дает нам мотивацию для феноменологической версии эпистемического интернализма, в соответствии с которым два переживания, которые тождественны феноменологически, тождественны также по статусу обоснования, что означает, что они обосновывают один и те же убеждения в одной и той же степени.

Ключевые слова: Трансцендентальная феноменология, эпистемология, Гуссерль, трансценден-тальная редукция, феноменологическая эпистемология.

1. INTRODUCTION

The present paper aims to exemplify how engaging with current debates in analytic epistemology can help to motivate transcendental phenomenology. In the following, we see the premises and the main thesis of this paper:

(1) Husserl's transcendental reduction is epistemologically motivated and is intended to rebut the charge of psychologism that has been raised against the Logical

(2) Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology is a project of ultimate elucidation — it is intended to reveal the ultimate epistemological principles (Husserl, 1984, 165).

(3) Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology should not be intended as a project striving for infallibility. Ultimate elucidation must not be confused with infallible justification. Ultimate elucidation means elucidating the ultimate epistemological principles. This does not require that all our justification is infallible. It does not even require that our justification for the ultimate principles is infallible!

(4) Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is subjective or idealist in the sense that he believes that only a descriptive, first-person perspective investigation of one’s own consciousness can lead to the ultimate science, to phenomenology as a First Philosophy that aims at ultimate elucidation. In this sense, and only in this sense, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can be called an egology (Husserl, 1973, 69).

(5) Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is eidetic in that he believes that one’s descriptive investigations of one’s own consciousness must be complemented by eidetic variations. What phenomenology is concerned with is not concrete phenomena but general, a priori structures of consciousness (Husserl, 2002, 312).

(6) Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is transcendental in that it investigates consciousness and the givenness of objects in its various modes “in suspension of all empirical posittings” (Husserl, 1984, 424 ff.; Husserl, 2002, 152).

(7) Husserl’s original ways to the transcendental reduction are problematic. While I agree with Drummond (1975) and Luft (2004) that the Cartesian way and the way through ontology are intended to complement each other, there still remain a number of problems, in particular the issue of the (in)fallibility of apodictic evidence. If apodictic evidence must be infallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology seems to be unattainable. If apodictic evidence can be fallible, the project of transcendental phenomenology is not as well-motivated as seemingly implied by the Cartesian way.

(8) As Husserl has pointed out, “there are various ways to phenomenology”. (Husserl, 2000, 201) I take it that any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology.

(9) One way to transcendental phenomenology in the sense specified in (8) can be found by discussing certain problems in current analytic epistemology.
I take it that (1), (2), (4), (5), (6) are well in line with Husserl’s ideas and statements and are rather uncontroversial (although Husserl scholars, who interpret Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a metaphysical idealism may oppose the wording of (4)). (3) and (7) are phenomenological-systematic claims. There are passages in Husserl’s oeuvre that suggest that he considers apodictic evidence to be infallible which implies that the Cartesian way is intended to lead to an infallible science or at least to an infallible starting point. However, there are also passages that suggest the fallibility of apodictic evidence (cf. Husserl, 1974, 164; Husserl, 1987, 248). More importantly, there is no systematic reason why phenomenologists should subscribe to the infallibility thesis. The present paper is supposed to show that there are ways to transcendental phenomenology that are not committed to the infallibility thesis.

(1) — (7) lead up to (8). According to (8), any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology. (9) claims that one such way to transcendental phenomenology can be found by engaging in current epistemological debates. The present paper is supposed to exemplify this claim.

2. STEPS TOWARDS TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

An effective and thorough way to transcendental phenomenology would consist of the following three steps:

Step 1: Offering reasons why the individual sciences cannot provide ultimate elucidation on their own. Mathematical and natural-scientific methods work well for mathematics and the natural sciences but not for the task of ultimate elucidation. Ultimate elucidation is the task of philosophy. Any argument against empiricism, psychologism, and (epistemic) naturalism in general can be seen as taking step 1 towards transcendental phenomenology. We find such arguments, e.g., in the Prolegomena, the beginning of Ideas I (in particular paragraph 20), and in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.

Step 2: Offering reasons why ultimate elucidation and epistemology must be subjective in the sense of a descriptive eidetic investigation of consciousness. The Cartesian way and the way through ontology can be seen as attempting to take step 2 towards transcendental phenomenology.

Step 3: Showing that a phenomenological epistemology is plausible and has advantages over rival epistemological theories. In step 3, the whole project of transcendental phenomenology gains support from its plausible consequences.
In his published works Husserl was mainly concerned with step 1 and step 2. That the whole project of transcendental phenomenology can gain motivation by demonstrating how its results are superior to those of rival theories is too seldom made explicit. This is particularly true for current phenomenological research. Rarely, if ever, do phenomenologists specify their fundamental epistemological principles, confront them with contemporary rival theories, and illustrate the advantages of a phenomenological epistemology. One may object that it is in principle impossible to motivate a theory or project by its results. This is simply not true. Assume you are a confectioner and are convinced that using ingredient I will result in perfect ice cream. Of course, you can try to convince other people by providing scientific facts about the relationship between ingredient I and human taste receptors. Alternatively, you can also simply make the ice cream and let people taste it for themselves. In what follows, I shall discuss three concrete examples popular in current epistemological debates and show that discussing these examples can make contributions to step 2 and step 3. This means that I will argue that these examples indicate that epistemology should be a descriptive and eidetic study of consciousness (step 2) and that phenomenological-epistemological principles provide a theoretical framework for understanding these examples that has advantages over rival theories such as reliabilism (step 3).

3. NEW WAYS TO TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

3.1. THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM

In the second half of the 20th century, an externalist conception of epistemic justification emerged that still enjoys popularity and now goes by the label of reliabilism. Reliabilism comes in many forms, process reliabilism being the most common and most widely discussed form of reliabilism. The basic idea of process reliabilism can be expressed as follows:

Process reliabilism: A belief is justified if and only if the belief is formed by a reliable process.

1. Among the notable exceptions confronting phenomenology with analytic epistemology aiming at highlighting the fruitfulness of such confrontations are Hopp (2016), Pietersma (2000), Wiltsche (2015) and the controversies between Hopp and Rinofner-Kreidl (Rinofner-Kreidl, 2013; Hopp, 2013) and Hopp and Heffernan (Hopp, 2009; Heffernan, 2009).

2. In our context we may say that we motivate transcendental phenomenology by its intuitive consequences and explanatory power.
A belief-forming process is reliable if it produces mostly true beliefs. The virtue of reliabilism is that it manages to implement a close connection between justification and truth. Many epistemologists have the intuition that truth is the ultimate aim not only of philosophy but of any science and that a plausible conception of justification, thus, must be able to account for the significance of reaching the truth (David, 2014). However, an externalist conception of justification such as reliabilism is anti-phenomenological. Not only because if reliabilism were true, there would be no motivation for a descriptive, eidetic investigation of consciousness, but also because it directly contradicts the basic theses of a phenomenological epistemology. By these basic theses I understand the claims that (i) experiences are the ultimate source of justification (cf. Husserl, 1976, 43), (ii) experiences that possess the phenomenal character of originary givenness are an immediate source of justification (Husserl, 1976, 51), and (iii) originary presentive experiences gain their justificatory force precisely from their character of originary givenness (Husserl, 1976, 43; Husserl, 1984, 347)³.

Reliabilism is silent with respect to (i) and (ii) and incompatible with (iii). A reliabilist account of experiential justification could be introduced as follows:

*Experience-Reliabilism: An experience is a source of immediate justification if and only if the experience is formed by a reliable process.*

An experience-forming process is reliable if it produces mostly veridical experiences. If the reliabilist holds that only originary presentive intuitions are formed by reliable processes, the reliabilist is in agreement with (i) and (ii). However, reliabilism obviously violates the subjective and internalist spirit of phenomenology which is best seen in the incompatibility of reliabilism with (iii). Of course, we do not want to dismiss reliabilism simply for the reason that it is anti-phenomenological. One of the most popular arguments against reliabilism stems from the so-called *new evil demon problem* (NEDP). By discussing NEDP, I want to reveal not only the shortcomings of reliabilism but also to indicate how such an example leads us to transcendental phenomenology.

NEDP can be traced back to Lehrer and Cohen 1983 and is supposed to show that, contrary to what is entailed by reliabilism, reliability cannot be necessary for justification:

Imagine that, unknown to us, our cognitive processes, those involved in perception, memory and inference, are rendered unreliable by the actions of a powerful demon or malevolent scientist. It would follow on reliabilist views that under such conditions the beliefs generated by those processes would not be justified. This result is unacceptable.

(Lehrer, Cohen, 1983, 192)

³ For more details on a phenomenological epistemology and, in particular, the claim that certain experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their distinctive phenomenal character (Berghofer, 2018a; Berghofer, 2018b).
Clearly, the new evil demon problem is inspired by Descartes’s “old” evil demon problem. The important difference is that while Descartes used the evil demon scenario to distinguish fallible from infallible beliefs, NEDP aims at revealing an essential feature of epistemic justification: reliability is not necessary for justification. If I live in the “good world” in which most of my perceptual experiences are veridical and my internal twin lives in the “bad world” in which an evil demon causes my internal twin to have experiences that are indistinguishable from mine but are systematically unreliable, then, if we both have an experience of a red book in front of us, we are both to the same degree justified in believing that there is a red book. In my case, there really is a red book. In the case of my internal twin, the book may be green or even be a hallucination. The point is that epistemologists have the strong intuition that, given that our experiences are phenomenologically indistinguishable, we are both justified to the same degree in believing that there is a red book, which implies that reliabilism is mistaken since reliability is not a necessary condition for justification.

NEDP has often been used to argue in favor of an internalist conception of justification called mentalism. We may introduce this idea as follows:

**Mentalism:** If M1 describes exhaustively the inner life of agent S1 and M2 the inner life of agent S2, then, if M1 = M2, S1 and S2 have the same degree of justification for their respective beliefs.

This implies that epistemic justification supervenes on the mental which is why mentalism is often introduced as follows: “The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions” (Conee, Feldman, 2004, 56).

Thus, NEDP not only casts serious doubt on reliabilism, it also indicates that epistemology should first and foremost be concerned with the mental. Concerning the supervenience thesis, importantly, we find a similar claim in Husserl:

A statement is grounded in experience, more precisely in perception and memory. It carries, so to speak, empirical weight. The clearer and more distinct the fulfilling empirical consciousness of givenness is, the more weight it carries. Obviously, we are not in a realm of contingent psychological subjectivity here either. Perception justifies by its phenomenological content, by its essence. Every singular perception with the same essence would justify “the same” statement proper to it in a precisely similar way, no matter where and for whom. (Husserl, 2008, 343, translation modified)

With respect to epistemic justification, this is one of the most important passages in Husserl’s oeuvre. Let us focus on the claim that “[p]erception justifies by its phenomenological content, by its essence. *Every singular perception with the same essence would justify ‘the same’ statement proper to it in a precisely similar way, no matter where...*
and for whom” (my emphasis). This expresses the view that phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences provide the same degree of justification for the same beliefs. This suggests the above-mentioned supervenience thesis: *Epistemic justification supervenes on the agent’s mental life*. Two persons who differ justificatorily need also to differ mentally. Hence, Husserl subscribes to mentalism.

However, I believe that NEDP and Husserl’s statement that “[e]very singular perception with the same essence would justify ‘the same statement proper to it in a precisely similar way, no matter where and for whom” tell us something even more fundamental about epistemic justification. Note that mentalism does neither specify which mental states are particularly epistemically significant nor what it is that makes certain experiences justifiers. It has been argued that mentalism, as it is introduced above, does not really qualify as an internalist position since conceptions that are traditionally viewed as externalist might be compatible with mentalism (Pritchard, 2011). Here the prime example is Williamson’s famous formula $E = K$. Williamson contends “that one’s total evidence is one’s total knowledge” (Williamson, 2005, 468). Since Williamson also argues that knowledge is a mental state, his knowledge-first epistemology qualifies as a version of mentalism: One’s evidence (i.e., justification) supervenes on one’s knowledge and since knowledge is a mental state this means that justification supervenes on the mental.

On the other hand, consider disjunctivists who hold that (i) veridical perception is essentially distinct from illusion and hallucination even if these mental states are phenomenologically indistinguishable and (ii) only veridical perception is a source of justification, but not illusion or hallucination. Even such disjunctivists could subscribe to mentalism, but note that Williamson and disjunctivists have a different response to NEDP. Since the internal twin in the bad world does not have knowledge and veridical perceptions about the world, Williamson and disjunctivists must deny that the internal twins (one in the good and one in the bad world) have identical mental states. Also, Williamson is forced to deny that the non-veridical experiences of the person in the bad world can have justificatory force (at least they cannot justify beliefs about the world to the same degree as veridical perceptions).

In order to sidestep Williamson’s view or disjunctivist accounts qualifying as a version of mentalism, mentalism is often defined as follows: One’s justification supervenes on one’s *non-factive* mental states. Since knowledge and veridical perception are factive, mentalism can, by this means, avoid the embarrassment of classifying seemingly externalist positions as a version of internalism. However, this solution seems ad hoc and mentalism still does not provide an answer to the question of why certain mental states have justificatory force. I believe that NEDP suggests a more specific answer:
Phenomenological Internalism: If two experiences are exactly alike phenomenologically, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., they justify the same beliefs to the same degree.\(^4\)

In this context Duncan Pritchard states:

“Finally, I take it that the thesis that underlies (NEG) [in our terminology: NEDP] is the following:

\[
\text{DISC. If the experiences had by S and } S^* \text{ are indiscriminable then S and } S^* \text{ will not differ in the degree of epistemic justification that they have for their beliefs.} \]

(Pritchard, 2011, 238).

I believe that Phenomenological Internalism is not only the lesson we should learn from NEDP but that it also captures precisely Husserl’s thoughts when he states that “[e]very singular perception with the same essence would justify `the same’ statement proper to it in a precisely similar way, no matter where and for whom”. Let me illustrate the plausibility of Phenomenological Internalism by Husserl’s method of eidetic variation. We begin with the concrete example of having a perceptual experience of a black laptop. Assume your experience has the character of originary givenness with respect to “there is a laptop”, “this laptop is black”, and “this laptop has a screen and a keyboard”. All these aspects are originally given to you, which basically means that you seem to be visually aware of them. And let us also assume that your experience is veridical, which means that you really are visually aware of a black laptop. How could you vary this scenario such that your perceptual experience loses its justificatory force? Say, we only change the external conditions such that the experience’s phenomenal character remains identical but the experience is a hallucination caused by whatever reason (evil demon, mad scientist, the Matrix, brain malfunction, etc.). Intuitively, just like in NEDP, we would say that the experience’s justificatory force is not affected. Now assume that most of your perceptual experiences are reliable but, for whatever reason, whenever you sit in front of your desk and fold your hands, you have a perfect hallucination of a black laptop. Assume also, you know of this fact (that whenever you sit in front of your desk and fold your hands, you have a perceptual experience of a lack laptop that is a hallucination). In this case, it seems plausible to assume that you are not justified in believing that there is a black laptop. But here we need to distinguish between immediate and inferential justification. In this scenario,

\(^4\) This formulation is parallel to Conee and Feldman’s definition of mentalism: “If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent” (Conee, Feldman, 2004, 56).

\(^5\) It should be mentioned that Pritchard does not subscribe to DISC or Phenomenological Internalism.
the reason why you are not justified in believing that there is a black laptop is that you know that this perceptual experience is a hallucination. The most plausible story we can tell about this scenario is that the hallucination does provide immediate justification for believing that there is a black laptop but this justification is defeated by your background knowledge (namely that this experience is a hallucination). Thus, even in this scenario, the perceptual experience is a source of immediate justification. These scenarios are the starting-points that are intended to help you to apodictically intuit that you cannot vary this case in such a manner that the perceptual character of the experience remains identical while the justificatory force of the experience diminishes. On the other hand, when you vary the phenomenal character, this can easily affect what and to what degree the experience justifies. Assume in our case that your perceptual experience does not seem to make you aware of a black laptop but of a green book. In this scenario, the experience does not have justificatory force for believing that there is a black laptop but that there is a green book. All this reinforces Phenomenological Internalism.

Note that accepting Phenomenological Internalism can be viewed as a way to transcendental phenomenology. We have clarified above that any argument or line of reasoning that, for epistemological reasons, motivates the study of consciousness in a non-empirical descriptive and eidetic fashion can be considered a way to transcendental phenomenology. Mentalism and Phenomenological Internalism not only suggest that epistemology must be a study of consciousness (since justification supervenes on the mental), but also that consciousness should be investigated in a non-empirical descriptive way (because an experience’s justificatory force supervenes on its phenomenal character). Phenomenological Internalism as such was additionally motivated by eidetic variations. The theses that justification supervenes on the mental and that an experience’s justificatory force supervenes on its phenomenal character are intended to be a priori epistemological truths.

3.2. NORMAN THE CLAIRVOYANT

While NEDP is often considered the most powerful argument against the reliabilist’s claim that reliability is necessary for justification, BonJour’s famous case of clairvoyance is intended to reveal that reliability also is not sufficient for justification. Let us take a look at BonJour’s original example:

Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or
against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (BonJour, 1980, 62)

In this case, the belief that the President is in New York City is formed by a reliable process, but intuitively, we would not say that this belief is justified. Again, we need to distinguish between immediate and inferential justification. If Norman knows that he has this clairvoyance power and that most or even all of his clairvoyant beliefs are true, then it might be plausible to assume that he is justified in believing that the President is in New York City. But such a clairvoyant seeming as such is not a source of immediate justification and since in this example BonJour specifies that Norman has no reason for believing that he is a reliable clairvoyant, he is not justified in believing that the President is in New York.

Let us, again, discuss various cases in order to gain a better understanding of the nature of justification.

Case 1: Norman possesses a mystical clairvoyant sphere. Whenever he touches the sphere, a true belief is caused. Norman touches the sphere which causes him to believe that the President is in New York City.

Case 2: Norman possesses a mystical clairvoyant sphere. Whenever he touches the sphere, a true event that takes place right now is displayed within the sphere such that the sphere can be used like a television for real events. Norman touches the sphere which causes the sphere to display the President giving a speech in New York.

Case 3: Norman possesses a mystical clairvoyant sphere. Whenever he touches the sphere, he sees the world through another person’s eyes. Norman touches the sphere which causes him to see the world through the eyes of a person who is in New York watching the President giving a speech. Norman sees the President exactly as he would if he were there in person, but he cannot actively move his head or eyes to change the perspective.

Case 4: Norman possesses a mystical clairvoyant sphere. Whenever he touches the sphere, he is immediately transported to some other place on earth. Norman touches the sphere which causes him to appear in New York seeing the President giving a speech.

Case 1 is very similar to BonJour’s original example, the only difference being that the clairvoyant belief is caused by touching the mystical sphere. Intuitively, such a belief cannot be immediately justified, whether or not it is formed by a reliable process. Such a belief can only be justified by background knowledge, which shows that
the mere reliability of a belief-forming process cannot be sufficient for justification. Although this may suffice to reveal the shortcomings of reliabilism, in order to get a better understanding of the nature of justification, it is also instructive to consider the other cases. In case 2, Norman is justified in believing that the sphere displays the President giving a speech in New York. Why? Because he can see it. His perceptual experiences have an originary presentive character concerning the sphere displaying the President giving a speech. Norman is not immediately justified in believing that the President is in New York giving a speech. For this belief background justification about the reliability of the sphere is required. In case 3, Norman has a perceptual experience of the President giving a speech. This perceptual experience has immediate justificatory force concerning the belief that the President is giving a speech. The special circumstances, however, provide good reasons for (falsely) assuming that this experience is a mere hallucination. Thus, the belief that the President is giving a speech is defeated by these reasons and can only be reinforced by background knowledge about the reliability of this process. In case 4, the situation is similar. Seeing the President justifies Norman in believing that the President is there giving a speech, but this belief may be defeated by his knowledge that it is not normal to be teleported to other places. It may take Norman a while to realize that this is not a bad dream.

The discussion of these examples is supposed to show not only that an external factor such as reliability cannot disclose the nature of justification but also that experiences are a source of immediate justification and that this is so due to their distinctive phenomenal character of originary givenness.

The following subsection will shed more light on the significance of an experience’s phenomenal character and motivate the phenomenologist’s core idea that establishing epistemological principles must be preceded by phenomenological (i.e., descriptive, first-person) analyses.

3.3. THE PHENOMENON OF BLINDSIGHT

The more precise your phenomenological analysis of experiences, the more accurate your conception of experiential justification can become. This shall be illustrated by discussing a philosophically significant real-world example, the phenomenon of blindsight. Chris Tucker describes the phenomenon as follows:

Subjects who have a damaged visual cortex often emphatically report that they cannot see anything within a certain region of their visual field. Nonetheless, such subjects often show remarkable sensitivity (though less than properly functioning humans) to such
things as motion, the orientation of objects, and the wavelength of light within their reported "blind spot". These subjects are typically surprised to discover their success, thinking that they were making random guesses. (Tucker, 2010, 530)

Consider the following example that is simplified but motivated by experimental-psychological investigations: A blindsighted person S looks at a piece of paper with a circle in S's region of normal sight (region R1) and a triangle within S's blind spot (region R2). Based on her perceptual experience, S judges that there is a circle in R1 and a triangle in R2. Are both judgments equally justified? Even if we stipulate that the perceptual experience makes it seem to S that there is a circle in R1 and makes it seem to her that there is a triangle at R2, and that both seemings are formed by equally reliable processes, there still is an important phenomenological difference.

Clearly, S's perceptual experience has an originally presentive character with respect to the circle. S seems to be visually aware of the circle; the circle is presented to her within experience. This, however, is not true for the triangle. The triangle is only co-given to S in the sense that S anticipates there to be a triangle. She has the anticipation that by moving her head, she will become aware of a triangle. The triangle is in the horizon of her perceptual experience but it is not presented to her. This phenomenological difference fits perfectly with the epistemological difference. S's perceptual experience provides her with immediate justification for believing that there is a circle in R1. She sees that there is a circle, thus she is immediately justified in believing that there is one. Intuitively, however, S's perceptual experience does not provide her with immediate justification that there is a triangle in R2. Of course, if S knows that her blindsight faculties are reliable in the sense that in the past most of her blindsight seemings have turned out to be veridical, then S may be inferentially justified in believing that there is a triangle. Based on her blindsight seeming and based on her knowledge that her blindsight seemings are reliable, she can justifiably believe that there is a triangle. But such justification cannot be immediate. A plausible conception of perceptual justification should be able to avoid the consequence that blindsight seemings can be an immediate source of justification (Ghijsen, 2016, 17–19; Smithies, 2014, 103 ff.).

Like BonJour's example of clairvoyance, the phenomenon of blindsight is often used to argue that reliability is not sufficient for justification (Ghijsen, 2016; Smithies, 2014). What is often overlooked is that such examples do not only indicate the failure of reliabilism but also motivate the close connection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and the significance of purely phenomenological analyses in particular. What these examples indicate is that a descriptive, first-person analysis of experiences must be at the very beginning of all epistemology. Epistemology must
be an analysis of experiences and this analysis cannot be proceeded “from above” by linking the justificatory force of experiences to external factors such as reliability. Types of justification (immediate vs inferential) and degrees of justification are linked to modes of givenness. What is given originally, and only what is given originally, can be immediately justified (Husserl, 1976, 326). Also, the clearer and more distinct the experience is, the more justification it provides (Husserl, 1984, 347).

The three examples discussed in this section (NEDP, clairvoyance, and the phenomenon of blindsight) indicate that a non-empirical descriptive study of consciousness must be the foundation for all epistemological investigations. The results we have gained (such as that justification supervenes on the mental and that an experience’s justificatory force supervenes on its phenomenal character) are not intended to be empirical generalizations but a priori truths gained by eidetic variations. Accordingly, we can say that our discussions of these examples can be considered ways to transcendental phenomenology.

Phenomenologists may object that these new ways to transcendental phenomenology fail to establish phenomenology as an infallible science. But this requirement cannot be met anyway — not by the way through ontology, nor even by the Cartesian way. As discussed above, ultimate elucidation must not be confused with infallibility. Phenomenology is supposed to be the ultimate science in the sense of ultimately elucidating all sources of justification. It is Husserl’s conviction that such ultimate elucidation can only be reached by a non-empirical, descriptive science of consciousness that aims at eidetic intuitions of general epistemological principles. In this section, we have seen that discussing examples that are currently popular counter-examples to reliabilism can play the role of leading to such a science, which is why we consider this to be a way to transcendental phenomenology.

Those contemporary epistemologists who may wish to be labeled analytic philosophers might object that discussing such examples and using them against reliabilism does not make them transcendental phenomenologists. I agree. What I have argued is that the discussion of these examples should make them subscribe to the fundamental thesis of transcendental phenomenology: No epistemology without phenomenology. Phenomenological descriptions are essential to epistemological investigations in the sense that the nature of justification can only be revealed by a non-empirical descriptive first-person analysis of experiences. Experiences justify by virtue of their distinctive phenomenal character and the more we learn about this character, the better for our epistemological investigations. By discussing NEDP, we have seen that justification supervenes on the mental and that if two experiences are exactly alike phenomenologically, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., they justify
the same beliefs to the same degree. By discussing cases of clairvoyance and the phenomenon of blindsight, we have seen the close connection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and how plausible epistemological theories need to be preceded by phenomenological analyses. Thus, discussing such examples should motivate transcendental phenomenology, properly understood.

REFERENCES


In this text, I intend to demonstrate the relevance of Husserl's phenomenology for the debate on Cantor's continuum hypothesis. Once described the classical formulation of this problem by Cantor, Dedekind, Zermelo-Fraenkel, and Hilbert, I observe that the current discussion about this issue is characterized by the opposition between a Platonist (Gödel) and a formalist (Cohen) solution. Although this latter is widespread among mathematicians, a few of them still think that the continuum conjecture is relevant for a philosophical foundation of set theory and, in general, for a scientific description of reality. Most of them have been somehow inspired by Husserl's phenomenology. This is the case, for instance, for Weyl and Gödel himself, even if both of them gradually abandoned phenomenology for, respectively, constructivism/predicativism and Platonism. My aim in this text is to reconstruct this "minor" history, in order to show how Husserl's account of the continuum, developed in different ways by Weyl and Gödel, remains the unique radical attempt to found mathematical formalization on intuition. Although the continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-experiences and the flowing of the intuitive data, is a real leitmotiv of the phenomenological method as a whole, it plays a peculiar role in the early Husserl, notably in his lectures of 1891 on Philosophy of Arithmetic, those of 1905–1908 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and those of 1907 on Things and Space. In these texts, there emerges a theory of how the concept of the continuum originates in the intuition of concrete data: more precisely, the intuition of continuity is conceived as the phenomenological condition for any mathematical formalization of the continuum. This does not entail that Husserl is not committed to the problem of a rigorous formalization of the continuum. Rather, as demonstrated by his in-depth inspection of spatial perception and time-consciousness, he is fully aware of the limits of any attempt of formalizing continuity (the same limits Weyl will emphasize concerning Cantor-Dedekind's axiom). Accordingly, it is precisely for its attempt to keep together intuition and formalization that transcendental phenomenology still plays a relevant role in the current debate about the foundation of mathematics.

Key words: Continuum, set theory, platonism, formalism, intuition, time-consciousness.
ПЕРЕОСМЫСЛИВАЯ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕННО-ВРЕМЕННУЮ ПРОТЯЖЁННОСТЬ: ВКЛАД ГУССЕРЛЯ В ДЕБАТЫ О КОНТИНУУМ-ГИПОТЕЗЕ

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В этом тексте я стремлюсь продемонстрировать значимость феноменологии Гуссерля для дебатов о континуум-гипотезе Кантора. Описав классическую формулировку этой проблемы у Кантора, Дедекинда, Цермело и Френкеля, и Гильберта, я констатирую, что для современной дискуссии по этому вопросу характерно противопоставление платонистскому (Гёдель) и формалистскому решению (Коэн). Хотя второе решение широко распространено среди математиков, только немногие из них до сих пор считают, что предположение континуума релевантно для философского обоснования теории множеств, и в целом для научного описания реальности. Большая часть из них испытала влияние феноменологии Гуссерля. Таков, например, случай Вайля и самого Гёделя, несмотря на то, что они оба постепенно сменили позицию с феноменологической, на, соответственно, конструктивизм/предикативизм и платонизм. Моя задача в этом тексте — реконструировать «малую» историю, чтобы показать, как представление Гуссерля о континууме, по-разному развитое Вайлем и Гёделем, остаётся уникальной радикальной попыткой обосновать математическую формализацию интуиций. Хотя континуум, а именно как феноменологическое условие потока живого опыта, равно как и проистекания данных интуиции, представляет собой реальный лейтмотив феноменологического метода в целом, он играет особую роль у раннего Гуссерля, особенно в лекциях 1891 г. Философия арифметики, 1905–1908 гг. О феноменологии внутреннего сознания времени, и 1907 г. Вещь и пространство. В этих текстах возникает представление о том, как понятие континуума происходит из интуиций конкретных данных: а точнее, интуиции непрерывности — это феноменологическое условие всякой математической формализации континуума. Из этого не следует, что Гуссерль не ставит проблему строгой формализации континуума. Скорее, его глубокое исследование восприятия, пространства и сознания-времени демонстрирует, что он полностью осознавал границы всякой попытки формализации непрерывности (эти же границы будет подчёркивать Вайль в том, что касается аксиомы Кантора-Дедекинда). Соответственно, именно в свете этих попыток рассматривать вместе интуицию и формализацию, феноменология продолжает играть значимую роль в современных дебатах об основаниях математики.

Ключевые слова: Континуум, теория множеств, платонизм, формализм, интуиция, сознание-время.

1. CANTOR’S CONJECTURE AND ITS FORMER DEVELOPMENTS

The continuum hypothesis, formulated by Cantor (1878), is one of the most famous conjectures in the set theory. In mathematical terms, the continuum problem is the following: which is the transfinite cardinality of the set of real numbers? In other
words, how many points are there in the real line? There exist two classic formulations of the continuum hypothesis: each infinite subset of the continuum (i) has the cardinality of the natural (countable infinite) or real number set; (ii) has the smallest transfinite cardinality after the countable infinite. These two formulations are equivalent if one assumes the nine-item list of rules called Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice (1904), affirming that, given any collection of non-empty sets, it is possible to make a selection of exactly one object from each set, even if the collection is infinite.

With respect to the problem of the continuum, the most relevant among Zermelo-Fraenkel's axioms claims that infinite sets exist. Nevertheless, assuming actual infinity leads to disturbing results: for instance, Cantor demonstrated that the infinite set of even numbers \{2, 4, 6, \ldots\} can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with all counting numbers \{1, 2, 3, \ldots\}: thus, there are just as many evens as there are odd- and evens. Even more troubling was his discovery in 1873 (Cantor, 1932) that the continuum of real numbers (like 0.00001, π, etc.) is uncountable: this means that there is no one-to-one correspondence between real numbers and the counting numbers, insofar as for any numbered list of them it is possible to devise a real number that is not on the list. That is, the infinite sets of real numbers and counting numbers have different sizes, or different cardinal numbers. Indeed, Cantor demonstrated that there are not two but an infinite sequence of ever-larger cardinals, each new infinity consisting of the power set, or set of all subsets, of the infinite set before it. More closely, Cantor asks whether there is either an infinity between the two smallest cardinals, or the infinity of the real numbers is the first infinity past the infinity of the counting numbers. On the one hand, rational numbers cannot provide such a mid-size infinity, insofar as they have the same cardinality as the counting numbers. On the other hand, there are just as many real numbers in any slice of the continuum (i.e. between 0 and 1) as there are in the whole set. Cantor concludes that there is no infinity between countable sets and the continuum, although he could not demonstrate his hypothesis using the axioms of set theory.

It is for these reasons that Hilbert (1935) put the problem of the continuum at the first place in the list of 23 unresolved mathematical problems presented at the International Conference of Mathematics of Paris in 1900. One has to wait until 1931 for a decisive turning point, when Gödel proved (Gödel, 1938) that an axiomatic system such as Zermelo-Fraenkel's one (plus the axiom of choice) cannot be at the same time consistent and complete. His famous theorem of incompleteness shows that, in order to prove that the axioms of set theory are consistent (namely, that they do not lead to contradictions) an additional axiom is needed which is not on the list,
and so forth. Indeed, whereas Gödel demonstrated that the continuum hypothesis is consistent with Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axioms (plus the axiom of choice), the American mathematician P. Cohen (Cohen 1963a; Cohen 1963b) proved the opposite, that the negation of the continuum hypothesis is consistent with Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axioms (plus the axiom of choice). As a result, the continuum hypothesis is actually independent of the axioms, that is, something beyond these axioms is required in order to prove or refute it.

Especially after the demonstration of the independence of continuum hypothesis from the set theory’s axioms, this issue is nowadays rather controversial. Its history has determined a global reconsideration of the notion of solution in set theory (and mathematics), because of its strong dependence on the issues of consistency and indeterminacy. With this regard, the continuum hypothesis involves a manifold of philosophical questions dealing with the question of solution: has the continuum problem been resolved? If so, which solution has been found? Otherwise, which is its current status? Under Gödel’s theorem of incompleteness, is it unavoidable a pluralistic view about the continuum? Gödel himself took part in this debate with an article (1947) in which he claimed that, once assumed the correctness of the set theory axioms, there follows that concepts and theorems describe a particular reality for which Cantor’s conjecture is either true or false. Thus, the axioms’ indeterminacy implies that they do not contain a complete description of that reality (Gödel, 1947). Gödel’s perspective can be included in the platonic approach to mathematics, namely the view for which mathematics has to deal with a realm of objects and concepts independent of our mind. From this perspective, the continuum hypothesis has a given value of truth, independently of our ability to discover it. By contrast, Cohen maintains that the demonstration of the continuum hypothesis’ independence of Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axioms (plus the axiom of choice) is completely satisfying: rather than requiring the understanding of any mathematical reality (as argued by Gödel), the solution of the continuum problem depends on the results we can reach within a certain axiomatic system. His formalistic solution is widely diffused among mathematicians: only a few of them still think that the continuum conjecture is relevant for a philosophical foundation of set theory and, in general, for a scientific description of reality. Most of them have been somehow inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology. For instance, this is the case for Weyl (at least until 1918) and Gödel himself, even if both of them gradually abandoned phenomenology for, respectively, constructivism/predicativism and platonism. My aim in this text is to reconstruct this “minor” history, in order to show

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1 For a precise overview of this discussion, see Linnebo (2017), especially chapters 4, 8, and 12.
how Husserl’s account of the continuum, developed in different ways by Weyl and Gödel, remains the unique radical attempt to found mathematical formalization on intuition. More precisely, to think together mathematical formalization and intuition (whereas Weyl and Gödel respectively developed the former and the second). With this respect, could transcendental phenomenology still play a relevant role in the current debate about the foundation of mathematics?

2. HUSSERL’S ACCOUNT OF THE CONTINUUM

The question of the continuum is central not only for mathematics, but also for natural sciences and theories of consciousness. This is particularly evident for one of the most relevant philosophical approaches developed at the very beginning of XX century, Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, the flow of phenomenological data, as well as the internal time-consciousness, are based upon the intuition of the continuum. As I will demonstrate, the interaction between the intuitive and the mathematical continuum provides with a perfect instance of the relation between what is constituting and what is constituted. In other words, between intuition and formalization. Indeed, although such an interaction is to some extent peculiar of almost all the history of the continuum hypothesis, it plays a primary role in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, in Weyl’s project of foundation of physics, and in Gödel’s mathematical program. With this respect, in the following sections I aim at clarifying the impact of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology on Weyl’s and Gödel’s early perspectives. Let us start here with Husserl.

Within the limit of this work, I cannot provide a complete discussion of the huge quantity of passages — from the published texts and manuscripts — where Husserl deals with the issue of the continuum. Although the continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-experiences and the flowing of the intuitive data, is a real leitmotiv of the phenomenological method as a whole, it plays a peculiar role in the early Husserl, notably in his lectures of 1891 on Philosophy of Arithmetic, those of 1905–1908 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and those of 1907 on Things and Space. As emphasized by Tieszen (1996, 304), “Husserl thinks that arithmetical knowledge is originally built up in founding acts from basic, everyday intuitions in a way that reflects our a priori cognitive involvement”. Within this framework, it is worth noting how Husserl takes

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2 For a critical reconstruction of the relations between Husserl’s phenomenology and sciences, see Feist (2004).
3 See also Centrone (2010, 1) (footnote 2).
into serious consideration both the intuitive and formal structure of the continuum since his first great work. For instance, let us consider the following passage from the section about the *Origin of the Concept of Manifold* in *Philosophy of Arithmetics*:

If we consider, for example, the cohesion of the points on a line, of the moments of a span of time, of the color nuances of a continuous color spectrum, of the tonal qualities in a “tone progression”, and so on, then we acquire the concept of combination-by-continuity, and, from this concept, the concept of the continuum. This latter concept is not contained as a particular, distinguishable, partial content in the image of every concretely given continuum. What we note in the concrete case is, on the one hand, the points or extended parts, and, on the other hand, the peculiar combinations involved. These latter, then, are what is always identically present whenever we speak of continua; however different may be the absolute contents which they connect (places, times, colors, tones, etc.). Then in reflection upon this characteristic sort of combination of contents there arises the concept of *continuum*, as that of *a whole* the parts of which are united precisely in the manner of continuous combination. (Husserl, 2003, 20)

It is worth putting this passage in connection with Husserl’s discourse on mathematical entities in § 60 of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* (Husserl, 2001c), where he distinguishes between sensuous abstraction and pure categorial abstraction. Whereas sensuous abstraction gives sensuous concept (for instance, “house, red”) and mixed concepts, categorial abstraction gives categorical concepts (for instance, “relation, set, number”), called by Husserl “formal-ontological categories”. If sensuous and mixed concepts are based upon sensuous intuitions, categorical concepts depend on categorial intuitions. Concerning the categorical intuition of a set, categorial abstraction refers to the collection’s form, without any consideration of all material aspects of the set’s members. Accordingly, provided that logico-mathematical intuition is a categorial intuition purified by categorial abstraction, pure logic and mathematics include no sensuous concepts. Once intuitively grasped a mathematical concept, one can grasp other mathematical objects in new categorial acts of higher level. Thus, mathematics results being based upon pure categorial abstraction, which excludes all the material contained in the categorial intuition.

From this standpoint, there emerges how the concept of the continuum originates in intuition of concrete data: more precisely, the intuition of continuity is the phenomenological condition for any mathematical formalization of the continuum.

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4 A very similar passage is to be found in the *Third Logical Investigation*: “Two contemporaneous sensuous *concreta* necessarily form an ‘indifferentiated whole’ if all the immediately constitutive ‘moments’ of the one pass unbrokenly over into corresponding constitutive ‘moments’ of the other. The case of exact likeness of any such corresponding moments shall count as a legitimate limiting case of continuity, i.e. as a continuous ‘passing over into self’” (Husserl, 2001b, 14).
This does not entail that Husserl is not committed to the problem of a rigorous formalization of the continuum. With this respect, it must be noted a strong influence of Hilbert's view, following which “one begins by assuming the existence of all elements (that is one assumes at the beginning three different systems of things: points, lines and planes) and one puts these elements into certain relations to one-another by means of certain axioms, in particular the axioms of connection, order, congruence and continuity” (Hilbert, 1900, 181). Nevertheless, Husserl is fully aware of the limits of any attempt of formalization of the continuity (the same limits Weyl will emphasize concerning Cantor-Dedekind's axiom):

We are able to bring each single group element to representation in its own right in temporal succession, even though not in one allinclusive act. But all of this is impossible in the cases to which we now turn. We speak of totalities, groups, and multiplicities also where the concept of their authentic formation, or of their symbolization through sequential exhaustion of the individuals involved, already contains a logical impossibility. We speak of infinite groups. The extensions of most general concepts are infinite. The group of the numbers in the symbolically expanded number series is infinite, as is the group of points in a line, and, in general, that at the limits of a continuum. The thought that some conceivable expansion of our knowledge capacity could enable us to have the actual representation – or even the mere sequential exhaustion – of such groups is unimaginable. Here even our power of idealization has a limit. (Husserl, 2003, 231)

One could spot the same tension between intuition and formalization of the continuum also in Husserl's lectures of 1907 on *Thing and Space* as well as in his courses on time-consciousness of 1905–1908. In both cases, I cannot provide even a synthetical overview of the enormous critical literature on these texts: thus I will only recall some quotations in order to show how the question of the continuum is at the very core of the general problem of the temporal and spatial perception. At the beginning of § 19 of *Thing and Space*, Husserl argues:

Here I have in mind the wonderful phenomenological forms of appearance which have the character of extensions of appearance: in them is constituted the spatial and temporal expanse that belongs to the essence of thingly objects; in them therefore lies the source of all spatial-temporal predicates. (Husserl, 1997, 51)

For what concerns the spatial continuity, Husserl distinguishes two main meanings: 1) The continuity that belongs to spatial extension as such and that comes to consciousness as an immanent moment when we allow unchange to pass over into

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5 It must be noted that these courses have been projected by Husserl as a whole series of lectures on the problem of perception.

6 I limit myself to remind of de Warren (2009) and Claesges (1964).
change, for example in the continuous migration of a qualitative discontinuity over an expanse filled up unitarily in such and such a way. 2) The continuity of the filling determinations themselves, for example the flowing over from quality to quality, perhaps in the transition from red through purple to violet. But what is particularly relevant for us is that, in Husserl words, “continuity is extension, and qualitative continuity qualitative extension. That essentially implies fragmentability and the ideal possibility of an abstract differentiation into phases. [...]” (Husserl, 1997, 59). This idea of the priority of intuitive continuum upon its mathematical construction is explicitly attested by the following passage:

Although in fact every body can be resolved into an infinite manifold of plane sections and can be considered a continuum of plane sections, yet the geometry of plane figures, which encompasses all these sectional figures, is still not the geometry of the spatial body. In proceeding beyond the plane, what is at issue is precisely the laws according to which the planes and the formations lying on them are continually modified. (Husserl, 1997, 173)

Much more complex appears to be the issue of temporal continuum precisely because of its irreversibility:

If time thus appears as an eternal stream which precipitates everything temporal into the abyss of the past, yet, on the other hand, time has validity as an eternal and fixed form, since every being maintains its position in time. Even a god cannot alter the temporal positions of events in the past. Here reside immense difficulties, which up to now have defied the acumen of the greatest. We will still devote efforts of our own to these difficulties. (Husserl, 1997, 55)

In order to make sense of these great difficulties, one has to address the question of the continuum within the framework of Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness from 1905–1908. Although the transcendental experience of time reveals some relevant differences with respect to the perception of space, it must be admitted that, in both the lectures on time-consciousness and spatial perception, there emerges the idea of a basic impossibility of reducing the intuitive continuum phases into a set of points7. From this perspective, in my interpretive hypothesis, Husserl's decision

7 Indeed, Husserl argues that “What we call original consciousness, impression, or even perception, is an act that is shaded off continuously. Every concrete perception implies a whole continuum of such shadings. But reproduction, phantasy-consciousness, also requires precisely the same shadings, only reproductively modified. It belongs to the essence of both of these experiences that they must be extended in such a way that a punctual phase can never exist by itself” (Husserl, 1991, 49).
of keeping the notion of the “original impression”\(^8\), although not conceivable as a punctual source of the temporal continuum, strictly depends on his attempt to clarify the conditions of the mathematical formalization of time. With this regard, Husserl argues:

It is inherent in the essence of every linear continuum that, starting from any point whatsoever, we can think of every other point as continuously produced from it; and every continuous production is a production by means of continuous iteration. […] The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced: it does not arise as something produced but through *genesis spontanea*; it is primal generation, it does not spring from anything. It is primal creation. (Husserl, 1991, 106)

Accordingly, the problem of the “original impression” contains and includes the ambivalence of the intuitive (pre-phenomenal) continuum and the mathematical continuum as a logical construction. As is well known, Husserl founds these different experiences of the continuum on two varieties of intentionality (but we know from a number of manuscripts that he was not really satisfied by this solution). Expressed in terms of the double continuum of “transverse” and “lengthwise” segments, the distinction between constituted transcendent object and constituting time-consciousness designates the transverse intentionality (phase-continuum), whereas the distinction between constituted time-consciousness (immanent unity of act and its content) and constituting absolute time-consciousness designates the “lengthwise” intentionality (stretch-continuum).

Nevertheless, in a manuscript from 1908 or 1909, Husserl becomes definitively aware of the impossibility of conceiving of the phenomenological continuum of time as something objective:

Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for example. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. […] Memory is an expression that always and only refers to a constituted temporal object. Retention, on the other hand, is an expression used to designate the intentional relation (a fundamentally different relation) of phase of consciousness to phase of consciousness and in this case the phases of consciousness and continuities of consciousness must not be regarded as temporal objects themselves. These are extremely important matters, perhaps the most important in the whole of phenomenology. (Husserl, 1991, 345–346)

\(^8\) As is known, the most serious difficulty entailed by the concept of the original impression is the infinite regression from what is constituted to what is constituting.
Husserl approaches anew these “extremely important matters” in the *Bernauer Manuskripte*, where the problem of the originary impression develops into the issue of individuation as a temporal process. From a genetic point of view, it is precisely in this process that the ego originates in its immanence. This means that individuation concerns not only the objects, but also the ego as such. In other words, the immanent “living-present” is the most originary type of individuation, composed of a multiplicity of sensible given unified in a continuous sequence. After a decisive discussion with R. Ingarden about the problem of the relation between the unity of sensible data and the flow of consciousness, Husserl recalls into question the scheme apprehension/content of apprehension introduced in his *Logical Investigations*, as testified by the manuscripts n. 6 and 9. In these texts Husserl argues that the flux of absolute consciousness constitutes the *Erlebnisse* as temporal objects within immanent temporality. This implies that the constitution of the temporal objects is inseparable from the constitution of a temporal consciousness. In other words, the flux of absolute consciousness implies an essential correlation between immanent perception and perceived object. Accordingly, the immanent temporality, namely the noetic side of intentionality, derives from the temporal constitution of the flux of consciousness as a continuous and consistent flux. From this viewpoint, both objective and immanent temporality are based on the “originary process” (*Urprozess*) of individuation. Indeed, Husserl states in the text n. 9:

> I mean that it is only by virtue of the coincidence (*Deckung*) which crosses retention and protention and continues from an originary presentation to a new one as a coincidence of this persisting sound (where the last originary presentation falls into retention), that we grasp the sound as a temporal object. If we abstractly isolate an originary presentation and its flow in the temporal flux, we obtain in each point a new nuclear given (*Kerndatum*) taken abstractly, not a temporal objective given (*zeitgegenständliches*). In other terms, we will obtain no representation (*Darstellung*) of something objective within the nuclear given. Accordingly, the persisting perception of a sound is not to be understood merely as the objective series of the originary presentations. This series is constituted […], as well as the series of the originary flux; nevertheless its objectivation has a different sense […]. (Husserl, 2001a, 171)9

In the light of this passage, it is clear that in these manuscripts Husserl is no longer committed to the idea of an originary presentation nestled in a double horizon of retentional and protentional phenomena. Thus, he changes his perspective and emphasizes the role played by both the protensions of the flux of retentional modifications and the influence of retentions in the determination of protentional con-

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9 Translation is mine. See also Schnell (2002).
tents. It follows that the originary process (Urprozess or Urstrom) reveals itself not as a mechanism of constant modification of the present in the just passed; rather, the temporal flux is deeply interwined with passive syntheses, anticipations and more or less intense degrees of fulfillment (Erfüllung) and emptying (Entfüllung). With this respect, Husserl maintains: “Differently from the previous texts, what is at stake here is no longer the mere [...] retentional consciousness of the originary flux, but rather a self-consciousness of the originary flux originally anchored in the fluent present” (Husserl, 2001, XIII). As a consequence, in the Bernauer Manuskripte Husserl testifies his awareness of the danger of infinite regression and describes the present itself as fluent continuity: “A fluent consciousness structured in this way is necessarily a consciousness of itself as fluent” (Husserl, 2001a, 48).

Still, the problem is not completely solved as long as the Urprozess is understood as an independent level of intentional consciousness, responsible for both the constitution of the temporal (immanent) objects and the acts of apprehension. What remains definitely open is the question of the flux’s nature: provided that the flux is placed at a transcendental level, why does it manifest itself a posteriori, as a condition of possibility of the constituted time? If the originary process needs to be grasped by the ego, without whom the function of constitution would not be possible, its independence is seriously compromised. This means that, although the nuclear model seems to be more fruitful than the model of apprehension (always subject to the danger of infinite regression), Husserl does not fully succeed in dealing with the difference between act-consciousness and consciousness of originary consciousness. Some scholars10 conceive of the originary flux as the unique non-constituted element in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to this view, the originary flux, understood as longitudinal intentionality, should be the origin of all temporal constitutions. Nevertheless, Husserl emphasizes how longitudinal intentionality is at the same time transversal intentionality, which is always in connection with the time of immanent objects. It follows that, in front of the problem of time, the notions of origin, process and constitution fall into a kind of short circuit.

In order to summarize, what is at stake in Husserl’s scrutiny of time-consciousness is the possibility of new originary presentations within the continuum of intentional givenness. More precisely, Husserl struggles to find an equilibrium between the continuous process of temporalization and the emergence of punctual new instants, that is, between the intuitive experience of continuity and the attempt to formalize it. Each protentional instant is never fully anticipated by the previous one: this means

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10 See for instance Sokolowski (1964).
that the grasping of temporal flux does not consume the surprise of our consciousness in front of the presentation of each new instant. It is for this reason that Husserl describes consciousness as what emerges from the awakening of time itself (Husserl, 1966, 178).

3. H. WEYL, A PHENOMENOLOGIST?

As is well known, Husserl’s early thought is strongly influenced by a number of mathematicians, such as Hilbert, Cantor, Riemann, Kronecker, Weierstrass, and von Staudt – just to mention the most important. Nevertheless, after the noteworthy works by D. Føllesdal (1999), B. Hopkins (2011), and S. Centrone (2010), also Husserl’s influence on the thinking of some mathematicians must be taken into account. Among others, this is the case for J. Klein, H. Weyl, and K. Gödel. Notably, Weyl presents his account of the continuum not only as a purely logical and meta-mathematical investigation of mathematics, but rather as an attempt for a phenomenological reconstruction of the world\(^\text{11}\). My aim in this section is to evaluate how and to what extent Weyl’s program can be understood as a scientific development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

As a matter of fact, the phenomenological method had a decisive impact on Weyl’s major works *The Continuum* (1987) and *Space Time Matter* (1922), both published in 1918. This influence is to be firstly recognized in Weyl’s claim that coordinate system is “the unavoidable residuum of the ego’s annihilation” (Weyl, 1987, § 5.3.4), a clear reprise of Husserl’s account of transcendental ego as the residuum of phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 1976, § 49). Furthermore, there is evidence of Weyl’s appreciation of the phenomenological method in his correspondence with Husserl\(^\text{12}\). From a biographical view-point, Weyl’s interest in phenomenology doubtlessly derives from his wife Hella Joseph, a student of Husserl, who introduced him to *Ideen I* after their move from Gottingen to Zürich in 1913. Nevertheless, as results from Weyl’s *Habilitationsschrift* (1913), it must be noted that he attended some of Husserl’s lectures and seminars from 1905 to 1908, when Husserl substituted for Hilbert (Weyl’s teacher of mathematics at that time). It is for these reasons that in my view, although Weyl always refers to *Ideen I*, his account of continuum is deeply indebted to Husserl’s *Dingvorlesungen* (1997), some of which he probably attended, as well as to Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness. Indeed, Husserl extensively approaches

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\(^{11}\) See for instance Rykman (2005) and Boi (2004).

\(^{12}\) See Van Dalen (1984).
the issue of continuum in his 1907–1908 lectures, rather than in Ideen I. Accordingly, I suggest that, whereas Weyl’s account of transcendental residuum is clearly influenced by the § 49 of Ideen I, his perspective on intuitive and mathematical continuum is to be understood within the framework of Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness and his theory of spatio-temporal perception developed in the Dingvorlesungen. Under these premises, I will first focus on Weyl’s dissatisfaction with the classical mathematical formalization of the continuum developed by Cantor and Dedekind; then, I will discuss the relevance of Husserl’s theory of the pre-phenomenal continuum on Weyl’s perspective.

What is stable among the diverse experiences of the continuum in the world? Above all, an invariance of scale: all the smallest parts of time (or of a line), keep the same properties of that of a longer one. Secondly, the absence of jumps and holes in the continuum. As explained above, at the beginning of the XX century, the question of the continuum in mathematics required to be addressed more precisely, also because of the theory of ether which strongly permeated the scientific spirit. In this context, Weyl appreciates the admirable work of Cantor and Dedekind, whose famous axiom states that real numbers are order-isomorphic to the linear continuum of geometry. Accordingly, the proposition “there is a one-to-one correspondence between real numbers and points on a line” provides analytic geometry with an absolute foundation. More closely, if we take the set of the integers, N (positive natural numbers), and the rationals Q (quotients of a fraction) as fractions of integers, we can observe that Q is a dense order (between any two rationals, there is always a third), invariant by scale, and without jumps. Nevertheless, Q has a number of holes or lacunas as well. Dedekind’s solution consists in defining a real number as the set of rationals that are smaller than itself. The result is the set construction of Cantor-Dedekind, that of the real line R of analysis: it satisfies the invariance-of-scale requirement and presents no jumps or lacunas. As a consequence, according to Cantor-Dedekind’s axiom, a curve is continuous if it is described by a law that does not introduce jumps or lacunas and is parametrized by the line R.

Nevertheless, in Weyl’s view, there is still a problem with this axiom. If a real number is the limit of all the rationals that precede it, we risk to fall into a circular proof. Indeed, there is always an infinity of positive rationals smaller than whichever positive real: thus, we need to use, when defining it, the collection N of all the integers. However, the classical definition of this totality has the following structure: N is

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13 See in particular Husserl (1997, § 21). The basic reason of the fact that Weyl does not quote any passage from these texts is that they have been published only in 1928 and 1973.
the intersection of all sets that contain zero and which are closed under the successor
operation\textsuperscript{14}. But the set of all sets that contain zero and are closed under the successor
operation contains \( \mathbb{N} \) itself: as a result, the \textit{definiens} uses the \textit{definiendum}. Poincaré
and Weyl were fully aware of this risk: with this regard, they discussed the possibility
of “impredicative notions” in mathematics\textsuperscript{15}, not always contradictory but very often
circular. It is precisely this solution that left Weyl unsatisfied, especially because he
was worried, as were most mathematicians at that time, about the lack of rigor in
mathematical definitions. For this reasons, he searched for a new approach of math-
ematical analysis in order to identify a common element between analysis and intu-
tion of the temporal continuum. It is precisely with this aim that has to be understood
Weyl’s use of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

The impact of Husserl’s theory of spatial and temporal perception on Weyl’s
account of the intuitive continuum is evident. In Weyl’s view, our intuition about the
continuum originates from common or stable elements, namely invariants emerging
from a plurality of acts of experience: for instance, the perception of time, of movement,
of a line extended, and so forth. For what concerns time, Weyl considers Husserl’s (and
Bergson’s) phenomenal time as a conscious experience coexisting with memory of the
instant gone. Consistently with Husserl’s perspective, Weyl describes the intuition of
time a flux, namely an experience of constant transformation. This means that time
is a duration without points: time consists in interconnected parts that are superim-
posed on each other. With this respect, Weyl’s phenomenological heritage is patent:

The view of a flow consisting of points and, therefore, also dissolving into points turns
out to be false. Precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the flowing from
point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually enduring present can
continually slip away into the receding past. (Weyl, 1987, 91–92)

In other terms, Weyl shares with Husserl a radical opposition between, on the
one hand, time and space as pre-phenomenal experiences and, on the other hand,
time and space as \textit{construed} mathematical entities. This means that, whereas the con-

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\textsuperscript{14} A set has \textit{closure under an operation} if the performance of that operation on members of the set
always produces a member of the same set; in this case we also say that the set is closed under the
operation. For example, the positive integers are closed under addition, but not under subtraction
(1–2 is not a positive integer even if both 1 and 2 are positive integers). The \textit{successor operation} (or
function) is a primitive recursive function \( S \) such that \( S(n)=n+1 \) for each natural number \( n \). For
example, \( S(1)=2 \) and \( S(2)=3 \).

\textsuperscript{15} As observed by Poincaré, these definitions are not always contradictory, but they always run the risk
of being circular. The question of impredicativity was largely discussed at the beginning of the XX
century, especially after the work of Russell.
The entities resulting from mathematical construction are made out of ultimate elements (the points), the pre-phenomenal life-experiences — time in particular — cannot be further reduced. More closely, Weyl accepts Cantor and Dedekind’s axiom about the one-to-one correspondence between the real line and pre-phenomenal space, but judges unsatisfactory the extension of such a correspondence to time. Also considering spatial movement, the situation is not significantly different. Indeed, “in movement, the continuum of points on a trajectory recovers in a continuous monotone fashion the continuum of instants” (Weyl, 1987, § 8). But following Weyl’s argument, this is just superposition: the temporal continuum does not have points, the instants are merely transitions, the present is only possible because of the simultaneous perception of the past and of the future. Accordingly, Weyl maintains:

I think that everything we are demanding here is obvious nonsense: to these questions, the intuition of time provides no answer—just as a man makes no reply to questions which clearly are addressed to him by mistake and, therefore, when addressed to him, are unintelligible. So the theoretical clarification of the essence of time’s continuous flow is not forthcoming. The category of the natural numbers can supply the foundation of a mathematical discipline. But perhaps the continuum cannot [...]. (Weyl, 1987, 90)

From this there follows that we can gather the following concerning objectively presented time: 1) an individual point in it is non-independent, i.e., is pure nothingness when taken by itself, and exists only as a “point of transition” (which, of course, can in no way be understood mathematically); 2) it is due to the essence of time (and not to contingent imperfections in our medium) that a fixed time-point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approximate, never an exact determination is possible (Weyl, 1987, 92). Points do not belong to our intuition of the continuum, neither temporal (as Husserl and Weyl tell us) nor spatial (a precise proof of the fact that a curve is a law, not a set of points, is provided by Wittgenstein (1964)). As a result, “the point without dimensions is a derived conceptual construction, a necessary consequence of a line as a one-dimensional law. It is a posterior reconstruction […] which puts together the points to reconstruct the line” (Longo, 1999, 404).

In the light of this inspection, one cannot deny a clear phenomenological inspiration of Weyl’s early thought. Nevertheless, as Insightfully argued by R. A. Feist (2004, 138), Weyl’s declaration of phenomenological membership should not prevent from considering two points of substantial divergence which, therefore, repute into question the claim that his view is a mathematical development of Husserl’s phenomenology. a) Firstly, Weyl’s claim in The Continuum that the sequence of natural number is given in an immediate intuition of iteration is clearly in contradiction with Husserl’s view that there cannot be any direct access to formal categories (included the sequence of
natural numbers), uniquely graspable by categorial acts. Furthermore, probably under the influence of Poincaré, who defended the idea that natural numbers are given to us through an *a priori* synthesis, Weyl maintains that we can have an intuition of an actually infinite sets. Also in this case one can register an explicit break with Husserl, strongly committed to the claim that finite and infinite sets can be only partially intuited, as pointed out in the previous section. b) The second point of divergence concerns Weyl's choice for predicativism. Following Weyl's argumentation in chapter 6 of *The Continuum*, the constitution of all higher level objectivities depends on the immediate intuition of natural numbers. Thus, whereas the latter exist independently, all other objectivities are constituted in conformity to logical constraints, that is, in Weyl's view, predicative constructions based upon the domain of natural numbers. By contrast, in Husserl's thought such logical restrictions are totally excluded, insofar as he was firmly convinced that mathematics is a variety of knowledge of reality and, at the same time, a formal theory of possible regions of being. In other terms, Husserl was not committed to any kind of restriction of mathematics with the purpose of fitting it into strictly intuitive (or predicative) limits. Rather, he was strongly involved in a research of formal systems, as testified by the *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* developed through the *Logical Investigation* as a part of his formal ontology. This means that Husserl's phenomenology does not exclude any formal (non-intuitive) mathematics, as well as formal and axiomatic theories of analysis capable of providing a ground for regional ontologies.

These two arguments lead Weyl to the thesis that a phenomenological foundation of the mathematical continuum based upon the analogy between the immediate intuition of time and the intuition of the natural numbers succession is in principle excluded. Once demonstrated that the intuitive and the mathematical continuum do not coincide, Weyl suggests that its mathematical construction must necessarily overcome the level of phenomenological description. This is the basic reason why Weyl progressively shift from phenomenology to predicativism after the works just considered. With this regard, in a lecture delivered in Princeton in 1927, with the title

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16 This restriction is doubtlessly influenced by Poincaré and Russell.

17 Another very relevant result of these restrictions is that they imply a rejection of the *epoché*, since Weil clearly does not suspend ontological commitments. This rejection of the *epoché* is also evident in *Space-Time-Matter*, where Weyl doubts that there could be an intuition of space unaided by the constructions of mathematical physics. This is a straightforward denial of the possibility of an intuition of essences, within the scope of *epoché*.

18 As stated by Da Silva (1997, 289): “Despite its debt to certain phenomenological ideas, the system of *The Continuum* cannot be seen as a prototype of how the whole of mathematics should be developed from the phenomenological perspective”.

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Time Relations in the Cosmos, Proper Time, Lived Time, and Metaphysical Time, he concludes:

The immediately experienced is subjective and absolute. On the other hand, the objective world is necessarily relative and may be represented by something definite, numbers or other symbols, only after a coordinate system has been arbitrarily imposed on the world. This pair of opposites, subjective-absolute and objective-relative, seems to me one of the most fundamental epistemological insights one can gather from science. (Weyl, 2009, 31)

4. GÖDEL’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM

Especially after Føllesdal’s insights (1999), Husserl's influence on Gödel is widely known. Although Gödel never referred to Husserl in his works, the publication of his Nachlass demonstrated that he knew Husserl very well and strongly appreciated his thought19. Furthermore, even if Gödel started studying Husserl only in 1959, when his mathematical view was wholly developed, he expressed a perspective in philosophy of mathematics very similar to Husserl long before studying it. With this respect, it is worth noting that in Gödel's works before his reading of Husserl one cannot find a systematic approach to philosophical questions, except some references to a kind of realism concerning mathematical entities. More precisely, Gödel was convinced that we can grasp mathematical theories by intuition, in a way not so distant from Husserl’s approach to mathematics. This is the substantial reason why Gödel found in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology a natural philosophical framework for his mathematical theory.

Gödel defended realism about mathematical entities since he was a student, throughout the 20s. For instance, in the essay on Russell's Mathematical Logic, he assumes a clear realistic view about sets and classes:

It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence. They are in the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions and in both cases it is impossible to interpret the propositions one wants to assert about these entities as propositions about the “data”, i.e. in the latter case the actually occurring sense perceptions20. (Gödel, 1944, 37)

19 Gödel's comments on Husserl are mostly appreciative, notably about Ideen I. However, in certain passages of the Nachlass he is critical, especially towards the Logical Investigations and the Crisis of European Sciences.

20 This passage is echoed by Gödel's following claim in 1953: “Mathematical propositions, it is true, do not express physical properties of the structures concerned [in physics], but rather properties of
What is particularly relevant for the issue of the continuum is Gödel’s supplement, composed in 1963 (after studying Husserl’s *Ideen I*), to *What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?* where he states:

Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future sense perceptions will agree with them and, moreover, to believe that a question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in the future. The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. That new mathematical intuitions leading to a decision of such problems as Cantor’s continuum hypothesis are perfectly possible was pointed out earlier. (Gödel, 1990, 268)

In all these quotations (and one can find a number of others) the similarity with Husserl’s account of mathematics is striking:\(^{21}\) once categorial intuition results being a widening of sensuous intuition, what at first glance seems to be Gödel’s naïve realism reveals itself as the expression of a phenomenological realism. The main outcome of Gödel’s account of mathematical intuition is the idea that axioms “force” themselves upon us as being true, a stance that plays a decisive role in his criticisms of Cantor’s conjecture on the continuum. Nevertheless, such a power of axioms does not entail that mathematical intuition is infallible, as follows from Gödel’s theorem of incompleteness. In a very similar way, Husserl claims that categorial intuition is not an absolute source of evidence, insofar as it involves anticipations about aspects and features of the objects not yet explored and, accordingly, the possibility of errors. Concerning the general issue of perception (to which categorial intuition belongs), Husserl argues in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* that “in the ideal, limiting case of adequate perception, this self/presenting sensed content coincides with the perceived object. […] Each individual percept is a mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled inten-

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\(^{21}\) As emphasized by Føllesdal (1999, 398), Gödel does not specify whether, in his view, the objects of mathematical intuition are classes and concepts, propositions (namely relations between concepts), sets, or all of these. With this respect, Husserl is much more precise when claiming that both intuition and perception are of objects. Whereas in perception is of a physical object, categorial/eidetic intuition is of an abstract entity.
tions” (Husserl, 2001c, 221). More explicitly, in his later lectures on *Active and Passive Synthesis*, he restates that

[…] every perception *implicite* invokes an entire perceptual system; every appearance that arises in it implies an entire system of appearance, specifically in the form of intentional inner and outer horizons. We cannot even imagine a mode of appearance in which the appearing object would be given *completely*. No final presentation in the flesh is ever reached in the mode of appearance as if it would present the complete, exhausted self of the object. Every appearance implies a *plus ultra* in the empty horizon. And since perception does indeed pretend to give the object [completely] in the flesh in every appearance, it in fact and by its very nature constantly pretends to accomplish more than it can accomplish. (Husserl, 2001, 48)

It is precisely for this reason that Gödel believes that phenomenology is a “systematic method for such a clarification of meaning” (Gödel, 1995, 383), that is a fruitful method to find new axioms in order to confirm or contest the continuum hypothesis. With this regard, in *What Is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?* Gödel develops his argument about the “success” of new mathematical axioms. In his view, “success” indicates fruitfulness in verifiable consequences. More precisely, consequences also demonstrable without the new axiom, but whose proofs with the help of the new axiom are remarkably simpler to discover. For instance, this is the case for a new axiom that allows for synthesizing into one proof many different proofs. As observed by Follesdal, what is at stake with Gödel’s notion of success is not the derivation of new theorems, but that the axiom permits us to derive old theorems in a more linear and consistent way.

In conclusion, it must be doubtlessly noted that Gödel’s realism/platonism about the continuum hypothesis, as well as in philosophy of mathematics in general, is much more sophisticated than traditionally thought. First and foremost, the intuited objectivities are transcendent. To put it differently, they are always experienced as independent of us. This is what one should call a “platonistic” tendency in both Husserl’s and Gödel’s perspectives. Nevertheless, Husserl emphasizes the active role of subjectivity in the process of constitution of reality: in other words, even if objectivities are independent of us, we play an essential function in structuring them. Although this transcendental aspect is at the very core of Husserl’s phenomenology, it is not seriously taken into account by Gödel.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the theoretical path I attempted to reconstruct here, there emerged how Husserl’s phenomenology contributed to the development of the debate on Cantor’s continuum conjecture. Notably, transcendental phenomenology strongly
inspired non-formalistic solutions, such as Weyl’s and Gödel’s ones. From a historical standpoint, Husserl’s influence on Weyl’s early works is testified by their direct interaction during the years 1907–1908, when Weyl attended Husserl’s lectures on spatial perception, a number of references to *Logical Investigations* and *Ideen I* in *The Continuum* and *Space-Time-Matter*, and some letters they wrote each other after the publication of Weyl’s works in 1918. Instead, Gödel never met Husserl and started studying phenomenology quite late in his career. Nonetheless, his late writings and the *Nachlass* recently published demonstrate a deep phenomenological inspiration, as if Gödel had found in Husserl’s thought a theoretical framework for his mathematical insights. From a theoretical point of view, I emphasized how Weyl’s direct confrontation with phenomenology does not involve a higher level of fidelity to Husserl’s thesis in philosophy of mathematics: indeed, Weyl substantially rejects intuitionism in favour of constructionism or predicativism. Accordingly, he makes use of phenomenological tools merely in order to separate the intuitive experience of continuity (of time, for instance) from a formal construction of the continuum as a transfinite set. A much more profound concordance with Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics is to be found in Gödel, who shares with Husserl the idea of the intuition of mathematical axioms as independent realities.

Regardless of Weyl’s and Gödel’s higher or lower fidelity to Husserl’s account of mathematical objectivities, what is actually at stake in their solutions of the continuum problem is the opportunity of phenomenology to make the debate progress further. Indeed, although Weyl and Gödel were somehow inspired by phenomenology, both of them developed Husserl’s thought unilaterally: the former by emphasizing its “Kantian” approach to intentional experience as a progressive construction, the latter by focusing on the independence of intuitive data from subjectivity. As is evident, neither Weyl nor Gödel fully grasped the “twofold soul” of phenomenology, namely Husserl’s challenge of taking seriously into account the interaction between the intuition of mathematical axioms as independent objectivities and the intersubjective process of constitution of perceptive and categorial experience. This double vocation of phenomenology has been often assessed as an ambiguity to be overcome. Rather, it is precisely in this ongoing oscillation that is to be found the fecundity of phenomenology for epistemology and the theory of science.

In other words, concerning the structure of our experience, Husserl rejects any separation between elements originated from us and from the world: rather, the genesis of our experience is a very complex process in which sensuous and categorial intuitions are inextricably connected to our temporal and intersubjective activity of intentional constitution. With respect to the continuum problem, this would lead to
a reconsideration of the connection between the intuitive and formal continuum, an attempt that both Weyl and Gödel left unexplored. Clearly, what is at stake in such a project is not a definitive solution, but rather a better justification of Cantor's conjecture. Indeed, consistently with Husserl's view, there is no domain of phenomenological experience where one can reach absolute evidence and certainty. More precisely, insofar as mathematical intuition is *a priori*, it may always turn out to be false. Nevertheless, the result is not scepticism, but the idea that a successful scientific theory depends on the equilibrium between intuition and the *doxa* of our life-world. From this perspective, also mathematics finds its justification in its interaction with the *Lebenswelt*.

Although such a connection of mathematical intuition with the realm of *doxa* could seem puzzling, Husserl core argument about scientific justification is that most of our assumptions are unthematized. This means that, because of the very nature of our experience, all presumptions of validity have somehow to do with a number of unthematized prejudices, namely attitudes that we can in no way avoid. As a result, life-world is the impassable root of our experience of the world, included categorial intuition of mathematical entities. Rather than being an ultimate truth to be possessed, absolute givenness is an infinite task of human reason. Within this framework, scientific work becomes an intersubjective research for always more refined justifications, namely an infinite project of even more accurate description of reality.

As is quite widely known, Husserl’s late claim “philosophy as a rigorous science — the dream is over (der Traum ist ausgeträumt)” (Husserl, 1970, 389) has often been taken as the final admission of an old and exhausted philosopher (and mathematician) of the impossibility of scientific philosophy. Obviously, this is a gross error resulting from a misinterpretation of this passage, where Husserl was just making a judgement about the culture of his age, and not about his own theoretical perspective. There is no doubt that much work is still to be done in the direction of a phenomenological reassessment of the continuum problem (and of philosophy of mathematics in general) on the basis of Husserl’s insights about scientific justification. Therefore, if the analysis I aimed at developing here are not so incorrect, the dream is not yet over.

REFERENCES


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22 See: (Husserl 1970, 140).


BEARING ONE’S SHADOW:
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FROM KANT,
THROUGH HUSSERL, TO MERLEAU-PONTY

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Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of “the transcendental” has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl’s “transcendental turn”, although significantly altering Kant’s original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions — from Kant’s “transcendentalism of faculties”, through Husserl’s “transcendentalism of pure consciousness”, to Merleau-Ponty’s “transcendentalism of the flesh” — arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist “thought style”. In the final section, we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the “truth of naturalism”, while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenologizing (“transcendentalizing”) nature.

Key words: Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, transcendental philosophy, naturalized phenomenology, phenomenologized nature, epoché, phenomenological reduction.

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СЛЕДУЯ ТРАДИЦИИ: КОНФИГУРАЦИИ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОГО ОТ КАНТА, ГУССЕРЛЯ К МЕРЛО-ПОНТИ

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В последние годы происходит возрастание интереса к трансцендентальной философии, подогреваемое дебатами по поводу вопроса о (не)возможности натурализированной феноменологии. Однако зачастую эти дебаты ограничиваются утверждением, что понятие «трансцендентальное» потеряло свой изначальный смысл со времен Канта, когда тот впервые представил свою систему трансцендентального идеализма. Данная статья имеет целью проанализировать некоторые важные изменения, полагая, что «трансцендентальный поворот Гуссерля», не смотря на его значительное отличие от изначальной концепции Канта, оставался в лоне трансцендентализма и стал основой для разработки данной темы у Мерло-Понти. В основной части данной работы речь идет о трех концепциях, начиная кантианским «трансцендентализмом способностей», учитывая «трансцендентализм чистого сознания» Гуссерля, и заканчивая «трансцендентализмом тела» Мерло-Понти. При этом указывается на тот факт, что всем им присущ трансцендентализм «стиля мышления». В заключительной части мы отстаиваем тезис, что увеличивающийся разрыв смысла трансцендентального проекта может пролить свет на дебаты по поводу (не)возможности натурализированной феноменологии. Мы осуществляем это намерение, имея в виду значение термина трансцендентальный, который высвобождает пространство для «правды натурализма», и в то же самое время указывает на необходимость реверсивного (и дополняющего) движения, заключающегося в том, чтобы феноменализировать («трансцендировать») природу.

Ключевые слова: Кант, Гуссерль, Мерло-Понти, трансцендентальная философия, натурализированная феноменология, феноменологизация природы, *epoché*, феноменологическая редукция.

1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL: POLYPHONY OF STYLES?

In his ingenious analysis of “thought styles” — specific ways of being, seeing and thinking characteristic of various ideational groups (so-called “thought collectives”) — Ludwik Fleck calls attention to the fact that technical terms permeating such styles have a distinctive thought-charm: far from being exhausted by their nominal definitions, *termini technici* also express “a certain specific power, being not only a
name but also a slogan or symbol” (Fleck, 1986, 99). In other words, technical terms are not mere denotations, but also enactive exhortations; they serve not only as descriptors, but also as expressions of allegiance, even calls to arms. When considering terms like “transcendentalism” and “transcendental philosophy” Fleck’s remarks strike remarkably close to home: while, to some, such terms stand as synonyms for obscure and decidedly barren philosophy, to others, they evoke an aura of authenticity surrounding the genuinely fertile pastures of thought. As such, “the transcendental” is often depicted as an ideational antipode of other philosophical attitudes, those usually gathered under the flag of “naturalism” or “objectivism”. Regardless of what side one takes, however, the positioning is often done against a horizon of predigested preconceptions and not infrequently leads to knee-jerk reactions: either blunt dismissal or whole-hearted approval.

However, there are signs that tides might be changing. Recent debates on the (im)possibility of “naturalizing phenomenology” have called into question radical dichotomizations and have even, by shying away from more “orthodox” transcendental philosophers (e.g., Kant and Husserl), and moving towards the seemingly more “naturalism friendly” thinkers (e.g., Merleau-Ponty), made daring attempts at weaving new thought styles that might mitigate between the age-old extremes. Even if it eventually turns out that the ultimate reconciliation between the warring factions remains unattainable, it could be argued that the greatest merit of such endeavors lies in their ability to “slacken the intentional threads” within both camps, thereby revealing what has, through sheer repetition and inculcation, become sedimented in their ideational backgrounds. It is, we feel, an admirable feat that, in the course of three decades, the question of “the transcendental” has become of interest not only to analytic philosophers, but also, to a certain degree at least, to cognitive (neuro)scientists.

As is often the case, however, such inquiries tend to disclose that what mannerisms of old portray as a coherent whole turns out to be a complex structure. The word “transcendental” means different things to different people, and has been used in different ways in different contexts. One of the aims of this paper is to trace and critically examine some of the alterations that the notion has undergone since its conception under the aegis of Kant’s critical philosophy. Specifically, it intends to show how Husserl’s “transcendental turn”, although altering Kant’s original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake, important resources for subsequent elaborations, some of which were seized and elaborated upon by Merleau-Ponty.

The article proceeds as follows: the main bulk of the paper (sections 2–4) will be dedicated to an analysis of how, and why, the successive move from Kant’s transcen-
dentalism of cognitive faculties, through Husserl’s transcendentalism of pure consciousness, to Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism of sensuous flesh\(^1\), might be said to belong to the same (transcendental) thought style. In the last part (section 5), we will examine what impact the multilayered architecture of the transcendental might have on the interrelation between transcendentalism and naturalism, arguing that naturalization of (transcendental) phenomenology cannot be achieved “on the cheap”, but must be accompanied by a complementary move of phenomenologization (“transcendentalization”) of nature and, consequently, natural sciences.

2. OF RAIN AND RAINBOWS: KANT’S TRANSCENDENTALISM OF COGNITIVE FACULTIES

At the very heart of transcendental philosophy lies a perennial philosophical theme, the theme of wonder. For, as Kant famously noted, it was not until “the remembrance of Hume” interrupted his “dogmatic slumber” (Kant, 1912, 7) that he undertook his famous shift towards critical philosophy and transcendental idealism. But what dogmatic reverie was Kant shaken from by the recollection of the Scottish philosopher? The wondrous awakening Kant underwent was related to his rationalist presuppositions about the possibility of the metaphysical knowledge of the mind-independent world, i.e., the belief that human beings are capable of gaining, through the faculty of understanding, \textit{a priori} (non-empirical) knowledge of the intelligible (trans-experiential) world.

Fueling his growing doubts about the possibility of such knowledge, Hume’s skepticism concerning causality, which Kant generalized to cover the whole of metaphysics\(^2\), made him recognize the naivety of his Leibnizian-Wolffian heritage and urged him to radically reconsider his views on the (im)possibility of metaphysics. According to Hume, \textit{a priori} knowledge, i.e., knowledge consisting of propositions that are necessarily and universally true, pertains solely to the “relations of ideas” (concepts and logical relations between them), and has no bearing whatsoever on “matters of fact”, which are contingent and particular. There can be no \textit{a priori} (necessary and universal) knowledge of the world, as all our knowledge of the world stems

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\(^1\) The terms “transcendentalism of pure consciousness” and “transcendentalism of sensuous flesh” were borrowed from an ingenious paper by Heinämaa (1999).

\(^2\) Cf.: “I therefore first tried whether Hume’s objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connexion of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions” (Kant, 1912, 7).
from experience, and is therefore *a posteriori* and *contingent*. This, in turn, sheds a grim light on the possibility of mathematics, natural science and metaphysics, all of which, Kant maintains, are based, at least partly, on *a priori* propositions (Kant, 1989, 143–146). Unwilling to cede to Hume’s skeptical musings, Kant famously set out to show how *a priori* knowledge about the world is possible, which, in his eyes, boiled down to showing how “synthetic *a priori* propositions” are possible — propositions whose justification does not depend on experience, yet are nonetheless not merely conceptual (elucidatory), but substantive (expansive).

Kant’s main *motivation* for undertaking his critical-cum-transcendental turn is then decidedly Cartesian in spirit, as it is aimed at securing our epistemic practices with firm foundations. However, given Kant’s misgivings about the possibility of *a priori* knowledge of the trans-experiential world, is such project not doomed from the very start? Not if we undertake a radical change of perspective:

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. (Kant, 1989, 110)

Instead of inquiring into how it is that our cognitive faculties can conform to the *trans*-experiential objects, Kant invites us to inquire into what the structure of our cognitive apparatus must be like for us to have specifically structured *experienced* objects. This change of perspective, which Kant famously likens to “the first thoughts of Copernicus” (Kant, 1989), entails that we give up on the impossible task of trying to elucidate the nature of *noumena* (“things in themselves”), i.e., things the existence of which is independent of our cognitive faculties, and focus instead on inquiring into the nature and possibility of *phenomena* (“things for us”), i.e., things as they appear in our experience. Put differently, Kant is willing to cede (*pace* rationalists) that our knowledge is, in a crucial sense, limited by our experience. However, *pace* empirical realists, the reason for this is not that experience is the only means of accessing the mind-independent world, but that what we *can* know is determined by the *structure* of our experience.

But although all our cognition commences from the experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. For it could well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself, which
in addition we cannot distinguish from that fundamental material until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out. (Kant, 1989, 136)

Instead of trying to elucidate how “objects of experience” could lead us to transcendent (trans-experiential) objects (noumena), we should consider a more fruitful question, namely what it means to be an “object of experience”, and investigate the transcendental conditions of objective experience, i.e., a priori cognitive structures that enable objects to appear to us in the first place. It is with regard to these a priori conditions that Kant believes that he can solve the problem of synthetic a priori judgments.

Let us now sketch the contours of the “Kantian transcendental” by trying to skillfully unravel the two threads constituting “experiential cognition”. The first thing to note is that the phenomenal world as the only world that is cognitively accessible to us (the noumenal world can be thought, but not known) is an amalgam of passively received sensory matter (“impressions” or “sensations”) and a priori forms actively supplied by our cognitive apparatus (Kant, 1989, 136). The cognitive apparatus, in turn, consists of several distinct faculties, two of which are essential to cognition: the receptive faculty or sensibility, through which impressions are “intuited” or “given” to us as presentations, and which invests them with forms of space and time; and the spontaneous faculty or understanding, which “thinks” presentations given through sensibility by supplying them with suitable concepts (Kant, 1989, 193).

However, before any kind of conceptual representation of intuited content can take place, the objects of our sensuous experience must be (pre)constituted as synthetic unities. This role is relegated to imagination — a third (mediating) faculty — which is responsible for the synthesis of intuitive manifold so as to yield a mediate representation, which is then given to an otherwise empty concept. Kant seeks to justify our application of pure concepts to appearances by means of so-called transcendental schemata, which stand for procedural rules issued forth by the faculty of imagination whose function is to govern the subsumption of intuitive presentations under appropriate pure concepts (Kant, 1989, 271).

We are now better equipped to see what Kant meant when referring to his system as “transcendental idealism”. It is transcendental because it is concerned with the inquiry into conditions of possibility of experience, and not into the possibility of transcendent realities outside all possible experience (Kant, 1989, 149). Further, it is idealist because its domain of investigation is relegated to the domain of things for us

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3 Cf.: “The term ‘transcendental’ […] signifies such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment” (Kant, 1989, 196).
(phenomena) and not to things in themselves (noumena) (Kant, 1989, 426). Let us have a look at a concrete example:

[W]e would certainly call a rainbow a mere appearance in a sun-shower, but would call this rain the thing in itself, and this is correct, as long as we understand the latter concept in a merely physical sense […]. But if we consider this empirical object in general and, without turning to its agreement with every human sense, ask whether it […] represents an object in itself, then the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental, and not only these drops are mere appearances, but even their round form, indeed even the space through which they fall are nothing in themselves, but only mere modifications or foundations of our sensible intuition; the [transcendent] object, however, remains unknown to us. (Kant, 1989, 187)

It is perfectly legitimate to say, in our everyday language anchored in the phenomenal world, that a rainbow is an “appearance in a sun-shower”, i.e., an appearance in the weak sense, whereas rain is “the thing in itself” (the thing that, in the presence of other conditions, causes the appearance); however, considered from a transcendental perspective, rain ultimately consists of drops which can, in turn, be characterized as spatiotemporal objects with specific causal (and other physically determinable) properties and, consequently, as mere appearances in the strong sense (phenomena), i.e., as cognitively accessible things for us caused by cognitively inaccessible things in themselves.

Note that Kant’s transcendental analysis of experience remains limited in at least two senses. First off, the a priori conditions of experience are not themselves given in experience, but can only be regressively deduced. Further, since the categories of understanding, coupled with the forms of intuition, exhaust the domain of transcendental determinative structures, the only experienceable objects are “natural objects”, i.e., spatiotemporal objects of the Newtonian physics. This is, so to speak, the foundational layer of objectivity: all other characterizations are subsequent additions on this transcendentally determined experiential grid.

3. OF APPLE TREE IN BLOOM:
HUSserl’s TRANSCENDENTALISM OF pure CONSCIOUSNESS

Husserl’s relationship to Kant and transcendental philosophy had a long and checkered history, ranging from initial aversion to eventual, albeit critical and qualified, endorsement. It is not our intention here to provide a comprehensive analysis of this interesting intellectual genesis (Kern, 1964; Moran, 2005, 174–201). Instead, we would like to focus on some aspects that are especially pertinent to our topic.
Specifically, it seems that, after his famed “transcendental turn”⁴, and despite all the misgivings he might still have harbored towards Kant’s philosophy, Husserl felt strong affinities with the latter’s transcendental project. This sentiment is clearly expressed in his letter to Ernst Cassirer from 1925, where he writes: “I had to realize that this science further developing in me encompassed, in an entirely distinct method, the entire Kantian problematic … and that it confirmed Kant’s main results in rigorous scientific founding and in their limitation” (as cited in Luft, 2007, 368).

There are at least two points in Husserl’s comment that bear emphasizing. To begin with, it is clear that Husserl construes his transcendental endeavor not as a substitution, but as a critical revision and extension of Kant’s project, one that, significantly, is said to offer a confirmation of Kant’s main findings. As he puts it in a manuscript from approximately 1917, “Kant’s oeuvre contains gold in rich abundance”; however, “one must break it and melt in the fire of radical critique to bring out this content” (Luft, 2007, 367). There is, in other words, a “hidden truth” in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, but one which needs to be made “accessible to insight” by means of “a method of disclosure appropriate to it” (Husserl, 1970, 119). What does Husserl mean by that?

It could be said, and this brings us to the second point, that for Husserl, Kant’s wondrous awakening proved to be short-lived. In Husserl’s view, “wonder” understood as the “passion for observing and knowing the world” stands at the very beginning of philosophy, it is that which gives birth to the “theoretical attitude”, the attitude of pure theoria devoid of all presuppositions and practical interests (Husserl, 1970, 284–285).⁵ The re-awakened sense of wonder at the world — the world as given to us in experience — allowed Kant to rekindle this originary impetus towards genuine philosophizing and free him from the dogmatic metaphysical preconceptions. However, despite having instigated what would later become known as a “Copernican turn” in philosophy, Kant failed to grasp the true radicality of his discovery, which is why he continued to entangle himself in the old ways of thinking and seeing.

⁴ According to Moran, Husserl “began to characterize his phenomenology in transcendental terms and embarked on a serious rereading of Kant” (Moran, 2005, 26) somewhere between 1905 and 1907. However, it was not until 1913, with the publication of Ideas I, that he — much to the dismay of his Munich and Göttingen followers — openly, and explicitly, expressed his allegiance to transcendentalism. Yet, while greatly appreciative of Kant’s contribution to philosophy, he refused to be labeled as a Neo-Kantian, and was adamant that his version of transcendental idealism was to be construed “in a fundamentally and essentially new sense” (Husserl, 1960, 86).

⁵ For an in-depth account of Husserl’s understanding of wonder, harkening back to the Greek notion of thaumazein, see Kingwell (2000). Kingwell suggests that while it might be “too strong an assertion to say that wonder is the central concept of Husserl’s phenomenology”, it is perhaps not too
What Husserl felt was lacking was a rigorous method, an “intuitive exhibiting method” (Husserl, 1970, 114), that would anchor Kant’s initial insights in a domain of self-evident truths and thus secure the firm grounding for our epistemic endeavors that Kant so eagerly sought to provide. For a proper “theoretical attitude” can only be attained and sustained, Husserl believed, if there is a method that enables us to engage in a presuppositionless inquiry into how the world appears to us, an inquiry that allows the philosopher-investigator to systematically free herself from any and all of the preconceptions that still bedevil Kant’s transcendentalism. We must, in other words, return to the things themselves, to the what and how of the phenomena. Our main source of evidence — the source that alone can provide for the apodicticity required of a rigorous and universal science that transcendental phenomenology aspires to be — should lie not in rational (re)constructions, but rather in the sphere of appearances itself, in the domain of what is immediately (originarily) given to us in experience:

Enough now of absurd theories. No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Husserl, 1983, 44)

The first step in actualizing this “principle of all principles” is the performance of epoché, which, according to Husserl, is the proper “gate of entry” (Husserl, 1970, 257) into transcendental phenomenology, a gate of entry that Kant discovered, but failed to pass through. Epoché, a sort of methodically cultivated wonder, entails the “putting out of action”, “exclusion”, or “parenthesizing” of all our “positings”, all our ontological commitments with regard to phenomena, so that, although these commitments are “still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, […] we make no use of [them]” (Husserl, 1983, 59). Such “putting out of action” enables us to investigate phenomena as phenomena, i.e., not as self-subsisting objects inhering in the pre-existing world, but as appearances, as things offering themselves to us in our experience. This “leading” or “bringing back” of the world and objects to the sphere of subject-relativity is the essence of the second methodological step, namely that of the phenomenological-transcendental reduction.

far-fetched “to say that the world exposed by wonder, and the attitude shifts occasioned by it, are central” (Kingwell, 2000, 90–91).

6 As is the case with many of his central notions, Husserl’s views on epoché and different types of reductions (in addition to phenomenological and transcendental, he also speaks of epistemological, philosophical, and psychological reductions) are notoriously difficult to unravel. Sometimes
In order to see how this methodological shift can be said to critically expand on Kant’s project, let us look at some concrete examples. In *Crisis*, Husserl (1970, § 35–38) speaks of two *epochés*, one pertaining to the natural sciences and the other to the life-world (Husserl, 1970, § 39–41). We will focus on each in turn, paying special attention to how they relate to what Husserl felt was lacking in Kant’s thought.

One point in which Husserl believed Kant erred is his uncritical endorsement of the picture of the world as propounded by the natural sciences. Kant’s domain of phenomena is a very *circumscribed* domain, consisting exclusively of mathematically idealized spatiotemporal objects as posited by Newtonian physics. A raindrop or, to use Husserl’s example, an apple tree in bloom (Husserl, 1983, 214 ff.) is not merely a geometrized object, but is endowed with several other meanings — it is something that is pleasant, valuable, and/or useful –, which carries significant implications for its respective modes of being and validity. In fact, from the phenomenological perspective — from the viewpoint of how things appear to me in everyday life — all these other meanings and modes of being and validity can be said to *precede* those posited by the natural sciences. In Husserl’s words:

> In ordinary life we have nothing whatever to do with nature-Objects. What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, tables, clothes, tools, etc. They are value-Objects of various kinds, use-Objects, practical Objects. They are not Objects which can be found in natural science. (Husserl, 1989, 29)

The first *epoché*, then, is meant to parenthesize the “well-fitting garb of ideas”, the “garb of symbols of the symbolic mathematical theories” (Husserl, 1970, 51) that was uncritically projected by Kant onto our “everyday world of experience” (Husserl, 1970, 96). In Husserl’s view, by putting out of action such theoretical positings of the natural sciences (Husserl, 1970, 145), the performance of the first *epoché* enables us to bring out into the open Kant’s “unexpressed ‘presupposition’” (Husserl, 1970, 103), namely our “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*), the overlooked, taken-for-granted “surrounding world of life” (Husserl, 1970) that functions as a “realm of original self-evidences” (Husserl, 1970, § 33d) for all our theoretical and practical (and, thereby, also scientific) inquiries.

The terms *epoché* and reduction are used synonymously, but often the former seems to function as a prequel to the latter (this is how their relationship in understood in our paper). It is not our intention to provide a comprehensive account of the various uses of, and often subtle differences between, the two terms, a topic of ongoing scholarly interest (Luft, 2012), but to simply point out their methodological significance for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.
It is only when we bracket the naturalist attitude and thus overcome “Kant’s prejudice for natural science” (Husserl, 1974, 52) that we regain the world as lived and experienced in our pre-scientific life. This, in turn, enables us to carry out successive phenomenological reductions, whereby the derivative truths and validities of the objective natural sciences can be “brought back” (re-ducere) to the primary — pre-scientific and subject-relative — evidential subsoil of the life-world. Consequently, many of the things that Kant either took for granted or simply overlooked must be “brought into transcendental consideration as ‘objects of possible experience’” (Husserl, 1974), which drastically expands and complexifies the domain of phenomena.

However, according to Husserl, the first epoché does not take us far enough. In addition to bracketing the ontology of the natural sciences and revealing the underlying ontology of the life-world, the proper transcendental science of phenomena requires a second, “universal” or “transcendental”, epoché (Husserl, 1970, § 39), which further suspends the truths and validities of the life-world, thereby disclosing the domain of pure transcendental consciousness. For, after the first epoché, the world is still “pre-given to us as that which exists” (Husserl, 1970, 143–145). So, in addition to parenthesizing the naturalist attitude (attitude characteristic of the natural sciences), we must also parenthesize the natural attitude (attitude characteristic of our natural [everyday] life), and thus put out of action all our ontological commitments, even those pertaining to the life-world.

Let us revert to the “blossoming apple tree” example (Husserl, 1983, 214). When bracketing the natural attitude — parenthesizing the “transcendent world” —, and taking on the “[transcendental] phenomenological attitude”, the first thing to note is that everything remains as before: we still perceive “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden, and so forth”, for “the tree has not lost the least nuance of all these moments, qualities, characteristics with which it was appearing in this perception”, that is as “‘lovely’, ‘attractive’, and so forth ’in’ this liking” (Husserl, 1983, 215–216). What does change, however, is that “all these descriptive statements […] have undergone a radical modification of sense”, as does the thing described, for it becomes “this perceived tree as perceived”, without any reference to a corresponding object in the outside world. We can now analyze not only what is given to us in experience, but also how it is given, without any references to the trans-experiential domain of being-in-itself.

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7 For instance, in confronting Hume, Kant uncritically followed the Scottish philosopher by directing his criticism solely to a posteriori knowledge, but not to analytic a priori, as if the latter were somehow self-evident (Husserl, 1969, 260).

8 For instance, the issue of transcendental grounding of (the findings of) social sciences and humanities (Husserl, 1974, 52).
It is only in and through this second transcendental *epoché* that we gain access to the “universe of the subjective” (Husserl, 1970, 146), the “phenomenological residuum” of “absolute or transcendentally pure consciousness” (Husserl, 1983, 130) wherein all “objectivity” attains its mode of being and validity. This radical shift of attitude opens up a completely new and self-transparent type of experience, which Husserl calls “transcendental experience” (Husserl, 1970, 153) — a notion that, as Moran rightfully observes, “would have been anathema to Kant” (Moran, 2005, 181) — and which lends itself to *transcendental reduction*. Transcendental reduction discloses the fundamental *intentional structure* of experience, whereby *something* is always given to *someone* in a *certain way*. Things do not simply appear; they appear to someone, and they appear as this-or-that. There is, then, a fundamental transcendental correlation between the world-consciousness (“I-pole”) and the world (“object-pole”); further, how the world appears depends on the activities of the world-consciousness. In other words, different types of objectivities — their meaning and ontological validity — are constituted by transcendental subjectivity: the *sense* of an object — the sense through which I intend it or through which it gives itself to me — is the accomplishment of transcendental subjectivity. Note, however, that Husserl is not interested in *individual, concrete examples* of such intentional and constitutional performances, but rather in their “idealized” essences, which are given to us by so-called “eidetic intuition” (Husserl, 1970, 178)9.

Although critical of Kant, it is clear that Husserl remained committed to the spirit of his transcendental idealism in that he sought to ground our knowledge of worldly objects in their subjective conditions of possibility. However, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity — the domain of pure consciousness — is not the Kantian domain of *formal structures* (experience-enabling faculties), arrived at by means of a *regressive* method, but rather a domain of *transcendental experience* (structured as pure intentionality), attained by means of rigorous *intuitive* method. Since Kant remained a prisoner of the naturalist (and consequently natural) attitude, he was, according to Husserl, never granted access to this “universe of the subjective”. For Kant, the domain of subjectivity always remained *equivocal*: on the one hand, it was, as for Husserl, that which functioned as the condition of possibility of objectivity; on the other hand, since Kant failed to develop an autonomous method for investigating this newly found field of subjectivity — a lack which resulted from his overtly narrow conception of intuition —, he was forced to reconstruct its structure and functioning indirectly (regressively) by reverting to the categories and concepts derived from the

9 The method of eidetic intuiting/seeing is more clearly articulated in (Husserl, 1969, 247–248).
objective (natural) sciences. That is to say, in Kant, the realm of the transcendental was populated by “faculties” and “functions” which, for Husserl, are not genuinely (originarily) subjective categories — categories obtained by means of a phenomenological inquiry —, but derivative (objective) notions. It was only by means of _epoché_ and phenomenological-transcendental reduction, Husserl contended, that the structure of transcendental subjectivity became open to investigation, which enabled him to not only _validate_ some of Kant’s conclusions, but also significantly _expand_ the scope of transcendental philosophy.

Before closing this section, we would like to point out that, all these caveats notwithstanding, Husserl’s “transcendental” remains surprisingly Kantian in spirit. This becomes very clear when we consider Husserl’s views on constitutional hierarchy. Namely, despite his criticism of Kant’s overtly narrow conception of objectivity in terms of “natural objects” construed as spatiotemporal entities, and his subsequent broadening of the domain of objectivity to include “value-Objects”, “use-Objects”, etc., it would seem that he nonetheless remained committed to a _layered_ notion of constituted objectivity, whereby “natural objects” are given the fundamental status. Thus, although in my everyday life a table is not given to me as a spatiotemporal thing, it is “at bottom, _qua_ natural body, [always] provided with natural properties accessible to simple experience — although often interest need not be directed toward them” (Husserl, 1973, 54).

Relatedly, there is a strong Kantian streak in Husserl’s general conception of intentionality, one that is said to hold of all constitutive levels. According to Husserl’s early writings, “[t]he stream of phenomenological being”, the domain of pure consciousness disclosed by _epoché_ and phenomenological-transcendental reduction, ultimately consists of “a stuff-stratum and a noetic stratum” (Husserl, 1983, 251). The “stuff-stratum” encompasses the so-called hyletic data, or sensuous matter (color-data, tone-data, etc.), while the “noetic stratum” comprises noeses, or animating morphel/ form (acts of sense-bestowal, e.g., seeing, judging, meaning, etc.). Noeses _animate_, or _bestow sense_ upon, the hyletic data, i.e., they _synthesize_ the multitude of sensations into “unities of sense”, or _noemata_, in and through which I intend a given object (Husserl, 1983, 207).

Let us revert, once again, to the apple tree example. Once we have performed the _epoché_ and have started examining the apple tree as a phenomenon, we will find, as inherent in the stream of pure consciousness, visual hyletic data, e.g., a succession of individual color-sensations, shape-sensations, etc., and noetic aspects, e.g., various sense-bestowing (sub)acts of seeing, judging, etc. Further, these aspects are joined together through multifarious acts of syntheses giving rise to _noema_ (object-as-intend-
ed): tree as perceived, or liked, etc. For example, the act of judgement (noesis) synthesizes various hues of brown and/or perspectival aspects (hyletic data) so that the tree trunk is given to me as brown and/or as three-dimensional (noema). Even though the tree does not necessarily appear in a causal nexus of nature as regarded by natural science, it is still conceived in its basic phenomenal structure as a synthetic unity of intuit-ed manifold. We can see, then, that Husserl inherited the general “synthetic framework” found in Kant, but tried to broaden it to encompass all types of objectivity.

Husserl's adoption of this general framework has important implications for his philosophy, the most pertinent one being his ambivalent relation to perception. On the one hand, Husserl seems to prioritize perception above all other noetic acts: “[E]xperience traces back ultimately to perception, to a seeing and grasping of something; and all other intuition, as it founds the procuring of eidetic insights, is merely a modal variation of perception” (Husserl, 1977, 148). To go back to the things themselves is, in the last analysis, to go back to how things are given in perceptual experience; perception is understood as the mode of givenness that discloses the most primordial stratum of experience. Yet on the other hand, the noetic-noematic framework, especially the underlying process of synthesis, seems to be modeled on the higher-level intentional acts, such as “predicating” and “judging”, whereas it is dubious how well it can account, from the phenomenological perspective, for the lower-level acts, such as “perceiving”. This puts a lot of strain on Husserl's position, since perception, which is supposed to ground, say, judgement, becomes modeled after, and in a sense predicated on, the latter.

As Husserl deepened his phenomenological investigations, he became progressively aware of these tensions, and sought to remedy them by various means. For example, he would, in addition to active syntheses which, roughly speaking, are undertaken reflectively, also speak of passive syntheses, which are paired with minimal-to-no reflective awareness. Relatedly, alongside act-intentionality, the active/positing intentionality issuing from an explicit act of consciousness, he spoke of functioning or operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität), the passive/implicit (anonymous) intentionality carried out on a pre-reflective level. Finally, his phenomenological analyses of “lived body” (Leib) and its role in the constitution of perceptual objects were aimed at bridging some of these pertinent difficulties. However, valiant efforts of some interpreters notwithstanding, it seems dubious whether Husserl, who never abandoned the “synthetic framework”, ever succeeded in resolving these tensions.10

10 Recently, alternative readings of Husserl have been proffered, based primarily on his late and/or unpublished work. These approaches generally tend to water down some of the more blatantly “intellectualist” (i.e., Cartesian and/or Kantian) features of Husserl's philosophy, e.g., his emphasis
Merleau-Ponty took it upon himself to dispel some of the ambiguities that were bedeviling Husserl's philosophy. In this regard, he could be said to stand in a similar relation to Husserl as the latter stands to Kant: although in general agreement with the *impetus* of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological project, he feels that, due to certain speculative “neuralgic spots”; it ultimately falls short of the goal it sets out to achieve. And, perhaps to the surprise of many, this goal is still, at least in its general outlines, *the same* as it was for both Kant and Husserl, namely that of providing *firm (transcendental) grounding* for our epistemic endeavors. In his reflections on Einstein's theory of relativity, Merleau-Ponty states explicitly that his general aim is not to *undermine* rationality and science, but rather to *rescue* their innermost value by finding a proper justificatory ground for them through “the rebirth of a philosophical sense” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, 197).

In a decidedly Husserlian move, Merleau-Ponty contends that the latter can be attained solely by going back to the “things themselves”, i.e., by reawakening “the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, ix). To this end, a proper methodological tool is required, and Merleau-Ponty thinks that phenomenological-transcendental reduction, construed, tellingly, as “‘wonder’ in the face of the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, xv), is the best candidate for the job. So far, Merleau-Ponty seems to be following closely in Husserl's footsteps. However, as we will see shortly, there is an important difference between the two authors, one that could be characterized evocatively with regards to how they conceive of wonder. While Husserl, as suggested in the previous section, believes that wonder, that wellspring of all philosophizing, is essential because it *leads* to theoretical attitude, Merleau-Ponty demurs and suggests that its greatest value lies in that it grants us access to that which *precedes*, and thus cannot be fully exhausted by, theoretical attitude. Husserl, although significantly improving on Kant's transcendental

on transcendental ego/subjectivity, act-intentionality, etc., and put more emphasis on the notions of embodiment, operative intentionality, etc., arguing that Husserl is a much more varied and radical thinker as is commonly portrayed. We agree that these commonly neglected aspects deserve careful study and provide a much more nuanced view of Husserl’s philosophy, yet feel that such alternative readings fail to convincingly demonstrate that Husserl managed to integrate these notions into a coherent philosophical position. In other words, while we appreciate the ingenious analyses of Zahavi (e.g., 1994, 2003) and others, we are much more inclined to side with Carman (1999) and Moran (2005) who insist that, despite significant differences of emphasis in his later philosophy, Husserl never wholly abandoned his earlier “intellectualist” commitments, which imbued his thought with serious conceptual incongruences.
project, errs in moving too quickly from the pre-reflective world, the “homeland of thoughts” and “cradle of things” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 28, 68), to the reflective world of “thoughts” and fully constituted “things”.

In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Husserl ultimately failed to heed his own advice by admitting into the foundations of his project theoretical posits that have not been “purified” in the fire of epoché. Most importantly, Husserl’s preconceptions about what constitutes valid knowledge and rigorous science — preconceptions modeled on the notions of belief, judgement, and explicit knowledge — invest his phenomenological investigations with a thick “tissue of judicatory and propositional acts” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 163). This creates a certain tension between his initial impulse to return to “the things themselves” and his intellectualist conception of phenomenology as a “rigorous science”, a tension which Husserl was aware of, but one that, as mentioned above, he never seems to have successfully resolved.

Merleau-Ponty’s goal is, therefore, not to undermine or limit Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological endeavors, as he is sometimes portrayed, but rather, by freeing them of any residual theoretical “sedimentations”, to broaden and solidify them — knowing all too well that, in so doing, he is sometimes pushing Husserl further than he himself was willing to go (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 72, 75). In an important sense, Merleau-Ponty tries to be more Husserlian than Husserl, arguing that it is only by disentangling Husserl’s thought from a web of preconceptions that the dictum of “going back to the things themselves” can be realized and a more genuine thematization of the subterranean transcendental dimensions of experience becomes possible.

This is reflected in how Merleau-Ponty views the two aforementioned epochés, the one pertaining to the life-world and the other to the transcendental subjectivity. As for the first epoché — the bracketing of the naturalist attitude — Merleau-Ponty seems to be in full agreement with Husserl, suggesting that the scientific (naturalist) point of view is “always both naïve and at the same time dishonest”, as it takes for granted, but fails to thematize, that “world which precedes [theoretical] knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, ix-x). However, Merleau-Ponty feels that, despite having opened up the vast and uncharted terrain of Lebenswelt, Husserl’s explorations remained thwarted by his own theoretical preconceptions. There is, for instance, the already mentioned prioritization of the “the ontology of blosse Sachen” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 163), which situates the “natural thing” at the fundamental level of objectivity. However, going back to the things themselves discloses that this is precisely not our primary way of living among things.

“Things in themselves” are not ultimately blosse Sachen; they are figures whose webs of significance are gently carved out by shadowy backgrounds of indeterminate
sense. A “thing” is not fundamentally a geometrized spatiotemporal object, but evocative force endowed with unique physiognomy, and the spectrum of significance it traverses is (co)determined by the precipices of valence behind and underneath it. When, after a long hike, I chance upon an apple tree in bloom, what I see is not, primarily, a natural object but a place of quiet and rest set forth against the background of exhaustion and toil, an alluring panoply of sights, smells and sounds, a soft beckoning murmur of its dense shadow.

Thus, a prototypical example of the sensuous is not a spatiotemporal object, but a human face. Just like a landscape or signature, a face, as given originarily in experience, is not a fully determinate thing, but a “whole charged with immanent meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 67); I can be “familiar with a face without ever having perceived the color of the eyes in themselves” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 13). The face has unique physiognomy, it is invested with a unique style, which cannot be adequately encapsulated in a propositional form, yet is suffused with implicit (motor-, affective- and value-laden) significance: it lends itself to me or pushes me away, it is attractive or repellent (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 151–152).

Thus, not only is the (re)discovered world of the sensuous, “the world as we lived it before our reflection began” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 49), the abode of “value-objects”, etc., but these various types of objects constitute conglomerates of significance in a thickly interwoven phenomenal field — the totality of my immediate experience —, where the elusive horizons and backgrounds play no lesser role than the figures that stand out against them. For this reason, the sense that is given to me at this pre-reflective level is not the full-blown sense that can be captured in pure intuition and expressed a propositional form, but rather “an earthy and aboriginal sense” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 77), consisting of “network of implications beneath ‘objective material thing’” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 166).

This brings us to Husserl’s second kind of epoché, one that is supposed to, through the bracketing of natural attitude, open up the self-transparent field of transcendental subjectivity. However, if we take the results of the first kind of epoché seriously, Husserl’s understanding of this step becomes problematic. The sensuous, whose deep recesses are imbued with the shadowy “aboriginal sense”, opens up a “pre-theoretical, pre-thetic, or pre-objective order”, which seems to upset “the relationship between the constituted (noema) and the constituting (noesis)” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 172). On the pre-objective level, there is, pace Kant and Husserl, no hylé, no sensuous isolated sensations, and for this reason, there is also no morphe, no meaning-bestowing activity of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 471); for even though these sense-dense “pre-givens”, these “knots” or “kernels of [aboriginal] meaning around which
man and the world gravitate” are still woven with intentional threads, they cannot be exhausted by the “intellectual possession of a noema” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 165).

My reflection is “always behind or ahead”, but never wholly “contemporaneous” with them (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c); it always falls short, or reaches too high, to be able to find its place among primordial things. The second reduction, then, does not consist of a move from “objective” to a “closed, transparent milieu” of the “subjective”, but instead discloses a “third dimension” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 162, 164), that “secret of secrets this side of our theses and our theory” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 165), wherein dichotomies of noesis-noema, constitution-constituted, even subject-object come apart. As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons why Merleau-Ponty felt that Husserl was unable to overcome the incongruences in his rendition of transcendental phenomenology was the latter’s commitment to the theoretical attitude (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 162–3), which prevented him from realizing that reflection — be it of naturalist or classical-transcendentalist bent — remains rooted in the pre-reflective layer and cannot simply shed its aboriginal skin.

In other words, if Kant remained, inadvertently, entangled in the naturalist web by failing to thematize the theoretical stance of the natural sciences, Husserl remained, also inadvertently, allied to naturalism by failing to thematize theoretical stance as such. For this reason, the natural attitude cannot be bracketed in the same manner as the naturalist attitude can be: this would hold true only if the latter were, just like the former, a theoretical posit, a thesis. But, as Husserl himself conceded, this is decidedly not the case: the givenness of the world in the natural attitude precedes all theses; it is, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, the “mystery of a primordial faith”, a “fundamental and original opinion (Urglaube, Urdoxa)”, which is “not even in principle translatable in terms of clear and distinct knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 162). It is for this reason that, in the ultimate analysis, phenomenology is neither a naturalism nor a classical (!) transcendentalism, but rather a critical endeavor bent at disclosing, and reflecting upon, the “pre-theoretical layer on which both of these idealizations find their relative justification and are gone beyond” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 164–165).

Drawing on Husserl’s analyses of embodiment in Ideas II, Merleau-Ponty speaks of this pre-objective “third dimension”, this purported pre-theoretical ground of both naturalism and classical transcendentalism, as the domain of corporeality. To return, once more, to the example of the human face: my gaze fails to recognize a face as a face unless it can take a certain grip on it, unless its features, with their thick implicative texture, are disposed in relation to me in a way that they can elicit a certain affective/motor/evaluative response from me. That is to say, “its being an object is [...] not a
being for the thinking subject, but a being-for-the-gaze which meets it at a certain angle” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 294–295).

It is by taking into account that the structure and dynamics of my life-world are always intermeshed with the structure and dynamics of my corporeal gaze that my *phenomenal* field becomes the *transcendental* field (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 69) — Merleau-Ponty’s equivalent of Husserl’s “transcendental experience”. In other words, it is only when I realize that the figure/ground structure of my experience always tacitly presupposes the “third term”, namely my body, that these *fleshly conditions of possibility* of experience disclose themselves to me (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 114).

However, unlike Husserl, whose commitment to the self-transparent domain of transcendental subjectivity makes his analyses of the body conceptually ambiguous (Carman, 1999), Merleau-Ponty refrains from putting on the intellectualist glasses and turns “embodiment” into his central transcendental notion. In his view, *my corporeality*, not in the sense of an objective body (*Körper*), as one thing among other things, but as an experiential structure (*Leib*), as my dynamic opening onto things, is the main locus of the *transcendental (non-dualist) betwixt*. The domain of the transcendental is thus ultimately the domain of the *ongoing co-constitution* between the corporeal subject and the aboriginal thing:

If the distinction between subject and object is blurred in my body (and no doubt the distinction between noesis and noema as well?), it is also blurred in the thing, which is the pole of my body’s operations, the terminus its exploration ends up in, and which is thus woven in the same intentional fabric as my body. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 167)

This ongoing dialectic is expressed in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of *body schema* (*schéma corporel*) (in Merleau-Ponty, 2002, usually mistranslated as “body image”). Although borrowed from psychological literature of the time (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 113 ff.), the notion can be traced back to Kantian “transcendental schemata” (Carman, 1999, 218–219), a set of procedural rules which we touched upon briefly in Section 2 and the main function of which, it will be recalled, was to link the concepts of understanding to imaginative synthesis that is constitutive of objective experience, thus mediating between sensual intuitions and pure concepts. Once purged of their formalist flavor, Merleau-Ponty cashes in on the “in-betweenness” of schemata so as to express an “integrated set of skills poised and ready to anticipate and incorporate a world prior to the application of concepts and the formation of thoughts and judgments” (Carman, 1999, 219).

What particularly sets Merleau-Ponty’s body schema apart from Kant’s faculties and Husserl’s pure consciousness is that, although it delineates conditions of possi-
bility of experience, it is said to be, first of all, *dynamic*, i.e., it is constantly “polarized by its tasks” and “gathers itself up to reach its goal” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 115); secondly, and relatedly, it is decidedly *non- or trans-dualist*, i.e., it is, at least in principle, neither objective nor subjective. As such, Merleau-Ponty moves even further away from “idealism” in the Kantian sense, although he remains committed, in an important sense, to a form of “transcendental anti-realism” (Pollard, 2014), in which body schema functions as a *transcendental Ur-Gestalt*, an ongoing and ever-changing *give-and-take, push-and-pull* between its objective and subjective poles:

> [M]y body is geared towards the world when my perception offers me a spectacle as varied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive from the world the responses they anticipate. This maximum distinctness in perception and action defines a perceptual *ground*, a basis of my life, a general milieu for the coexistence of my body and the world. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 292)

In Merleau-Ponty’s view, one finds, hidden underneath the reflective noesis-noema intentionality, the abode of the pre-reflective “motor intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 110), which, as a close cousin of Husserl’s aforementioned “operative intentionality”, stands for “that which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, xx). It is because of this “antepredicative [body-world] unity” that we need to pay special heed to Husserl’s admonition that *epoché* is not a negation, but a *bracketing*, of the world: reflection does not “withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world’s basis”, (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, xiii); instead, it “slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, xiii). As such, this transcendental in-between is not a mere regressively postulated entity on a par with Kantian faculties, but something that discloses itself in experience; however, since it is, by its very “nature”, ambiguous, it cannot be (*contra* Husserl) adequately given in pure intuition.

This opens up an important question, namely that of the relationship between (theoretical) reflection and (pre-theoretical) existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, this relationship is not unilateral. It is not as if the latter would simply ground the former and as if, once we would have unearthed it, we could simply discard reflection altogether. It is only in and through reflection that the pre-theoretical order is discovered: since “existence is too tightly caught up in the world to know itself”, there

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11 We add the caveat “in principle”, because Merleau-Ponty himself seems to have been dissatisfied with his analyses of the body in *Phenomenology of Perception*, which led him to adopt a more explicitly trans-dualist notion of “the flesh” in his later works (Apostolopoulos, 2017).
is “the need of ideality in order to come and know and prevail over its facticity” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, xiv–xv). However, theoretical reflection is not self-sufficient, as “it is limited to consecrating the labors of the pre-objective layer” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 172): it can only transcend the pre-theoretical “opening to the world” by “making use of the powers it owes to the opening itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 164; Merleau-Ponty, 1964c, 172). What is needed, then, is critical reflection that never loses track of its corporeal origins and is able to thematize the ongoing dialectical relationship between ideation and existence which Husserl called Fundierung (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 458).

This is why, from a Merleau-Pontyean perspective, it can be argued that there is truth to both naturalism and classical transcendentalism: they are both “fields of idealities” issuing forth from, and reflecting upon, the transcendental domain of existence, and as such, their respective modes of inquiry — induction on the one hand and eidetic analysis on the other — can be seen as, again, pace Husserl, structurally similar and mutually enriching (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 69–70). However, this is also why classical transcendentalism can be said to constitute a significant step forward in relation to naturalism, for it is only through its reflections that we first awaken to the conditions of possibility of experience. The reason why classical transcendentalism falls short is because, in its call for self-scrutiny, it excludes itself from this critical undertaking: it fails to thematize how the uncovered conditions of possibility reflect back upon its own modi operandi, thus forgetting the corporeal “opening” from which its reflective activities issue forth. It is because I, as an inquiring scientist or philosopher, am a living body that both my personality and my world are given to me; and it is in and through this givenness that I can reflect on their conditions of possibility. Or in other words, “I can understand the function of the living body only by enacting it myself, and only insofar I am a body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 75).

5. OF SERPENTS AND SHADOWS: BETWEEN NATURALIZATION AND PHENOMENOLOGIZATION

The aim of the forgoing analysis was to show that, all differences notwithstanding, the three authors under scrutiny belong, if we revert to the Fleckian terminology, to the same thought style. Their endeavors harken back to a common impetus, namely that of wonder at the face of the world, wonder at the realization that things are not simply “out there”, but appear to us in unique ways. As such, they agreed that various faces of objectivity, from the geometric contours of a cube to the expressive irregularities of a landscape, are bound to specific conditions of possibility, and that any philosophy that disregards these transcendental conditions — any philosophy that builds
its conceptual nest exclusively amongst things-in-themselves — must be considered naïve.

In unearthing the layered architecture of the transcendental we have hoped to show how the three authors ought to be viewed not as antagonists, but as critical collaborators. To reiterate: Husserl saw himself as someone who not only validated, but expanded the main findings of Kant's transcendental inquiries; similarly, Merleau-Ponty conceived of himself not as someone who undermined, but deepened Husserl's transcendental project. However, despite their close affinities, there remain pertinent differences among them, which deters cursory grouping under a common denominator. If Husserl and Merleau-Ponty can be said to bear the shadow of Kant in the sense that they critically continue his newly woven thought style, Kant can be said to have borne, in the unthematized subterranean layers of his thought, the shadow of differentiation that came to view in Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's œuvre.

These reflections have important implications for the current debates on the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology mentioned in Section 1. On the one hand, it is spurious to claim that, due to Merleau-Ponty's change of emphasis from pure consciousness to embodiment, phenomenology has been divested of its transcendental dimension and can therefore be readily incorporated, as a supplementary enterprise dedicated to producing accurate descriptions of experience, into the edifice of the natural sciences. For, it bears recapitulating that, in Merleau-Ponty, body schema is a transcendental structure, one that, although significantly different from transcendental structures found in Kant and Husserl, functions as a condition of possibility of objectivity (Heinämäa, 1999). However, it is equally wrong to simply lump all three authors under the common heading of “transcendental idealism”. The move from Kant through Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, although traversing the same transcendental trajectory, is punctuated by differences that are significant enough to preclude such hasty (over)generalizations. For, if the transcendental idealism of Husserl already differed substantially from that of Kant, the designation seems wholly inappropriate when assigned to Merleau-Ponty. Body schema, albeit a transcendental structure, is so far removed from the idealist tradition that the designation seems unwarranted (Pollard, 2014).

While “deflationary” naturalist approaches (Inkpin, 2017) tend to exacerbate the differences between various conceptions of transcendentalism, “inflationary” transcendentalist approaches (Gardner, 2015) tend to overlook the flexibility of the transcendentalist thought style. Curiously enough, both seem to share a common preconception: that the initial forms of transcendentalism (those of Kant and, possibly, early Husserl) constitute the genuinely “authentic forms”, and that any divergences
from that “ideal” must be put on the Procrustean bed and either divested of the transcendentalist title or lumped, more-or-less forcibly, into the pre-existing transcendentalist categories.

However, by hermeneutically unraveling various strands of transcendentalism, we have tried to show that a much more nuanced relationship between natural sciences and (transcendental) phenomenology is forthcoming. Since all knowledge originates in, and reflects back upon, my embodied existence, it can be argued that both naturalist and transcendentalist approaches represent not only valid, but uniquely valuable means of expressing this dynamic transcendental flux. It is this that makes the transcendentalism of sensuous flesh more amenable to a rapprochement with naturalism, and not the mere fact that it brings to the epistemic table the notion of “embodiment”. Merleau-Ponty’s *Leib* cannot be simply projected onto “nature” as conceived by naturalists. Yet, by imploding a sharp distinction between the constituting and the constituted, the dividing line between transcendental and naturalist “ideations” also becomes much more porous.

For this reason, while there might perhaps be good reasons to label Merleau-Ponty a methodological naturalist, as Reynolds (2017) purports (a thesis we take issue with), there are even more convincing reasons to proclaim him a methodological transcendentalist, as suggested by Pollard (2017). Namely, the architecture of the transcendental does entail a certain hierarchy of epistemic-methodological (and existential) significance, where transcendentalist reflections can be said to *foundationally precede* the naturalist ones. For the latter, on account of their methodological (and insofar legitimate) or metaphysical (and insofar naive) disregard for the “cradle of things”, build their conceptual nests among fully-constituted things — entities thickly coated with the logico-mathematical “garb of ideas” — and never engage in rigorous self-scrutiny. On the other hand, transcendental ideations in their classical (Kantian and/or Husserlian) guises inquire into conditions of possibility of “thingness” and are therefore closer to the whirlpool of spiraling self-reflectivity, which ends in the pre-reflective realms of corporeal existence.

In this constellation, it becomes obvious that the naturalization of phenomenology cannot be carried out “on the cheap”. While it is true that findings of the natural sciences, especially in domains where they are not yet subsumed under the “garb of ideas”, but hinge on the seams of experience, can be relevant for phenomenology, it is also true that transcendental reflections about the grounds and significance of scientific investigations need to be taken equally seriously. That is to say, the process of naturalization of transcendental phenomenology must be accompanied by a complementary move of phenomenologization (“transcendentalization”) of the natural
sciences (Zahavi, 2004, 344), “a rethinking of a concept of nature […] that might ultimately lead to a transformation of natural science itself” (Zahavi, 2010, 16–17). What is needed, then, is a conceptual and methodological equivalent of the *uroboros*, that ancient mythical serpent that constantly devours its own tail.

In this regard, perhaps the best way of taking the architecture of the transcendental seriously, would be something along the lines proposed by Varela, Thompson, Rosch (1991), where, in an attempt to erect a more comprehensive platform for investigating mind and cognition, (transcendental) phenomenology and natural sciences are viewed as engaged in an ongoing back-and-forth exchange that is rooted, and refers back on, life-world — world of “everyday practice” and “lived experience”. From a phenomenological perspective, some of the most promising avenues of realizing this conceptual-methodological *uroboros* have been explored by the representatives of the contemporary “French school of phenomenology”, a heterogeneous group of phenomenologists and phenomenologically-minded thinkers (M. Bitbol, N. Depraz, C. Petitmengin, P. Vermersch, etc.) whose distinctive feature is that, in addition to providing textual and theoretical analyses, they try to develop *concrete, embodied first-person methods* for investigating experience and/or combining these investigations with corresponding third-person methods as developed in (cognitive) science.

Let us, before closing, take a look at just one concrete example. In consonance with what has been said above, namely that both naturalist and classical transcendentalist ideations must ultimately stem from, and reflect back upon, the world of lived experience, Depraz, Varela and Vermersch emphasize that “a renewed, contemporary phenomenology” should be centered around *epoché* characterized not so much by “its internal theoretical structure or an *a priori* justification of knowledge”, but primarily *by its praxis or modes of enaction* (Depraz, Varela, Vermersch, 2000, 122). In fact, the three main components of such enacted *epoché* — (i) suspension: putting aside our habitual thoughts and judgements; (ii) conversion: a shift of attention from objects of experience to modes of givenness of these objects; (iii) receptivity: harboring intimate openness towards experience — bring us back to one of the main evocative figures that has been running through our inquiry. For it would seem that it is by developing means for *not only talking about*, but *systematically enacting* a return to the “things themselves” — that is to say, by continuously cultivating an *open attitude of wonder* towards the pre-reflective domain of lived experience, and *only then* engaging in theoretical (naturalist or classical-transcendentalist) reflection on what has been un- and dis-covered — that we can start to weave a new thought style, a style that might, perhaps, subsume and transcend some of the age-old dichotomies.
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NATURE AS EXPRESSIVE SYNTHESIS:
THE SENSIBLE AWAKENING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL
BETWEEN KANT, HUSSERL AND MERLEAU-PONTY

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The critical insights of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology evolve out of a tension in the nature of consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is a synthetic activity or intentional that discloses the horizon in which meanings and objects have conditions of possibility. On the other hand, in perception we find the workings of sense that point to a dynamic, expressive origin prior to the pure activity of consciousness. Our investigation is concerned with explaining how this passivity of consciousness is itself a synthesis that arises out of our expressive bodily nature. There is a clear logical connection between the ways Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceive of a synthesis within sensibility and bodily affectivity, where each thinker requires us to conceptualize nature as a mode of expressivity, with the implication that transcendental conditions of possibility must, mysteriously, happen within the very intercorporeal and temporal fields that they render possible.

Key words: Phenomenology, transcendental idealism, Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, consciousness, temporality.

ПРИРОДА КАК ВЫРАЗИТЕЛЬНЫЙ СИНТЕЗ:
ЧУВСТВЕННОЕ ПРОБУЖДЕНИЕ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОГО
У КАНТА, ГУССЕРЛЯ И МЕРЛО-ПОНТИ

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Критические усмотрения трансцендентальной философии и феноменологии произрастают из напряжения внутри самой природы сознания. С одной стороны, сознание есть деятельность синтеза или интенциональность, раскрывающая горизонт, на котором смыслы и предметы об-
The critical insights of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology evolve out of a tension in the nature of consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is a synthetic activity or intentionality that discloses the horizon in which meanings and objects have conditions of possibility. On the other hand, in perception we find the workings of sense that point to a dynamic, expressive origin prior to the pure activity of consciousness. Our investigation concerns how this passivity of consciousness is a synthesis that arises out of our expressive bodily nature. There is a clear logical connection between the ways Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceive of a synthesis within sensibility and bodily affectivity, where each thinker requires us to conceptualize nature as a mode of expressivity, with the implication that transcendental conditions of possibility must, mysteriously, happen within the very intercorporeal and temporal fields that they render possible.

Kant’s provocative concept of “transcendental affinity” in his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason reveals a level of kinship between our pre-reflective experience of nature and the pre-conceptual association of sensation by the imagination. The primordial associative workings of the imagination resonate with a pre-objective nature that is not yet determined by concepts, but rather prepares itself to be thought. As a bridge between cognition and sensibility, imaginative synthesis as immanent to the field of experience breaks down the logical distinction between a priori and a posteriori. For Husserl, the very form of experience is temporally dynamic, and consciousness as a necessary condition of experience is manifest in and through an affective awakening. Husserl works, like Kant, in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis exposes a level of immanent, flowing synthesis, termed operative intentionality. Consciousness emerges through a call-response structure and is animated by this level of
affective bodily synthesis at which the dichotomies of activity and passivity, a priori and a posteriori, self and world, do not hold. For Husserl, transcendental consciousness happens out of an affective, pre-conceptual awakening.

In Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* and *Institution* lectures we find a combination of these two problems. Merleau-Ponty explores consciousness, like Husserl, as a temporally emergent and awakening field of sense, but like Kant, Merleau-Ponty finds this imaginative proto-production of sense to be the mark of a deep affinity between consciousness and nature as expressive institutions. Kant’s affinity with nature is phenomenologically manifest through the natural generality of the lived body, and the expressive, acquired depth of its natural past. Consciousness must emerge from nature, and must awaken through emotion, and this requires driving the implications of Kant’s critique of the imagination and Husserl’s phenomenology of operative intentionality to their furthest logical conclusions: an overcoming division of dualisms of activity/passivity, fact/essence and contingency/necessity, past/present, by showing nature itself, and its institutions of life and consciousness, to be an expressive movement from nonsense to sense. This way of thinking resitutes transcendental conditions of possibility as transformative events within histories of local, divergent forms of life and consciousness. If we drive these philosophical methods to their furthest logical conclusions, transcendental idealism and phenomenology mutually illuminate the radical embeddedness of transcendental conditions of possibility within a generative time of natural expressivity.

2. KANT: THE TRANSCENDENTAL AFFINITY OF NATURE AND EXPRESSION

What makes experience possible is an elemental kinship between sensory intuitions and concepts, but sensation and the understanding are functionally opposite. Sensation is passive, receptive, disparate, bodily, empirical and emerges contingently, where understanding is active, spontaneous, unifying, mental, transcendental and operates according to necessary principles. Kant’s insight is to render sensation and understanding moments of experience that, though we can later analyze them as separate poles of experience, are originally derivative features of a synthetically experienced whole.

The two editions of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, in particular the two versions of “The Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, offer two explanations of this synthesis. The B Deduction of the 1787 *Critique* proposes a solution that hearkens back to Cartesian rationalism. Kant’s famous maxim that concepts without intuitions are empty but that intuitions without concepts are blind
amounts to a phenomenological reduction ad absurdum. The very structure of experience demands, as its condition of possibility, an already accomplished synthesis of mind and body, sensory difference and conceptual unity. Kant's stance toward experience is reflective. Approaching experience as a hypostasized object of reflection, we can notice the mutual necessity of sense and concept. This approach, however, assumes that the form of our experience is something that we detachedly encounter from the outside in an already complete act, but thereby we conflate the product of synthesis with its production.

Kant's argument in the B Deduction rests on a retrospective illusion, the projection of a completed act of synthesis and an already-formed object of experience, back into the ontological conditions of possibility for that experience. The necessity that we encounter within experience as the product of experience is taken to be its condition of possibility. This kind of argument not only takes for granted the stance of a detached, reflective self-conscious act, but also amounts to question begging, because here one-side of the experience, the necessity of its conceptual unity, is being retroactively taken to be its condition of possibility. Kant errs in his revised Deduction by hypothesizing experience as an object of judgment, and tautologically concludes that this act of judgment is the source of the total experience that enables it. This circular reasoning also preserves an untenable dualism: by rendering consciousness the ground of experience, we cannot account for the constitutive role of difference, contingency and alterity in experience.

We encounter another way forward in the 1781 A Deduction. Instead of conceiving sensation and understanding as extrinsically related, Kant calls for us to think of this difference as self-articulation from within experience. A logical precondition of this unity of opposites is a common source out of which these opposites can be related. Kant's argument in this earlier version rests on recognizing a level of experience prior to the explicit separation of sensation and concept, activity and passivity. There is an intrinsic, generalized relationship between sensations as such, prior to their being thought in a concept, and Kant terms this pre-conceptual linking the work of a productive power of imagination. There is a readiness to “converge” into an object of experience, prior to there being an actual object thought (Kant, 1998, 235–236, A 113). This pre-conceptual congruence and affiliation between sensations is not only discovered on the side of consciousness, but in the objects of our experience, in nature, we necessarily encounter a “readiness” to be thought. Kant terms this kinship between originary association in consciousness and the preparation for thinking in nature a “transcendental affinity” of the two. There is a transcendental, not contingent, linkage between the productive imagination and nature.
Affinity is a peculiar notion in Kant’s logic, because it points to a state between identity and difference. We can infer an affinity between difference and identity, out of which they can be related. Here Kant speaks, for example, of there being a common ground between the variegated manifold of sensations and the ideal unity of the concept, that being the transcendental possibility of association between different sensations. There is a manifold of disparate, incompatible sensations, and in order for these differences to be manifest in a unified concept, there must already be some lateral affiliation between them. This lateral relatedness is not yet ideal unity. Affinity mediates between difference and identity. Prior to any particular association of sensations in a concept then, there are these general, ambiguous associations among them.

The concept of affinity points back to a different kind of synthesis, a truly passive synthesis that underlies the relationality of concept and intuition. Synthesis is passive here because there is not already a causal actor in place: Kant has already thoroughly rejected the dogmatic argument for experience being the product of an external cause, but this transcendental argument equally entails that consciousness or the mind cannot constitute experience from the outside, in a prior moment of judgment. In experience, then, we find an association of sensations that allows different sensations to be brought together without, thereby collapsing their difference into abstract conceptual identity. We experience this productive differentiating power within our experience prior to our rational judgment and self-conscious agency, yet this linking and yoking within experience is not a brute empirical given either. This pre-conceptual orientation is not only found within consciousness, but it also must,

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1 There is thus an association or commonality between specificity and homogeneity, a generality between particularity and universality: “Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: 1. by a principle of sameness of kind in the manifold under higher genera, 2. by a principle of the variety of what is same in kind under lower species; and in order to complete the systematic unity it adds 3. still another law of the affinity of all concepts, which offers a continuous transition from every species to every other through a graduated increase of varieties” (Kant, 1998, 598, A 658/B 686). Kant points out that association is not a separate act with affinity its product, nor is there a pre-existing affinity that we discover association within. Affinity is an ongoing work of association, and this work of association only ever unfolds empirically, within experience.

2 For Kant there must be an objective side to the originary association of the productive imagination: “For then I would not know whence we should obtain the synthetic propositions of such a universal unity of nature, since in this case one would have to borrow them from the objects of nature itself. But since this could happen only empirically, from that nothing but merely contingent unity could be drawn, which would fall far short of necessary connection that one has in mind when one speaks of nature” (Kant, 1998, 236, A 114).

3 Kant argues that the productive synthesis is original and a precondition for later acts of sensory apprehension and conceptual judgment: “But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle
transcendently define our bodily experience of nature as a tacit, pre-conceptual sense of orientation and preparation for thought.

On the subjective side we find the “association of representations” that gathers together sensations in a non-indifferent, non-abstract manner\(^4\). This association shows that some affectations are akin, and that these relationships are not arbitrary but actually depend upon the particular sensory content. On the objective side, prior to objectifying nature and understanding it as a causal system, we experience a kinship through which nature can be thought in the first place, in and through offering us regular, perceptible affinities in our basic givenness. This proto-activity of the imagination, then, is equally a proto-objectivity in nature. Nature does not immediately have an affinity with the concept, but with the productive imagination, so we should not conceive of this nature with the terms of realism. It is evident that here we must conceive of nature, like the imagination, as a principle of production.

In his *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Martin Heidegger suggests that instead of conceiving the reproductive synthesis of the imagination as a third stem alongside the apprehension of sensations and recognition of concepts, Kant conceives of it as a common root, out of which sensation and concept can be synthesized (Heidegger, 1997, 190, 282–283, § 21). Kant makes clear that this unit is neither given from the outside nor constituted from within a unitary act of consciousness:

> If the objects with which our cognition has to do were things in themselves, then we would not be able to have any a priori concepts of them at all. For whence should we obtain them? If we take them from the object (without even investigating here how the latter could become known to us), then our concepts would be merely empirical and not a priori concepts. If we take them from ourselves, then that which is merely in us cannot determine the constitution of an object distinct from our representations, i.e., of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience” (Kant, 1998, 237–238, A 118).

\(^4\) Kant argues that association cannot be abstract and conceptual, but must be concrete. The necessary orderings we find through the imagination are, oxymoronically, only revealed empirically. Here Kant is, however unintentionally, blurring the distinction between necessity and contingency, as well as a prior and a posteriori, because this synthesis has both transcendental and empirical sides: “Since, however, if representations reproduced one another without distinction, just as they fell together, there would in turn be no determinate connection but merely unruy heaps of them, no cognition at all would arise, their reproduction must have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is called the association of representations” (Kant, 1998, 239, A 121).
be a ground why there should be a thing that corresponds to something we have in our thoughts, and why all this representation should not instead be empty. (Kant, 1998, 244, A 130)

Kant points back to a common productive source that is beneath the level of awareness, whether sensory or conceptual, out of which the sense of intuition and concept emerge. The imagination is both productive and receptive, which leads Heidegger to argue that it exists as temporally ecstatic or active in a moment prior to conscious experience, but a moment that is leaping-ahead of itself in the process of its own production: “the pure concept of understanding is not given at all through a pure formal-logical function of judgment. Rather, this concept springs form the imaginative synthesis which is related to intuition and that means to time” (Heidegger, 1997, 193). To conceive of synthesis as temporal then, drives Kant’s logic of the imagination to undermine some of the conceptual distinctions upon which the whole edifice of his critical arguments depend: namely the difference between a posteriori and a priori, as well as the presupposition that time is defined as a manifold of continuous, uniform events.

There is something ambiguous in the workings of the imagination, because it functions between contingency and necessity, and straddles the difference between empirical and transcendental consciousness. Kant argues that even though the imagination is a necessary principle, it cannot be exhaustively determined by or subsumed under a unitary concept in advance of its actual productivity. The work of the imagination is thus only manifest as trace, that is to say retrospectively, in the empirical regularities it conjoins and affiliates within experience:

It is this apperception that must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its function intellectual. For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle. Through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, however, concepts that belong to the understanding can come but only by means of the imagination in relation to the sensible intuition. (Kant, 1998, 240–241, A 124)

This claim requires us to shift the terms of where Kant situates the transcendental. There is not a top down synthesis from the concept, nor a bottom up construction from empirical sensations, but rather an intermediary linking together of sensations that retrospectively manifest, through the specific regularities we encounter in natural perception, principles of order and necessity from within the field of experience. One example of such a locus of associations would be our pre-reflective attunement to other living bodies. There is thus an irreducibly empirical moment in synthesis,
but not an abstract one. Instead of reducing materiality to pure, uniform potentiality, Kant begins to conceive of this materiality as an internal auto-production within sense and nature\(^5\). The empirical events we naturally encounter unfold an ordering within themselves, an we experience an affinity with this unfolding and gathering of sense.

Husserl’s analysis of the lived body reveals how, already at the level of affectivity a tacit synthesis is happening, and that we can understand this synthesis as a prereflective ground of consciousness. Husserl situates consciousness itself as a becoming and awakening within time, thus beginning to definitely shift the terms of synthesis away from an external relationship of consciousness to nature, and of necessity to contingency. But this requires us to conceive of sense as an original absence and call to consciousness, and to understand sensibility as a prereflective, affective field, of which consciousness is a moment of expression.

3. HUSSERL: THE AFFECTIVE AWAKENING OF TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In Edmund Husserl’s *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* consciousness is conceived of as emerging through a temporal flow. Time is the “universal formal framework in which all other possible syntheses must participate” (Husserl, 2001, § 27). Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, and thus to understand it as a synthetic act we have to phenomenologically interrogate not only its immediate givenness, but also its genesis in affective awakening. Sensations for Husserl are already associated and productive, but they point to an affective level beneath perceptual consciousness. The moment of sensation is not something of which we are explicitly, punctually conscious. Sensation is not yet present, but is a kind of temporal stirring, a pre-conscious moment which nevertheless calls, animates consciousness to attention. There can be no isolated moment in which a sensory impression could be given, because temporal moments are part of a non-objectivating, flowing awareness, or *operative intentionality*\(^6\). We are only tacitly aware of this operative flow, we sense according to it and are affectively oriented within it, but it is not a direct object of consciousness.

\(^5\) David Morris develops a similar argument, where he sees Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger as relocating the Kantian synthesis of the imagination to place and time, respectively (Morris, 2008).

\(^6\) Christina Schües insightfully argues that intentionality must be conceived of at this deeper level, which is wholly active and passive: “Intentionality is simultaneously an openness to diversity and an ordering process understood as a synthesizing constitution, that is, it is both intuition and constitution” (Schües, 1998, 146).
Affect explains the awakening of consciousness as a responsive movement of sense. The focal insight of Husserl’s analysis of passive synthesis is that impressions are not only temporally expansive, but they are not neutral, inert contents that impress themselves on consciousness. From the beginning, impression is charged “affectively”, such that it can awaken consciousness. Consciousness is not some absolute constitutive activity that acts on neutral contents. Instead, these contents are associatively animative from the outset: “within every living present (and restricted initially to the sense-data that are being unified within it), affections are constantly at work beyond themselves; we always find affective awakenings, that is, associations” (Husserl, 2001, 206, 158). In this sense, passive synthesis renders a field of affects that are not foreign to the ego, but whose newness the ego attentively turns toward: “The wakeful life of the ego is such that the ego is explicitly affected, affected by special unities that are, precisely through this affection, given to, graspsable or grasped by the ego” (Husserl, 2001, 208, 160). There is no alien impression that somehow enters into relation with consciousness. Sensibility’s meaning has changed from impression to affect, such that it is always already a pull on the ego, which is why Husserl calls passive genesis the lowest level of generative activity.

This level of generativity, affective allure, operates by a call-response, or motivational structure, in which the moment of sensation is tacit, and only manifest retrospectively in the acts it awakens. In place of empirical givenness and objects, Husserl argues that the affective field of sensation is structured with “pre-given” “object-like formations” (Husserl, 2001, 210, 162). These formations of sense are not objects of experience, but contrasts and reliefs in a field of affective allures. This language of proto-objectivity closely parallels Kant’s doctrine of an affinity between imaginative association and the generally structured sense of our empirical experience of nature.

Husserl systematically lays out the different levels at which affects are active. The most basic level of passive synthesis occurs as absent from the standpoint of egological awareness. Husserl describes affect in its most simple form as “tendency” or a ray which reaches out from the objectlike formation in the direction of the ego, “send[ing] as it were, affective rays of force toward the ego pole, but in their weakness do not reach the ego pole, they do not actually become for it an allure that awakens” (Husserl, 2001, 196, 148). These potential, unacknowledged affects can become retro-
spectively awakening for the ego. Husserl writes of a “modal transformation” which precedes the active “turning toward”, such that the affect “has come into relief for the ego, even if only in the antechamber of the ego”. The ego tacitly detects the affect before it is ever present or grasped in an attentive way (Husserl, 2001, § 35). This is an ecstatic moment where, before coming into explicit presence, the affect is ahead of itself, beckoning conscious attentiveness in a meaningful but not-yet-explicit, furtive way. We live sensations in advance of perceiving them. Some affects can reach the ego and exercise an explicit pull on consciousness. Here consciousness is receptive to the affect, its interest sparked and motivated toward the objectlike formation.

Husserl argues at once that an affect can come to be in affective relief that comes about in a “contrast” of material conditions of sensation, but that these materially conditions can only form a contrasting context because they are united with each other affectively. On the one hand, “all particulars are set off from one another” in this synthesis, and yet: “Only by virtue of affective force does connection come about at all…Within the streaming living sphere of the present there cannot be individuated intuitions” (Husserl, 2001, 224, 175). This “hyletic core” of affects is always “multiple” yet “unified”, always affecting us with a “unitary vivacity” (Husserl, 2001, 184, 138). There is thus an irreducible materiality and bodily dimension of synthesis, out of which our consciousness is affectively awakened.

Our attentiveness to affect, what strikes us as alluring, hinges not only on the integration of sensory contents, but even on the ego’s particular patterns of attentiveness: “The same contrast can, for instance, actually exercise an allure on the ego, another time it can be that the ego will not be reached by the affective tendency” (Husserl, 2001, 197, 150). Husserl argues that our motivation in taking up certain affective vivacities depends in part upon “valuations of the heart” (Husserl, 2001, 178). Here affect becomes an incomplete striving that is rendered fully manifest with my attention. As we have seen, affect occurs in a field, and is not a determinate value or valence, but is always cast as a relief and in a relativism of other affects. Husserl depicts

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8 Natalie Depraz helpfully points out that the ego is a “narrow” or static kind of intentionality that constitutes explicit objects. This is akin to what Husserl takes to be intentionality in much of his earlier writings. Here we see that this model of intentionality depends upon a more foundational, genetic analysis (Depraz, 1998, 38).

9 For a discussion of this structure see Schües (1998, 150).

10 Dan Zahavi explains that affect is synthetic in that it is not “ontologically independent” from the ego, while it is equally passive as “a facticity which is passively pre-given without any affective participation or contribution of the ego” (Zahavi, 1998, 217).
any given present as filled with multiple allures, but notes that our attention only singles out some of them explicitly, such that in a given moment:

...particular coloured figures become quite prominent affect us; affecting us at the same time are noises like the sound of a passing car, the notes of a song, prominent odours, etc. All this takes place at the same time, and insofar as we turn to it alone, listening to it, the song wins out. But the rest still exercises an allure. (Husserl, 2001, 197, 150–151)

Husserl’s incisive discovery is that we can turn back to this affective context as remembered and animate attentively, for the first time, an object which was, at the time, an unrecognized object-like formation. This also happens with objectlike formations in a temporal succession: when my friend stops whispering in my ear, I hear the faucet dripping, and realize it had been dripping the whole time she was speaking to me. Husserl argues that hearing a stunning, “mellifluous” note can point us backward to a pre-given melody which is “still living within the field of the present”. Our attentiveness can “radiate back into the retentional phases” (Husserl, 2001, 203). My affective awareness does not take the form of explicit presence, but a rich contrast of tensions and reliefs, a moving texture of rhythms and possibilities, only some of which awaken full consciousness. There is thus a depth to our experience of the past, not just as an object that exceeds our full perception, but as a rich and multi-layered affective topography harboring imperceptible possibilities. The field of passive synthesis ballasts and sustains, but ultimately exceeds the reach of our consciousness.

There is a generative richness to the past that is still alive in perception, and also a way in which consciousness is ecstatically ahead of itself in affective sensings. Husserl temporalizes consciousness, making past and present intertwine in a productive synthesis of the imagination that exceeds Kant’s thinking about time. Where Kant finds an affinity of consciousness and nature, Husserl sees consciousness as awakening out of the variegated textures and rhythms, the rich and layered affective topography of our bodily, material existence. Genetic analysis opens up this pre-reflective level of consciousness and allows us to fully work out the logic of Kant’s productive imagination. Husserl has disclosed a bodily, rhythmic, multiply layered flow of affects prior to the level of conscious attention, a moving attunement to nature. Yet Husserl remains installed within the transcendental horizon of consciousness, such that genetic phenomenology remains framed within limits of the ego and its pre-reflective “antechamber.” This analysis points back to a more original analysis, a becoming of sense out of nonsense, and the emergence of presence from non-presence, and the development of contingency into necessity.
4. MERLEAU-PONTY: THE EMBODIED, EXPRESSIVE EVENT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL

Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes how passive synthesis arises in a true moment of passivity prior to the subject, an originary absence of fully determinate existence, a non-sense which nevertheless summons forth and orients a sense to come. This new concept of “institution”, a take on Husserlian *Stiftung*, resituates Husserl’s call-response structure of the awakening of meaning within being, between events and bodies themselves. This entails that we reject the idea that consciousness, or anything else for that matter, can play the role of a pre-established, a priori form of experience: “This real-form content analysis and the position of the form as the a priori condition of the content are illusory” (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 5). For Merleau-Ponty the movement of sense will only become present retroactively, because it is a process of the dynamic emergence of events which set their own conditions of possibility. These events simply cannot happen as such, because they inaugurate a new register in which anything like an event makes sense. These institutions only unfold as events, within the wake of their own happening: “Therefore institution [means] establishment in an experience (or in a constructed apparatus) of dimensions in relation to which a whole series of other experience will make sense and will make a sequel, a history” (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 7–8, 4–5, 3). This act of institution is not the creative act of a world constituting consciousness, which would only make sense for in individual, isolated self. Sense is not constituted from an isolated source or already established cause or intending-act, but emerges dynamically within already structured fields of sense.

The principle of synthesis happens, argues Merleau-Ponty, *within the very field of its synthetic production*. Synthesis thus does not unfold from a unitary source or principle because, in shaping, it is always already shaped by what it shapes. That is to say, there is a reciprocal relationship between activity and passivity here, but also of form and content, such that there can be no a priori synthetic principle, anywhere, that is not shaped by the materiality and interbodily dynamics of field of time in which it unfolds. The principle of synthesis is thereby historical and embodied, and it is only ever manifest within specific institutions of time. Thus instead of a pure synthetic principle that constitutes, there is instead, Merleau-Ponty argues, always an instituting-instituted. Being is always mediated, such that individual causes and activities always exist relationally, and must always emerge developmentally as self-articulating structurings within time. Even our activities of contemplation are mediated by acts of linguistic expression and signs. Institution, as a principle of passive synthesis that is not localizable in a body, organism, or self, but rather between them, thus avoids
the pitfalls of subjectivist philosophy, as in Kant and Husserl, because the “instituted makes sense without me” (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 8, 5, 4).

For Merleau-Ponty, the affective is not a level of consciousness or an antechamber of the ego, but an ambiguous zone between our awareness and the world. Perception is, initially in its pre-reflective mode a “natural subject” defined not by personality but by anonymity: “It is never self-enclosed but never transcended. Whether it is a question of the other person's body or of my own, I have no other means of knowing the human body than by living it, that is, by taking up for myself the drama that moves through it and by merging with it. Thus, I am my body, at least to the extent that I have an acquisition, and reciprocally my body is something like a natural subject, or provisional sketch of my whole being” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 205–240). There is the trace of an acquired organic style and history within bodily movement. My body presents an anonymous, natural self and general world, prior to being grasped in an explicitly self-conscious act. In Heideggerian terms, we have a pre-ontological understanding of being, but a developmental one. Consciousness is temporal: it not only awakens but emerges through growth and development. We are born out of this time that is a field in which events themselves take on finite, contingent, and yet formatively shaping arrangements. Thus it is within time that synthetic dimensions of form, as well as conditions of possibility for new events, unfold as a transformative movement within the content itself.

We encounter this “lateral kinship” of time in the animal style of our own body, in the depth of movement folded into the dimensions of our perception of the world. For Merleau-Ponty the self-articulating movement of time amounts to a thickness and depth of time, whereby formative past events endure in the present, and they have a posthumous life insofar as they continue to exist, not as objects of memory or in any form of explicit presence, but rather as the character and style of our bodily possibilities. For Merleau-Ponty, synthesis occurs in this interbodily matrix, between bodies, generations and species. There is in time a movement of becoming, a sedimentation of sense that is immanent to relationships in time. Sense-making oc-

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1 Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “lateral kinship of all the 'nows' which makes for their confusion, their 'generality', a 'trans-temporality’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 7, 4, 3).

12 Toadvine explains sensibility as rooted in a past that we have always already passed over in our perception and action. This past is present through the evolved organic dimensions or institutions of our natural body and its temporal rhythms: “Sensibility as an organic inheritance is therefore the generative ground of experience, even as it remains for each of us, in our reflective lives, a past that has never been present […] This prehistory is fundamental to understanding our biological continuity with and difference from other forms of life, as I have argued elsewhere, since it is due to the lateral kinship of this organic prehistory that other animals speak through our voices and gaze out through our eyes” (Toadvine, 2014, 275).
curs as a productive difference that enables a continuous experience: we experience in the wake of these becoming *institutions*. Experience is always a product of this affinity between the events themselves:

> Therefore by institution, we were intending here those events in an experience which endow the experience with durable dimensions, in relation to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, will form a thinkable sequel or history—or again events which deposit a sense in me, not just as something surviving or as a residue, but as the call to follow, the demand of a future. (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 77)

Events do not just elapse, but formatively open a future in ongoing, unpredictable ways. As immanent to time, the principle of synthesis is multiple and cannot be circumscribed by an act of knowledge. Synthesis is open, transformative, and exists in a modality of genuinely novel possibility. This living possibility emerges within time, as transformative inheritance, a transformation that continues the past while giving it new expression and enabling the possibility of different, new future significances.

“Trans-temporality”, as Merleau-Ponty deems it, is this mellifluous possibility for the rhythms and textures of institutions to be transformatively taken up in emergent structurings of possibility. Thus the field of multi-layered possibility extends deeper than our own preconscious affective attunement, to an affective affinity between all bodies, and even to a deeper imperceptible natural time. It is always within the movement of events then, that our organic, perceptual, and cognitive activities are awakened:

> I can learn to know the surrounding better through science, but this will always be the reworking of the perceived world, the employment of its structures. Therefore [there is an] instituted and instituting subject, but inseparably, and not a constituting subject; a certain inertia — [the fact of being] exposed to […] but [this is what] puts an activity en route, an event, the initiation of the present, which is productive after it. (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 6, 3, 2)

Consciousness exists not only in a temporal flow, an operative non-objectivating intentionality, but also exists as an emergent, self-transforming, finite, material institution. Institutions, as temporal rhythms and structurings of fields from within, take time to emerge. But this emergence gives rise to polyvalent possibilities. The body is one sedimented institution of possibilities, but it points back to a becoming of sense out of nonsense, just as originally arbitrary developments, like the evolution

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13 See Vladimir Jankélévitch's commentary of Bergson for an account of this new modal category of an “organic possibility” that exceeds given conditions of possibility or “logical possibility” (Jankélévitch, 1959, 216). For a full discussion of this concept, and Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of it, consult the discussion in *The Birth of Sense* (Beith, 2018, chapter 2, section 5).
of the opposable thumb and the grasp, become necessary for entire worlds of culture and technology\textsuperscript{14}.

There is an ultimate reversibility between contingency and necessity, a priori and a posteriori, fact and essence. This is because institutions unfold as a progression from nonsense to sense. Transcendental structures are events, situated within, albeit as self-transformations of, space and time. Events are not intrinsically sense-bearing or sense-causing, but rather take on sense through interaction, relationally. There is thus a trajectory of becoming, such that any kind of foundation is retrogressively established. The past of development then, was not present in advance of what it eventuates. There can be no beginning as such, even though there will have been one in the future anterior, or backward becoming of sense. Synthesis is always already underway, multiply, richly, dispersed through fields across developing constellations of sense. The opening of the future, of a domain of sense and possibility, is what equally renders a developmental past determinate. The past itself here is cast in a living field of relief, and awakens out of the present. This past is neither there in itself, nor a spontaneous, transcendental act that constitutes the present:

The relation to the past is different also: consciousness has no consciousness of being born. Birth: the passage from the moment where nothing was for X to the moment where everything is also for X. Such is the translation consciousness makes of it, i.e., birth [means] first of all the openness of a future, from a background of non-being from which what was projects itself. (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 6, 3, 2)

The formative past of consciousness, while organically significant, had to develop and emerge as a human significance out of cultural and evolutionary developments. Similarly the dimensions of sense in the living body must develop and evolve through birth, growth, reproduction and adaptation.

\textsuperscript{14} This logic of institution is already being rehearsed in the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, where at the end of the chapter on sexuality, Merleau-Ponty explains how our whole existence as a consciousness is thrown into, and emerges from the shared, ambiguous and contingent developments of our inter-bodily life: “Everything is necessary in man, and, for example, it is not through a simple coincidence that the reasonable being is also the one who stands upright or who has opposable thumbs — the same manner of existing is expressed in both of these cases. And everything is also contingent in man in the sense that this human way of existing is not guaranteed to each human child through some essence acquired at birth, in the sense that it must be continuously renewed in him through the accidents of the objective body. Man is an historical idea, not a natural species. In other words, there is no unconditioned possession in human existence, and yet neither is there any fortuitous attribute. Human existence will lead us to revisit our usual notion of necessity and of contingency, because human existence is the change of contingency into necessity through the act of taking up. […] Why else would our body be, for us, the mirror of our being, if not because it is a \textit{natural self}, a given current of existence, such that we never know if the forces that carry us belong to us or belong to our body—or rather, such that they are never entirely our body’s or entirely ours” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 174–209).
Like birth, institution names the way in which activities take time to unfold and become themselves. Transcendental conditions of possibility must themselves become possible. As much as they are enabled by a past, they are also expressive transformations of the very sense of this past, such that the past is only manifest as trace. The organic body thus only survives as trace, in for example the generalized style of my walking, the anonymous self of my sleep, my deep immersion in a hike, or my sense of losing the limits of my own body as I blend into my aikido partner and sense the dynamic possibilities of our new shared, moving interbodily schema. We live out of an affective immersion in new possibilities, and our consciousness always exists in the wake of this self-articulation happening in nature:

Birth [is not an act] of constitution but the institution of a future. Reciprocally, institution resides in the same genus of Being as birth and is not, any more than birth, an act. There will later be decisionary institutions or contracts, but they are to be understood on the basis of birth and not the reverse. (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, 7, 4, 3)

Note how closely this language echoes Kant’s description of the imagination, where acts of perception and judgment are possible only on the basis of an a priori imaginative production or associative synthesis. And with Husserl, here we see that, via birth, our consciousness as such is an organic awakening, and remains undergirded by the anonymous organic self, the “natural subject” we find in the temporal flow and generality of perception. This naturality, as we saw in Kant and Husserl, is dynamic and multi-layered, an unfolding, self-grounding depth within events. Time is itself expressive, and so we can unite the features we found in the imagination and in nature, but only if we overcome the idol of an absolute a priori, and instead see the transcendental as a movement between events in time, a movement that births and sometimes awakens new institutions of sense.

5. CONCLUSION

The analysis of sensibility opens the problem of the relationship of consciousness and nature. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in its earlier form, set the terms to conceptualize synthesis as a productive, generative power undercuts and founds the distinctions between mind and nature, activity and passivity, sensation and understanding, and ultimately, even if Kant does not explicitly say so, fact and essence. By situating consciousness in the flow of time, Edmund Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis reveal how the very structure of sensibility is one of temporal expression. The moment of sensibility is not isolated and punctual, not a given content, but rather calls to consciousness out of a rich, multi-layered
affective field. Where Husserl conceives of this field as an implicit zone of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty sees this dynamic texturing of sense from within as a movement within nature. Nature here is lived generally and anonymously, as a prereflective inter-bodily field where sense develops between events. Our affective life points back to this rich field of differences. Instead of structuring experience from the outside, synthesis is a natural, ambiguous proto-production of sense that happens between nature and the imagination. By understanding synthesis as incomplete, as always historically embedded and underway, Merleau-Ponty radically calls into question the distinction between necessity and contingency. Between these three thinkers, then, we can work out the full implications of passive synthesis as a natural affinity between events, a trans-temporality out of which transcendental conditions of possibility emerge as transformative events. The awakening of our consciousness in sensibility is but a species of this continuous birth of the transcendental.

REFERENCES


BEYOND THE GENESIS, TOWARD THE ABSOLUTE.
EUGEN FINK’S ARCHITECTONIC FOUNDATION OF
A CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY BETWEEN
A META-CRITIC OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE AND
HIS OWN PROJECT OF A DIALECTICAL MEONTIC

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While Eugen Fink was working on the revision of Husserl's five Cartesian Meditations and preparing
them for publication as a magnum opus for the German public, which — as Husserl itself claimed — required a truly phenomenological counterweight to Heidegger’s Being and Time, he not only sought a presentation of the vivid and most actual insights that guided the phenomenological philosophy but also stressed the urgent need to integrate their achievements in order to overcome their philosophical naiveté. This was due to the initial (and inevitable) exclusion of the deepest issues concerning phenomenology as a whole transcendental system, and particularly those regarding the total reach of evidence toward the transcendental field of experience. This sort of incompleteness had to be overcome by a solid “critic of the transcendental reason”. But, whereas for Husserl the task of self-criticism was directed at an examination of the evidences acquired in the transcendental attitude, for Fink it turned out to be a totally different challenge that ended up in an innovative vertical displacement of the horizontal structure of Husserl’s phenomenology. From the very beginning, Fink truly worked on a large-scale system of phenomenological philosophy and on an architectonic conception of the different stages of the pure phenomenology, in which the regressive phenomenology (transcendental aesthetic and analytic) was followed by a new progressive phenomenology (transcendental dialectic) endowed with a “constructive” method. The following article explores the emergence and relates the main topics of such constructive integration of phenomenology, whose conceptuality was only briefly foreshadowed in the famous VI Cartesian Meditation and, nonetheless, systematically developed in the large amount of Fink’s private notes that constitute his own meontic philosophy.

Key words: Eugen Fink, phenomenology, architectonics, constructive phenomenology, meontic.

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Eugen Fink was a regular attendant of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s lectures for many years and, being deeply acquainted with both the thinking of one and the other, has been increasingly recognized as the proponent of a “third way” between

1. INTRODUCTION

Eugen Fink was a regular attendant of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s lectures for many years and, being deeply acquainted with both the thinking of one and the other, has been increasingly recognized as the proponent of a “third way” between
the two great masters of philosophy in Freiburg. Working daily as Husserl’s assistant and collaborator, Fink was at first assigned to the organization and the editing work of the famous “Book on the Phenomenology of Time”, presenting thereby the final position of Husserlian phenomenology in relation to the problems of time-constitution and time-consciousness, once the task was to gather both Husserl’s Manuscripts of Bernau and the so-called C-Manuscripts. But Fink was also immediately involved in other projects concerning the urgency of a global systematization of the various strata of “phenomenological reason” and could therefore formulate the basis for a System of phenomenological philosophy to be developed in the context of the revision of the Cartesian Meditations, which Husserl ended up leaving entirely to his charge to finally devote himself to the greatest project of the last years of his life: the conception of the Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Husserl, 1976a). In fact, Fink not only completed a thorough review of Husserl’s five meditations but also wrote a Sixth Meditation regarding the so-called “transcendental theory of method”, which would perform as a methodological turning point and also as a clarification of the previous five. This scenario of daily involvement with the “father of phenomenology”, combined with a deep knowledge of Heidegger’s thought, presents Fink as the privileged point of convergence from which we can articulate and re-engage in dialogue the monumental philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, and, in addition, to glimpse into the third entirely original way settled by Eugen Fink himself. For the vibrant and long-standing joint philosophizing settled between Husserl and Fink (1929–1938) shows paradigmatically that “the continuation of Husserl’s phenomenology for a younger generation was possible only with a profound transformation of their implicit operational presuppositions” (Van Kerckhoven, 2003, 16). However, from a continuance perspective of the phenomenological tradition through a profound transformation, the phenomenology as a whole, and not only some precise analysis of consciousness’ life, had to be put into question. In this regard, the famous Fink’s essay from 1939 Das Problem der Phänomenologie Husserls (Fink, 1966, 179–223) hits clearly the mark. But unlike Heidegger, who saw in Husserl’s transcen-

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2 This text was considered for a long time as a work of Husserl’s authorship. On this historical matter, a note by Sebastian Luft is quite elucidative: “Among the first generation of French phenomenologists, the VI. Meditation was taken as a Husserl’s writing; this was, for example, Berger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s view” (Luft, 2002, 5).

3 In a later text, however, Fink still intends to confront the “phenomenological motives of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy” with his own philosophical horizon in the lecture on Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, held in the winter semester 1955/56 at the University of Freiburg. It carries the very significant title: „Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffs“ (Fink, 1958).
dental phenomenology a philosophical impasse that ultimately led to a solipsistic theoreticisn of consciousness and subjectivity, Fink considered the phenomenological ontology in the outline of a constitutive system as well as a “certain abstraction”, but “a necessary and not only possible” (Fink, 2006, 221) one. This undeniable difference in the philosophical position between Heidegger’s approach and Husserl's phenomenology, which e.g. can be clearly seen already in Being and Time, could not prevent Fink from seeing in the ego, in the transcendental science of the ego and what belongs to it (i.e. in the a priori correlation system of world and subjectivity), the only possible breakthrough toward an “existential meaning of philosophy” (Fink, 2006, 221–222)⁴. Thus, for Fink, the egological approach was the one and only concrete ground for the legitimate exposition of the basic knowledge of phenomenology — despite the fact that this transcendental egology of consciousness’ life was necessarily affected by a certain provisionality, by a sort of philosophical incompleteness with regard to the entirety of problems related to the concepts of inter-subjectivity and world.

Fink’s phenomenological consideration could be characterized by a synoptic view of the individual truths and hidden ramifications of a philosophy — whether Heidegger’s or Husserl’s — which is able to pinpoint the essential connections beyond what was originally separated and divided. For a long time, Fink was consequently considered either as the appointed interpreter of Husserl's phenomenology or regarded as a philosopher obscured by Heidegger’s brilliance. Both views, however, as Bruzina makes clear in his most recent and exemplary study about the intellectual cooperation between Husserl and Fink (Bruzina, 2004), are insufficient. In fact, no other previous Husserl’s assistant ever had a full and active part in his work as Fink, whom was clearly acknowledged by Husserl himself as “a mind with a contribution of his own to make in the work both were involved in” (Fink, 1995, xxvii). Therefore, the many and articulated critics he made to Husserl's position, and the differences that constantly emerged during their daily encounters and large discussions, “had their identity and their force within a larger encompassing whole of common agreement” (Fink, 1995, xxxi). In other words, as Bruzina points out while discussing the nature of the co-thinking or co-philosophizing between Husserl and Fink, “the differences from Husserl that emerged in Fink’s thinking were genuine problems for and within

⁴ Philosophy exists for Fink only because of the impetus of freedom that inhabits us, since the motivation for the reduction lies solely and exclusively in the “will to freedom” (Wille zur Freiheit). This freedom, however, is not understood in terms of the freedom as a power to do or to allow/let something (Tun- oder Lassen-Können) but rather as the liberation (Befreiung) of human existence. On Fink’s early conception of phenomenology as a philosophy of freedom and on his “meontic philosophy” as a phenomenology of the absolute and as theory on freedom, see (Giubilato, 2017a; 2017b).
transcendental phenomenology, genuine problems that developed intrinsically within it” (Fink, 1995, xxxiii). Even though problems of this order usually involves deep implications, they necessarily lead as well to a critical re-conceiving and reshaping of the phenomenological project as a whole.

2. OVERCOMING THE PHILOSOPHICAL NAIVETÉ

Looking back on what has been gained through his Meditations, at the end of the fifth one, Husserl explicitly writes that there is an “essential relation of phenomenology to itself” (Husserl, 1973a, 178). At this point, the assertion is not referred to the claim for self-justification and self-foundation of phenomenological philosophy, but to its operative completeness, understood by Husserl as an open system. It is a methodological necessity for phenomenology, at first, to follow a naive, straightforward-directed initial instance of evidence, while at the same time achieving essential descriptions without having to worry about the systematic whole opened up with it. Only afterward, “repeating and reflecting and carrying out reflexive descriptions” (Husserl, 1959, 477), can the critical consciousness verify to what extent unobserved conditions still may be involved in the process of those straight descriptions. The concrete work of research on the phenomena must be integrated with an infinite self-questioning; its ultimate goal is a constant review and self-examination of itself. The peculiarity of the phenomenological mode of operation is determined precisely by the fact that “no systematic design precedes concrete research, but arises in analysis itself. Yet the possibility of the whole intentional analysis blows over again the systematic design up” (Fink, 2008, 333). The resulting mobility characterizes phenomenology as an open system reflecting its dynamics in a self-questioning movement. An always new synthesis is continuously to be achieved in this ceaselessly renewable revision of the standards, which, however, can only be a provisional one. In other words, it remains valid only as long as it is not refuted by a renewed analytical insight. Otherwise, it has to be revised, even completely struck off. Accordingly, every introductory, general and systematic draft must come after the concrete analyses, which, in their turn, receive their specific relevance only in the light of the systematic context. This means that therefore the results of any single analysis, of any phenomenal inquiry, cannot be measured to their full extent unless they have been subjected to an orderly self-criticism and self-questioning. This typical retarding, inhibiting function of each individual analysis forced Husserl to ignore the problem of the full extent and reach of transcendental knowledge at the beginning of the Second Meditation. First of all, it is appropriate to justify and elaborate both the individual forms of phenomenological
research and the overall performance of transcendental phenomenology, and only then, in hindsight, to design a possible self-criticism. As the penultimate paragraph of the Meditations concludes the first reflexive exploration of the transcendental experience, the procedure followed thereafter seemed “not yet philosophical in the full sense”, because, as for a “natural scientist in his dedication to the evidence of natural experience” the “problem of a fundamental criticism of experience” (Husserl, 1973a, 69) remained totally out of question. Even if the Meditations had essentially fulfilled their purpose (as Husserl admits in the final word), they remained within a certain “philosophical naiveté” insofar as the theoretical intentional achievements — from which the exposure of the transcendental experience had arisen — had not yet been fully developed and methodically explained. It might be the case that, from a closer perspective, some apodictic insights such as the first ones to be fixed in the subjective explication (i.e. egology) of transcendental subjectivity may later go through a transformation — as it's actually the case when phenomenological research passes over to the initially closed sphere of transcendental subjectivity.

As a matter of fact, Fink’s participation in the Freiburg Phenomenology Workshop presupposes Husserl’s thinking in its full development at the time and especially in the Cartesian Meditations presentation, but “it also goes further inasmuch as it expressly puts into question the methodological naiveté found throughout it” (Fink, 1995, 2). Beyond the diversified topics examined by the Meditations, the question of inter-subjectivity was the most affected by the successive attempts to determine the basis of the phenomenological system and, therefore, the most responsible for revealing the incompleteness of its first-staged topic as being nothing more than an egological disclosure of the transcendental continent. During the V. Meditation rework, no-

5 The task of such a transcendental self-criticism has in fact already been envisaged by Husserl since the lecture Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie of 1910/11. However, a detailed elaboration of the self-criticism took place for the first time in the winter semester 1922/23 lectures, Einleitung in die Philosophie. This theme was again referred to in the following year’s lectures, entitled Erste Philosophie (1923/24), nevertheless only with regard to the urgent need to practice such a higher-level self-criticism. In any case, at the end of the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), in paragraph 107 on the “delineation of a transcendental theory of evidence as an effective intentional performance”, the necessity of a transcendental self-criticism is brought back: “It was very late before I recognized […] that this whole criticism leads back to an ultimate criticism: a criticism of those evidences that phenomenology at the first and still naive level carries on straightforwardly. But that implies: The intrinsically first criticism of cognition, the one in which all others are rooted, is transcendental self-criticism on the part of phenomenological cognition itself” (Husserl, 1969, 287–289). The task of such a phenomenology of phenomenology signified therefore the unfolding of a transcendental, apodictic critique of the sphere of evidence to which a limit is consequently set. This self-criticism corresponds essentially to the methodological elaboration of the self-referential character of phenomenology.
toriously dedicated to a first unveiling of the “monadological inter-subjectivity”, Fink became definitely aware of the fact that “if the transcendental sphere of being reaches altogether beyond the ego, then it can only occur in the form of a transcendental inter-subjectivity” (Fink, 1988, 256). And this whole new territory reaching beyond the most general structures of egological presence and constitution had yet to be explored, described and studied. It concerns therefore the exploration of the “limits” of phenomenological egology at the heart of Husserl’s genetic (regressive) analysis, for the purpose of discovering the full reach (Tragweite) of transcendental subjectivity and of transcendental life. Hence, even if within “a truly Copernican revolution” the confinement of the natural attitude was broken in behalf of a progress “forward into the sphere of transcendental subjectivity”, the “constitutive becoming of the world” in the transcendental life’s performance of sense-foundation “had not yet been fully and properly exhibited, because all the explications of the transcendental realm had remained referred only to the ‘presentness’ of its reductive givenness, i.e. only to the “egological stream of life in the full concreteness of its living present” (Fink, 1995, 6). Thereby, the phenomenological proceeding had “not advanced into the properly constitutive strata of transcendental life” (Fink, 1995, 4–5). As Fink ultimately points out: “only when transcendental life has become visible to the full extent of its givenness, can one begin the move back into the depths where constitution takes place” (Fink, 1995, 5). In order to reach these unseen depths is necessary, according to Fink, to undertake a new “examination of the external horizons of the reductive givenness” of the transcendental life, which has its “necessary motivation in the first irresolvable ‘problems at the margins’” (Fink, 1995, 7) of genetic phenomenology. If some archaic processes of the original self- and world-constitution are entirely beyond the subjective and genetically matured achievements and cannot consequently be brought to any present or memorable self-givenness due precisely to the fact that it’s lying beyond the limits of any phenomenological reflective and regressive path into the constitution’s history, then it is required a step beyond the methodological horizon of the first, preliminary explications as they’ve emerged so far. In this different stage of thinking, phenomenology has to commence with “transcendental cognitions of a particular sort” (Fink, 1995, 55), as a result for having “been stranded on the rocks, on the problems that lie at the margins of the regressive analytic, on order from that point to receive the motivating impulse” for a “move beyond the regressive style of intentional-constitutive clarification” (Fink, 1995, 7). Now, the question is: how is it possible? To explain it we need to move over to Fink’s architectonic organization of the phenomenological system, in order to clarify how he completes Husserl’s thinking with his own proposal of a not regressive (or genetic) but constructive phenomenology.
3. THE ARCHITECTONIC OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL SYSTEM: CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS MEONTIC EXTENSION

The search for this “architectural” solution by Fink — which focuses in particular on the Kantian concept of Architektonik as “the art of systems” — arose from embarrassment facing the task of defining a suitable concept of system for a very particular investigation practice such as Husserl’s Arbeitsphilosophie, characterized for maintaining an analytical and intuitive imprint and rejecting any conceptual construction that tends to replace the concrete descriptive findings, as well as every conclusive claim made in the name of a philosophical “spirit of system”. Certainly, all Fink’s investigations are to be settled on the plane of the totality of the phenomena in order to offer an overall picture in which every phenomenological analysis is placed in accordance with the necessity (nonetheless with Fink’s ability and talent as well) to include Husserl’s individual analysis in a systematic perspective which could ultimately offer a coherent overview over their mutual implications and connections. Already in the introductory lines of Vergegenwärtigung und Bild (Fink, 1966), Fink exposes his main methodological thesis according to which “no single analysis exists because of itself, and every single one is subordinated to the tension towards the whole of the system, being guided and set in motion by a fundamental question” (Fink, 1966, 2). In such manner, Fink tried to reconcile Husserl’s research and experimental process that put in first place the concrete intentional analysis by unraveling the implicit moments of sense of the phenomena up to a systematic and progressive edification of philosophical insights, along with the Heideggerian procedure of an “anticipation of a structural whole”, understood as a “constructive project”, to which analysis tends to flow back into a function of clarification and exemplification. According to this synoptic point of view, the phenomenological project is conceived by Fink as an intellectual enterprise (a true exercise of thinking) that develops the performance of bracketing the world-validity and the consequent establishing of the transcendental onlooker (Fink, 1995, 12) in different but interlinked stages of philosophical work, starting with the human self-reflection (inspectio sui) and immediately radicalized into the phenomenological reduction. It is on the basis of this very idea that Fink conceives the architectonic disposition of the different stages of phenomenological work by establishing a fundamental distinction within it and dividing the philosophical system at its onset into a transcendental theory of elements and a transcendental theory of method.

The latter one, focused on the theoretical operations already developed by the philosopher (the phenomenologizing onlooker) — and, surely and above all, the deci-

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6 See e.g. Heidegger, (1977, 37, 67, 493).
sive performance of the reduction — remains in a deep anonymity during the operative development of the theory of elements. The theory of method developed by Fink in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation has essentially to do “with the methods exercised and put in practice in the theory of elements” (Fink, 1995, 25). Consequently, Fink deals there with questions concerning the phenomenological exercise as a fundamental action of reduction, a theoretical experience, an action of ideation, a predication, etc. The important fact is that this methodological reflection can only be unfolded when the previous theory of elements has already taken place, as it has already been performed and developed in a great number of analyses that now have to undergo a deep revision and self-critique.

The transcendental doctrine of elements, whose general object is the becoming of the world (or the “transcendental cosmogony”) within the constitutive play between transcendental operations and their worldly results, is divided in two main subjects: regressive and constructive phenomenology, in which the phenomenological onlooker is essentially addressed to constitutive operations of the transcendental subjectivity that reach the world as their final product. The first one is subdivided into an aesthetic and a transcendental analytics, while the latter one is identified with a transcendental dialectic. The transcendental aesthetics acts mainly as a preliminary explanation of the phenomenon of the world by examining and describing the cogitata and their relations with the corresponding cogitations and by pointing out the essential structures of pure consciousness in order to obtain transcendental guidelines for successive constitutive analyses. It corresponds roughly to the concept of a static phenomenology and to Husserl’s new employment of the Kantian term e.g. in Formal and Transcendental Logic. The static analysis, thus, aims to expose a system of validities and structural foundations of consciousness’ life, i.e. to describe the general structure of intentionality, the various classes of acts and the objectivities appearing on them. The essential structure of the world-experiencing subjectivity is explored in this process, acknowledged as “the condition of possibility of a perfect intuition of the world’s construction as the only possible one at all” (Husserl, 1973b, 617). Consequently, static phenomenology is nothing but a descriptive study of the essential structures (eida) of pure consciousness. As a consequence, it acts as a precondition for genetic intentional analysis and, in this case, only when the foundations of existence are known can one trace back their genesis in the course of consciousness’ becoming. The proceeding of genetic phenomenology is therefore also called a “regressive questioning”. The transcendental analytic achieves the conditions of a regressive phenomenology whenever it returns to the most profound constituent layers of the transcendental-constitutive life and contemplates there the problems belonging to a non-static but genetic description of this
life as a fluent self-givenness constituted through a permanently becoming, a history of formation and an *autopoiesis*.

For Fink, nonetheless, the transcendental doctrine of the elements cannot cease here and has to include a new theoretical level as well: the level of a *constructive* phenomenology that deals with the problems arising from the borders of regressive phenomenology and its genetic developments. Interestingly, Fink does not establish a breach between transcendental aesthetics and logic as Kant does in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, but does it, rather, between the aesthetics and the analytic on the one hand (settled in continuity relation to the so-called regressive phenomenology) and the dialectic, on the other. This is due to the fact that, for Fink, the truly discriminating factor does not actually operates between *intuition* and *concept*, between *sensibility* (receptivity) and *intellect* (spontaneity) — but between what is (or can be) phenomenologically given and what is not-given, i.e., between the internal and external horizons of transcendental life, between the findings of a genetic questioning of consciousness and its limits, its dark-zones, which lead to the pointing out of those structures of totality pertaining to the transcendental realm that exceed the merely egological sphere. If the whole phenomenological-analytic work remains “blind” as long as “the totality of all the motivated constructions that go beyond the intuitive givenness of transcendental life” had not been unfolded (Fink, 1995, 8), then the constructive phenomenology is precisely the only way to approach those limit-problems — found at the borders of a regressive intentional analysis and yet impossible to be solved or made explicit in itself due to its interdiction regarding the “presentness” (*Gegenwärtigkeit*) of transcendental life — without leaving phenomenology itself completely behind but, on the contrary, radicalizing it. The first consequence of this constructive integration of the phenomenological system is that the term “construction”, which in Husserl’s work received most of the time a negatively connoted meaning, re-emerges in the context of Fink’s philosophy designating essentially his concept of a new method that comprises a peculiar transcendental knowledge which, from the point of view of its contents, can be extremely heterogeneous. In this sense, the fundamental differentiation between a constructive and a regressive phenomenology undertaken first of all methodologically by Fink has the duty to consider all “transcendental questions of totality” (Fink, 2008, 124) such as the generative problems of birth and death, the question of history related to the parallelism between the history of the world (of the world understood as the previous reduction) and the transcendental history, as well as the problems concealing the temporality of the last constitutive process and, above all, the question of the enworlding (*Verweltlichung*), to be minutely discussed in the next section of this paper.
Bringing phenomenology back into its historical ground, Fink explicitly links the constructive method with Kant's *Transcendental Dialectic*. Three elements bear the common ground covered by Fink along with the Kantian concept, in spite of the fundamental difference regarding the questioning of both philosophers. First of all: “the relation of the ‘given’ to the ‘non-given’” (Fink, 1995, 64). In both Kant's and Fink's perspectives, the transcendental dialectic deals with “structure of wholeness that are in principle non-given (Fink, 1995, 64): for Kant, it is a question referred to the totality of phenomena that ultimately leads to the cosmological antinomies, whereas for Fink it concerns the totality of transcendental subjectivity and life that reaches beyond the interpretation of what is merely given intuitively in the inner sphere of the presence. In fact, accordingly to Kant, the relations of the “inner world” are not applicable to the (not-given) totality of the world. Secondly, the problem of the subject's unity (or “soul”) expressed in the paralogisms of pure reason corresponds, in Fink's disposition, to the phenomenological question about the “coincidence between transcendental subject and its enworlded self-objectivation” (Fink, 1995, 64), and, therefore, also to the problem of beginning and end of the transcendental constituent life and its connection with the already constituted, psychic man. Thirdly, there is an important distinction to be made in the way phenomenological understanding proceeds: constructive phenomenology is no longer “intuitive” but “constructive”, just like Kant's *Dialectic* was no longer “constitutive” but “only of regulative employment” (Fink, 1995, 64). The employment of a Kantian terminology seems to be supported by two important arguments: on the one hand, we are faced with a concept of phenomenology that is not afraid of extending the constitutive investigation to the point of legitimizing “constructions” that involve problems such as “limits” and “totality” (that is, with defining problems of the Kantian *Transcendental Dialectic*); on the other hand, the point in question here is the undergoing attempt to provide a systematic configuration of phenomenology, to bring together Husserlian micro-analysis in an overall and possibly unitary framework. 

The not-given totality of the transcendental life and its structures is now precisely the main question of Fink's own “meontic philosophy”. If we take a closer look at the enormous labyrinth of Fink's private notes from the years 1927–1939, what clearly

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7 The underlying intention on the basis of Fink's interpretative comparison with the Kantian thought started during the years 1927–1939 and continued intensively in the years of his Freiburg teaching (from 1946 until 1970). His theoretical enterprise aimed not merely to repeat Kant, but to “rethink it”; that is — as he affirms in the introduction of his seminary (SS 1968) on Kant's *Transcendental Dialectic* — to “test a phenomenological-speculative way of thinking in reconsidering the paths of Kantian thought” (Lazzari, 2009, 78).
emerges there — and exclusively there, that is, nowhere else in his published writings, even if they contain some more or less hidden indications of it — is his systematically and coherently development of the “methodological unity of all phenomenological cognitions that are accessible only by ‘construction’” (Fink, 1995, 56) into the core of his so-called *meontic*, or “meontic philosophy”. Accordingly, the term “meontic” was brought up by Fink from the junction of two Ancient Greek particles (μὴ and ὂν) to designate his own philosophical project in the years of his collaboration with Husserl and — most importantly — to distinguish it decidedly from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions, both of which remained, nonetheless, his main sources of inspiration and polemic targets. Despite of its eminent importance, the term “meontic” is nowhere to be found in the writings published at the time but appears largely in his private notes. The reason for the long-standing silence over the meontic is probably that “the whole idea of meontic is one that opposes the dominant character of Husserlian phenomenology, according to which everything that is thematized must be justified in vivid evidence” (Bruzina, 2006, 196). But how can something essentially un-given be brought to self-givenness and evidence? It cannot. The meontic certainly represents Fink’s comprehensive result of that self-critical enterprise, which truly corresponds to the self-referential character of phenomenology in itself, and which has required (and the same for Husserl) a critical examination of the evidence principle and its analytical unfolding into many individual investigations and re-considerations. But Fink’s “meontic principle” is not only opposed to the principle of evidence (of phenomenological self-givenness), but, rather, lies beyond the realm of evidence and of the first phenomenological reductive stage in which the present givenness of the ego (and thus of the co-present others) is examined. In fact, the meontic acts no longer “intuitively” but essentially “constructively”, most of all due to its relation to a transcendent “non-givenness” that barges into the phenomenological system questioning the wholeness of the transcendental, last-constitutive life and the “coincidence between transcendental subject and its enworlded self-objectivation”, the coincidence “between the temporality of bracketed human immanence and that of the transcendental stream of experience” (Fink, 1995, 61).

This mysterious coincidence and “identity in difference, antithesis in self-same-ness” (Fink, 1995, 23) between the transcendental (that is, not-in-being) and the worldly sphere of “what is in being” (and therefore between the non- or pre-existent transcendental and the mundane (or human) subjectivity) represents for Fink *the very*
object of phenomenological philosophy and, in its radicalized form, of a Meontic. An everlasting limitation of phenomenology to the task of describing the consciousness and its intentional structures would be an absurd misunderstanding of its living philosophical intention, for the realm of what is given as describable in terms of consciousness is too limited and far too restricted to cover the entire spectrum of the phenomenological investigation. Furthermore, this necessary limitation is already to be found in the heart of phenomenology itself. For Husserl, the “absolute being” can turn out to be the “subject-being” of the consciousness in which the original constitution (time-constitution) of consciousness itself and of the universe of transcendent objects takes place⁹ if and only if he is able, starting with the Cartesian principle of the apodicticity found in the “ego cogito”, to block himself to the access to the me-ontic character of the transcendental consciousness¹⁰. For Fink, on the contrary, instead of the Absolute itself, the primal ego might be rather its first emanation coming from a primordial life (Ur-Leben) that is prior to the difference between ego and alter-ego and constitutes therefore this plurality by a subsequent self-pluralization¹¹. Among the provisional (and surely too short) explications on the phenomenological concept of Absolute, we may find the following excerpt in the last paragraph of the Sixth Mediation:

What perhaps is shown, then, is that the community of monads itself represents one more constituted stratum in the constitutive becoming of the world. The question is therefore posed whether the transcendental individuation of plural monads is a final and reductively irremovable determination of constituting life. What may then be proven is whether the Absolute itself is articulated in the plural and subjected to an individuation — or whether all articulations are only self-articulations within it, and it itself can only be thought definitively under the Idea of the “One”. (Fink, 1995, 145)

Accepting this re-conduction of the inter-subjectivity and monadic plurality to a fully articulated in a constituted plurality an absolute “One” implies a necessarily questioning of the primordial and transcendental emanating life in its unity and totality and even previously to its being, i.e. previously to the moment it came-into-being and into plurality. The “μὴ ὀν” is therefore the presupposition and the constituent enabling for every constituted being. Not by chance Fink calls it also “origin”. As he points out, the Absolute is by no means a being standing beside or outside what is ex-

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⁹ Cf. Husserl, (1976b, 103 ff.).


¹¹ Cf. Fink (1976, 223). On the notion of “phenomenological Absolute” as “primal life” or “absolute spirit” and its development in Fink’s early works see Giubilato (2014).
istent (ontic) and that lies motionless and static in repose. The non-existent (me-ontic) Absolute is only in its constitution, otherwise it is nothing, it is not. Nevertheless, this original “Absolute is only accessible from the ontic, from the finite sphere of constitution”. Seen in this way, the Absolute “is in some sense the ontic (what is existent) itself, but questioned so radically that it is the ontic but [an ontic] before its own εἶναι” (Fink, 2006, 269). “Before its own εἶναι” clearly means “beyond being”: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. The meontic phenomenology is therefore that very ascension, enabled by the phenomenological reduction, into what lies beyond being: the speculative dimension of the Absolute. In fact, the vertical axis of the “meontic thinking” dialectically links the absolute origin of what is constituted and what is constituting, the “constituted-ness of what is in being” (Konstituiertheit des Seienden) (Fink, 2008, 140) and the constitutive process of world’s becoming, which is not-in-being but constitutes what is being. As Fink writes in a draft for a foreword to his Sixth Meditation, his aim there was “to formulate a series of problems that remained latent in Husserl’s philosophy”, and consequently to exercise a reduction “to the deeper life of absolute spirit that lies prior to all individuation” (Fink, 1995, 1). The radical question raised by Fink’s meontic can be formulated as follows: how can this process of individuation and emanating from an absolute transcendental life (or spirit) be understood?

4. THE CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY OF “ENWORLDING” — INDIVIDUATION

In the very same draft, Finks clearly notes that “Husserl does not carry the distinction between transcendental subject and human over into the dimension of individuation” (Fink, 1995, 1, modified translation). For him, the transcendental ego is indeed a “human” by self-apperceptive constitution. But already in Vergegenwärtigung und Bild, Fink drew attention to the problems concerning the “constitution of the worldly character of the absolute transcendental subject (the constitution of his finitude, of his ‘humanity’) or, as we say terminologically, to the elaboration of the problem of its enworlding” (Fink, 1966, 9). This means, with other words, the exploration of the “ontological opacity of transcendental life”, its coming-into-being, and for that purpose Fink establishes a triple theoretical progression: first of all, he defines the starting point of every phenomenological enterprise, the “natural attitude”, as “the essential attitude belonging to all human beings as beings in the whole of the world, […] the attitude of the enworlded subjectivity: the natural being of man in and to the world in all his modalities” (Fink, 1966, 11). Secondly, and according to what has been just said, the phenomenological reduction is presented as a fundamental movement.
that “springs back from that situation to the absolutely constitutive life, in which it has already constituted a finished world and has itself enworlded in it” (Fink, 1995, 15).

Thirdly, he sums up the constitution process as a “finitization” (Verendlichung) of the absolute transcendental life. It involves indeed a questioning of the primordial relation of origin and originated, of the non-existent absolute and its world with existing subjects. Instead of using the term “constitution”, Fink uses “ontification”: “Ontification: under this title, the meontic phenomenology understands the way of emanation of the origin” (Fink, 2006, 288). From this point of view, his meontic phenomenology of the Absolute is nothing more than an enormous exploration of the ontification process of the Absolute.

But how does the enworlding self-apperception and constitution of intentional experiences take over as psychic acts, constituting them as acts of a psycho-physical human being in the world? In his attempts to clarify and develop this point, Fink distinguishes three levels of enworlding self-apperceptions. First of all, there are all those overlays of knowledge acquired by dealing with others, a knowledge therefore not originated from one’s own experience. Secondly, one’s own body, namely the inner feeling of corporeality, comes into play. This is given in two ways: once as an acting body in the very immediate inner consciousness of one’s own potentialities and as their only and coherent center (Leib) and, secondly, as a “body” in the apperception of the outside world. My body gives itself to a subject in external apperception as “real corporeality” (Körper), as an organ of my possibilities. The third level of self-apperceptions is that of the mental (seelisch) conception of my consciousness: here “the inner experience is understood as the inward sphere of a human in the world” (Fink, 1988, 166–169).

Those three different layers of enworlding self-apperceptions are based on the ultimate ground of self-enworlding of the primal Absolute as human conscious subjectivity in the world. Fink calls it also “Urnoematisierung”: the original and primal “noematization” of consciousness (its becoming an “object” of itself) is its “ontification”, the process of becoming mundane and human of the transcendental, absolute consciousness “in the constitutively deepest self-apperception” (Fink, 2006, 44). When the three above-mentioned basic forms of self-apperceptions are established in their constituent performance, the consciousness is already an “ontic” consciousness, bearing “ontic” notions: it is a consciousness of a human-being, of a being in the world. According to that, the consciousness’ constituting process “Urnoematizierung” through all its different stages resulting in the ontic mode of consciousness as human being, presupposes (and is preceded by) a not-ontic one, a not-being one that is precisely me-ontic. Clearing this point, Fink emphasizes repeatedly that one must understand that the theme of
phenomenology (or of “phenomenologizing”) “as disclosed by the reduction, is not a region or a new field of being, transcendental subjectivity in antithesis to the world”, but rather the constitutive process that “goes out from” transcendental absolute life and “and terminates in the end-product, world” (Fink, 1995, 44–45). As the main theme of phenomenological thinking must be regarded the transcendental world constitution in the syntheses and unit formations, habitualities and potentialities of the transcendental life. The term “transcendental life” does not mean just a solipsistic subject, but the all-embracing unity of the monadic inter-subjectivity, “communitized” (Vergemeinschaftung) in the constitution process. The transcendental, self-communitizing absolute life is the starting point (the “whereof”) of the constitutive becoming, and the world the “where-to” of its teleological termination, of its “directedness” towards being. Therefore, the self-apperceptions “I” and “world” represent for Fink quasi the first and last hypostases of the constitution process starting from an absolute, me-ontic and emanating life. In it, the constitutive genesis (of subjectivity and world) is not merely an accident, “not something that goes on merely attributively, […] as if that subjectivity first already was (as substance, as it were) and then would in addition engage in constitution” (Fink, 1995, 45). Thereby, not the isolated members of the constitutive correlation, but the correlation itself in the absolute, not-yet-in-being transcendental life is the “prior thing”: “it is not that subjectivity is here and the world there and between both the constitutive relationship is in play, but that the genesis of constitution is the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in world-actualization” (Fink, 1995, 45).

One of the most interesting and innovative elements of Fink’s theory of the constitutitional play interconnecting Absolute and worldly being (with all its plurality of subjects and beings) consists in the fact that he, once again, distinguishes three levels of constitution. First of all, the level of constitution of objects (Noematisierung), which has been extensively studied by Husserl and nevertheless remained his only and principal model for thinking the constitutive process. Secondly, there is the level of the in-stancies (Instände) that constitutes the being-in-the-World of the transcendental subjectivity and, thirdly, the level of the “circum-stancies” (Um-stände) or “around-dimensions” in which the objects are situated and, therefore, the dimension that constitutes the worldly-character of our surroundings (Fink, 2006, 33). The analytic deployment of the constitutive problem of “enworlding” has consequently to follow the stages of constitution of objects, of in-stancies and of circum-stancies. According to Fink, Husserl has operated only in the first level, although his investigations provided the operative basis for a subsequent interpretation of the other two levels.

In his phenomenology of inter-subjectivity, Husserl points out to a particularly important kind of apprehension that contributes significantly to the constitution of
psychic humanity. This is the “analogizing apperception”, which he determines as an indirect intentionality constitutive for the experience of others (Husserl, 1973a, 138). Due to the physical empathy and because of the “Paarungsassoziation”, the apperceptive transmission of senses in which I perceive myself as an ego vis-à-vis with an alter ego becomes possible. This is also the basic principle of the genetic constitution, in contrast to the static constitution centered in perception. Husserl’s preoccupation with genetic considerations, then, seeks to locate the constitutive history of consciousness in the sense of a “history of all possible apperceptions” (Husserl, 1966, 339). But in contrast to Husserl, who thinks that those self-apperceptions are derived from coping with others, from the empathy towards them and ultimately from the “secondary” domain of inter-subjectivity, Fink believes that the basic self-apperceptions originate in the immediate original sphere of self-constitution of the subjectivity in the world, and secondly, that they are “not at all of a general type, but have special and purely constitutional differences of their composition” (Fink, 2006, 232). All genetically discoverable self-apperceptions belong to a basic genre, while the other genre would be assigned to the in-stancies. For these, in principle, any “genetic intentional constitutive enlightenment” is possible, and the phenomenological analysis requires therefore new methods for their appropriate understanding and thematization — what, as we have seen, is provided by the constructive phenomenology. While e.g. the “apperception” of one’s own body as a natural object are genetically constituted, just as the essential structures of the world are grown associatively, the consolidations of “habits”, the in-stancies “are eidetic structures (and so belonging to the essence of consciousness and subjectivity) not affectable by the genetical temporal structure” (Fink, 2006, 233).

The problem of their constitution leads ultimately “to the phenomenological marginal problems of the ‘ontification of time’ and is an explicit introductory theme for a transcendental meontic” (Fink, 2006, 233). From 1927 onwards, the terms Instand, Instände and the adjectival form inständig are frequently found in Fink’s private notes, once he has systematically employed it to describe the absolute basic structures of human consciousness (as currently situated in the world) and of human existence as a whole, thought as a result of the self-objectification (or ontification, or enworlding) of the absolute life. Thanks to those in-stancies, among which Fink mentions “history”, “birth and death”, “being amidst” and “destiny”, the subjective life, as the life of a factual man, has its concrete position in the world. The in-stancies are therefore the most original and not-genetic modes of the self-constitution of the Absolute, which in them is finally enworlded, “ontified”, and secularized in the world. Fink, probably inspired by an early and profound lecture of Heidegger’s Being and Time, considered the “finitude” as the most important of those in-stancies because of the self-constitution
of the transcendental, absolute life to worldly, human life means primarily a finiteness, a “self-contingentization” into finitude.

The stream of experience is not a stream of intentional experiences that have thereupon a unifying structural moment, a polarization on the ego, but is rather the unity of the Instancies. Only from the ecstatic horizon of the in-stancies (history, birth, death, being amidst, destiny) can happen before of all experience. (Fink, 2006, 239)

But as finite human life is always a consciousness’ life in the world, the in-stancies always come along with the “circum-stancies” (Umstände), which are responsible for the constitution of the worldliness of the world. The worldliness of the world is then revealed in the circum-stancies to which the “I also belongs, in which the I is incorporated” (Fink, 2008, 185). The world can be thereby understood more accurately than simply as an ensemble of indefinitely projected potential objects; it is also “the totality of the surround/circum-stance (Umstandsganzheit) for beings”, the whole of circumstantiality. In some notes Fink interprets explicitly this concept of world’s never fully-given totality on the basis of the ancient concept of κόσμος, which for him, at this point, “is nothing other than the circumstantiality that makes up the whole world” (Fink, 2008, 118). This matter has an obvious hermeneutic importance since the “world” is the main concept of the whole Fink’s philosophy and since he, mostly in the years after the Second World War, devoted himself to the elaboration of a so called dialectical cosmology.

The phenomenon of circum-stancies plays a central and highly problematical ontological role because, apparently, they are not beings — neither Vorhandenes nor Zuhandenes, as Fink says (2008, 379) — , i.e., they are not objects at all. Therefore, there is no thematic consciousness intentionally directed towards objects involved in their experience, but rather a horizontal experience that can grasp the horizons, the circum-stancies in which experience and its objects are given. Accordingly, awareness of circum-stancies is in itself an unthematic-consciousness, or more precisely, circum-stancies are grounded in an unthematic form of consciousness. For the “circum-stancies are constituents of experience, determination of what happens in experience” (Fink, 2008, 379), their localization is a “total different than that of objects” (Fink, 2008, 235). And so, by nature, the two most important “circum-stancies” are time and space, which are not objects but world circumstances. In his drafts and plans, Fink examines particularly spatiality as a prime instance of a “surround”, analyzed through the elements of “distance and closeness, silence and sound, night (or darkness) and day (or light), [and] climate (as sun — rain — storm, summer — winter)” (Fink, 2008, 301, 235). Finally, if subjectivity is always a being-in-the-World,
and if the worldliness of the world is shown in the circumstances, these have also an "existential meaning", or an “in-stancial” significance always involved in it. This means that in-stancies and circum-stancies cannot be investigated separately, but only considering their intertwined constitution.

To conclude we may say that Fink's radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology basically aims at an overcoming of the “classical” horizon model of constitution, which in Husserl's phenomenology represents the transcendental basic structure of the world of experience. Fink is concerned above all with the constitution of the horizons of experience themselves, and thus not with a horizontal but rather vertical constitution of the world as a whole. This problem, as we've seen, refers to the necessary and mutual (inter-)relation of the absolute to the world, i.e to the relation between transcendental and worldly in general. This aspect clearly shows the basic structure of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which is played between the “transcendental” and the “mundane”. For Fink, however, this dichotomy is no longer interpreted horizontally but vertically or according to the axis of the meontic enworlding process: the self-ontification or self-emmanation into finitude of the absolute spirit.

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EMMANUEL KANT
PRINCIPES MÉTAPHYSIQUES DE LA SCIENCE DE LA NATURE
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IMMANUEL KANT
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE
Translated with an introduction by A. Pelletier, Paris: Vrin, 2017

In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant develops what the Critique of Pure Reason calls the "rational physiology", which is the metaphysics of corporeal nature. The aim of this text is to specify the object in general as matter and as the “movable in space” and, for this purpose, to take into account the various properties that make possible the material donation of the object, such as rest, speed, direction, impenetrability, attraction, repulsion, etc., the so-called predicables of the pure understanding (§ 10 of the CPR). Those predicables constitute the properties that are indeed necessary to ground the natural science (mathematical physics) and are here examined from a transcendental point of view thanks to the system of the categories and principles of the Analytics of Principles. The structure of the book is thus the following: Phoronomy deals with quantity (Axioms of Intuition), the Dynamics with quality (Anticipations of Perception), the Mechanics with relations (Analogies of Experience) and the Phenomenology with modalities (Postulates of Empirical Thought). What Kant seeks to account for, then, is the applicability of the mathematics that make the intuitive and apodictic certainty possible thanks to the construction of the object in an a priori intuition. The methodological problem concerns the possibility of this a priori construction, which must be here realized in the realm of existence. How to connect the empirical properties of the object to the necessary and universal principles provided by the categories in order to account for the possibility of the mathematical construction of the object? The metaphysics of the corporeal nature is different from the transcendental cognition of the pure...
nature in general because it considers the transcendental schematism from the point of view of space and not of time.

Key words: Kant, natural science, rational physiology, objective reality of the categories, transcendental schematism, transcendental epistemology, space, matter, force.

La nouvelle traduction des Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft de Kant publiée par A. Pelletier chez Vrin est un heureux événement pour les études philosophiques françaises. Aucune édition séparée de cet ouvrage n’avait vu le jour depuis celle de J. Gibelin en 1952 et la dernière traduction en date, de F. De Gandt, n’était accessible qu’en Pléiade (Kant, 1980). Les lecteurs disposent désormais d’un ouvrage de
L'une des questions suscitées par la problématique physiologique est la suivante. Comment le dispositif catégorial de l’Analytique et le schématisme transcendantal peuvent-ils s’approprier le donné dans ce qu’il a de plus empirique ? Peut-on connaître a priori de la matière, définie en tant que mobile dans l’espace ? Comment traiter d’un point de vue authentiquement métaphysique, grâce aux « actes purs de la pensée » (Kant, 2017, 67), le repos, la direction, la vitesse et la relativité du mou-

vement (Phoronomie) ; les forces d’attraction et de répulsion qui assurent le remplissement de l’espace (Dynamique) ; l’inertie, la conservation et la communication du mouvement (Mécanique) ? Ces questions, qui sont au cœur de la physique et de la métaphysique de la nature du XVIIIe siècle, sont abordées par Kant de façon tout à fait singulière puisque, d’une part, il pousse jusqu’au bout l’interprétation critique et transcendantale de la révolution copernicienne et de la physique galiléo-newtonienne en en discutant les concepts et les implications les plus décisifs (principe de relativité, espace absolu, forces originaires, rotation de la Terre, etc.), mais aussi parce que, d’un point de vue interne au critique, il faut trouver les moyens de tenir sur la natura materialiter spectata un discours qui puisse se prévaloir de l’universalité et de la nécessité propres aux jugements synthétiques a priori. Or c’est là un défi inédit puisque rien, dans l’Analytique des principes, ne permet de s’avancer au-delà de la structure de l’objet en général, dans la rencontre avec l’étant matériel. Les Metaphysische Anfangsgründe développent une véritable doctrine transcendantale de la science positive de la nature, dont la méthodologie transforme alors de l’intérieur le geste transcendantal. On peut esquisser les raisons de cette transformation en s’arrêtant sur la Préface de l’ouvrage, pièce maîtresse de la réflexion kantienne sur les rapports entre métaphysique, science de la nature (physique) et mathématique. Quels sont les déplacements majeurs que les Principes métaphysiques opèrent par rapport à la Critique ?

Centrée autour du « mot nature », la préface problématisé à nouveau les rapports entre existence et intuition. L’Analytique des principes repose sur le partage inaugural de ces deux domaines ontologiquement distincts, l’intuition relevant des principes mathématiques constructibles (Axiomes de l’intuition et Anticipations de la perception), l’existence des principes dynamiques non constructibles (Analogies de l’expérience et Postulats de la pensée empirique en général). Or ce partage est immédiatement remis en question par la métaphysique de la nature corporelle car elle se déploie tout entière sur le sol de l’existence, mais selon une méthodologie qui doit être celle de l’intuition puisqu’il ne peut y avoir de « véritable science » (eigentliche Wissenschaft) que dans la mesure où l’on peut construire mathématiquement ses concepts dans l’intuition (Kant, 2017, 61–63). L’intérêt fondamental des Principes métaphysiques réside dans la résolution de cette tension entre méthodologie de l’intuition (construction) et ontologie de l’existence (prédicables). Ce que l’Analytique avait séparé demande à être rapproché et pensé selon une affinité inédite. Et contrairement à ce que soutient notamment M. Friedman dans Kant’s Construction of Nature (Friedman, 2013, 26–28, 570), il n’est pas possible de reconduire strictement la structure de l’Analytique des principes sur celle des Principes métaphysique car la prise en compte des prédicables modifie de fond en comble la déduction de l’expérience et les opérations de subsomp-
tion qui instituent le rapport entre le donné et les catégories. On ne peut pas affirmer que la Phoronomie et la Dynamique seraient exclusivement concernées par la construction de l'essence et seulement justiciables d'une fondation mathématique tandis que la Mécanique et la Phénoménologie relèveraient exclusivement de l'existence et d'une fondation métaphysique. Chacun des chapitres de l'ouvrage doit affronter une double fondation, selon l'intuition et selon l'existence, en vue d'une construction possible, opération qu'il revient au métaphysicien de justifier en raison du fait que les Naturforscher prétendent à une apodicticité dont ils ne cherchent pas eux-mêmes les fondements (Kant, 2017, 67). Le projet kantien n'est donc pas, à la lettre, une construction de la nature, mais une élucidation métaphysique de la possibilité de construire mathématiquement la nature — ce qui n'est pas du tout la même chose.

Or, pour réaliser un tel projet, la méthode du jugement déterminant de la Critique ne suffit pas. Le jugement déterminant doit être réaménagé afin d'inventer les ressources cognitives capables de montrer que et comment il est possible de subsumer les prédicables sous les catégories (affinité de l'existence et de l'intuition). Une telle problématique ne se ramène pas à une simple application des catégories, comme le soutiennent Friedman et Vuillemin avant lui. Elle implique des opérations sui generis de la faculté de juger, semblables aux futures Gedankenexperimente de E. Mach, puisqu'il faut partir du donné afin d'inventer le principe de la construction, ce que ni les formes logiques pures des catégories ni les principes de l'Analytique ne permettent de réaliser (la relativité du mouvement et le principe de sa composition sont par exemple prouvés par une procédure de dédoublement de l'espace qui est un acte original de l'imagination). La méthodologie des Principes métaphysiques est l'œuvre d'une faculté de juger qui anticipe en partie celle de la troisième Critique puisque juger est un art qui ne s'apprend pas et que l'entendement, muni de ses catégories, est incapable de les appliquer au donné. L'opération de construction apparaît comme l'acte d'une faculté de juger déterminante dont les ressources s'apparentent déjà à celles d'une réflexion réfléchissante qui invente un principe de construction en partant du donné empirique.

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I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN

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The review provides an outline of Béatrice Longuenesse’s latest book: I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again (Oxford University Press, 2017), which attempts to offer “a more systematic exploration of Kant’s account of self-consciousness”, with a particular focus on “its relation to contemporary analyses of self-consciousness” (Longuenesse, 2017, xi). Longuenesse’s recent analyses have indeed the major interest of orchestrating a fecund dialogue between Kant’s comprehension of the I and several key interlocutors, from Wittgenstein to Freud and including Sartre, Anscombe, Evans and others. Thus, the first section of the book originates in twentieth-century debates and challenges the claim that bodily self-consciousness is the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness. The second section of I, Me, Mine provides a thorough discussion of Kant’s view on the “I think”, on self-consciousness and personhood, and continues to plead for a genuine form of self-consciousness independent from the consciousness of one’s body. Yet, a more general objective of the book progressively emerges: that of a “naturalization of the notion of person”, by showing that “Kant’s criticism of the paralogism of personhood opens the way to substituting for the rationalist concept a rich and complex concept of a person as a spatiotemporal, living entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for autonomous self-determination” (Longuenesse, 2017, 163). This naturalization of the Kantian concept of subjectivity is set in motion, within the last section of the book, with the unexpected assistance of Freud’s account on the ego and the super-ego.

Key words: Kant, I, self-consciousness, apperception, person, naturalization, Freud.

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РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ БЕАТРИС ЛОНГНЕСС

I, ME, MINE. BACK TO KANT, AND BACK AGAIN


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Рецензия раскрывает главные итоги самой свежей книги Беатрис Лонгенесс «Я, Мне, Мое. Назад к Канту и снова назад» (Издательство Оксфордского университета, 2017), которая пытается предложить «более систематическое рассмотрение кантовского подхода к самосознанию», фокусируясь, в частности, на «его отношении к современному анализу самосознания» (с. xi). Новый анализ, проделанный Лонгенесс, представляет значительный интерес для налаживания диалога между кантовским пониманием Я и некоторыми ключевыми собеседниками, от Витгенштейна до Фрейда, включая Сартра, Анскомба, Эванса и др. Таким образом, первый раздел книги укоренен в дебатах и вызовах XX столетия, утверждая, что телесное самосознание — это предельное основание единства сознания. Второй раздел книги «Я, Мне, Мое» представляет обсуждение кантовских воззрений на «я мыслю», на самосознание и личность, продолжая защищать подлинную форму самосознания, независимую от сознания тела. Впрочем, о себе последовательно заявляет и более общий сюжет книги. А именно речь заходит о «натурализации понятия личности». Это достигается показом того, что «критицизм Канта, направленный на парапалогизм личности открывает путь для подмены рационального понятия содержательным и комплексным понятием личности как пространственно-временной, живой сущности, наделенной единством апперцепции и имеющей способность автономного самоопределения» (с. 163). Натурализация кантовского понятия субъективности берется в рассмотрение в последнем разделе книги с неожиданной опорой на фрейдовскую трактовку Я и Сверх-Я.

Ключевые слова: Кант, Я, самосознание, апперцепция, личность, натурализация, Фрейд.

In I, Me, Mine. Back to Kant, and Back Again, Béatrice Longuenesse attempts — and brilliantly succeeds — to offer “a more systematic exploration of Kant’s account of self-consciousness”, with a particular focus on “its relation to contemporary analyses of self-consciousness” (Longuenesse, 2017, xi). The major originality of the book comes indeed from the fact of weaving, around Kant, an entire network of contemporary references and interlocutors, from Wittgenstein to Freud and including Sartre, Anscombe, Evans and others. This complex architecture does not affect, though, the clarity and the incisiveness of the problematic core, which consists in conjointly interrogating the uses of “I” and the modalities of self-consciousness.

The first section of the book originates in twentieth-century debates. Thus, the aim of chapter 2 is to confront Kant and Wittgenstein and to show that “Kant’s dis-
tinction [...] between two kinds of consciousness” (empirical and pure) and “Wittgenstein’s distinction [...] between two ways in which we use the word ‘I’” (“I” as object and “I” as subject) “do not exactly map” (Longuenesse, 2017, 2, 19). The crucial question that emerges from this discussion is that of knowing if “the properties and states whose self-ascription is IEM [immune to error through misidentification] are not limited to mental states but include bodily states” (Longuenesse, 2017, 26). Is the bodily self-consciousness the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness? The clinical case of Christina, the “disembodied lady” described by Oliver Sacks (Longuenesse, 2017, 32 ff.), gives the author the opportunity to challenge this claim and to formulate an audacious thesis: “all uses of ‘I’ as subject ultimately depend on the kind of information that grounds Kant’s ‘consciousness of oneself as subject’” — namely, a “particular brand of consciousness [which] is not consciousness of oneself as an embodied entity” (Longuenesse, 2017, 37; see also 161, 231).

In chapter 3, “Sartre meets Wittgenstein”, and this encounter is occasioned by a common shortcoming: “paying insufficient attention to the kind of self-consciousness Kant called ‘consciousness of oneself as subject’ expressed in the proposition ‘I think’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 45). While the author shows that “Sartre’s ‘pre-reflective cogito’ is close to the Kantian ‘I think’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 48), she also unveils an ambiguity in the author of Being and Nothingness, for whom the non-thetic consciousness of oneself is not clearly enough emancipated from the non-thetic consciousness of the body. By doing so, the aim is to highlight the existence of a specific kind of non-thetic self-consciousness “present throughout the ‘unified theme’ of a mental activity” (Longuenesse, 2017, 58). It is this form of self-consciousness, consciousness of “the unity […] of one’s mental activity” (Longuenesse, 2017, 64), that will be analysed with Kant in Part II.

The first chapter (chapter 4) of this second part of the book deals directly with Kant’s account on “I think”. The finesse and precision of these analyses deserve to be noted: they luminously revisit Kant’s criticism of the Cartesian cogito (in order to stress, for instance, that “Kant is clearly mistaken by attributing to Descartes the claim that ‘I exist’ is derived from ‘I think’ via a syllogistic inference” (Longuenesse, 2017, 84), and they deploy a most salutary clarification effort, by distinguishing “three ways in which, for Kant, I am conscious of my own thinking”, namely, the pure intellectual consciousness, the mere “indeterminate perception” and the determinate perception, or experience (Longuenesse, 2017, 86). A decisive point here is that of knowing to what extent “the empirical minimal component grounding the proposition ‘I think’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 90) comes from external experience, as the 1787 Refutation of idealism would suggest it. Against the interpretations that give an exorbitant credit to
the reasoning of this Refutation, the author will argue that the (indeterminate) perception that I think does not rely on external experience: only the determinate (temporal) consciousness does (Longuenesse, 2017, 90 ff.). This crucial claim contributes to consolidate the view of a genuine form of self-consciousness independent from the consciousness of one’s body.

But this does not suffice to answer the question “what am I, I who have the possibility to use ‘I’ in ‘I think?’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 102), handled in chapter 5 (“Kant on ‘I’ and the Soul). Again, the author will proceed to important terminological clarifications, by examining the uses and meanings of the transcendental (or synthetic) unity of apperception, of the judgment “I think” (which expresses this unity), of the “I”, as thinking, as a subject and as a self, in respect to the metaphysical concept of the soul. The two first Paralogisms of Pure Reason (that of Substantiality and that of Simplicity), in their 1781 and 1787 elaborations, are then analysed with a special insistence on the fact that the subjective necessity (incarnated in the “first-person standpoint”) (Longuenesse, 2017, 131) of thinking myself as a substantial or as a simple entity does not allow the drawing of any ontological conclusion about the way I exist and about what I am: the consistence or the simplicity of the subject of thinking is only logical.

The third Paralogism (that of Personality) receives a separate treatment in chapter 6 (“Kant on the Identity of Persons”), where a more general objective of the book progressively emerges: that of a “naturalization of the notion of person” (Longuenesse, 2017, 166), by showing that “Kant’s criticism of the paralogism of personhood opens the way to substituting for the rationalist concept a rich and complex concept of a person as a spatiotemporal, living entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for autonomous self-determination” (Longuenesse, 2017, 163). To do so, the author will first denounce the fact that “Kant was prey to a paralogism of practical reason”, insofar as he considered that “the notion of person defended by the rationalist can nevertheless remain, as ‘necessary and sufficient for practical use’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 157, 152). She will then insist on the necessity to reshape the rationalist concept of person by inscribing it into the empirical world.

The “naturalization of the notion of person” announced in the last chapter of Part II will be pursued in Part III with the unexpected assistance of Freud’s account on ego and super-ego. Announced since the Preface, this peculiar alliance of Kantian critical philosophy and Freudian metapsychology will be developed at two levels, by displaying the “structural similarities” (Longuenesse, 2017, 173) that exist, firstly (chapter 7), between Kant’s “I” in “I think” and Freud’s “Ego”, and secondly (chapter 8), between Kant’s “I” in the Moral “I Ought To” and Freud’s “Super-Ego”. This confrontation requires several methodological precautions: the author insists on the
fact that her aim is to provide “an investigation of conceptual similarities, not an account of historical influence” (Longuenesse, 2017, 176) and, to persuade the reader of the interest of such an inquiry, she also stresses that “the link between the transcendental and the empirical investigation is readily apparent in Kant’s works in both directions: from transcendental to empirical and from empirical to transcendental” (Longuenesse, 2017, 175). In respect to the last point, a most fruitful resource is found in Kant’s *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) and in his *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786). But beyond method clarifications, the Freudian framework proves itself fruitful also by entailing a useful clarification of “the scope of Kant’s notion of consciousness” (Longuenesse, 2017, 184): here, once again, the author mobilizes her very sharp sense of distinctions, in order to show in what sense(s), for Kant, representations are “conscious” or are “my” representations (Longuenesse, 2017, 180 ff.). This will also lead to enlightening comments about, on the one hand, the status of imagination and the reasons for which we are, according to Kant, “seldom even conscious” of it (Longuenesse, 2017, 182 ff.) and, on the other hand, the “two importantly different senses in which, for Kant, we are blind to the nature of our motivation” (Longuenesse, 2017, 213).

But the last important challenge of the book is to rigorously articulate Freud’s concept of the super-ego to the Kantian categorical imperative (while Freud himself has stressed their connection on several occasions: see (Longuenesse, 2017, 219 ff.)). Thus, the author underlines the following: “For Kant, morality is the manifestation of the highest in us: our rational self. For Freud, morality is the manifestation of the highest in us: our “social sense” and our capacity to live by norms we endorse. But it is also the “direct heir” of the most helpless in us: the system of emotional dependences that shape us” (Longuenesse, 2017, 222). And given that, for the founder of psychoanalysis, “the origin of morality […] locates its roots in our living, sensing, emotion-driven bodies”, the author concludes that “we do find in Freud a general outline for a naturalization of Kant’s critical account of the ‘I’” (Longuenesse, 2017, 224, 227): a naturalization which takes into account the fact that “our capacity for setting norms of cognition and our capacity for setting norms of practical agency both have a developmental history” and which, consequently, is to be regarded in terms of what McDowell has called a “naturalism of second nature” — insofar as “the content of the norms is brought about not only by our relation to nature and our existence as biological entities, but also by the internalization of the parental figures and the learning of language” (Longuenesse, 2017, 227, 194).

The project of such a naturalization of Kantian philosophy is undoubtedly audacious and inspiring, especially as it draws its arguments from the very heart of tran-
scendental philosophy, namely, from the concept of the I. But even those for whom the price that this enterprise demands — leaving completely behind the transcendental path —, is too high to be fully justified, will certainly find profit in reading Béatrice Longuenesse's book.

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CHAD ENGELLAND
HEIDEGGER’S SHADOW. KANT, HUSSERL, AND
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This review presents historical and philosophical hypotheses of Chad Engelland’s book by first considering the general thesis of a Heidegger transcendental philosopher, then emphasizing the importance of this theme for the treatise *Sein und Zeit* (1927), finally considering promises and *aporia* of such an interpretation for the second Heidegger. Heidegger first endorsed the program of a certain transcendental philosophy, to reject it in a second part of his work. Each time, the problem is to know what type of transcendental philosophy it is, which implies asking the question of Heidegger’s relation to both transcendental philosophy of Kant and transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Does the thought of utensility or authenticity in *Being and Time* refer to a transcendental questioning? And is it a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental? But also, can the thought of *Ereignis* and of the last God be so, as C. Engelland thinks? The reviewer insists on the importance of understanding the role of intuition in phenomenology’s relationship to Kant, but also on the link made by Heidegger between Kant’s first and second *Critiques*, that is, between the theory and practice. Finally, it shows from the book the role of affectivity, not without indicating possible extensions including the analysis of neokantism, or Hölderlin.

*Key words:* Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, transcendental phenomenology.

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РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ ЧЕД ЭНДЖЕЛЛЕНД
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Рецензия представляет исторические и философские гипотезы, содержащиеся в книге Чеда Энджелленда, прежде всего, за счет рассмотрения главного тезиса о Хайдеггере как трансцендентальном философе, подчеркивая, далее, значимость этой темы для трактата «Бытие и время» (1927), наконец, рассматривая перспективы и апории такой интерпретации для позднего Хайдеггера. Хайдеггер, действительно, придерживается программы своего рода трансцендентальной философии, отказываясь от нее на втором этапе своего интеллектуального пути. Каждый раз проблема заключается в том, чтобы понимать, о каком типе трансцендентальной философии идет речь. А это предполагает постановку вопроса об отношении Хайдеггера к обеим версиям трансцендентальной философии — к философии Канта и к философии Гуссерля. Связано ли мышление об утвари или о собственности с трансцендентальной постановкой вопроса? И является оно трансцендентальным в смысле Канта или в смысле Гуссерля? Но вопрос может быть сформулирован иначе. Может ли мышление об Ereignis или о последнем Боге быть таковым, как полагает Энджелленд? Рецензент настаивает на понимании важности роли созерцания в отношении феноменологии к Канту, но также на связи между первой и второй «Критиками», а значит, — между теорией и практикой, акцентированной Хайдеггером. Наконец, на основании рецензируемой книги, здесь показана роль аффективности, не без указания возможных расширений проблематики, включая анализ неокантианства и Гельдерлина.

Ключевые слова: Хайдеггер, Гуссерль, Кант, феноменология, трансцендентальная философия, трансцендентальная феноменология.

Chad Engelland's book on Heidegger's transcendentalism reinforces an entire section of phenomenological research (especially American) that attempts to place Heidegger’s thought in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (William Blattner, Steven Crowell, Jeff Malpas, Tom Rockmore…). The originality of this book is to widen the scope of the investigation to the second part of Heidegger's work, with the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Engelland, 2017, 5). The introduction summarizes the problem and the issue of the book. The author wants to interpret Heidegger using the right tools. If Aristotle or the pre-Socratics are the privileged interlocutors of the philosopher, they do not make it possible to grasp the main orientation of his philosophical project, unlike Kant and Husserl (Engelland, 2017, 7). Though Heidegger himself warned against a transcendental interpretation of his work (Heidegger, 1997, 94) or
the limits of Kantian and Husserlian projects (Heidegger, 1989, 451–477), that is not to say that his philosophy is not related to the current of transcendental philosophy.

With regard to the issues at hand that are no longer just historical but also philosophical, the author gives a particularly important place to phenomenological reduction, insisting on the problem of its motivation, which in Ideen I comes from the freedom of the subject who practices it (Husserl, 1976, 62), then in the posterior work (for example in the Krisis) from a historical telos that leads to what is the foundation of empiricism. According to the author, Kant himself has made this connection between transcendental project and history in the Geschichte der reinen Vernunft of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is this tradition that would make it possible to understand the historical conception of the transcendental in Heidegger, particularly from the 1930s (Engelland, 2017, 17). For the author, “Heidegger’s ‘history’ is really his attempt to give affectivity to the philosophical life. As Kant traces every thought to intuition, so Heidegger returns the transcendental turn to the givenness of fundamental dispositions” (Engelland, 2017, 19). In fact, affectivity plays a transcendental role (Engelland, 2017, 20). We must then speak of an “affective transcendentalism”, even if Heidegger himself considered the transcendentalist path an “illusion” (Engelland, 2017, 20). There lies the difficulty of the author’s work: identifying the unthought of Heidegger’s thought in his report to Kant and Husserl.

The author, in the first part, proposes a transcendental interpretation of Sein und Zeit (1927). His general idea is delineated right from the outset. There are two transcendental questions in SZ: “A preparatory one on the timely openness of Da-sein, and a fundamental one on the temporal reciprocity of that openness and being” (Engelland, 2017, 30). For the author, the first question is necessary in order to reach the second, but is at the same time inadequate for thinking being. In sum, the transcendental questioning aims to exceed the transcendental. The meaning of the questioning of SZ is then transcendental: „nur wenn Seinsverständnis ist, wird Seiendes als Seiendes zugänglich“ (Heidegger, 2006, 212). Dasein must first be thrown into the world in a certain way so that there may be tools around it. But understanding (whether it is the understanding of tools by Dasein or Dasein’s understanding of being) is, in turn, based more originally on ekstatic temporality (Engelland, 2017, 36).

The author also wants to show the not only ontological, but also methodological dimension (Engelland, 2017, 45) of the transcendental in Heidegger. If the question of motivation concerning the Husserlian reduction is central, that of the motivation of Heidegger’s questioning also arises. Discussing first the early concept of “formal indication”, the author comes to show the importance of the distinction between “authenticity” and “inauthenticity” when the place of the transcendental is to be considered.
The author also quickly mentions at the end of his reading of SZ (Engelland, 2017, 56) the importance of affectivity, but it is regrettable that these tracks (the role of authenticity and affectivity) are not furtherly deepened.

The second part of the book is about Heidegger’s 1929 Kantbuch. The return to Kant, for John van Buren or Theodore Kiesel, had the effect of scientifying the second part of SZ with the original temporality, damage that was repaired by the second Heidegger through importance given to affectivity. The author’s intent is to understand the philosophical coherence of Heidegger’s return to Kant through the idea that Kant is the forerunner of a phenomenological thought of intuitive donation (Engelland, 2017, 69). Having listed in a very useful way the different stages of Heidegger’s readings of Kant by quickly showing their relation to Husserlian phenomenology (Engelland, 2017, 70–83), the author recalls the importance of Leibniz’s interpretation so as to understand Kantbuch, then tries to show more precisely its phenomenological content (despite some unfortunate formulations, such as “… though the 1927–20 reading of Kant according to Being and Time’s horizon of questioning was undoubtedly a distraction” (Engelland, 2017, 84). The author puts forward the primacy of intuition. It is true that Heidegger takes Kantian intuition very seriously as it is also the mark of human finitude as receptivity. As the author writes, “thinking is subordinate to intuiting in the same way as logos is subordinate to phenomenon in SZ” (Engelland, 2017, 92). The intuition thus privileged, it is the immediacy of what is given which occupies the first position, before the conceptual thought (Heidegger, 1991, 20–30). However, it is not easy to reconcile this undeniable primacy of intuition in Heidegger’s interpretation with the equally undeniable primacy of imagination, that is, of the transcendental meeting place between sensibility and understanding, still according to Heidegger. The author’s answer (Heidegger, 1991, 97) — “understanding is relative to imagination, which is relative to intuition” — is not immediately convincing, since imagination is presented in Kantbuch as the root of sensibility and understanding and at the same time as the original place of the constitution of the relation to objects. But to the extent that Heidegger thinks imagination as being based on temporality (Heidegger, 1991, 191), as well as an experience of the possibility of objectless objectivity (which manifests the finitude of the human mind — see (Heidegger, 1991, 108), barely commented and yet crucial), the intuitionist path remains undoubtedly the most consistent for Heidegger. However, there is indeed a fundamental ambiguity of Heidegger’s commentary that the author does not emphasize: on the one hand, the Aesthetics enjoys a certain primacy in his commentary, since according to Heidegger pure space and time intuit something without the support of the understanding; on the other hand, the Analytic prevails to the extent that it exposes the role of imagination,
more original than pure space and time. This ambiguity of Heidegger’s commentary is difficult to grasp and perhaps insoluble, if not by taking into account the second *Critique*, which Heidegger does himself when interpreting the concept of “respect” (absent from the author’s analyses).

In the third part of his book, the author approaches the “Kehre” in the work of Heidegger starting from the lecture *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (1935–1936). The problem is the following: “Heidegger’s own transcendental project becomes a more dynamic vocabulary centered on the changing affectivity of historical dispositions” (Engelland, 2017, 123). In the mid 30s, Heidegger becomes a critic of Kant while making his work an essential moment in the history of metaphysics. Therefore, the *Kantbuch* is “revised”, insofar as he has conceded too much to Kant from the phenomenological point of view. From then on, starting in 1935–1936, Kant becomes the thinker of scientific objectivity. (It is interesting to note that Heidegger has evolved in the same way with regard to Aristotle.) Besides, Kant must now be inscribed in a scientific horizon (that of mathematized modern science): according to Heidegger, every form of science rests on presuppositions, and it is all the merit of the *Critique* to try to assign the foundation (intuitive and therefore pre-phenomenological) and the limits (those of understanding) to the scientific exercise. It would have been interesting here to show how Heidegger, in some way, appears to agree with the interpretation of Hermann Cohen, who also put modern science at the heart of the Kantian project. And just like Cohen, Heidegger puts the analytic of principles at the heart of the critical edifice (Heidegger, 1984, 186); and it would have been just as important to mention Heidegger’s conception of the history of science, his way of making divisions and identifying discontinuities. Yet Heidegger distinguishes himself from Neokantism when he emphasizes the importance of intuition given for synthesis, a datum that would be above all constituted subjectivity and objectivity, since it would constitute them. But this given belongs to the domain of „Zwischen“ of the „Offene“ that lets things happen, even before they are objects. However, Kant remains historically attached to rational subjectivity and scientific objectivity, and has not fundamentally parted with these conceptions (Engelland, 2017, 149). The author concludes that transcendental philosophy is for Heidegger a means to reach the thought of the other beginning, and not the end of thought”.

This is the full meaning of his reading *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1936–1938), which is the main contribution of the book since it tries to pursue a transcendental interpretation for the second Heidegger. It is the problem of the motivation of the reduction, historicized in the *Beiträge*, that moves his analysis: this motivation is affective, through the *Grundstimmungen*, which are the condition of every donation. It is “the affectivity of thought” (Engelland, 2017, 182), which cannot be thought outside
the process of history. Here again, we would have liked to ask the question of Heidegger’s cutting-up, historical methodology, which distinguishes various beginnings without really knowing on what criterion. However, these pages are in our view the most interesting within the book, because they propose reading the *Beiträge* analyses in the light of the reduction problem, in a historical perspective.

The interest of Chad Engelland’s work is therefore to sharply introduce to the transcendental interpretation of the second Heidegger, with all the difficulties and impasses that it can involve. To conclude, we would like to make some suggestions. First of all, we are surprised at the lack of consideration on the status of phenomenological reduction in *SZ*, while in France Didier Franck then Jean-François Courtine have quite long ago orientated the reading of the 1927 *opus* in this direction. It is also surprising that there should be no considerations on the status of *epoke* in Heidegger’s later texts, such as *Zeit und Sein* (1962). More broadly, this book is about Heidegger, and not about Kant or Husserl; however, the author could have compared Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant with that of the Neokantians (as cited in Engelland, 2017, 32, 68), like Hermann Cohen, without whom the *Kantbuch* is literally incomprehensible. The analysis would have also gained taking into account Hölderlin whose *Verfahrungsweise* of 1800, interpreted by Heidegger in 1934–1935, prepares the affective metamorphosis of the transcendental (Hölderlin speaking of a „*transzendentale Empfindung*“). Also, the choice of interpreting the transcendental as a misleading and necessary passage, already in *SZ*, is guided by the last period of Heidegger’s work. Is this not a daring use of anachronism? These critical remarks are motivated only by the interest that Chad Engelland’s work arouses with its sharp sense of questioning.

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL
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What can phenomenological reflection contribute to the ongoing discussion of transcendental thought? What kind of transcendental philosophy is phenomenology? Why does Husserl’s unfinished project merit the name transcendental? Can the notion of transcendental phenomenology be defended today, and is Husserl right in insisting upon its uniqueness and indeclinability? To what extent is the very idea of transcendental phenomenology deeply committed to metaphysical prejudices that we have to renounce the transcendental project in favour of other projects? To what extent is speculative realism in a position to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework? This impressive collection of essays is a lucid, insightful and important attempt to answer these questions. Not only does it give new insight into the transcendental character of phenomenology, but it also outlines the dynamic development of phenomenology as a continuing and expanding domain of research. The editors claim that this volume “is motivated by the insight that the novel interdisciplinary situation in which phenomenology conducts fruitful exchanges with several empirical sciences demands that we reconsider thoroughly the fundamental methodological questions concerning the transcendental character of phenomenological inquiries. Phenomenology and the Transcendental brings together original articles that together clarify the transcendental aspects of phenomenology and outline new transcendental versions of phenomenology in distinction from the naturalistic, vitalist, and poststructuralist approaches that dominate philosophy at the moment” (p. 3). In this review, I provide a brief overview of the contributions to this volume to show how the transcendental standpoint is indispensable for genuine phenomenology and philosophical reasoning in general.

Key words: Transcendental, phenomenology, subjectivity, world, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger.
РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ:
САРА ХЕЙНАМАА, МИРЬЯ ХАРТИМО, ТИМО МИЕТТИЕН (РЕД.)
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Какой вклад феноменологическая рефлексия может внести в текущую дискуссию о трансцендентальной мысли? Какого рода трансцендентальную философию представляет собой феноменология? Почему незавершённый проект Гуссерля заслуживает наименование «трансцендентальный»? Можно ли сегодня отстоять понятие трансцендентальной феноменологии, и прав ли Гуссерль в том, что настаивает на наименование «трансцендентальный»? В какой мере и насколько глубоко сама идея трансцендентальной феноменологии нагружена метафизическими предпосылками; ведёт ли это к тому, что мы должны отказаться от трансцендентального проекта в пользу других форм рефлексии? В какой мере спекулятивный реализм способен преодолеть кантовскую философскую концептуальную рамку? Этот впечатляющий сборник статей представляет собой ясную, содержательную и значимую попытку ответа на эти вопросы. В сборнике не только представлены новые идеи, затрагивающие трансцендентальный характер феноменологии, но также намечается динамическое развитие феноменологии как непрерывно расширяющейся области исследования. Редакторы сборника исходят из того, что «новая междисциплинарная ситуация, в которой феноменология продуктивно взаимодействует с рядом эмпирических наук, требует исчерпывающего пересмотра фундаментальных методологических вопросов, касающихся трансцендентального характера феноменологических исследований. Феноменология и трансцендентальное объединяет ряд оригинальных статей, которые вместе проясняют трансцендентальные аспекты феноменологии и намечают новые варианты трансцендентальной феноменологии, в отличие от натураллистических, виталистических и постструктуралистских подходов, господствующих на данный момент в философии» (с. 3). В данной рецензии я предложу краткий обзор статей этого сборника, с целью показать насколько трансцендентальная позиция неотъемлемо присуща подлинной феноменологии и вообще философскому рассуждению.

Key words: Трансцендентальное, феноменология, субъективность, мир, Кант, Гуссерль, Хайдеггер.

In recent years, several books dedicated to various possible approaches to the horizon of phenomenological transcendental philosophy have been published1. We have witnessed also a resurgence of scholarly interest in post-Kantian idealism and in

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1 See, for example, Dan Zahavi (2017); Chad Engelland (2017); Jairo José da Silva (2017); Phillip Honenberger (2016); Sebastian Gardner, Matthew Grist (2015); Andrea Staiti (2014); Sebastian Luft (2011).
transcendental modes of philosophical inquiry\textsuperscript{2}. In contrast to many other books of this kind, \textit{Phenomenology and the Transcendental} doesn't strike the reader as an eclectic collection of relatively independent contributions. On the contrary, this groundbreaking volume provides new and important insights into the “indispensability of the transcendental standpoint for phenomenology and philosophical reasoning in general” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 2). It is a virtue of this collection that it draws attention to the connection between transcendental character of phenomenological inquiries and new other transcendental topics, including the temporal development of personhood, mortality and generativity, animality, and materiality (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 4).

\textit{Phenomenology and the Transcendental} is an anthology of first-rate essays from key figures and several younger researchers in the field of phenomenological philosophy, each addressing “the concept of transcendental primarily in terms of a movement or a motive that does not simply leave behind the empirical reality but asks for its conditions of possibility in the experiencing subject, its correlates, and its manifold intentional layers” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 11). The fourteen chapters are separated topically in four parts: Part I — \textit{Transcendental Phenomenology}, Part II — \textit{Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity}, Part III — \textit{Mind and the World}, Part IV — \textit{Beyond Correlation}. A helpful introduction by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo, and Timo Miettinen provides a succinct overview of the individual pieces. As they make clear in the Introduction — \textit{Methodological, Historical, and Conceptual Starting Points}, the present volume “brings together original articles that together clarify the transcendental aspects of phenomenology and outline new transcendental versions of phenomenology in distinction from the naturalistic, vitalist, and poststructuralist approaches that dominate philosophy at the moment” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 3).

The first part, \textit{Transcendental Phenomenology}, comprises only three essays ("Transcendental Life" by Steven Crowell, "Categories of Experience and the Transcendental" by László Tengelyi, and "The Transcendental Nature of Experience" by Bernhard Obsieger) and includes principled interpretations of the nature of transcendental phenomenology, its main variations, and its relation to the tradition of transcendental philosophy. Steven Crowell examines first Husserl's and Heidegger's investigations on the nature of transcendental phenomenology, arguing that genuine transcendental philosophy proves to be indispensable for the analysis of life “as the unhintergehbar horizon of all inquiry” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 36). Crowell argues that “the intented move beyond transcendental phenomenology is il-

\textsuperscript{2} See especially Halla Kim, Steven Hoeltzel (2016).
lusory: either it is no longer phenomenological, or else it fails to account for crucial features of the ‘life’ that is ours’ (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 36). László Tengelyi compares Kant’s and Husserl’s notions of transcendental in order to show that “transcendental arguments can be integrated into a phenomenological investigations on the categories of experience, provided that they are founded on ‘subjectively necessary transcendental presuppositions’ of reflective judgements” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 59). Bernhard Obsieger closes this part by exploring how “our experience is not understood as a process that occurs within the world but as a process in which the world itself presents to us, and the subject is not understood as existing within the world but as the subjective correlate of the world as it appears from the experiential first-person point of view” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 61).

The second part, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, consists of four essays (“Transcendental Subjectivity and the Human Being” by Hanne Jacobs, “Husserl on the Factual and Historical Grounds of the Transcendental Subject” by Simo Pulkkinen, “The Animal and the Infant: From Embodiment and Empathy to Generativity” by Sara Heinämaa, and “Transcendental Social Ontology” by Timo Miettinen) and clarifies the structures of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity and the Husserlian concepts of activity and passivity. The essays in this section demonstrate that transcendental phenomenology is not mere epistemology but also examines dependencies that are relevant to social philosophy, political philosophy and ethics.

Hanne Jacobs explores Husserl’s paradox of human subjectivity understood as “being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world” (Husserl, 1988, 178–181). Drawing on Husserl’s account of the distinction between the human being in the lifeworld and the human being as approached by natural science, Jacobs argues “for the need for a more developed personalistic account of the embodied person” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 88). Simo Pulkkinen argues that “for Husserl, transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive functioning are from the ground up determined by a radical historicity and facticity” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 107). By focusing especially on Husserl’s analyses of the passive substratum of conscious life and on the dynamic, reciprocal interplay of preconstitution and pregivenness with the higher-level of conscious activities, Pulkkinen suggests that “transcendental subjectivity is determined by dynamic historicity starting from its most primordial and fundamental levels” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 107). Sara Heinämaa tries to analyse how human-animal contrast functions in Husserl’s account of the constitution of the sense of the true world, that is the cultural-historical world. The overall purpose of this chapter is to clarify the nature-culture divide in Husserl’s phenomenology of generative communities. Timo Miettinen dis-
cusses the possibility of reinstituting “the relevance of transcendental philosophy for social ontology” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 147). According to Miettinen, Husserl's philosophy of intersubjectivity based on the idea of a “transcendental we” (transzendentale Wir) provides us with rich dynamic of communal existence, one that is able to afford communities as certain transcendental status.

The third part, Mind and the World, comprises four essays (“The Emergence and Transformation of Husserl's Concept of World” by David Carr, “Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders: An Outline for Transcendental Philosophy as Object-Guided Philosophy” by Sophie Loidolt, “The Bodily Feeling of Existence in Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis” by Joona Taipale, and “William James on Consciousness and the Brain: From Psycho-Physical Dualism to Transcendental Philosophy” by Richard Cobb-Stevens) and explores the concepts of the world and the body and the role of the object in transcendental phenomenology.

David Carr traces the emergence and the subsequent transformations of Husserl's conception of the world. Carr's profound revisitation of these transformations allow us to “better understand Husserl's phenomenological method and the kinds of transcendental inquiries that it makes possible” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 176). Sophie Loidolt compares Kant's account of simple (schlicht) and basic objectivity linked to subjective conditions of experience with Husserl's exploration of transcendental structures with the aim of “capturing the main Kantian ideas for an object-guided transcendental philosophy” (Transzendentalphilosophie vom Gegenstand her). By “object-guided”, Loidolt means “a constant orientation along the character of givenness of objectivity and the objective world that is simple and straightforward, even if the analysis of its constitution brings to light a complex structure” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 193). Joona Taipale juxtaposes what Freud, together with his successors, calls the body-ego (Körper-Ich) with the Husserlian lived-body in order to illustrate “how psychoanalysis, a particular nontranscendental discipline, may challenge and complement phenomenology” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 219). Richard Cobb-Stevens closes the third part and outlines some important similarities and differences between Husserlian phenomenology and William James's account of the complementary contributions of mind and body to our cognitive and affective modes of consciousness.

The fourth and final part, Beyond Correlation, comprises three essays (“What is a Transcendental Description?” by Fredrik Westerlund, “Transcendental Idealism and Strong Correlationism: Meillassoux and the End of Heideggerian Finitude” by Jussi Backman, and „Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst‘: Making Sense of the Twists and Turns in Heidegger’s Thought“ by Niall Keane), and discusses recent criticism.
that motivate the move beyond transcendental phenomenology and demonstrates this move cannot mean a step back to pretranscendental inquiries but must rather proceed forward. Rather than naturalizing phenomenology or inserting phenomenological inquiries into some positive ontology, this last part of the volume argues that transcendental philosophy can and must be developed by a radicalization of its questions.

The goal of Fredrik Westerlund’s chapter is to revisit the sense of transcendental descriptions by discussing two doubts against this kind of procedure: essentialism and subjectivism. Westerlund shows how “transcendental descriptions cannot and need not involve any notion of transcendental subjectivity as their basic field of description or any ambition to establish the essential transcendental structures necessarily constituting different kinds of experince” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 272). Jussi Backman reconstructs Meillassoux’s critique of the main correlationist positions available since Kant’s “Copernican revolution”. As Backman clarifies, Meillassoux’s reading of Heidegger as a strong correlationist is of key importance to his own project of “speculative materialism”. Backman concludes with some remarks on the speculative “end of finitude” as a “way out of the final outcome of the heritage of transcendental idealism, or from contemporary ‘postmodern’ impasse in which the deabsolutization of thinking culminates in its deuniversalization” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 288). Niall Keane make sense of the “twists and turns in Heidegger’s Denkbewegung as responses to the twists and turns in being itself” (Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014, 311). Keane argues that the “turn” (Kehre) unfolds as a topical motive in Heidegger’s philosophy, and this motive explains the transition from the existential analytic of Dasein toward the history of being.

As a final aside, it is worth noting that every part of this collection is stimulating and rich in useful insights about the transcendental heritage in phenomenology. This edited collection will be of interest to philosophers working on the post-Kantian transcendental tradition, traditional forms of transcendental philosophy, and post-transcendental phenomenology.

REFERENCES


Журнал “HORIZON. Феноменологические исследования” издается при Институте философии Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета и при участии Центрального европейского института философии при Карловом Университете и Институте философии Чешской академии наук в формате научного рецензируемого периодического издания с 2012 года. Журнал выходит два раза в год, все материалы проходят процедуру двойного 'слепого' рецензирования и экспертного отбора. Издание рассчитано как на специалистов в области феноменологии и философской герменевтики, так и на широкий круг читателей, имеющих интерес к актуальной философской ситуации.

Цель журнала является формирование и поддержание общего коммуникативного пространства для исследователей, работающих сегодня в области феноменологии и близких к ней философских направлений.

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The journal is intended both for specialists in phenomenology and hermeneutics and for all those interested in the current situation in philosophy.

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- the manuscript proper

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